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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON 
ABSTRACT 
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES 
Doctor of Philosophy 
THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT IN EXILE AND THE JEWS DURING 
WORLD WAR 2 (1938 1948) 
by Jan Láníček 
 
The thesis analyses Czechoslovak Jewish relations in the twentieth century using the 
case study of the Czechoslovak Government in Exile in London and its activities 
during the Second World War. In order to present the research in a wider perspective, 
it covers the period between the Munich Agreement, when the first politicians left 
Czechoslovakia,  and  the  Communist  Coup  in  February  1948.  Hence  the  thesis 
evaluates the political activities and plans of the Czechoslovak exiles, as well as the 
implementation of the plans in liberated Czechoslovakia after 1945. 
  In comparison with previous contributions to the theme, this thesis is based 
on extensive archival research. It examines how the Czechoslovak treatment of the 
Jews was shaped by resurgent Czech and Slovak nationalism/s caused by the war and 
the experience of the occupation by the German army. Simultaneously, the thesis 
enquires into the role played in the Czechoslovak exiles’ decision making by their 
efforts to maintain the image of a democratic country in the heart of Europe. An 
adherence  to  western  liberal  democracies  was  a  key  political  asset  used  by 
Czechoslovakia since her creation in 1918. Fair treatment of minorities, in particular 
the Jews, became part of this ‘myth’. However, the Second World War brought to the 
fore Czechoslovak efforts to nationally homogenize the post war Republic and rid it 
of its ‘disloyal’ minorities. Consequently, the thesis evaluates how the Jews as a 
minority were perceived and constructed.  
The  thesis  is  divided  into  five  chapters,  following  the  developments  in 
chronological, as well as thematic order. The first chapter analyses the influence of 
people in occupied Czechoslovakia on the exiles’ policy towards the Jews. Chapter 
two and three document the exiles’ policy towards the Jews during the war, including 
the government’s responses to the Holocaust. Chapter four enquires into the war 
time origins of the post war Czechoslovak policy towards the Jews. Finally, the last 
chapter analyses the influence of public opinion abroad on the Czechoslovak policy 
towards the Jews during and after the war.  
    
Contemporary  historiography  acknowledges  the  peculiar  situation  of  Jewish 
survivors in post war Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, this thesis argues that the post 
war developments had their origins during the war and cannot be attributed purely to 
the malignant influence of Nazi anti Semitism. Consequently, the thesis documents 
the  main  influences  that  shaped  the  exiles’  attitude  towards  the  Jews  and 
contextualizes them with other priorities on their agenda.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  The  reparation  which  Christendom 
owes to Jewry is infinite. It is debt which can 
never  be  paid,  but  which  can  only  be 
acknowledged. 
 
 Rev. James Parkes (1962) 
 
 
According  to  classic  historiography,  bystanders  constitute  one  of  the  three  main 
categories, besides  the  perpetrators  and  victims,  of  Holocaust  research.  Since  the 
mid 1960s, many historians have tried to focus on one sub category of the bystanders, 
on the outside world’s responses to the Jewish plight. Comprehensive studies have 
emerged on the American, British and recently on Soviet policies.
1 However, when 
we survey the historiography on the subject, we can see that not many historians 
have  ever  tried  to  focus  on,  let  alone  comprehend,  the  position  of  the  exile 
governments. Hence this introduction will evaluate the reasons why a special study 
on an exile government’s Jewish policy is desirable and in fact necessary. It aims to 
highlight that the minor Allies did not play a marginal role in the world’s response to 
the Holocaust. An exploration of the exiles’ treatment of Jewish issues can also help 
to re evaluate the response of the Allies as a whole. Subsequently, the core of the 
preface is focused on the introduction to the case study of one of the exiles, the 
Czechoslovak  government in exile.  The  introduction  opens  and  explains  the 
complexity of the situation the exiles faced when dealing with the so called ‘Jewish 
question’. The investigation is done with the help of a new methodological approach 
to the topic with the emphasis on comparative analysis and on the continuity of the 
historical development.  
 
Bystanders to the Holocaust: the uniqueness of the exile Governments’ responses 
During  recent  years,  the  topic  of  the  bystanders  to  the  Holocaust  has 
remained  heatedly  contested  by  historians.  Even  the  term  ‘bystander’  remains 
controversial.  Especially,  to  label  an  actor  as  a  ‘bystander’  bears  negative 
                                                 
1 See  Kushner,  Tony,  ‘Pissing  in  the  Wind:  The  Search  for  Nuance  in  the  Study  of  Holocaust 
Bystanders’, in David Cesarani – Paul Levine (eds.), ‘Bystanders’ and the Holocaust: A Re evaluation 
(London: Frank Cass, 2002), pp. 57 76; Marrus, Michael R., The Holocaust in History (London: 
Penguin  Books,  1989);  Altman,  Ilya,  Жертвы  ненависти.  Холокост  в  СССР  1941 1945  гг. 
[Victims of Hate. The Holocaust in the USSR, 1941 1945] (Moscow: Kovcheg, 2002). 11 
connotations. As Thomas Brudholm suggests, ‘to label something or somebody a 
“bystander” typically functions like a kind of shaming or an acknowledgement of 
failure; the audience could and should have done something, yet did not’.
2 Michael R. 
Marrus criticizes historians for judging and moralizing about the ‘bystanders’ on the 
basis  that  ‘they  failed  to  live  up  to  our  standards’.  He  continues:  ‘The  obvious 
temptation in this kind of exposition is to assess bystanders, not from the standpoint 
of their own cultures, priorities and preoccupations, but from what we assume ought 
to have been their beliefs and actions.’
3 Marrus hence advises that only ‘by making a 
painstaking effort to enter into their minds and sensibilities’, can we actually fully 
comprehend  the  conduct  of  a  bystander.
4 A  bystander’s  behaviour  needs  to  be 
explained in its historical context. It means to enquire into his/her other priorities and 
also to understand the responses within a long term perspective.  
Concerning  the  historiography  of  the  bystanders’  responses  to  the  Jewish 
plight, nobody has ever tried to summarize, or comprehend, the position of the exile 
governments. There are comprehensive individual studies, especially on the Polish 
government. Nevertheless, nobody has researched the minor Allies’ cooperation with 
their Jewish policies, or evaluated the importance of this issue in their diplomatic 
relations with the major Allied powers. It could be argued that the British to a large 
extent influenced exile governments’ policies towards the Jews. The reason was that 
the  minor  Allies  were  from  the  very  beginning  in  close  contact  with  the  British 
government. The former were especially allowed to continue their fight against the 
Axis on the latter’s soil. This meant that they had to respect the rules set by their 
British hosts. In addition, the influence of the Soviet Union and the United States, as 
the main powers in the world, cannot be denied. Yet this was a two way process: the 
exiles had the ability to influence the policy of the major Allies towards the Jews as 
well.  
For example, the exile governments had better access to intelligence from the 
occupied  countries.  It  was  their  underground  movements  that  communicated 
information about the Holocaust from Europe. The disclosures of the British and 
                                                 
2 Brudholm, Thomas, ‘Surveying a Gap: A Philosophical Perspective on Historians’ Responses to 
Discourses on the ‘Bystanders’’, in Holocaust Studies: A Journal of Culture and History, Volume 11, 
No. 3 (Winter 2005), p. 3. 
3 Marrus, Michael R., ‘Bystanders to the Holocaust (Review of Monty Penkower’s The Jews Were 
Expendable: Free World Diplomacy and the Holocaust and David Wyman’s The Abandonment of the 
Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941 1945)’, in Verne W. Newton (ed.), FDR and the Holocaust 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), p. 152. 
4 Marrus, Michael R., The Holocaust in History (London: Penguin Books, 1989), p. 157. 12 
American  military  intelligence  and  the  messages  deciphered  by  the  Office  of 
Strategic  Services,  the  US  intelligence  agency,  revealed  substantial  information 
about  the  ‘Final  Solution’.
5  Nevertheless,  as  suggested  by  Nick  Terry,  the 
intelligence was far from clear; not all of the information was caught in its entirety 
and it was frequently out of context and misleading.
6 With this in mind, the role of 
the exiles’ connections with home underground groups should not be underestimated. 
The  minor  Allies  might  significantly  contribute  to  the  disclosure  of  the  ‘Final 
Solution’.
7 Additionally, by revealing or suppressing such intelligence, they could 
influence the policies of the British and American governments. Moreover, strong 
interventions or publicity in the exile press could have influenced the major Allies’ 
policies  and  their  reluctance  to  broaden  the  rescue  measures.  Nevertheless,  the 
exiles’ influence on the British or American governments might have been a negative 
one too.  Bernard Wasserstein suggests that worries concerning Polish anti Semitic 
policies caused British carefulness in restricting immigration to Palestine during the 
war.
8  
Moreover, concerning the specificities of the exiles’ perception of the Jews, 
the Nazi occupation of the European countries triggered resurgent nationalism. These 
sentiments affected the populations of the subjugated countries and had their imprint 
in exile as well. This is a crucial factor, especially when relations between major 
nations and one minority are discussed. Indeed, the national feelings and hatred were 
directed  not  only  against  the  occupying  forces  and  their  nation;  together  with 
nationalism, xenophobia and anti Semitism also re emerged. We can presume that 
the policies of the exile governments were shaped by the strong nationalism in the 
occupied homeland, as well as in their own ranks.  
Additionally,  there  were  generally  different  political  issues  that  the  exiles 
dealt with than those in the case of the major Allies. The main Jewish issues can be 
                                                 
5 Breitman, Richard, Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew 
(London: Penguin, 2000). 
6 Terry, Nicholas, ‘Conflicting Signals: British Intelligence on the ‘Final Solution’ Through Radio 
Intercepts and Other Sources, 1941 1942”, in Yad Vashem Studies, XXXII, 2004, pp. 351 396. 
7 For example the mission of a Polish courier Jan Karski in November 1942 actually brought to the 
Allied  countries  the  confirmation  about  the  mass  extermination  of  Jews.  See:  Karski,  Jan,  ‘The 
Message that was delivered, but not heard’, in Marcia Littell – Richard Libowitz – Evelyn Bodek 
Rosen (eds.), The Holocaust Forty Years after (Lewington: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1989), pp. 29 35; 
Story of a Secret State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1944). 
8 Wasserstein,  Bernard,  ‘Polish  Influences  on  British  Policy  Regarding  Jewish  Rescue  Efforts  in 
Poland  1939 1945’,  in  Anthony  Polonsky  (ed.),  Polin,  Volume  11:  Focusing  on  Aspects  and 
Experiences of Religion (London: The Litman Library of Jewish Civilization, 1998), pp. 183 191. 13 
coherently summarised as the problem of the rescue and relief measures for the Jews 
in  ghettoes  and  concentration  camps.  The  Jews  were  citizens  of  the  countries 
represented by the exiles and one of the most fundamental duties of a state is that of 
protecting its own citizens. Among the other political issues the exiles faced were: 
the repatriation of the deported or exiled Jews; retribution of the crimes committed 
against  the  Jews;  and  the  post war  settlement  of  ‘the  Jewish  question’  in  their 
countries. Not all of these issues were on the agenda of the major Allies, or at least 
were not so strongly pronounced. One of the intentions of the thesis is to present, 
with  regard  to  the  Czechoslovak  case  study  and  in  a  comparative  perspective,  a 
theoretical framework of the exile bystanders’ responses during the war. Hence we 
can raise a question as to what extent were the exile governments a separate category 
in the Allied reaction to the Holocaust? We also have to ask whether there existed 
anything like a policy of the exile governments, or whether we have to talk all the 
time  about  their  policies.  When  we  keep  in  mind  the  insufficient  state  of  the 
contemporary  historiography  on  the  subject,  is  it  still  possible  to  determine  any 
common taxonomy of the exiles’ conduct and to find a place for the Czechoslovaks?  
The Czechoslovak case study is at the centre of this thesis. Nevertheless, the 
case studies of the other exiled governments are used to identify the main issues that 
might be of interest. It does not suggest that all the identified theories need to be 
necessarily valid for the Czechoslovak case study, only that we may suppose that 
they  might  have  played  some  role.  Recent  historiography  has  used  comparative 
approaches towards Jewish/non Jewish relations during the war. This seems to be a 
very important and indeed useful approach.
9  
As documented, there is a large variety of topics that call for our attention 
when dealing with the exile governments’ relations with Jews during the war. The 
centrality of the Holocaust in the whole story cannot be disputed. The tragedy of the 
Jewish people simply seems to be the main Jewish issue on the agenda of the exile 
political representatives. However, contemporary historiography has proved that the 
imagination of the Allied politicians was not able to grasp entirely the enormity of 
the Nazi extermination plans.
10 If we accept this theory as a plausible or at least a 
partly correct variation, can we thus also dispute the centrality of the Holocaust on 
                                                 
9 For example, Kosmala, Beate – Tych, Feliks (Eds.), Facing the Nazi Genocide: Non Jews and Jews 
in Europe (Berlin: Metropol, 2004). 
10 Kushner,  Tony,  The  Holocaust  and  the  Liberal  Imagination  (Oxford  –  Cambridge  (Mass.): 
Blackwell, 1994). 14 
the exiles’ agenda? As suggested by the aforementioned ascent of nationalism, we 
shall start the exploration of the exiles’ Jewish policies not at the moment when the 
first deportation trains left for ‘the east’, or even when the Nazis introduced their 
anti Jewish legislation. Instead, it is more suitable to start the investigation of the 
topic even earlier, at the moment when the Nazis’ expansionist policy threatened 
Czechoslovakia in the days of the Munich crisis. This was the point when no one 
could actually predict the future horrific scope of the Nazi racial policy in Europe. 
The intention is to document that the exiles started to contemplate the plans for the 
post war solution of the Jewish position in their countries regardless of the Nazi 
persecution of the Jews. The development in post war Czechoslovakia, concerning 
the Jews, was to a large extent prepared a long time before the exiled authorities 
realised the full scale of the Jewish tragedy. It seems that in this case, the fact of 
whether they fully realised the fate of the European Jews in 1942 or 1944 was only 
of secondary importance in setting the course  of the Czechoslovak  government’s 
Jewish policy. However, before we analyse the Czechoslovak case study, we need to 
evaluate the contemporary historiography on the governments in exile and the Jews. 
 
   
Historiography of exile governments’ attitude towards the Jews 
A  desire  to  research  the  topic  of  the  exile  governments’  Jewish  policies 
during the war faces the lack of an extensive and sophisticated historiography. There 
were nine exile governments during the war: Belgian, Czechoslovak, Dutch, French 
(National Committee), Greek, Luxembourg, Norwegian, Polish and Yugoslav. Not 
all  of  their  attitudes  towards  the  Jews  have  been  a  subject  of  comprehensive 
historical research. The main exception is the Polish government, whose approach 
towards the Jewish plight has been discussed extensively. A strong condemnation of 
the Polish government’s conduct was already presented in the shadow of the ruins of 
the Warsaw ghetto. Emanuel Ringelblum, a historian hiding on the ‘Aryan’ side of 
Warsaw, concluded:  
 
at  a  time  when  extermination  threatens  the  Jewish  people,  the 
government has done nothing to save at least a remnant of Polish Jewry. 
The official attitude concerning the surviving handful of Polish Jews 15 
has been completely wrong, viewed in relation to the unprecedented 
tragedy, which the Jewish people is undergoing in Poland.
11 
 
The tone of the post war historiography has been polarized.
12 The works that 
have  dealt  with  the  Polish  war time policy  can be divided into two  groups. One 
group  of  historians  condemn  the  Poles.  They  explained  that  the  Polish  war time 
indifference to the Jews was caused, for example, by political anti Semitism; others 
attributed it to more pressing priorities on the Poles’ political agenda.
13 The second 
group, in contrast, has tried to prove that the Poles responded adequately and did 
more than any other of the Allied governments.
14 This historiographical dispute was 
part of a wider discussion of the Polish Jewish relations that has been in progress 
since the end of the war and which became stronger in the late 1960s during the new 
wave of anti Semitism in Poland.  
The two most comprehensive volumes were published in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s by David Engel. Engel suggests that the pro Jewish actions of the Polish 
government  were  shaped  by  their  conviction  about  the  influence  of  international 
Jewish organizations over the major Allied governments, especially the Americans. 
In fact, this was not the case only with the Polish western government: Stalin, for 
example, apparently shared these feelings as well.
15 Engel concludes that this notion 
prevailed  among  the  lower  ranking  Polish  military  officers  as  well  as  the 
government’s ministers.
16 Nevertheless, he also shows that most of the pro Jewish 
                                                 
11 Ringelblum,  Emmanuel,  Polish Jewish  Relations  during  the  Second  World  War  (Evanston,  IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1992), p. 223. 
12 Stola, Dariusz, ‘In the Shadow of the Facts’, in Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry, Volume 8: Jews in 
independent Poland (London: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2004), pp. 331 344; Engel, 
David,  ‘Reading  and  Misreading:  A  Reply  to  Dariusz  Stola’,  in  Polin:  Studies  in  Polish  Jewry, 
Volume 8: Jews in independent Poland (London: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2004), 
pp. 345 381. 
13 Avital, Zvi, ‘The Polish Government in Exile and the Jewish Question’ in Wiener Library Bulletin 
33/34, 1975, pp. 43 51; David Engel, In the Shadow of Auschwitz: the Polish Government in Exile 
and the Jews, 1939 1942 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987); Facing a Holocaust: 
the Polish Government in Exile and the Jews, 1943 1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1993); Gutman, Yisrael – Krakowski, Shmuel, Unequal Victims: Poles and Jews During World 
War Two (New York: Holocaust Library, 1986); Stola, Dariusz, ‘The Polish Government in Exile and 
the Final Solution. What Conditioned Its Actions and Inactions?’, in Joshua D. Zimmerman (ed.), 
Contested  Memories.  Poles  and  Jews  during  the  Holocaust  and  its  Aftermath    (New  Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 2003), pp. 85 96. 
14 Lukas, Richard C., Forgotten Holocaust. The Poles under German Occupation 1939 1944. Revised 
Edition (New York: Hippocrene Books, 2007); Iranek Osmecki, Kazimierz – Lichten, Joseph L. – 
Raczynski, Edward, ‘The Polish Government in Exile and the Jewish Tragedy During World War II’ 
in Wiener Library Bulletin 37/38, 1976, pp. 62 67.  
15 Friedlander, Saul, Nazi Germany and the Jews 1939 1945. The Years of Extermination (New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), p. 250. 
16 Engel, David, Facing a Holocaust, pp. 27 28 and 34. 16 
actions of the  government were not followed through.
17 The policy of the Polish 
government  resembled  walking  on  eggshells,  when  any  pro Jewish  action  was 
immediately  criticized  by  the  Polish  resistance  in  the  occupied  country. 
Simultaneously, the exiles’ reluctance to fulfil demands of pro Jewish activists was 
commented on in the western press. The Poles were hence caught in a net of complex 
influences. Engel’s conclusions seem plausible and could be further elaborated on in 
the Czechoslovak case study. As the newest research has confirmed, although the 
treatment of the Holocaust by the Poles was far from positive, we could not talk 
about any conspiracy of silence.
18  
  Concerning the other exiles, studies on the Belgian or Dutch approaches have 
mostly been based on the radio broadcasts from London, exile press, or on randomly 
chosen documents.
19 Therefore the official authorities in Belgium recently decided to 
conduct a comprehensive research on the Belgians’ behaviour during the war. As a 
result of this initiative, an extensive study was published. The book also critically 
explores  the  Belgian  exile  government’s  response  to  the persecution  of  the  Jews 
                                                 
17 As was the case with the Council for Matters Relating to the Rescue of the Jewish Population in 
Poland, the Polish version of the War Refugee Board. See Engel, David, Facing a Holocaust, pp. 138 
167. 
18 Wróbel, Piotr, ‘Dziennik Polski (The Polish Daily), the Official Organ of the Polish Government 
in Exile and the Holocaust, 1940 1945’, in Robert Moses Shapiro (ed.), Why didn’t the Press Shout? 
American and International Journalism During the Holocaust (New Jersey: Yeshiva University Press 
– KTAV Publishing House, 2003), pp. 507 534. 
19 Laureys, Véronique,  ‘The Attitude of the Belgian Government in exile in London toward the Jews 
and the Jewish Question During World War II’, in Dan Michman (ed.), Belgium and the Holocaust. 
Jews Belgians Germans 3
rd Edition (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2007), pp. 287 306; Coestecker, Frank, 
‘The Reintegration of Jewish Survivors into Belgian Society, 1943 1947, in David Bankier (ed.), The 
Jews are Coming Back. The Return of the Jews to their countries of origin after WWII, (Jerusalem: 
Yad Vashem, 2005), pp. 72 107; Barnouw, David J., ‘Dutch Exiles in London’, in Martin Conway – 
José Gotovitch (eds.), Europe in Exile. European Exile Communities in Britain 1940 1945 (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2001), pp. 229 246; De Jong, Louis,  ‘The Netherlands and  Auschwitz’, in Yad 
Vashem Studies 7, 1968, pp. 39 56; Presser, Dr. J., Ashes in the Wind. The Destruction of Dutch Jewry 
(Detroit:  Wayne  University  Press,  1988),  pp.  329 336;  van  der  Zee,  Nanda,  Um  Schlimmeres  zu 
verhindern... Die Ermordung der niederländischen Juden: Kollaboration und Wiederstand (München: 
Carl Hanser Verlag, 2002). For example Presser based his description of the Dutch government’s 
response  to  the  Holocaust  on  ‘the  Minutes  of  an  Enquiry  Committee’  of  the  post war  Dutch 
parliament. Book by van der Zee is very critical of the Queen Wilhelmina and her decision to leave 
the Netherlands on the eve of the German occupation. It was, according to van der Zee, one of the 
reasons of the very  high  number of  victims among the Dutch Jewry; because the Queen left the 
country, the German civil administration with Arthur Seyss Inquart was appointed and immediately 
started  to  prepare  the  gradual  segregation  of  the  Dutch  Jewry.  Most  of  the  Dutch  historians  are 
sceptical about her conclusions. Selected historiography on the Jews in the other countries with exile 
governments during the war: Pavlowitch, Stefan K., ‘Out of Context – The Yugoslav Government in 
London 1941 1945’, in Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 16, No. 1, The Second World War: 
Part 1, (January 1981), pp. 89 119; Goldstein, Ivo, ‘Restoring Jewish Life in Communist Yugoslavia, 
1945 1967, in East European Jewish Affairs, vol. 34, no. 1, 2004, pp. 58 71; Zariz, Ruth, ‘The Jews 
of Luxembourg during Second World War’, in Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 
1993, pp. 51 66; Abrahamsen, Samuel, Norway’s Response to the Holocaust. A Historical Perspective 
(New York: Holocaust Library, 1991). 17 
during  the  war.
20 The  Belgians’  attitude  was  full  of  contradictions.  Whilst  they 
avoided mentioning the plight of the Jews when contacting people in the homeland, 
they at the same time conducted schemes that would exchange German civilians in 
Allied hands for Jews in occupied Belgium.
21 Other authors noted that the Belgians 
and  Dutch  were  unable  to  grasp  entirely  the  information  coming  from  Europe. 
Véronique  Laureys  shows  that  the  Belgian  newspapers  in  exile  published  the 
incoming information inconsistently, in odd corners and – in the terms of timing – 
arbitrarily.  However,  she  also  concludes  that  the  news  coming  from  Europe  was 
contradictory and often simply wrong.
22 In the case of the Dutch government, the 
most revealing fact is that its prepared repatriation programme expected that around 
70,000  Dutch  Jews  would  return  from  Poland.  In  fact,  only  6,000  Dutch  Jews 
survived the Nazi extermination camps in the east.
23 More critically, an academic 
discussion  was  stimulated  by  a  controversial  book  by  Nanda  van  der  Zee.  She 
strongly criticizes Queen Wilhelmina’s and the Gerbrandy government’s silence on 
Jewish issues, especially over the BBC.
24 The limited sources used by van der Zee 
have  caused  doubts  on  the  side  of  historians  and  her  thesis  is  not  generally 
accepted.
25 In any case, the authors of the studies on the Belgian, French and Dutch 
governments still generally agree that the reaction to the Holocaust had a low place 
on  their  agenda.  For  example,  Sébastien  Laurent  notes  that  the  French  Military 
Intelligence  was  so  obsessed  with  the  military  revenge  against  the  Germans  that 
anything else than purely military intelligence simply did not interest them.
26   
  Moreover,  important  issues  have  been  raised  by  Renée  Poznanski  in  her 
investigation  of  the  French  resistance  movement’s  attitude  towards  the  ‘Jewish 
question’. In her opinion, the attitude of the French resistance (including De Gaulle’s 
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21 Debruyne, Emmanuel, The Belgian Government in Exile and the Jews during World War 2, paper 
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22 Laureys, Véronique, ‘The Attitude of the Belgian Government in exile in London toward the Jews’, 
pp. 292 and 305. 
23 Barnouw, David J., ‘Dutch Exiles in London’, pp. 242 243. 
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Free French) towards the Jews was full of ambiguities. They understood that most of 
the population believed that a ‘Jewish problem’ existed in France. Hence we need to 
differentiate between their humanitarian compassion with the persecuted minority 
and feelings about the general Jewish position in France. The Free French cautiously 
followed the development in the public opinion in occupied and Vichy France. The 
Gaullists had to struggle for public support with the Pétain Vichy government which 
was, for a long time, seen by the French population as a potential power that might 
turn against the Germans and liberate France. Simultaneously, the Jews were accused 
by  the  French  of  ruling  the  decadent pre war  Third Republic  (for  example  Leon 
Blum). They were thus allegedly the main culprits of its disintegration and military 
defeat.  According  to  Poznanski,  the  concerns  about the public  opinion  in  France 
caused De Gaulle’s careful handling of Jewish issues.
27 A report prepared for the 
General in April 1943 stated among other: ‘the General must not be the man who 
brings back the Jews [emphasis in the original]’.
28 Furthermore, another document 
stated:  
 
It would be in the Jews’ interest to no longer constitute a separate 
group but to assimilate into the rest of the French people, not to stand out 
during the period of national reorganization after the war and to enter 
equally all circles and all professions (numerus clausus), without which 
fairly vigorous reaction will emerge spontaneously and impair the moral 
unity of France.
29  
 
As will be documented, similar demands emerged also in the Czechoslovak 
resistance. 
Concerning  the  Czech  and  Slovak  historiography  after  the  fall  of 
Communism,  both  Jewish  history  in  Bohemia  and  Moravia  and  Czech Jewish 
relations were slowly scrutinised more closely by historians. This is also relevant to 
modern Jewish history, especially the twentieth century. Concerning the topic of this 
thesis, historians, however, focused mostly only on the immediate post war period. 
The transitional years between the liberation of Czechoslovakia and the Communist 
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coup in February 1948 have been comprehensively investigated.
30 Nonetheless, the 
authors have mostly focused only on the history of the third Czechoslovak republic 
(1945 1948) without investigating the origins of the post war development in the 
situation during the war.  
Yet there are also historians who have touched on the topics in connection 
with the situation among the Czechoslovak exiles. Peter Heumos published a social 
study  of  the  wartime  Jewish  emigration  from  Czechoslovakia.
31 Furthermore,  he 
raises issues of the approach of the Czechoslovak political authorities as well. Other 
authors,  for  example  Avigdor  Dagan,
32  Erich  Kulka,
33  Jan  Němeček,
34  Livia 
Rothkirchen,
35 or Jan Stříbrný
36 have attempted to explain the diverse factors of the 
Czechoslovak and inner Jewish politics in exile. One of the issues discussed has been 
the role of Zionism and minority rights for Jews in the preparation of the post war 
order. Nevertheless, none of the authors has studied the problem in its complexity 
and none has researched all the available sources. Němeček, whose area of interest 
lays  more  in  the  government’s  diplomatic  policy,  presents  his  article  as  a  short 
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summary of the most important issues of the Czechoslovak exiles’ war time policy 
towards  the  Jews.  Nevertheless,  doubts  can  be  cast  on  some  of  his  conclusions, 
especially on the role of Zionism in Beneš’s war time strategy, the treatment of the 
Holocaust  by  the  Czechoslovak  administration  and  the  positive  role  of  Jan 
Masaryk.
37 Furthermore, no one among the historians has sophisticatedly evaluated 
the Czechoslovak exiles’ attitude towards the Jews in comparison with their relation 
to other minorities in the Republic, especially the Germans and Hungarians. 
Rothkirchen, besides her interests in the Beneš government, was also one of 
the  initiators  of  the  first  academic  studies  of  Czech Jewish  relations  in  the 
Protectorate.
38 She suggests that there were anti Semitic tendencies in the ranks of 
the  Czech  resistance  movement  and  also  opens  the  issue  of  Beneš’s problematic 
response to the Jewish persecution.
39 Yet she does not, for example, enquire into the 
reasons for Beneš’s and Jan Masaryk’s staunch support of the Zionist movement.
40 
Her contributions can be regarded as the most comprehensive, but even her latest 
book is based on research from the late 1960s and early 1970s making her study 
outdated.
41 Hence, for the situation in the Protectorate, the studies by Miroslav Kárný 
are particularly indispensable.
42 In fact, the historiography of the Slovak treatment of 
the Jews during the war is better developed than in the case of the historical lands of 
Bohemia and Moravia.
43  
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43 See for example: Kamenec, Ivan, Po stopách tragédie (Bratislava: Archa, 1991); ‘Changes in the 
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The tone of all the important works dealing with the Czechoslovak exiles’ 
Jewish policy remains mostly positive. Criticism is directed only against some parts 
of the army officer corps, but never against the Czechoslovak exiles as a whole.
44 
The  authors  have  not  questioned  the  prevailing  notion  of  the  Czechoslovaks’ 
exceptional  democratic  attitude  towards  the  Jews.  The  history  of  Czechoslovak 
Jewish relations is seen positively, with the sole exception of the brief period of the 
Second Republic (October 1938 March 1939).
45 It is only modern historiography that 
tries  to  comprehend  Czech Jewish  relations  in  their  complexity  and  in  broader 
international comparison. Michael Frankl, for example, suggests that anti Semitism 
was a significant element in the Czech political tradition at the beginning of the 
twentieth century.
46 He, in collaboration with Kateřina Čapková, also questions the 
Czechoslovak welcoming of German and Austrian refugees who tried to escape the 
Nazis during the 1930s.
47  
More  conclusions  can  be  drawn  from  the  contributions  on  general 
Czechoslovak  history,  the  Czechoslovak  government in exile  and  interethnic 
relations  in  occupied  Bohemia  and  Moravia.  The  first  academic  studies  on  the 
Czechoslovak exiles emerged in the early 1960s.  The Marxist historian Jan Křen 
introduced  in  two  volumes  the  history  of  the  first  years  of  the  exile  resistance 
movement.
48 He also included a short synopsis on the exiles’ treatment of the Jews 
and  highlighted  the  nationalistic  and  anti Semitic  tendencies  that  developed 
especially in the army.
49 On the other side of the globe, the Czech American émigré 
historian Radomír Luža presented the first serious study on Czech German relations 
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before, during and after the war.
50 In his opinion, the German anti Czech policy in 
the 1930s and 1940s inevitably led to the expulsion of the German minority from 
Czechoslovakia after the war. However, Luža did not explore the exiles’ treatment of 
other Czechoslovak minorities, including the Jews. Also in the United States, another 
émigré,  Edvard  Táborský,  the  former  personal  secretary  to  Beneš,  wrote  the 
diplomatic history of the struggle for renewed Czechoslovakia.
51 Táborský analysed 
Beneš’s foreign policy during the war and the development of his contacts with the 
Soviet Union. He did not mention the Jews at all and hence did not attribute to them 
any role in the Czechoslovak diplomatic history. Furthermore, the second volume on 
the history of Czech German relations by Johann Wolfgang Bruegel analyses the 
development during and after the war.
52 He critically approached Czech nationalistic 
tendencies  that  developed  after  Munich  and  condemned  the  expulsion  plans. 
Significantly, Bruegel raises the issue of the persecution of the German speaking 
Jews in post war Czechoslovakia. 
In  Germany  Detlef  Brandes,  in  his  older  study,  analysed  the  German 
occupation  regime  in  the  Protectorate  and  the  responses  of  the  Czech  resistance 
groups.
53 In contrast to previous authors, Brandes utilised the temporary openness of 
Czechoslovakia in the late 1960s and researched primary sources in Prague archives. 
In  his  newer  study,  he  compared  the  formation  of  three  exile  governments,  the 
Czechoslovak, Polish and Yugoslav, and their relations with their British hosts.
54 
Brandes focuses his study on diplomatic history and hardly deals with Jewish issues.   
The Czechoslovak attitude towards the Sudeten Germans became one of the 
main topics of the post Communist historiography in particular. Tomáš Staněk was 
the  first  Czech  author  who  after  1989  focused  on  the  post war  expulsion  of  the 
German minority from Czechoslovakia.
55 Staněk also briefly introduced the wartime 
path that led to the expulsion plans and drew historians’ attention to the fate of the 
German speaking Jews in post war Czechoslovakia. Another detailed study on the 
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transfer of the German population from Czechoslovakia emerged in the late 1990s 
thanks to Brandes.
56  
Of  the  general  historiography  on  Czechoslovakia  in  the  first  half  of  the 
twentieth  century,  the  recent  successful  study  by  Andrea  Orzoff  should  be 
emphasised.
57 Orzoff presents the myth building of Masaryk’s Czechoslovakia and 
the struggle for its sustenance during the late 1930s and 1940s. She describes how 
the ‘myth’ was created during the First World War in order to persuade the western 
powers to support the creation of an independent Czechoslovakia. This ‘myth’ was 
later promoted in the international arena as one of the main assets the Czechoslovaks 
used in the 1930s to maintain the support of the western world. Orzoff lists Jews 
among staunch supporters of the ‘myth’, especially because of the role of Masaryk.
58 
Yet she fails to discuss the role that the Jews played in the formation of the ‘myth’ 
and  also  whether  the  treatment  of  the  Jews  was  not  used  by  Czechoslovakia  as 
another proof of its adherence to democratic ideals. Furthermore, as this thesis argues, 
the wartime and post war change in the Czechoslovak perception or treatment of the 
Jews did not pass unnoticed. Did this cause any complications in the Czechoslovak 
mythmaking? If not, then what were the reasons for this development?  
Important  studies  dealing  with  the  interethnic  relations  in  the  Protectorate 
have recently been published. Chad Bryant examines Czech nationalism and asks 
how people in occupied Bohemia and Moravia and in exile responded to the Nazi 
policy  of  Germanization.
59 Bryant  questions  the  accepted  stereotypes  of  identity 
formation and presents wartime Bohemia and Moravia as a territory with ‘hopelessly 
mixed  people’.  Furthermore,  Bryant  documents  how  the  exiles  utilised  the  anti 
German  feelings  of  the  majority  of  Czechs  to  settle  accounts  with  the  German 
minority and force it into expulsion.
60 Tara Zahra also uses new approaches towards 
the study of Czech nationalism and the treatment of minorities.
61 She focuses on the 
family level and discusses how children were claimed at different times by various 
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nationalists as the offspring for future national generations. National radicalization of 
the Czechs is further documented by Benjamin Frommer.
62 His analysis of post war 
Czechoslovak  retribution  proves  how  radical  Czech  nationalism  and  the 
determination to homogenize the Republic became the main objectives of the exiled 
and the first post war governments. They preferred the expulsion of all the Sudeten 
Germans  to  a  prolonged  prosecution  and  trial  of  the  middle  and  low  ranking 
criminals.
63  
Hence the available historiography offers answers to various questions that 
emerge from the topic of this PhD. Yet, at the same time, the historiography opens 
other issues that need to be evaluated and addressed here. Are the case studies of the 
other exile governments a useful instrument in this respect? 
 
 
Policy or policies of the governments in exile? 
We can identify several key factors that shaped the Jewish policy of the exile 
governments. These can be divided into two main groups: one of them is connected 
with the conditions in exile and the second one with the situation in the occupied 
homeland. War time Jewish policies of the exile governments were influenced by the 
set of priorities on their agenda. The interests of the nation, who could feel betrayed 
by its allies and lived under the terror of occupation, were always prioritized. In this 
respect,  the  diplomatic  position  of  the  governments  figured  at  the  top  level  and 
insecurity in this area pushed other issues aside. Not all of the exile governments 
were  firmly  accepted by  the  Allies,  at  least  not  during  the  whole  war.  This  was 
mostly  the  case  with  the  East Central  European  governments,  countries  liberated 
later  by  the  Red  Army,  or  by  underground  movements.  For  example,  the 
Czechoslovak government and its President Edvard Beneš had problems receiving 
full recognition from the Allies. Even after Beneš gained full diplomatic status, the 
government  constantly  and  carefully  followed  the  growing  Soviet  imperialistic 
tendencies  in  the  east.  Even  more  complex  was  the  position  of  the  Polish  and 
Yugoslav governments. There was a strong opposition against them within their own 
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countries  or  later  from  the  side  of  the  Soviets.
 64 The  exiles’  struggle  for  their 
political  survival  might  have  influenced  their  reaction  to  the  persecution  of  one 
minority living among them.  
The structure of the exile community played its role as well, particularly the 
number  and  political/national  affiliation  of  the  Jews  who  escaped  the  Nazis  and 
organised their political struggle abroad. The western minor Allies (and to a large 
extent also the Yugoslavs and Greeks) did not have to ‘solve’ any difficult problems 
because their Jewish population had been assimilated long time before, or because 
there were not many of their national Jews in war time London.
65 Assimilated Jews 
did not want to stress the persecution of the Jewish minority by the Nazis in order to 
prove their unconditional loyalty to the struggling major nation.
66  In contrast, the 
Czechoslovak  and  Polish  Jewish  exiles  were  to  a  large  extent  supporters  of  the 
Jewish national movement. They organised themselves into political organisations 
and  attempted  to  influence  the  politics  of  their  respective  governments.  We  can 
therefore argue that in this respect the situation of the Czechoslovaks and Poles was 
different  from  that  of  the  other  Allies.  Hand  in  hand  with  the  national Jewish 
demands for the minority rights went the issue of the governments’ view of Zionism.  
However,  interventions  did  not  come  only  from  the  side  of  exile  Jewry. 
International Jewish organisations focused their attention on the exile governments 
as  well.  The  most  eloquent  among  the  former  were  the  pro Zionists.  They  were 
mainly interested in the countries with large Jewish populations, especially those in 
East Central Europe. The role of the international and exile Jewries in the formation 
of  the  exile  governments’  policies  should  not  be  underestimated.  The  exiled 
governments  maintained  contacts  with  the  pro Jewish  activists  because  of  their 
political  eloquence  and  alleged  influence  on  the  international  stage.  Furthermore, 
every  issue  related  to  minorities  needed  to  be  treated  carefully  because  of  the 
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democratic image the exiles wished to maintain in the west. No one wanted to be 
perceived as an undemocratic government. Interestingly, for the Jewish organisations, 
the record of the pre war treatment of the Jewish minority in each particular country 
played  a  more  prominent  role  than  the  actions  conducted  by  their  exile 
administrations in the war. Therefore the Poles had to struggle from the beginning 
with  strong  prejudices  on  the  side  of  the  Jewish  organisations.
67  In  contrast, 
Czechoslovakia was always considered to be one of the most sympathetic countries 
towards the Jews.
68  
In any case, further influences on the policies of the exile governments have 
to be sought in the occupied homelands. Indisputably, key factors were the number 
of Jews in the particular countries, their proportion vis à vis the major population, 
their religious and national affiliation, the number of Jewish refugees  from other 
countries, but also the presence of other national minorities, particularly Germans. 
The  case  study  of  Belgium  shows  that  we  cannot  judge  only  according  to  the 
numbers of Jews in each specific country. Around 65,000 Jews lived in this country 
before 1940, but 90 percent of them were refugees from the east, or Germany. They 
were not regarded as a part of the Belgian national community.
69 Hence the Belgian 
Jewish community, in the eyes of London, consisted only of several thousands Jews. 
The actions of the Pierlot government could be influenced by its perception of who 
was and who was not ‘Belgian’. Whilst this constituted a big issue in comprehending 
the Western European exile governments’ response to the Holocaust, it was not the 
case  with  the  others.  Although  there  were  Jewish  refugees  in  Poland  and 
Czechoslovakia, their proportion was relatively low.  
There was another Jewish factor that played a role in these two particular 
countries. Whilst the Jewish community in the west was mostly assimilated, many 
Czech  and  Polish  Jews  were  followers  of  the  Zionist  movement,  or  of  Jewish 
orthodoxy. The number of national Jews constituted one more issue for the exile 
governments, mainly in connection with the prepared post war order in the liberated 
countries. The exile governments were reluctant to promise any new group minority 
rights. This of course was met with strong opposition within Zionist circles. Hence it 
is also necessary to evaluate how the Jewish minority was perceived by the majority 
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society. An analysis of the behind the scenes perception of the Jews seems crucial. 
The exiles officially declared their adherence to democratic and liberal values. Yet 
does this mean that they felt and acted in this manner?  
Another issue to take into account was to what extent the Jewish policy of the 
exile governments was influenced by the approach of underground groups and by the 
prevailing  moods  in  the  occupied  countries.  The  state  of  the  historiography  on 
Jewish/non Jewish relations in occupied Europe is better developed than is the case 
with the exile governments. For example, in the case of the Poles, French, or Dutch, 
researchers have conducted studies on the Jewish aspect in the underground press.
70 
There is no such study on the Czechs.
 71  It has usually been assumed that the Czechs 
behaved decently towards the Jews during the war. But recent research implies that 
the  response  was  marked  more  by  indifference  than  by  decency.
72 Whilst,  for 
example,  the  Dutch  underground  press  wrote  about  the  gas  chambers  and  mass 
murder as early as 1942 and 1943, this was probably not the case with the Czech 
resistance.  It  is,  indeed,  the  attitude  of  underground  resistance  organisations  that 
needs to be studied, as highlighted by Poznanski. The exiles were accountable to the 
population in the homeland as its political representatives. At the same time, they 
also struggled with public opinion at home that was to various degrees influenced by 
Nazi anti Semitic propaganda, or by the peoples’ own negative sentiments against 
the Jews.  
This basic summary primarily documents that the exile governments did not 
constitute  a  homogeneous  group.  Their  attitude  towards  Jews  was  influenced  by 
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other agendas and by other issues that might on the surface be perceived as more 
prominent. As suggested, the diplomatic position of the exiles and the complexity of 
their relations with the population in the homeland need to be evaluated as the key 
issues.  It  will  now  be  helpful  to  turn  to  the  historical  background  of  the 
Czechoslovak Jewish relations before the Second World War.  
   
Historical background of the Czechoslovak Jewish relations 
In order to comprehend the Czechs’ and Slovaks’ perception of the Jews 
and vice versa during World War 2, an exploration of the pre war development is 
essential. The purpose of the following introduction is to identify the main issues of 
Czechoslovak Jewish  relations  before  1939,  providing  a  context  for  the  period 
following – the main focus of this thesis. Hence the intention is to document the 
continuity in mutual perceptions, but keeping in mind that the Second World War 
brought its own dynamics to an already complex situation. Yet, these new factors 
emerging after 1938 should be added to longer term factors.  
It is necessary to go back to the end of the nineteenth century and then to 
the  years  1918  and  1919  –  to  Versailles,  where  the nations  of  the  world  met  to 
discuss the post war situation in Europe. This period of turmoil was the time when 
the  new  independent  Czechoslovak  state  emerged  and  the  first  official  contacts 
between the Czechoslovak authorities and the Jewish political leadership in the world 
were established. Czechoslovakia was created after World War 1. Simultaneously, 
the Jewish national programme was, following the Balfour Declaration, introduced to 
the international arena.  
At  this  point  it  is  important  to  introduce  Tomáš  Garrigue  Masaryk.  The 
positive reputation of his approach towards Jews is crucial for the whole history of 
modern Czechoslovak Jewish relations. However, the attitude of Masaryk (a pre war 
professor at Prague University) towards Jews was ambiguous. He was brought up in 
a  traditional  Christian  surrounding,  with  stories  about  Jews  kidnapping  Christian 
children  and  killing  them  for  ritual  sacrifice.  He  himself  admitted  that  he  never 
overcame anti Semitism emotionally – only intellectually.
73  
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Masaryk did not believe in national assimilation. He labelled it as ‘impossible, 
in  fact  laughable’.
74 He  argued  that  no  person  was  able  to  assimilate  fully  into 
another nation. This applied also to Jews. Masaryk supported the Zionist goal, not 
necessarily in Palestine, but at least culturally, in the sense of ideas presented by 
Achad Ha’am. Masaryk’s attitude to national assimilation, directed to the Czechs, 
but applied also to the Jews, could be described by the following two quotes: ‘It is a 
duty of every thinking person to participate actively in the rebirth of his nation’
75 and 
‘a person of solid character would never, under no circumstances be untrue to his 
nation’.
76 Consequently Masaryk became one of the first non Jewish politicians to 
declare  publicly  his  support  for  Jewish  national  revival.  Later,  in  1927,  as  the 
Czechoslovak President, Masaryk was the first head of state to officially visit Jewish 
Palestine.
77  
 
Image no. 1: Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk (1925)
78 
Masaryk gained a world reputation thanks to his open fight against the blood 
libel superstition and ritual murder accusations. In 1899, a poor Czech Jewish pedlar, 
Leopold  Hilsner,  was  accused  of  murdering  for  blood  a  Christian  girl,  Anežka 
Hrůzová. Hilsner was convicted and received life imprisonment.
79 The affair aroused 
overt anti Semitic reaction among the Czech population and was utilised by populist 
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politicians. Risking his own reputation and public position, Masaryk stepped out and 
fought the superstition. In the end, Hilsner still spent almost twenty years in prison. 
Yet, Masaryk’s defence received wide acclaim and gained him respect among all 
Jewish national and ideological groups. 
His defence of Hilsner and the public support of Jewish nationalism gained 
Masaryk popularity among American Jews, represented before the war for example 
by Stephen Wise. In particular, Wise invited Masaryk in 1907 to be the first speaker 
addressing  the  Free  Synagogue  on  the  81
st  Street  in  New  York.
80  Masaryk’s 
reputation  among  American  Jews  became  momentous  during  World  War  1.  As 
Masaryk recollected:  
 
In America, as elsewhere, the Jews stood by me; and particularly in 
America my former defence of Hilsner [...] put me in good stead. As 
early as 1907 the Jews of New York gave me a great reception. Now I 
had many personal meetings with representatives of Orthodox Jewry as 
well as with Zionists. Among the latter I should mention Mr. Brandeis, a 
judge  of  the  Supreme  Court,  who  was  originally  from  Bohemia  [sic! 
Brandeis  was  born  in  Louisville,  Kentucky.  His  parents  arrived  from 
Bohemia – J. L.]; he enjoyed the confidence of President Wilson. In New 
York Mr. Mack was a leading Zionist and I met Nahum Sokoloff [sic!], 
the influential Zionist leader.
81  
 
Likewise,  Masaryk  wrote  to  Beneš,  his  close  associate  in  exile  during 
World War 1 and later the first Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, in October 1918: 
‘Hilsner helped us a lot now: Zionists and other Jews have publicly accepted our 
programme’.
82  Later  on,  Masaryk’s  reputation  was  further  boosted  when  the 
Czechoslovak constitution allowed Jews to declare publicly their nationality.  
Another document confirming Masaryk’s reputation among American Jews 
was the special “Masaryk Issue” of the Jewish Daily Bulletin (JDB) that appeared in 
March  1930,  on  the  occasion  of  Masaryk’s  80
th  Birthday.
83 The  most  important 
representatives  of  the  world  Jewry,  for  example  Wise,  Vladimir  Jabotinsky,  and 
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Felix Frankfurker toasted the birthday of the first Czechoslovak President. Indeed, 
even the American Vice President Charles C. Curtis wrote for the JDB: ‘The fact 
that Masaryk, in the midst of his indomitable championship of his own people’s 
freedom, nevertheless found time to assist the Jewish people to realize its national 
aspirations, testifies to the nobility of character of this true idealist.’
84 The perception 
of  Masaryk’s  democratic  Czechoslovakia  was  acknowledged  also  within  high 
ranking politicians  in  the  United  States.  Hence  the  notion  –  ‘the  myth’  –  of  the 
exceptional Czechoslovak democracy – closely linked to its treatment of Jews – was 
born. The Czechoslovaks soon became aware of this image among the other East 
Central European nations and began to utilize it for their own political benefit. The 
‘myth’ of Czechoslovak democracy became the main asset of Czechoslovak foreign 
policy in Versailles.
85 
 
Image no. 2: Louis D. Brandeis
86 
  The  Versailles  conference, besides  the peace  treaty  with  Germany  and  its 
allies, also solved issues concerning the newly emerged countries in Europe. These 
were mostly multi national states, with significant minorities within their borders. 
Yet, at the same time, they were countries whose democratic political system and 
treatment of minorities was in doubt.
87 As suggested by Mark Levene, regarding the 
                                                 
84 Ibid. 
85 Orzoff, Andrea, Battle for the Castle. The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914 1948, p. 9.  
86 www.wikipedia.com 
87 Rabinowicz, Aharon Moshe, ‘The Jewish Minority’, in The Jews of Czechoslovakia: Historical 
Studies and Surveys. Volume 1 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1968), pp. 168 
170; Levene, Mark, ‘Nationalism and Its Alternatives in the International Arena: The Jewish Question 
at Paris, 1919’, in Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 28, no. 3, July 1993, p. 511. 32 
various  lobbying  minority  groups,  ‘the  peace makers  in  Paris  [had  come] 
increasingly  to  focus  their  attention  on  […]  Jews,  as  if  its  problems  [had  been] 
symptomatic – indeed paradigmatic – of all the Eastern European national minority 
issues  under  discussion’.
88  Indeed,  the  Jews,  represented  by  western  Jewish 
politicians,  French,  British,  and  American,  became  one  of  the  eloquent  minority 
groups at the Conference.
89 Their most evident achievement was the inclusion of the 
so called ‘Jewish articles’ (Article 10 and 11) into the Polish Minority treaty.
90  
Nonetheless, the Czechoslovak politicians, especially Beneš, refused to sign a 
treaty that would explicitly mention the protection of Jews in Czechoslovakia.
91 The 
following negotiations between the Czechoslovak delegation and the representatives 
of the Jewish groups documented the existence of factors that shaped Czechoslovak 
Jewish relations in the following decades. 
During  his  talks  with  pro Jewish  activists  during  World  War  2,  Beneš 
repeatedly  recollected  his  meeting  with  Woodrow  Wilson.  The  latter  wanted  the 
Czechoslovaks  to  sign  the  minority  treaty  including  ‘the  Jewish  articles’.  Beneš 
refused and asked Wilson whether he would be willing to sign the same treaty for the 
United States. According to Beneš, Wilson laughed and the issue was withdrawn.
92 
Indeed, in 1919, Beneš expressed the position of Czechoslovakia in the following 
way:  
 
Our state and nation generally enjoy the sympathies and confidence 
of  all  the  Allies  in  this  respect.  We  have  fulfilled  and  will  fulfil  all 
obligations and we have shown that in the national question we are more 
liberal than anyone else. I rejected the article that might have morally 
questioned the relations of our state with the Allies.
93 
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 Nevertheless,  the  creation  of  the  Republic  and  the  beginning  of  the 
negotiations  in  Paris  was  accompanied  by  anti Jewish  riots  in  Czechoslovakia.
94 
Those took the form of public rallies and the losses were generally mostly material. 
They could not be compared even closely to the events in Galicia, where tens of 
thousands of Jews were massacred by various armies, including by the Polish and 
Ukrainian.
95 But the events in the Czech lands still raised concerns on the side of the 
Jewish activists. Max Brod wrote in his letter to Leo Hermann, a Zionist politician 
born  in  Czechoslovakia,  in  the  eve  of  the  Czechoslovak  independence  that  ‘[i]t 
seem[ed] certain to [him] that when the proclamation [was] made [in Prague] at a 
later date […] there [would] be major anti Jewish riots which [might] well turn into 
outright  pogroms’.
96 Brod  even  suggested  a  coded  language  for  the  following 
correspondence  in  case  the  Czech  censorship  would  not  allow  the  passage  of 
authentic information.
97 His letter thus shows that the Jewish representatives were 
indeed afraid of the progress of events in Czechoslovakia.  
Moreover, in mid 1919, Chaim Weizmann complained strongly about the 
anti Semitic development in the new country, especially in Slovakia: ‘These facts are 
[…] in complete contrast to the avowed Czech policy in Paris, and also to the public 
utterance  of  the  Minister  Beneš.’
98 According  to  Weizmann,  even  the  official 
authorities  and  newspapers  were  arousing  anti Jewish  sentiments.
99  Still,  as 
documented on Beneš’s statements, the Czechoslovaks in Versailles were promoting 
the  notion  of  their  exceptional  democracy  and  their  unconditional  adherence  to 
liberal values. The Czechoslovaks presented themselves as an exception among the 
new  countries  in  East Central  Europe,  not  refraining,  as  suggested  by  Beneš’s 
meeting  with  Wilson,  from  comparing  themselves  to  the  United  States.  The 
comparison is remarkable when we keep in mind that Czechoslovakia was born only 
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half  a  year  before  the  aforementioned  negotiations  took  place.  Therefore  no  one 
could claim any guarantee of democratic progress in the country. Beneš was building 
the image of a democratic and tolerant Republic even as anti Jewish incidents took 
place in newly born Czechoslovakia. 
Both Masaryk and Beneš were aware of anti Semitic tendencies that existed 
among Czechs and Slovaks. However, exactly at that time, ‘a notion of relativity’ 
came into existence and was diligently spread by the Czechoslovaks. One of the 
main cards used by the Czechoslovak delegation in Paris was the comparison with 
other countries in the region. Beneš declared to Sokolow:  
 
the two articles [10 and 11] represented a sort of ‘yellow badge’ of 
which only Poland and Rumania were deserving. Unlike those countries, 
Czechoslovakia was at the head of the Slavic nations, and was a Western 
state.  Moreover,  she  was  not  anti Semitic  and  suspicion  must  not  be 
allowed to arise in the World that she was.
100  
 
Furthermore, in a letter to Weizmann, one of the Zionist representatives 
recalled his meeting with Masaryk in late 1918: ‘Masaryk agreed that the Poles are 
most unreliable. He told me how often he, himself, had argument with the Poles, 
about the Jews and he never could bring them to see the questions in the light of 
justice  and  liberalism.’
101 The  author  later  described  Masaryk’s  reaction  to  the 
reports  that  Czechs  were  driving  Jewish  refugees  back  to  Galicia.  Those  were 
presented  to  him  by  Broughman,  a  Philadelphia  newspaperman,  and  Water 
Lippmann, an assistant to the President Wilson: ‘Masaryk made clear his position 
and promised to use all his influence in order to have the Jews fairly treated in his 
country’.
102 The  situation  in  Czechoslovakia  was  therefore presented  as  relatively 
good and as being easily improved if Masaryk’s influence could be utilised.  
This  notion  was  confirmed  by  the  Czech  Zionists,  when  Felix  Weltsch 
wrote: ‘the Czech anti Semitism is an endurable anti Semitism’.
103 The leaders of the 
Jewish organizations clearly differentiated between the situation in Poland and that in 
Czechoslovakia. As the information that the new Czechoslovak State intended to 
send  Jewish  refugees  back  to  Galicia  leaked  to  the  west  in  1918,  the  Zionist 
politicians  were  primarily  anxious  that  the  expellees  might  have  been  caught  in 
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pogroms back in Poland.
104 In their opinion, the Czechoslovaks were intolerant and 
were expelling foreign Jews, but the Poles were instigating pogroms.  
Identical arguments, comparing the situations in Czechoslovakia and other 
countries,  were  used  by  Sokolow  when  he  tried  to  persuade  the  Czechoslovak 
authorities of the desirability to include ‘the Jewish articles’ into their minority treaty. 
According to Janowsky, ‘[i]t was feared that [the Czechoslovaks’ refusal] would set 
a  precedent  for  other  states,  for  Rumania,  for  example’.
105 This  argument  was 
repeatedly  used  during  the  ongoing  negotiations  by  pro Jewish  activists.
106 
Nevertheless, the omission of ‘the Jewish articles’ in the Czechoslovak treaty was 
indeed based on the facts that ‘the Jews were comparatively few in number […]; they 
did not constitute, as in Poland, a separate community with a different language, and, 
there was little tendency to persecute them’.
107 At the time, when anti Jewish riots 
were taking place in Czechoslovakia and only twenty years after the Hilsner Affair, 
two  very  important  notions  became  rooted  in  common  perception.  First, 
Czechoslovaks were tolerant and knew how to treat minorities, particularly the Jews: 
as  stressed  repeatedly  by  Masaryk  and  Beneš,  there  was  no  Jewish  question  in 
Czechoslovakia.
108 Second, the notion about Czechoslovak decency was to a large 
extent  based  on  the  comparison  with  other  countries  in  East Central  Europe, 
especially with Poland.  
How  is  it  possible  that  these  notions  were  immediately  rooted  in  the 
perception of Czechoslovakia by the outside world, especially in connection with a 
country that had been born only several months before the negotiations in Versailles 
took place? Furthermore, how could this be in relation to the country that refused the 
inclusion  of  ‘the  Jewish  articles’  into  its  minority  treaty  and  after  its  creation 
witnessed anti Jewish riots? The explanation of this phenomenon opens other issues 
that are significant for the study of Czechoslovak Jewish relations during the Second 
World War.  
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Although  ‘the  Jewish  articles’  were  not  embodied  in  the  Czechoslovak 
minority treaty signed in Versailles, some of the Jewish minority rights appeared in 
the Czechoslovak Constitution, or explicitly in the explanatory report to its Article 
128  of  29  February  1920.
109 Consequently,  Czechoslovakia  was  the  only  East 
Central European country that allowed Jews, who wanted to declare their nationality 
in the population census, to do so. This right was not based on their mother tongue, 
or  membership  in  religious  communities.
110 As  Hillel  Kieval  remarks,  ‘[i]n  the 
context  of  interwar  East  Central  Europe,  Czechoslovakia  concessions  to  Jewish 
nationalism [had been], in fact, unprecedented’.
111 But, why did the Czechoslovak 
Republic allow Jewish nationalists to declare their nationality freely and publicly? 
Concerning  the  internal  reasons,  the  role  of  Masaryk  and  his  sympathy  with  the 
Jewish national movement should not be left out. Furthermore, this concession did 
not cost the Czechoslovak Government very much. It did not mean any significant 
minority right and it was granted to all the other minorities (for example, Germans 
and Hungarians). 
 
Table no. 1: Nationality of the Czechoslovak Jews according to censuses 
in 1921 and 1930
112 
  1921  1930 
Jewish nationality  53.62 %  57.20 % 
Czechoslovak nationality  21.48 %  24.52 % 
German nationality  14.26 %  12.28 % 
Hungarian nationality  8.45 %  4.71 % 
Other nationality  1.83 %  1.29 % 
 
In fact the permission given to Jews to declare their Jewish nationality was 
significantly influenced by the Czechoslovaks’  desire to weaken the German and 
Hungarian minorities.
113 The citizens of Jewish nationality lived mostly in the border 
areas of the country and used German or Hungarian as their means of communication. 
Hence, once the Jews were allowed to register as members of the Jewish nation, the 
German and Hungarian nations were less prominent in the census in some of the 
crucial regions of the country. The fact that one of the main inter war Czechoslovak 
concessions to the Jewish minority came through an effort to weaken the remaining 
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minorities is fundamental to understanding developments during the Second World 
War. Consequently, the change of the Czechoslovak policy towards the Germans and 
Hungarians in the 1940s – the plans for the expulsion of these minorities – were to 
impact also on the position of the Jewish minority.  
However,  there  were  also  external  factors  in  play  –  the  pressure  of  the 
American Zionists and their influence as perceived by the Czechoslovak leadership. 
Sokolow, for example, threatened Beneš with the potential adverse effect that the 
Czechoslovaks’ rejection of the Jewish national demands might have had on their 
image among the American Zionists.
114 Additionally, Weizmann used the following 
argument concerning anti Semitic riots in Slovakia:  
 
The sympathy shown by the whole of Jewish opinion throughout the 
world to the struggles and triumph of the Czecho Slovakian nation is well 
known  to  you.  We believe  in  the  spirit  of  liberty  which  animates  the 
Czecho Slovakian people and the name of the President is a sufficient 
security  for  its  continuance.  […]  Our  appeal  to  you  is  therefore  the 
stronger, and we most urgently ask you to take all possible steps to check 
the  unworthy  anti semitic  agitation  now  being  carried  on  [in 
Czechoslovakia]  and  the  undignified  attitude  of  officials  in  Slovakia 
towards the Jews. No one would regret more than ourselves if, as a result 
of these occurrences in Slovakia, the Jewish and non Jewish circles of 
England,  America  and  other  Entente  countries,  which  have  always 
inclined to the Republic, should call public attention in their respective 
countries to the dangerous position of the Jews in Slovakia.
115 
 
Sokolow indeed remarked during a meeting of the Committee of Jewish 
Delegations that Masaryk ‘[did] not forget either the services which Brandeis and 
other  Jews  in  America  [had]  rendered  to  the  Czecho Slovakian  people,  with 
Wilson’.
116  
The observations by the Zionist leader were not entirely baseless. It brings 
us  to  another  key  factor  for  the  study  of  Czechoslovak Jewish  relations.  The 
Czechoslovak political leadership believed in the power possessed by the American 
Jews and their press. Masaryk revealed it in a conversation with the famous writer 
Karel Čapek:  
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Yet during the [First World War] I came to realize how useful it had 
been [Masaryk meant his defence of Hilsner – J. L.]. The world press is 
partly managed or financed by Jews; they knew me from the Hilsner case 
and repaid me by writing sympathetically about our cause – or fairly at 
least. That helped us a great deal politically.
117  
 
Later on, Masaryk repeated the same story, only instead of using ‘partly 
managed’ he used the connection ‘a great influence on newspapers in all the Allied 
countries’.
118 The  great  philosopher  and  humanist  Masaryk  was  still  able  to  use 
exactly the same anti Semitic trope that has always been at the bottom of all anti 
Jewish accusations. The perception of the alleged ‘power’ of the American Jews was 
generally widespread at that time and was accepted in their discourse even by liberal 
politicians.
119 Jews living in America were still seen as Jews not as Americans. They 
were supposed to act on behalf of the Jews in the world and to influence American 
public opinion in the direction they decided. In fact, the American Jewish politicians 
were also spreading the notion to enhance their position in political negotiations.
120 
Such beliefs contributed to the concession given to the national Jews in interwar 
Czechoslovakia.
  
After its consolidation, the first Czechoslovak Republic (1918 1938) did not 
witness any outburst of anti Semitic sentiments similar to the events between 1918 
and 1920.
121 Although anti Semitism existed in Czechoslovakia, the situation calmed 
down and was stabilised.
122  Thanks to the political and moral leadership of Masaryk 
and  later  Beneš,  public  pronunciation  of  anti Semitism  became  politically 
unacceptable for the most part.
123 Anti Semitic parties never gained many votes in 
the  elections.  Another  reason  for  the  limited  spread  of  anti Semitism  in 
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Czechoslovakia was the extensive secularization of the Czechs. Moreover, with the 
establishment of free Czechoslovakia, the national ambitions of Czechs and to some 
extent of Slovaks were satisfied.
124 This theory seems to be confirmed by the sudden 
rise of anti Semitism after Munich.  
Nevertheless,  negative  sentiments  against  some  parts  of  the  Jewish 
population existed in Czechoslovakia and were confirmed even by Beneš. Jews were 
seen by Czechs as tools of national oppression and contributors to the Germanization 
policy of the Hapsburg Empire. Indeed, in the case of Slovakia, Jews were repeatedly 
accused of supporting the former Hungarian rulers. The constant Jewish usage of the 
Hungarian language backed these accusations.
125 The previous Jewish assimilation to 
the German/Hungarian nation/s was, in Beneš’s eyes, one of the reasons why the 
Czechoslovak leadership welcomed the Jewish national revival. He stated: 
 
In old Austria, Jews frequently let themselves be used as instruments 
of Germanization, as tools of persecution of non Jewish nations [Völker]. 
The  Jewish  nationalist  movement,  which  allows  Jews  to  consider 
themselves as members of the Jewish nation, counteracts the repetition of 
such policy and is therefore in line with Czech state ideology. On the 
other hand, the Czech government does not want to exploit Jews in the 
same way, meaning as instruments for Czechization. It would be more 
beneficial if the Jews exist as an independent and neutral element [Die 
Juden kaemen als unabhaengiges neutrales Element viel wohltuender zur 
Geltung].
126 
 
Beneš’s  remarks  showed  that  Jews  were  not  entirely  trusted  by 
Czechoslovaks. However, as perceived, the fault was on the Jewish side, not on the 
Czech or Slovak. Thanks to the fulfilment of the Czech national ambitions, the issue 
of German Jews in Czechoslovakia ceased to be acute at that time. Nevertheless, as 
we will see later, the problem existed and came back with virulent power in the hour 
of the Czecho/Slovak nation’/s’ crisis.  
In his 1926 statement Beneš repeated the idea of the tolerant Czechoslovak 
attitude towards the Jews who, in his opinion, could freely function in the Republic. 
The  notion  of  Czechoslovak  exceptionality  was  strengthened  in  the  1930s  with 
totalitarian  and  authoritarian  regimes  surrounding  the  last  bastion  of  democracy. 
                                                 
124 Čapková, Kateřina, Češi, Němci, Židé? Národní identita Židů v Čechách 1918 1938, p. 26. 
125 Klein Pejšová,  Rebekah,  Among  the  Nationalities:  Jewish  Refugees,  Jewish  Nationality,  and 
Czechoslovak Statebuilding, pp. 94 98. 
126 Weizmann Archives, Chaim Weizmann Papers, Aufzeichnung ueber die Audienz von Sir Wyndham 
Deedes  und  Leo  Herrmann  bei  Dr.  Benes,  Minister  des  Auswartigen  der  Tschechoslowakischen 
Republik. Prag, am 23. Januar 1926. My translation. 40 
Almost all of the neighbouring countries – Hungary, Rumania, Poland, and of course 
Germany – introduced anti Jewish laws. This was not the case with Czechoslovakia. 
Moreover, when in 1935 Germany introduced the Nuremberg Laws, Beneš argued to 
Nahum  Goldmann,  a  prominent  Jewish  activist,  that  Jews  should  start  publicly 
campaigning  against  them.  The  Czechoslovak  Foreign Minister  and  an  important 
representative of the League of Nations did not speak only about protests against the 
German racial laws, but also about organizing ‘a fight against Hitlerism on all fronts’. 
He  promised  full  Czechoslovak  support.
127  There  were  obviously  also 
Czechoslovaks’ own interests in the fight against the Germans, besides any altruistic 
sympathies for Jews. Yet this statement further reinforced the Jewish trust in the 
Czechoslovak leadership.  
Oskar  Janowsky,  an  author  analysing  the  history  and  adherence  to  the 
minority treaties in East Central Europe, wrote in 1938: ‘Czechoslovakia does not 
persecute  Jews.’
128 Although  he  criticized  the  Czechoslovak  government  for  their 
treatment of Jewish employees among civil servants, he added that ‘it [wa]s difficult 
to  suspect  the  government  of  employing  methods  prevalent  in  Rumania  or 
Poland.’
129 In  his  opinion  the  ‘statesmen  of  Czechoslovakia  alone,  notably  the 
humane  Masaryk  and  his  discipline,  President  Beneš,  […]  manifested  an 
understanding of the problem [of minorities] and a desire to evolve a satisfactory 
solution.’
130  
This summary by Janowsky does not mean that the Czechoslovaks were, in 
reality, that tolerant or exceptional. The difference between the perception of events 
and the real state of affairs opens one of the main theoretical approaches of this thesis. 
The  historiography  of  Czechoslovak Jewish  relations  mostly  deals  with  the 
description of the events themselves and is not focused that much on the perception 
of the events by both interested parties. Nevertheless, it might have been indeed the 
perception of the events that was to play a key role during subsequent developments. 
It is indeed the perception of the other that is an important factor when evaluating 
relations between two parties. Both the Czechoslovaks and the Jewish leadership had 
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political agendas that they aimed to achieve and the misleading of the other party 
was a common feature of the negotiations. Hence a description and explanation of 
both of them, of the events themselves and of their perception by both actors, needs 
to be contextualised. A comparison with similar case studies and the continuity of 
events will be at the core of this thesis.  
However, even pure perception of the events by one of the parties is not a 
sufficient source for the description of mutual relations from the historian’s point of 
view. For example: when checking memoirs published by various Jewish politicians 
after the war, we can  without any doubt conclude that Czechoslovakia is always 
mentioned as the friendliest country towards the Jews. There is hardly any negative 
assessment of the Czechs’ attitude. The names of Masaryk, of his son Jan, and of 
Beneš are always pronounced with respect and admiration.
 131 However, can we be, 
as a result, convinced that the war time relations and the perception of the Czechs’ 
attitude towards the Jews were entirely positive? Could not the post war perception 
of Czechoslovaks be shaped by the situation during the Communist era, with anti 
Zionist and indeed anti Semitic campaign in Czechoslovakia and the non existence 
of Czechoslovak Israeli relations? In this comparison, the Czechoslovak record prior 
to the Communist coup must appear positive.  
The image of democratic Czechoslovakia was one of the main assets of 
Masaryk’s and Beneš’s foreign policy. The fair treatment of Jews and comparison 
with the other neighbouring countries were the crucial elements of this notion. The 
perception  of  the  Czechoslovak  government,  of  Masaryk  and  Beneš,  had  a  firm 
position among international Jewish public even at the end of the inter war period. 
At the same time, in the Czechoslovaks’ perception, the pro Jewish politicians in the 
USA  contributed  to  the  creation  of  Czechoslovakia  and  were  influential  in 
international  politics.
132 Being  on  good  terms  with  these  actors  was  considered 
                                                 
131 For example, Gerhart Riegner wrote about Beneš as a great friend of the Jewish people. Also 
Goldmann and Weizmann wrote purely in positive terms. See: Riegner, Gerhart M., Never Despair. 
Sixty Years in the Service of the Jewish People and the Cause of Human Rights (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 
2006), p. 52; Weizmann, Chaim, Trial and Error: the autobiography of Chaim Weizmann (London: 
East and West Library, 1950), pp. 500 501; Goldmann,  Nahum, Memories: the autobiography of 
Nahum Goldmann. The story of a lifelong battle by world Jewry's ambassador at large (London : 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970), pp. 148 149, 243. 
132 For example, the role of the Congressman Adolph J. Sabath in the creation of Czechoslovakia is 
often mentioned. Sabath was born in Záboří, Bohemia, and was of Jewish background. He was among 
the  politicians  who  opposed  Wilson’s  plans  for  the  separate  peace  with  Austria Hungary  and 
promoted the idea of self determination for various nations of the Monarchy, particularly Czechs. 
Furthermore, Sabath was instrumental in organizing of the meeting between Wilson and Masaryk that 42 
essential. The thesis first of all aims to analyse how the Czechoslovak treatment of 
the Jews developed during the war when challenged by the resurgent  Czech and 
Slovak  nationalisms.  Yet  it  will  also  answer  the  question  of  how  this  changing 
attitude towards the Jews was reconciled with the Czechoslovaks’ efforts to maintain 
the image of a democratic country and being on good terms with international Jewish 
organizations.  
The  sources  selected  for  this  thesis  correspond  with  the  methodological 
approach that sets the Czechoslovak case study in a comparative analysis. Primary 
sources are constituted mostly by documentation of official provenance. The thesis is 
to a large extent a diplomatic history. It deals with the issues of high politics, of 
political negotiations conducted in the highest strata of the Allied political leadership 
during the war. Most of the archival sources are of Czechoslovak official provenance 
and  will  provide  material  for  the  main  body  of  the  thesis.  These  are  especially 
governmental  papers,  for  example,  of  President  Edvard  Beneš,  the  Council  of 
Ministers, and the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice and Social Welfare. 
They  should  supply  information  for  understanding  the  internal  mechanisms  that 
functioned within the Czechoslovak exile government’s structure.  
Furthermore,  the  thesis  enquires  into  the  perception  of  the  Czechoslovak 
policy  towards  the  Jews  by  other  actors  who  were  involved  in  the  political 
negotiations  during  the  war.  Hence  primary  sources  from  outside  of  the 
Czechoslovak circles, especially of various Jewish organizations and the Allies (the 
American, British, and Polish governments) were consulted. The main focus of the 
thesis is to understand mutual perception of the Czechoslovak Jewish relations by all 
relevant actors. The papers of the World Jewish Congress, especially, provide an 
insight  into  the  changing  perspective  of  the  Czechoslovak  exiles’  treatment  of 
minorities, in this case the Jews.
133   
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Aside from the papers of the official authorities, private papers of individuals 
involved in the Czechoslovak Jewish relations during the war have been studied.  
The  information  contained  in  private  documents  is  used  to  reveal  influences  or 
intentions  hidden  behind  the  official  scene.
134  For  illustration  of  the  public 
presentation  of  the  Czechoslovak Jewish  relations  during  the  war,  selected 
newspapers, from all interested parties, were also consulted.
135   
The thesis is divided into five chapters and deals mostly with the situation 
in  Czechoslovakia  and  among  the  Czechoslovak  exiles  between  the  Munich 
Agreement in late September 1938 and the Communist Coup in February 1948. The 
main  focus  is  on  the  Czechoslovak  Government in Exile  that  existed  in  London 
between 1940 and 1945. Yet the examination of the theme starts from the formation 
of the Czechoslovak exile resistance after Munich and follows also the development 
in liberated Czechoslovakia. Hence it will analyse not only the political programme 
and  plans  prepared  by  the  exiles  during  the  war  in  London,  but  also  their 
implementation and new influences that shaped the plans in post war Czechoslovakia. 
The thesis generally follows the development in chronological order, but I also want 
to stress the thematic element. Hence the first chapter is focused on one of the main 
influences that shaped the exiles’ policy during the war: the attitude of people in the 
occupied homeland and of the main resistance groups towards the Jews. How did 
they influence the Czechoslovak exiles’ policy towards the Jews? 
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CHAPTER 1: CZECHO/SLOVAK UNDERGROUND MOVEMENTS, PEOPLE IN 
THE OCCUPIED HOMELAND, THE JEWS AND THE GOVERNMENT IN EXILE 
     
It is the general opinion that after 
the war Jews will not dare to go in for 
politics or take part in public life, or 
be doctors or lawyers.   
 
Report about the situation in the 
Protectorate (1942)
136 
 
Introduction 
Exile  governments  form  a  specific  subcategory  among  the  bystanders  to  the 
Holocaust during World War 2. Although the response of the outside world to the 
Nazi persecution of the Jews has been an important theme of historical research in 
the recent decades, many questions, especially in connection with this sub category, 
remain unresolved. For example, a common taxonomy of the exiled bystanders has 
yet to be presented. As a matter of fact, the factors shaping exiles’ responses to the 
Jewish plight were fundamentally different than those influencing the policies of the 
major Allies. It does not mean that this chapter seeks to argue that the relations in the 
process of each particular bystander’s policy formation necessarily differed. Instead, 
the actors and factors that influenced exiles’ policy making had particular origins. 
Special attention will be paid to the connection between the broad masses of people 
in occupied countries and their representatives – the resistance movements abroad. 
The policies of the American and British governments, concerning, for example, the 
admission of immigrants were influenced by the sentiments prevailing among the 
population, by economic considerations and by the fear of possible ‘racial problems’ 
within their own societies.
137 The population of the western countries, not occupied 
by  foreign  armies  and  not  facing  the  Nazi  persecution,  still  influenced  their 
governments to defend the perceived national self interest.  
What, then, was the situation with the exile governments whose populations 
were indeed witnessing the true meaning of the Nazi ‘new order’? The population in 
occupied countries did not posses the means to control directly its representatives 
abroad. Yet, the exiles were supposed to be answerable to the people at home, whom 
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they  claimed  to be  representing.  In  order  to be  recognised  diplomatically by  the 
major  Allies,  the  exiles  had  to  prove  recognition  and  support  by  people  in  the 
homeland.
138 The exiles were in contact with underground leaders and they wanted to 
influence each other. Therefore, the information transmitted in both directions did 
not have to correspond entirely with the real situation either in exile or in the country. 
We can presume that both the underground leaders and the exiles coined their views 
on the Jewish issues. But, did the general population have any influence on the exile 
government’s Jewish policy and if so, in which direction? These contacts between 
underground movements and the exiles are one of the main factors that make a case 
study  on  an  exiled  bystander  unique.  Thus,  by  analysing  the  Czech  and  Slovak 
underground groups’ perception of the Jews, this chapter will provide an important 
part of the framework for the following examination of the exiles’ policy itself.  
  Case studies of the other exiles, particularly the Poles and French, help to 
identify the main issues to be examined with regard to Czechoslovak exiles’ contacts 
with the homeland. The core of the chapter is focused on underground reports that 
contributed to the formulation of the exiles’ policy towards the Jews. The validity of 
this hypothesis is partially examined through an analysis of mutual contacts between 
the exiles and home underground groups. It serves as a preliminary explanation of 
the degree to which the underground groups shaped the exiles’ policy. Nonetheless, 
the  Slovak  underground  movement  developed  independently  from  the  Czech 
resistance. Hence it is dealt with separately. This approach is necessary also because 
of  the  different  nature  of  the  war  experience  in  Slovakia  and  Slovaks’  extensive 
collaboration in the ‘Final Solution’.   
 
Underground movements in occupied countries and the Jews 
  As  argued by  David  Engel,  after  the  occupation  of Poland,  Polish Jewish 
relations were ‘determined according to a new set of factors, not the least important 
of which was each group’s estimation of the other’s willingness and ability to assist 
it  in  the  achievement  of  its  aims  vis à vis  the  occupiers’.
139 The  main  feature 
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accompanying  the  occupation  of  Poland,  but  generally  of  every  country  in  Nazi 
Europe,  was  a  rise  (or  continuity)  of powerful  nationalisms.  The  interests  of  the 
nation  became  the  main  factors  shaping  the  policy formation  of  resistance 
movements.  Furthermore,  very  often  the  most  nationalistically  radical  elements 
within  society,  among  them  former  members  of  the  officer  corps  or  politicians, 
reached the highest echelons in the fight against the Nazis. This strong nationalism 
excluded any elements not fitting into the framework of an unconditional fight in the 
interests of a nation. Thus it became an essential factor in the relation between the 
major population and the Jewish minority as well. Non Jews in occupied countries 
wanted  Jews  to join  the  common  struggle  unconditionally.  Any  deviation  in  this 
process  was  to  have  consequences  at  the  hour  of  liberation,  but  also  during  the 
occupation.  
  Despite  the  fact  that  there  is  not  any  synoptic  piece  of  historical  writing 
dealing  with  the  topic  under  consideration,  the  present  historiography  still  offers 
research dealing with the main factors of this chapter. Engel and Poznanski are in 
agreement that the messages transmitted by home resistance movements did indeed 
have an influence on the decision making of the exiles.
140 At the same time, both 
share the view that their impact was mostly negative. For example, in February 1940, 
Jan Kozielewski (née Karski), a Polish underground courier, prepared a report about 
the Jews in the occupied homeland.
141 His account and other reports transmitted to 
the exiles negatively described the Polish Jewish relations in occupied Poland. The 
attitude  of  the  Poles  to  the  Jewish  population  was  depicted  as  being  at  best 
ambivalent,  but  generally  hostile.  The  parts  of  the  report  presenting  the  Jews 
welcoming  the  Soviet  occupation  forces  in  the  eastern  Polish  territories  were 
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highlighted.
 142 By  alleged  collaboration  with  the  Soviets,  who  together  with  the 
Germans occupied Poland, the Jews were betraying the Polish nation.
143 Thus any 
action on behalf of the Jews, for example, a political declaration about their post war 
status,  or  request  of  their  support  by  the  Polish  underground,  was  seen  by  the 
Sikorski government as complicating their own political stance in the homeland.
144 
In this manner, the underground movements shaped the policy of the western Polish 
government.  
As  argued  by  Poznanski,  the  reasons  for  the  Free  French  carefulness  in 
dealing with the ‘Jewish question’ were to some extent different. The motive was 
actually not the reports depicting French attitude towards the Jews, but the worries of 
the possible effectiveness of the German propaganda that was presenting De Gaulle 
as being controlled by the Jews.
145 Well known is the story of the Nobel Prize award 
winner  René  Cassin  who  initially  rejected  an  offer  to  join  the  leadership  of  De 
Gaulle’s Free French. Cassin did not want to compromise the French resistance by 
his Jewish origins.
146 Moreover, Poznanski proves that these political considerations 
of the Free French played a vital role in decisions about broadcasting on the BBC.
147 
A  notion  existed  among  the  exiles  in  London  that  the  Jewish  presence  was  too 
prominent and might cause harm to the resistance. It suggests that besides the reports 
of the Czech and Slovak underground, Poznanski’s conclusion about the role of Nazi 
and collaborationist propaganda also needs to be taken into account. 
 
Czechs’ attitudes towards the Jews in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia 
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The  historiography  is  in  agreement  that  the  attitude  of  ordinary  Czechs 
towards the Jews in the Protectorate was positive and humane.
148 People expressed 
their solidarity with the suffering Jews and also extended some basic help to their 
unfortunate plight. Although it seems that only a low number of Jews survived in 
hiding  in  the  Protectorate,
149 the  explanation  for  this  can  largely be put  down to 
geographical,  demographic  and  political  factors.  Concerning  the  Czechs’  attitude 
towards  the  Jews  in  the  first  war years,  the  Protectorate  Sicherheitsdienst  (SD) 
situational reports have been utilised. Based on the reports, it has been assumed that 
the  Czechs’  attitude  towards  Jews  became  a  serious  problem  for  the  occupation 
authorities.
150 This assessment appeared especially in the autumn of 1941 at the time 
of the branding of Jews with the Star of David and preparations for the deportations 
to the east.
151  
These positive accounts notwithstanding, anti Semitism had long history in 
the historical lands of Bohemia and Moravia. Besides the traditional Catholic sources 
of anti Semitism, or anti Judaism, economic and social tensions can be documented 
throughout the centuries. Furthermore, a special variety of anti Semitism, developed 
in  the  nineteenth  century  historical  lands,  tended to perceive  Jewish  cultural  and 
linguistic identification with Germans.
152 These prejudices survived the fall of the 
Hapsburg Empire, although they were not strongly articulated in the interwar period 
when  Czechs  dominated  the  newly  founded  Republic.  Yet  the  collapse  of  the 
Republic  in  1938  caused  their  revival.  Additionally,  after  Munich,  racial  anti 
Semitism  was  taken  from  the  Nazis  and  partly  introduced  in  the  Second 
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Czechoslovak  Republic,  for  example,  in  professional  associations.
153  However, 
historians are in agreement that the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia changed this 
trend, by revealing to the Czechs the real culprit of the national catastrophe.
154 
Crude  Czech  anti Semitic  circles,  who  were  active  collaborators  with  the 
Nazi authorities, never received any significant support among ordinary Czechs.
155 
Although the Czech fascist groups, for example, the Banner, tried to stir anti Jewish 
violence in the streets of Czech towns during 1939, Czech people never took part.
156 
In addition, the German authorities understood the limited support Czech fascists had 
in the society and used them only as a threat to the Protectorate government, as a 
proof that they had other forces in case the ministers did not cooperate.
157 
The  historiography  of  the  Holocaust  in  Bohemia  and Moravia praises  the 
Protectorate government of the General Alois Eliáš for its alleged opposition against 
the  implementation  of  the  strict  Nuremberg  Laws  in  the  Protectorate.
158  The 
definition of a Jew, as proposed by the government, was indeed more lenient than the 
final law adopted by Konstantin von Neurath, the Reichsprotektor. Yet, the attitude 
of the Protectorate government was driven, at least partially, by their concerns that a 
wider definition of a Jew would transfer too much property from Czech hands to the 
Germans. Any company with a Jew (as defined by the law) in its management was 
designated for Aryanization. The struggle for the definition of a Jew was decided 
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unilaterally by the Reichsprotektor von Neurath himself on 21 June 1939, and the 
German version of the Nuremberg laws was introduced in the Protectorate.
159  
The  Protectorate  government  developed  further  initiatives  to  limit  the 
position of the Jews in the society even during the following months and years.
160 
The  National  Alliance  (Národní  souručenství)  was  the  only  quasi political 
organization  allowed  in  the  Protectorate,  associating  almost  the  whole  adult 
population.
161 In 1940, anti Semitic activists gained the upper hand in its leadership 
and introduced ‘Jewish decrees’ regulating the contacts between the members of the 
Alliance and the Jews. Nevertheless, the decrees caused indignation in the society 
and most of them had to be repealed.
162 This conflict documents that the situation in 
the Protectorate was complex and also the involvement of the Czechs, on various 
levels, must not be marginalised.
163 Only Heydrich’s arrival in Prague at the end of 
September 1941 as the Deputy Reichsprotektor and the beginning of the deportations 
finally moved all the initiatives into the hands of the German administration.
164 
During  the  war,  the  information  about  the  Czechs’  unyielding  positive 
treatment of Jews filled columns in the western press.
 165 However, when looking 
into the reasons for the Czechs’ behaviour, Miroslav Kárný argued that it was more 
in line with ‘the Germans’ enemy is our friend’.
166 Indeed, an SD report from August 
1942 stated that public support for the Jews, for example during deportations, was 
perceived  by  the  Czechs  as  a  way  of  expressing  anti German  sentiments.
167 
Furthermore, the Czechs were afraid that after the Jews it would be their turn. In this 
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respect, Kárný concluded that the ‘ever more evident link’ to ‘the "solution of the 
Czech  question"  had  a  much  stronger  impact’  on  Czechs’  sympathies  with  the 
Jews.
168  
SD and Gestapo reports for 1943 and 1944 presented a complex image of the 
Czechs’ attitude towards the Jews. The Gestapo repeatedly reported the significant 
help offered by ordinary Czechs to the Jews trying to avoid deportations.
169 Yet, the 
SD  in  late  1943  concluded  that  more  and  more  Czechs  appreciated  the  German 
cleansing of the Protectorate of its Jewry and that they did not wish the Jews to 
return.
170 The majority of the Czechs were allegedly against the Jewish presence in 
Bohemia and Moravia and hoped that the Jews would not be willing to come back 
after  the  war.
171 This  report  cannot  be  dismissed  as  pure  German  propaganda, 
especially when taking into account the previous SD reports condemning Czechs for 
their sympathies with the persecuted Jews. Likewise, the SD later stated that with the 
changing military and political situation in Europe, some Czech circles behaved in a 
friendlier manner towards the remaining Jews. The SD concluded that even those 
Czechs, who resented the Jews, had sought political advantages in the case of the 
anticipated Allied victory  and the Jewish return to Bohemia and Moravia.
172 The 
change  documented  by  the  SD  approximately  between  1942  and  1943  is  highly 
significant. Reports describing Czechs’ sympathies with the Jews were replaced by 
those documenting Czech negative perceptions of the persecuted minority. 
Do  these  reports  suggest  a  negative  change  with  regard  to  the  Czechs’ 
perception  of  the  Jews  during  the  war?  SD  and  Gestapo  documents  offer  an 
important insight into the situation in the Protectorate. But caution is necessary when 
dealing  with  these  documents.  The  reports  were  prepared  by  criminal  agencies, 
following their own policies and the information cannot be taken at face value. Yet 
these reports were intended only for internal use. Hence we can accept that they 
might present the situation as it was perceived in order that adequate measures might 
be taken. In any case, cross referencing with other sources is desirable.  
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There is a lack of any comprehensive study that would analyse the Czechs’ 
attitude  towards  the  Jews  in  the  Protectorate,  but  some  documents  from  the 
provenience of the Czechoslovak resistance circles tend to confirm Nazi observations. 
Anti Semitic prejudices could be documented among some of the resistance leaders 
and  Czech  intellectuals.
173 Furthermore,  an  article  from  underground  Přítomnost, 
published  in  March  1943,  revealed  anti Jewish  sentiments  among  Czech 
underground groups.
 174 A similar analysis was presented by Emil Sobota, a pre war 
official  in  Beneš’s  presidential  office.  Sobota  did  not  condemn  Jews  on  racial 
grounds. However, sections of the Jews were labelled as an  anti social and anti 
Czech entity.
175 The brutal Nazi policy aroused Czech sympathies for the persecuted 
minority. However, the Aryanization allegedly confirmed to the Czech people the 
disproportionate wealth owned by the Jews. Sobota emphasised that the following 
development would be dependent on the solution of the ‘Jewish question’ by the 
post war administration. Only ‘social justice’ in the restitution of the Jews would 
cause  the  eradication  of  anti Semitism  in  Czechoslovakia.  If  handled  otherwise, 
Sobota  concluded,  even  stronger  anti Semitism  would  emerge  among  the  Czech 
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people.
176 As  noted  by  Sobota,  the  majority  of  the  Czechs  avoided  any  direct 
involvement in the Nazi anti Jewish policy. Yet there was a part of Czech society 
that joined the Nazi racial struggle and their efforts had an influence on the exiles as 
well.  
 
Anti Semitic Propaganda in the Protectorate and the exiles 
In  the  September  1941  issue  of  Harper’s  Magazine,  Benjamin  Akzin,  a 
revisionist Zionist, published an article called ‘The Jewish question after the war’.
177 
Akzin concluded that there was no place for the Jews in post war Europe and the 
only  solution  was  their  emigration  to  Palestine.  Even  more  significant  was  the 
argumentation  used  by  Akzin.  He  opened  the  article  with  remarks  made  by  Jan 
Masaryk in early 1940. Masaryk, who later became the Czechoslovak exile Foreign 
Minister, was to assure a public gathering in London that all the Jewish émigrés 
would eventually come back with him to liberated Czechoslovakia. This statement 
received wide publicity, but was taken over by the German authorities.
178 German 
propaganda allegedly used it to win over the public support in the Protectorate. The 
Germans warned people that, thanks to the exiles, the Jews would come back and 
would  claim  all  their  property.
179  Consequently,  according  to  Akzin,  the 
Czechoslovak exiles, concerned about the response at home,  
began anxiously inquiring whether an adequate and humane solution 
could  be  found  for  these  refugees  other  than  their  return  to 
Czechoslovakia. Not stopping there, these liberal Czechs, never before 
impressed by the need for Jewish emigration from Europe, suddenly 
embarked  on  a  feverish  if  discreet  search  for  an  outlet  which  could 
absorb many of the Jews who remained in Bohemia and Moravia and 
who,  once  the  war  is  over,  would  like  to  find  a  better  future 
elsewhere.
180  
 
In fact, Akzin did not condemn the exiles for this reaction. It was impossible 
to ask the ‘liberal leaders’ to throw the non Jews out of their jobs and give them back 
                                                 
176 Ibid. 
177 Akzin, Benjamin, ‘The Jewish Question after the War’, in Harper’s Magazine, September 1941, pp. 
430 440. 
178 Ibid., 430. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid.  54 
to  the  Jews.  It  would  have  questioned  the  authority  of  the  Czechoslovak 
leadership.
181  
 
 
Image no. 3: Jan Masaryk
182 
Hence  Akzin  already  during  the  war  publicly  identified  one  of  the  most 
important influences that shaped the exile governments’ Jewish policy: the voice of 
the people in occupied countries, or, better formulated, its perception by the exiles. 
Furthermore,  he  confirmed  that  the  Nazis  used  ‘the  Jewish  Question’  in  their 
propaganda war against the exiles.  
Anti Semitism  belonged  to  the  main  themes  of  Nazi  and  collaborationist 
propaganda machinery across the whole of occupied Europe.
183 The main bearers of 
anti Semitic propaganda at the onset of the German occupation of the historical lands 
were  Czech  fascist  groups.  The  Jews  were  accused  of  all  the  misfortunes  of  the 
Czech nation, especially of the rule in the inter war Republic, the opposition against 
Czech German rapprochement that led to Munich and of their role in the Bolshevist 
Soviet  regime  (Judaeobolshevism),  one  of  the  Allies  of  the  Beneš  pre war 
Republic.
184 More influential was a group of Protectorate activist journalists, formed 
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around Vladimír Krychtálek, Karel Lažnovký and Emanuel Vajtauer.
185 Additionally, 
among the politicians, the main role in anti Semitic propaganda was played by the 
renegade  former  Colonel  of  the  Czechoslovak  army,  Emanuel  Moravec,  often 
labelled  the  Czech  Quisling.  In  January  1942,  Moravec  became  the  Minister  of 
education and national enlightenment.
186 The rest of the Czech Protectorate ministers, 
including  the  State  President  Hácha,  mostly  avoided  any  overt  anti Semitic 
proclamations.  
Jeffrey Herf proves that one of the main themes of Nazi propaganda was 
accusing London and the Allies of waging the war in Jewish interests.
187  Goebbels 
diaries are also full of references to the Jewish role in the Allied radio propaganda.
188 
The  link  made  between  the  Czechoslovak  government in exile  and  the  Jewish 
interests  was  one  of  the  main  features  of  the  Protectorate  collaborationist 
propaganda.
189 For example, Krychtálek described the Beneš exile administration as 
full of Jews (members of the parliament Julius Friedman, Julius Fürth, or of the 
government, the Minister of State, later the Minister of Justice, Jaroslav Stránský).
 190 
The Beneš government’s struggle for political freedom was presented as waging war 
on  behalf  of  the  Jews,  for  their  money  and  in  their  interests.  The  Protectorate 
journalists were indeed not only searching for ‘Jews’ among the exile politicians, but 
also among their relatives.
 191 Hence they ‘revealed’ Jewish relatives in the case of 
Bohumil  Laušman,  a  member  of  the  State  Council  and  an  important  Social 
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Democrat
192 and Hubert Ripka, the head of the exiles’ propaganda.
193 The labelling 
of the President Beneš as a ‘White Jew’, a term used for non Jews ‘fraternizing’ with 
Jews, was common.
194 Krychtálek in his February 1941 article continued:  
[D]o you really think that Mr Beneš uses his own funds? He has never 
done that. So, in order to sustain his gang, he has only the money given to 
him by Jews, and one day the Jews would like to request the money to be 
paid  back,  but  of  course  not  from  his  [Beneš’s]  funds,  but  from  the 
calluses of the Czech nation. Because if Beneš should some day come 
back, then it would be with a pack of bloodthirsty Jewish hyenas, and 
then all the people here would at once become Jewish slaves. England 
and America are entirely in thrall to the Jews, our London and American 
emigration is in thrall to them; even Beneš himself is in their thrall.
195  
 
This article was largely a response to the Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA) 
report  about  Czechoslovak  Zionists’  demand  for  representation  in  the  exile 
parliament.
196 The  article  thus  documents  that  the  Protectorate  activist  journalists 
followed the development among the exiles and responded aggressively. We also 
know that the Beneš government was informed about these reports published in the 
Protectorate press.
197  
Reports sent to London by the Czech underground movement can be used in 
order  to  assess  the  impact  of  this  propaganda  on  Czech  and  Slovak  people. 
Nevertheless, the reports can hardly be seen as expressing the opinion of the nation 
as a whole. They rather revealed the sentiments of specific resistance groups, very 
often consisting of several tens or maybe hundreds of people. The exiles understood 
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the limitations of these reports and did not take them at face value as an expression 
of the Czech people’s sentiments.
 198  
A home resistance organization warned the exiles as early as December 1939 
that the Czech people resented the presence of so many Jews in Beneš’s entourage.
199 
Another report from Prague in the early spring of 1942 stated:  
  
Naturally the propaganda which alleges that all the influential places 
with us were secured by the Jews has a lot of influence even in the 
circles which are otherwise disinterested, and account must be taken of 
this fact.
200  
 
Later, at the end of 1944, a report sent by a certain Tristan XY (probably 
Vladimír  Tůma)  confirmed  that  the  Czechs  were  receptive  to  this  part  of  Nazi 
propaganda: ‘There is here […] a kind of anti Semitism that after all has become 
slightly stronger, partly thanks to propaganda, as well as with the experience with the 
often cowardly behaviour of the Jews during these years’.
201 Other reports confirmed 
the conclusions, presented by Akzin in 1941 that much apprehension existed among 
the Czechs that the exiles would bring back, upon their return to the country, all the 
Jewish émigrés and would reinstate them to their previous positions: ‘It should be 
taken into consideration that after the war anti Semitism will grow substantially, and 
that all those who will try to ease and assist the return of the Jews will meet with 
opposition’.
202 Additionally, in March 1944, Arnošt Frischer – an exiled Zionist in 
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the Czechoslovak State Council – warned Beneš that Nazi anti Semitism would not 
disappear immediately after the liberation.
203 
The  exiles  were  concerned  about  the  possible  effects  of  anti Semitic 
propaganda. The Association of Czechs Jews, an organization of the exiled Jewish 
assimilationists, argued in 1942 that the Protectorate propaganda stories about Jewish 
role  among  the  exiles  had  an  effect  on  the  Beneš  government.
204 The  result, 
according to the assimilationists, was the suppression of the Jewish element in the 
ranks  of  the  exile  administration.
205 Furthermore  Masaryk,  the  Foreign  Minister, 
upon  returning  from  one  of  his  stays  in  the  United States,  expressed  amazement 
about what he perceived as the Judaization (užidovštění) of the Foreign Ministry 
since he had been abroad. He thought it might have caused troubles to the exiles.
206 
The  source  of  Masaryk’s  worries  has  to  be  sought  exactly  in  the  possible 
confirmation of the Protectorate propaganda stories. Indeed, during a conversation 
with  the  WJC  representatives  in  London,  Beneš  emphasized  that  he  was  being 
attacked daily by Protectorate propaganda and was being presented as being under 
Jewish influence.
207 It was, according to the President, one of the reasons why he was 
reluctant to include a Jew in the exile parliament, the State Council.
208 Based on 
these conclusions, we should turn our attention to the reports revealing to the exiles 
the perception of the Jews by home underground groups.  
 
The Czechoslovak Exiles’ dependency on the public opinion at home  
The exiles’ concerns about the efficiency of Nazi anti Semitic propaganda 
might have been reinforced by reports sent to London by underground groups. The 
government was aware that home resistance depicted the situation according to their 
own perception, pursuing their own policy and trying to influence the exiles. The 
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reports could not be taken as all encompassing.
209 Yet the reports served to the exiles 
as a good guide documenting sentiments among people at home.
210 The policy of the 
exiles was shaped by two main factors: home underground reports and the exiles’ 
diplomatic contacts abroad. Complying with both of them, it was hoped, would lead 
to them being the recognised government of the whole population on their return. 
This was the alpha and omega of their very existence.  
The relations between the exiles and home branches of the resistance were 
complex. In London, Beneš stressed his dependency on public opinion at home. In 
his words, the exiled statesmen  
could make only such decisions which they were convinced would 
ultimately  be  ratified  by  their  nationals.  […]  [A]s  they  were  acting 
outside their countries, they had to be doubly careful in formulating 
what they considered to be the real views of their people.
211  
 
This  statement  notwithstanding,  the  Czechoslovak  President  was  an 
experienced  diplomat,  whose  public  statements  need  to  be  carefully  examined 
alongside his decisions reached in private. There are known cases when Beneš acted 
against the will of the home resistance movement.
212 Also with the progress of the 
war,  the  significance  of  the  underground  movement  in  the  Protectorate  was 
diminishing. No representative of the home resistance was called on the first post 
war government.
213 Nevertheless, this was an outcome of a development that no one 
could have predicted during the war and the influence of underground groups on 
Beneš’s policy, especially in the first war years, cannot simply be ignored.  
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Consequently,  this  chapter  only  opens  the  issue  of  the  exiles’  policy 
formation, by presenting the image the exiles had about demands of people in the 
occupied homeland. In the case of political plans, or decision making, the influence 
of the home resistance has to be taken into account. However, there are cases when 
the impact of the home resistance seems easier to document. This is the case with the 
contacts between the exiles and the population in the homeland – for example, the 
Czechoslovak  BBC  section  broadcasts.  Analysis  of  these  serves  to  confirm  the 
hypothesis  concerning  underground  groups’  influence  on  the  exiles’  policy. 
Subsequently, this influence will be considered in the following chapters, examining 
the exiles’ treatment of the so called ‘Jewish question’ during and after the war. 
In relation to the reports sent to the exiles, the issue of who was actually in 
charge – or, more precisely, who was capable of informing the exiles – needs to be 
addressed.  The  contacts  between  the  Czechoslovak  home  and  exile  resistance 
movements were maintained mainly via radio transmissions or broadcasts, by courier 
services, or orally by people who escaped from the Protectorate and Slovakia and 
who  were  later  interviewed  by  the  Czechoslovak  authorities  in  neutral  or  allied 
countries.
214 This suggests that the means of communication with the exiles were the 
privilege of a small circle of underground resistance fighters. Moreover, reports to 
London by an occasional refugee did not carry the weight of a report sent by the 
recognised resistance in Czechoslovakia.  
Who were the main leaders of the Czechoslovak underground movement? A 
basic line needs to be drawn between the historical lands and Slovakia. A strong 
underground structure in Slovakia, with the programme of a common Czechoslovak 
state and links to London did not develop until 1943. This was the time when the 
mainstream Czech underground political movements had already ceased to exist.
215 
The first resistance structures in Bohemia and Moravia emerged immediately after 
Munich,  many  years  before  any  significant  non Communist  illegal  organisations 
appeared in Slovakia. Pro Beneš politicians, who remained at home, played a major 
role  in  the  movement.  It  was  the  ex President,  now  in  London,  who  gradually 
assumed the leadership and was accepted by the resistance. The first organisations of 
                                                 
214 Kokoška, Stanislav, ‘Dvě neznámé zprávy z okupované Prahy o postavení židovského obyvatelstva 
v Protektorátě’, in Terezínské studie a dokumenty 1997, p. 30. 
215 Jablonický, Jozef, Z ilegality do povstania : Kapitoly z občianského odboja. (Bratislava: Epocha, 
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the civic movement, for example Political Headquarters (Politické ústředí), Petition 
Committee We Remain Faithful (Petiční výbor Věrni zústaneme), or The Defence of 
the  Nation  (Obrana  národa)  were  led  by  experienced  politicians  and  soldiers.
216 
Although  the  radicalisation  of  the  movement,  in  the  national  sense,  was  already 
clearly  visible,  their  political  programme  still  remained  moderate,  even  in  their 
attitude  towards  the  Germans.
217 Besides  the  civic  underground,  the  Communist 
structure was also founded.
218 Its importance was constantly increasing, especially 
after 22 June 1941, but the Communists did not maintain contacts with the exiles in 
London.   
The first generation of the Czech resistance was crushed by the Germans by 
the winter of 1939/1940 and its leaders were either captured, or escaped abroad, to 
exile.
219 In early 1940, a new, radical generation entered the scene and acquired a 
strongly articulated anti German (not anti Nazi) programme of the total elimination 
of the whole German element in Czechoslovakia.
220 The programme was influenced 
by the radicalization of the German occupation policy in the autumn of 1939 (closure 
of  universities,  arrest  of  the  resistance  leaders).
221  Furthermore,  widespread 
condemnation  of  the  economic  and  social  system  in  the  pre war  Republic  ruled 
among the Czechs. The population generally expressed more leftist tendencies and 
demanded  broader  participation  in  the  economy,  going  as  far  as  advocating  the 
nationalization of key industries.
222 
The  first  political  messages  about  the  Jewish  position  in  post war 
Czechoslovakia  already  reached  the  west  shortly  after  the  beginning  of  the 
occupation in 1939. Concerning their content, the home resistance’s reports dealing 
with Jews could be summarized into several sections. The first distinction should be 
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1945, pp. 101 113 and pp. 213 220. 
222 Brandes, Detlef, Češi pod německým protektorátem. Okupační politika, kolaborace a odboj 1939 
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drawn between the messages actually revealing the attitude of the home resistance 
cells  and  those  only  forwarding  Protectorate  propaganda.    When  evaluating  the 
former,  the  underground  cells’  reports  contained  four  groups  of  information  in 
relation with the Jews:  
1)   The general political programme; 
2)  Overall attitude of the population towards minorities and in particular 
the Jews;  
3)   Information about the Jewish plight; by revealing or suppressing it, or 
by expressing ambivalence to the Jewish plight, the resistance movement showed its 
attitude, possibly influencing the government in exile;   
4)   Political reports, in the sense of statements on how the post war status 
of Czechoslovak Jews should be solved and how the resistance movement viewed 
the restitution and rehabilitation of the Jews in Czechoslovakia.  
 
Reports sent by Protectorate resistance groups to London 
Whilst the Protectorate propaganda attacks on Beneš were part of the war 
between the Axis and the Allies, the Czechoslovak resistance movement’s views of 
‘the Jewish question’ had to be considered by the exiles even more seriously. The 
Jewish question was not of the utmost importance for the home underground groups. 
The resistance was more interested in the general issues of minorities, especially the 
Germans.  Nevertheless,  their  perception  of  the  German  problem  is  revealing  on 
minority  (in  particular  Jewish)  issues  in  general.  Czech  national  interests  were  a 
common  feature  of  the  reports  sent  to  London.  The  Czechs,  as  a  nation,  felt 
abandoned  by  their  Allies,  but  also  by  people  actually  living  with  them  in  the 
common state – by minorities. Concerns for the future Czechoslovak state allowed 
the resistance to suppress the interests of other nations or people who were living in 
the same territory and who in some cases had not caused any harm to the Czechs. On 
the contrary, the assessment of who actually had betrayed the nation was constantly 
becoming harsher. Judging and condemning ‘others’ became an integral part of the 
Protectorate underground groups’ discourse.  
The  national  radicalization  in  Bohemia  and  Moravia  became  a  cause  of 
conflict with the exiles. The Central Leadership of the Home Resistance Movement 63 
(Ústřední  vedení  odboje  domácího  –  ÚVOD
223),  an  umbrella  organisation,  was 
formed by the civic, pro Beneš resistance fighters in early 1940. Its leaders disagreed 
with  the  exile  President  on  the  participation  of  Sudeten  Germans  in  the  exiled 
administration. They informed Beneš, who negotiated with exile Sudeten Germans to 
satisfy the British demands that the nation would never accept any concessions given 
to the Germans.
224 We have no proof that the leaders at home were informed about 
the political demands of exile Jewish groups. Still the home resistance made their 
point  clear.  They  did  not  accept  any  fragmentation  of  the  resistance  movement, 
especially on a national level, but also any political representation based purely on 
personal  ambitions.
225 The  struggle  for  the  nation  should  have  been  without  any 
preconditions.
  
A report received by the exiles in May 1939 argued that the anti Semitism of 
the Second Republic disappeared with the arrival of the Germans. Yet, the author 
documented prevailing suspicion towards the Jews and especially the reluctance to 
share with them the Czechs’ own concerns about the national liberation.
226 Therefore, 
an  issue,  how  the  Jews  –  as  a  group  –  were  perceived  by  the  resistance  in  the 
Protectorate, has to be addressed. The Jews were not alluded to as a nation. Reports 
dealing with minority issues in the post war Republic did not mention the Jews at all. 
In the national sense, the Jews were perceived based on the language they used and 
were also supposed to share the fate of each of the particular national groups in post 
war Czechoslovakia. Hence, Czech Jews were perceived as a special group of people, 
living in the territory of Bohemia and Moravia; a group of people who were expected 
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to be grateful to the Czech nation for being allowed to join it after the fall of the 
Austro Hungarian  Empire.  The  Jews  were  regarded  by  the  Czechs  as  a  peculiar 
community in transition from the German national and cultural surroundings – more 
as a subject than a partner. The transition was to be only one way and nobody who 
actually wanted to live among the Czechs was to be allowed to remain or behave 
German: that is not to adhere to the German culture and especially not to use the 
German  language.
227 The  Jews  were  supposed  to  be  Czech,  to  use  the  Czech 
language, to be a part of the community and share its happiness and sorrows. It also 
seems that for an individual, to be, or to remain simply Jewish was not considered an 
acceptable option.  
This ‘opportunity’ to become ‘Czech’ was perceived to have been missed by 
a large segment of the Jewish population, a fact that was considered as going against 
the interests of the Czech nation.
 228 Based on a section of the Jews, the whole Jewish 
community  was  regarded  as  agents  in  spreading  Germanization.  As  Jan  Tesař 
suggests, one of the main features of Czech nationalism after the occupation was the 
renewed interest in Czech history and culture, but especially the maintenance of the 
Czech  language.
229 These  sentiments  reinforced  the  already  existing  stereotypical 
prejudices against the Jews. Hence the reports sent to London contained information 
about their allegedly inadequate behaviour in the fateful hours of the Czech nation. A 
report, sent to London already in 1939, highlighted that the persecution was perhaps 
good for the Jews and they would not continue to support voluntarily the German 
national stream anymore.
230 More specifically, in 1940, the underground journal V 
boj (To the Fight) brought an article under the headline Židovská otázka (The Jewish 
Question). It contained the following:  
 
The purpose of these lines is not to incite our people against the Jews. 
However,  we  realize  facts  and  we  declare  clearly  and  determinedly. 
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There will be no racial theories for us. We reject this German nonsense, 
as the whole civilised world does. It means that a Jew, who is a good 
Czech, does not have to be afraid that he will be treated differently than 
any  other  good  Czech.  However,  it  does  not  mean  that  a  Jew,  who 
behaved as a coward, or even as a traitor of our cause, should think that 
just because he is Jewish – we will treat him differently than a traitorous 
Czech! And no Jew, who today thinks that he must – even only at home 
in his family – gibbering in German, should not hope that – just because 
he is Jewish, we will handle him better than other barbarians. On the 
contrary: a Jew, who still after all the suffering from the side of the Nazis, 
is still using German, has to be logically considered as an extra hard core 
Germanizer and according to it we will break the back of him! We know 
about him, we follow him and we have him in our lists.
231  
  
The discourse of this article confirms the perceived stereotypes of Jews as 
cowards  and  Germanizers.  Czechs  regarded  themselves  as  democrats  who  were 
rejecting all German racial theories. At the same time, however, under the changed 
conditions, only those who were unconditionally Czech were to be allowed to live in 
Czechoslovakia.  Any  deviation,  perceived  by  the  resistance  with  the  help  of  an 
imposed identity, was then considered as a hostile act. The article was not just a 
sober listing of ‘facts’, it was an overt threat to the German speaking Jews. This 
publication, which was available to the exile government, expressed the view of the 
radical  part  of  the  Czech  resistance  movement  –  the  ÚVOD  military  wing  –  in 
1940.
232 In their opinion, even the basic fact that a person used the German language, 
although s/he had been brought up and educated in it and used it for the whole of 
his/her life, was a symbol of their adherence to Germandom, to the German culture, 
to the oppressors of the Czech nation – all despite of the cruel persecution of those 
Jews, even because of it.
233 Those tendencies among the Czech population did not 
disappear with the progress of the war and with the gradual progress of the ‘Final 
Solution’. Beneš himself argued to the leaders of the WJC in London that the main 
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reason  for  the  rise  of  anti Semitic  tendencies  in  the  Bohemian  lands  were  some 
‘short sighted Jewish opportunist forces’ who in the nineteenth century decided for 
the German nation.
234 Thus the highest strata of the exile administration expressed 
understanding for the position adopted by the population at home. In fact, the exiles 
shared the prejudices, or at least it did not consider it politically indiscrete to talk 
overtly about them.
235  
In 1942, one of the escaped members of the resistance revealed to the exiles 
further evaluations of Czechs’ views. At this time the main part of the resistance had 
already been destroyed and the deportation of the Protectorate Jewry to the east was 
in full swing: 
 
It is the general opinion that after the war Jews will not dare to go in for 
politics or take part in public life, or be doctors or lawyers. If this fact is 
overlooked  it  may  have  very  unpleasant  political  consequences.  Our 
people recognise that all have an equal right to live and reject the crude 
German anti Semitism. But they say that the Jews must work like others 
in crafts, on the land and in factories and fulfil both his civic and national 
duties unconditionally. The German knout [a metaphorical usage of the 
word used to stress the harsh totalitarian rule – J. L.] has taught us to 
respect ourselves and work for that which is here and there, and when it is 
a case of a Jew who has helped the Germans against us nothing can be 
done for him.
236  
 
The Jews were to be allowed to stay only as Czechs, not as a distinctive 
community in any sense. Curiously, the underground groups wanted the Jews to be 
Czech, but perceived them only as Jews. The quote referred also to the position of 
the Jews in Czechoslovakia and argued that limitations on their economic and social 
position were desirable. It was a new factor to be taken into consideration. Other 
similar  reports  show  that  the  negative  perception  of  the  Protectorate  Jewry  was 
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widespread  and  that  London  was  very  well informed  of  such  attitudes.
237 More 
significant is that the exiles did not try to suppress the reports and even forwarded it 
to the British Government.
238  
Moreover,  the  Jews  were  not  perceived  as  zealous  fighters  for  the 
Czechoslovak  national  cause.  Information  about  their  alleged  cowardice  was 
repeatedly received in London.
239 Among others, the exiles themselves contributed to 
this stereotypical perception of the Jews. For example, Prokop Drtina, the political 
referent  of  the  Czechoslovak  National  Council  (the  official  body  before  the 
Provisional  Government  was  recognised),  wrote  to  the  Protectorate  about  the 
problems with the formation of the Czechoslovak army abroad: ‘Then there is here 
[in  exile]  a  group  of  intellectuals,  mostly  Jews,  very  often  with  Communist 
tendencies, who have a thousand plus one ideological reasons to avoid joining the 
army. We will cope with them.’
240 The Jewish presence among the deserters was 
prominently highlighted. Drtina’s reference to their Communist ideals also reveals 
his assessment of Jewishness based on racial grounds.
241  
The negative image of ‘a Jew’ was thus constructed with the common help of 
old  anti Jewish  prejudices  and  resurgent  Czech  nationalism.  Both  these  factors 
played  an  equally  crucial  role  in  the  underground  movement’s  treatment  of  the 
information  about  the  Nazi  persecution  of  the  Jews.  Czech  underground  groups, 
                                                 
237 TNA, FO 371/30837. Reports from Prague, March 24 31, 1942. ‘Whatever the Germans may do, 
there is no hatred of the Jews amongst the people. Rather is there a definitive sympathy with them. If 
things develop as they have so far, in a year’s time there will not be any so called Jews at all, and 
those who remain will be beggars. Their movable goods will be consumed by the Germans, their 
immobile goods for the most part in the hands of the German hands. Only very little Jewish property, 
if any, has come into Czech hands. […] Naturally our people do not approve of their [Jewish] cruel 
persecution. But they allow for the fact that after the war the Jews will never return to the positions 
which they occupied before. Naturally the propaganda which alleges that all the influential places with 
us were secured by the Jews has a lot of influence even in circles which are otherwise disinterested, 
and account must be taken of this fact [italics – J. L.]’.  For other examples see Otáhalová, Libuše – 
Červinková, Milada (eds.), Dokumenty z historie československé politiky 1939 1943 Volume 2, p. 721. 
Report by the Czechoslovak Consul in Ankara Miloš Hanák; Pasák, Tomáš, ‘Český antisemitismus na 
počátku okupace’, p. 151. See also: VHA, 37 91 7, Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry to the Ministry of 
National Defence, 26 April 1944. The report described the Czech Jews as Germanizers, cowards and 
ungrateful to the Czech nation who helped them after Munich. As stated, the Jews, although they 
knew about the coming deportations, still did not give their property to the Czechs who helped them 
and let the Gestapo steal it. When interrogated, the Jews denounced Czechs who listened to foreign 
broadcasts and many people were thus allegedly executed by the Nazis. 
238 TNA, FO371/30387. Reports from Prague, March 24 31, 1942, or Report sent by Bruce Lockhart 
to Ambassador Nichols on June 30, 1942. 
239 For example, CNA, Archiv Huberta Ripky (AHR), 1 50 49. MZV to KPR, MNO, MV, PMR, 24 
January 1944. 
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compared to the Poles or even Slovaks, were not in the position to reveal to the west 
the actual situation in the east, especially the grim reality of ghettos and the death 
camps.
242 These  events  took  place  outside  of  the  Czech  territories.  Hence  only 
information about the situation in the Protectorate itself, or reports by occasional 
refugees – who escaped from Poland, was available.  
Radio  transmissions  to  the  west  contained  information  about  the  Jewish 
plight only occasionally. However, more significant was the manner in which the 
information was presented or additional demands were attached by the resistance. 
SPARTA  1  was  a  clandestine  radio  connection  with  London,  operated  by  the 
Political  Headquarters  between  1939  and  early  1941.  A  comparison  of  two 
messages from the autumn of 1939 reveals the PH’s perception of two repressive 
actions conducted by the occupation regime in the Protectorate. In the first case, the 
underground simply stated: ‘The Gestapo carries out the violent removal of all the 
Jews from the Protectorate to Galicia. […] The operation is supposed to be carried 
out quickly and for the whole Protectorate [italics – J. L.].’
243 Yet, when describing 
the first extensive anti Czech action, the suppression of the national demonstrations 
in October 1939, and the subsequent closure of universities and the persecution of 
students, the PH attached further demands:  
 
Try to secure that the governments of England and France protest most 
vigorously,  as  soon  as  possible,  against  the  brutal  persecution  of  the 
Czechs in the homeland and that they declare publicly that in retaliation 
they  will  treat  the  Germans  in  their  territories  in  the  same  manner. 
Negotiate with the Neutrals, especially USA, USSR, and Italy that their 
ambassadors make a protest against our persecution.
244  
 
In the  case of the planned deportation of the whole Protectorate Jewry  to 
Eastern Poland, the underground group simply transmitted the message. However, in 
the case of the persecution of Czechs, they demanded retaliatory measures to be 
adopted by the Allies. This simple comparison captures the different perceptions of 
the Nazi persecution of various groups of people by one of the leading underground 
organizations.  
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In  the  following  years,  the  Czech  underground  occasionally  transmitted 
further communiqués containing information about the Jewish plight.
245 Nevertheless, 
there rarely was any demand for action.
246 One exception is a message, sent in late 
1939, which asked the exiles to denounce publicly the persecution of the Jews in the 
Protectorate. However, the content of the letter overtly documents the actual attitude 
of some among the underground leaders and thus needs to be quoted at length:  
 
I am of the personal opinion that it would be necessary for the press of 
our  resistance  abroad  to  deal  more  energetically  with  the  racial 
persecution, especially in the direction that the Czechoslovak nation, both 
in the Protectorate and in the exile, has not committed atrocities against 
the Jews or has not taken part in their persecution. It has to be noted that 
according to Czech Jews themselves, the Czech nation has still remained 
faithful to its democratic principles and that all the decrees, ordering the 
persecution and abuse of the Czech Jews have been boycotted, indeed in 
many cases defied.
247  
 
The  author  then  pointed  to  T.  G.  Masaryk’s  defence  of  Hilsner.  Yet, 
Masaryk’s  action  was  presented  as  defending  the  Czechs  and  their  image  in  the 
world.
248 He continued: 
In this case, Masaryk’s struggle was not led on behalf of the Jews, but 
to protect the Czech nation.  
Hence I consider the present time and situation suitable to show not 
only to the Jews all around the world, but also to all the democratically 
inclined nations that the Czech nation has not abandoned democracy, not 
even an inch.  
I  would like to add that some circumstances force us to ask  you to 
publish similar articles, because German propaganda tries by all means to 
delude both American and all the Jews living in the whole world that the 
Czechoslovak nation in the Protectorate and in Slovakia persecutes the 
Jews on its own initiative, following the example of the Reich. 
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247 CNA, AHR, 1 50 44. A Proposal dated 29 September 1939. 
248 Ibid.  ‘As  well  as  our  President  Liberator  [T.  G.  Masaryk]  in  his  times,  by  his  energetic 
argumentation  against  the  ritual  murder  took  the  Czech  nation  into  protection,  because  by  the 
intention of this behind the scene shabby game the Czech nation was supposed to be thrown against 
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eyes of the World.’ 70 
The aim of this propaganda is quite clear: in the first instance, it is 
supposed to divert the foreign Jews from both the financial and moral 
support  of  the  Czechoslovak  resistance  movement  and,  secondly,  it  is 
aimed at weakening the boycott of the German trade and turning it into an 
‘anti Czechoslovak’  boycott.  It  should  not  remain  unnoticed  that  the 
Protektor  [Konstantin  von  Neurath]  has  forbidden  permission  to  non 
Aryans to visit the Prague specimen trade fair and on the contrary, the 
non Aryans did not have any difficulty in visiting Leipzig and Germany 
as a whole. 
A  short  proclamation  of  our  noted  representatives  abroad,  over  the 
radio,  would  have  a  very  significant  effect  and  could  not  miss  its 
objective. 
I am of the opinion that as we needed good Jews during the [First] 
World War, we need them now even more [underlined in the original].
249 
 
The Czechs considered it politically significant to maintain the image of a 
democratic nation, but the tone of the letter clearly contradicted the notion. It was, 
indeed, not the fate of the Jews, but the reputation of the Czechs that worried the 
resistance.  Even  more  striking  was  the  desire  to  use  the  power  and  money  of 
international Jewish organizations, but, at the same time, not caring about their co 
religionists in the Protectorate. It was important, in the interests of the Czechs, to 
distance people at home from the racial persecution. The Czechoslovak resistance 
groups perceived the alleged interests of the nation as paramount. 
When  the  Germans began  the  widespread  confiscation of  Jewish property 
(Aryanization), it was, in the eyes of an underground group, only the transfer of the 
Jewish property to German hands that was emphasised.
250 According to the Czechs, 
Aryanization was not the theft of Jewish property, but only a pretext for the general 
Germanization of the historical lands.
251 The resistance asked the exiles to broadcast 
a  warning  to  the  Czechs  against  participation  in  the  Aryanization  process. 
Nevertheless, the reason was not that the whole concept was immoral. As argued by 
the authors, in the case of the German victory the property would not be saved for the 
Czechs and, in the case of the German defeat, the property would be returned.
252 Still, 
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the authors recommended that the broadcast should not deal exclusively with the 
possession of the Jews, but rather also with the property of the Legionnaires and the 
Red  Cross. 
253 It  implies  that  the  underground  did  not  consider  it  wise  to  give 
prominence to the persecution of the Jews. This was, in fact, also a feature of the 
messages describing the actual situation in concentration camps.
254  
During the final years of the war, the home resistance groups expressed their 
views  on  the  general  position  of  the  Jews  in  liberated  Czechoslovakia.  Nazi 
propaganda, mixed with sharp nationalism, was by now deeply rooted in society. It 
became  apparent  that  the  post war  government  would  have  to  face  those  issues 
sooner or later. A report received via Ankara in 1943 stated that anti Semitism was 
the  only  part  of  the  Nazi  programme  that  would  be  probably  assimilated  by  the 
Czechs. The Jews in post war Czechoslovakia were supposed to stop profiting from 
the work of Czechs. Restitution of the Jewish property was not to be allowed. Any 
attempt to return property back to the Jews would go against ‘public opinion’.
255 
Likewise, another report from late 1944 demanded nationalization of big properties 
previously owned by ‘German Jewry’ that thus used to be ‘German property’.
256  
Furthermore, the authors of the following two reports even made a link to the 
exiled  Jews  and  their  role  in  the  Beneš  government,  one  of  the  main  points 
repeatedly stressed by Protectorate propaganda. In August 1943, Milan Hanák, the 
Czechoslovak Consul in Ankara, forwarded the following report:  
Much  apprehension  [exists]  that  the  Czechoslovak  Government  will, 
upon its return to the country, bring back all the Jewish émigrés and will 
return them to their original and, possibly, even better positions. To our 
own [local] Jews, people are extending help wherever they can, prompted 
by sheer humanitarian motives. Otherwise they do not wish their return. 
They feel alienated from them and are pleased not to encounter them any 
more.
257  
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In  their  discourse,  the  authors  again  wanted  to  confirm  their  democratic 
feeling by showing that Czechs were helping the Jews. Nevertheless, the return of the 
Jews to Czechoslovakia was seen as going against the wish of the nation. Even the 
language differentiation among the Jews was no longer present. The line between 
‘our own’ people and the Jews was clear and impossible to cross. Later, in mid 1944, 
the most important resistance organization in Bohemia and Moravia, The Council of 
Three (Rada Tří), made the threat even clearer: ‘We will not tolerate the return of 
Germans, including the Jews.’
258 The Council of Three reacted to a message from 
Beneš, informing them about the plan to allow the return home of Germans who had 
joined  the  resistance  abroad  and  fought  for  Czechoslovakia.
259  There  was  no 
reference to the Jews in his message.
260 As Chad Bryant has concluded, even the 
‘more gracious among Czech informants’ had stated that those Jews who would like 
to stay in post war Czechoslovakia would have to speak Czech.
261  
How  did  the  exiles  perceive  similar  messages?  When  the  answer  of  the 
Council of Three was received in London, it did not cause any overt response that 
would try to change these views. Vladimír Klecanda, a member of the State Council 
and a close associate to Beneš, after reading it, simply made a note: ‘[I]f we answer 
[to the Council of Three] that they should definitely follow the Masaryk legacy, you 
will see that [they] will truly follow the President.’
262 With the progress of the war, 
the exiles started to be more self confident in their treatment of the underground 
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groups’ messages; a process that ended in the total exclusion of the home resistance 
fighters from the post war government. Moreover, as highlighted later by Klecanda 
himself,  the  resistance,  as  such,  had  a  clear  opinion  about  the  ‘difficult’  ‘Jewish 
problem’. It had to be solved in a just, democratic and moral manner.
263 A part of the 
exiles  were  not  able  to  comprehend  the  real  extent  and  pervasiveness  of  radical 
Czech nationalism.
264 Hence they thought that a simple reference to the democratic 
tradition would be sufficient to change the opinion of the people at home. However, 
most of the exiles expressed serious concerns when touching on issues that were 
condemned by the underground groups. 
 
The  Czechoslovak  BBC  Section  broadcasts  in  the  shadow  of  the  underground 
movement’s reports 
The  Czechoslovak  exiles  did  not  raise  Jewish  issues  in  their  official 
communication with Protectorate underground groups.
265 The situation was different 
when the exiles addressed people at home over the BBC. These were the main exiles’ 
means of communication with the broad masses at home, with people who very often 
risked their and their family members’ lives listening to the exiles. From a theoretical 
point of view, the broadcasts to the occupied country constituted a mix of complex 
influences: the exile government’s intention was to influence the population at home. 
Simultaneously, the broadcasts themselves were inspired by reports coming from the 
occupied  country,  revealing  the  actual  mood  and  demands  of  the  population,  or 
rather of the resistance leaders.
 266 The government’s efforts to shape public opinion 
at  home  reflected  the  content  of  messages  received  from  the  Protectorate 
underground groups. The home resistance thus possessed influence on the exiles’ 
Jewish policy. Nonetheless, the content of the broadcasts usually became public in 
London as well.
267 The broadcasts dealing with Jewish issues were often published 
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267 For example a broadcast by Juraj Slávik, 9 February 1944, published by Arnošt (Ernest) Frischer, a 
member  of  the  State  Council  (London  Metropolitan  Archives  (LMA),  Board  of  Deputies  Papers 74 
by pro Jewish activists, or journalists. Indeed, it cannot be completely ruled out that 
some of these speeches were intended not only to inform people at home but also to 
enhance the exiles’ image in the west. British censorship or unwritten laws in the 
BBC  might  have played  a  role  too.  Hence  the government  had  to balance  every 
broadcast because of the possible damage to their image at home as well as abroad.  
During the war, the exiles did not try to change the presented perception of 
the Jews among the people at home. For example, the prejudices against a group of 
people,  based  only  on  the  language  they  used,  were  not  considered  as  being 
undemocratic  or  worth  fighting  against.  In  fact,  the  reports  coming  from  the 
Protectorate helped the exiles in strengthening their perception of some parts of the 
Jewish population. Consequently, the exiles hardly touched the issue over the BBC at 
all. One of the exceptions was a broadcast by Masaryk on the occasion of the Jewish 
New Year in the autumn of 1943: 
It is […] true that some Jews did not behave well. They went about the 
Prague coffee houses and spoke German even after 1933. But they have 
received  such  a  lesson  that  after  the  war  it  will be  difficult  to  find  a 
Czechoslovak  Jew  who  would  wish  to  repeat  these  mistakes.  But  of 
course  we  also  knew  many,  very  many,  decent,  honest,  modest,  loyal 
Jews,  legionaries,  Sokols  [patriotic  youth  sport  movement]  and  they 
belonged and still belong to us and are our own […] You must have 
understanding  for  their  weaknesses  and  if  any  of  these  disinherited, 
confused, frightened and wretched people talk German to day, thinking 
that  it  may  save  them  after  all,  then  you  must  explain  this  as  the 
expression of complete powerlessness in which the drowning man seizes 
at a straw or even at a blade.
268 
 
Masaryk in his speech indeed asked Czechs to overlook the Jewish usage of 
German as a means of communication. As expressed in the speech, those Jews were 
desperate and that was why the Czechs should treat them benevolently. However, 
Masaryk did not fight the main principle of those accusations, which was wrong in 
its  basic  assumption:  that  the  Jews  did  not  use  German  because  they  were 
sympathetic  to  the  Germans  (or  even  the  Nazis),  or  because  they  wanted  to 
Germanise Czechs. They spoke German because of the historical development in 
Bohemia and Moravia, which could not have changed over several years. The exiles 
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did not try to convey to the population back home that the Jews, who were terribly 
persecuted by the Germans, were not guilty just on account of their mother tongue. 
In  his  discourse,  Masaryk  even  assimilated  the  underground  groups’ 
perception of the Jews. The Jews living in the Protectorate appeared as a group of 
people not fully responsible for its deeds. They were presented as a community that 
was  incapable  of  reaching  the  only  fundamentally  correct  decision,  in  a  kind  of 
pubescence. Furthermore, it was a community that tried not to comply fully with the 
good  will  of  its  educators,  the  democratic  Czechs.    Indeed,  Masaryk  repeatedly 
revealed paternalistic tendencies over the Jews.
269  
The lack of an adequate government response to the anti Jewish prejudices 
suggests that the exiles were concerned about the reaction in the Protectorate if the 
prejudices  were  publicly  attacked.  Therefore,  we  can  argue  that  the  exiles  were 
influenced by the attitude of home resistance. Indeed, although Czechoslovak BBC 
broadcasts dealt with the Jews only rarely, they still provoked ambiguous responses 
at home. During a government’s meeting in liberated Czechoslovakia, in October 
1945, Ripka, the war time chief of exiles’ propaganda, stressed that  
in relation to the Jewish problem […] Minister Masaryk and he talked 
about  it  from  London  several  times,  always  receiving  letters  from  the 
Czech  and  Slovak  circles,  where  the  authors  expressed  their  opinion 
against the fact that they were taking care of the Jews.
270  
 
For  example,  one  of  the  escapees  from  the  Protectorate,  who  reached 
Stockholm in 1944, considered it important to mention the following:  
The speech by the Minister Masaryk on the occasion of the Jewish New 
Year made an unfortunate effect. […] The Czechs have not done any 
wrong to the Jews, they have human compassion for them, but cannot do 
anything actively for them. […] A lot of people, who helped, fell into 
misery,  because  the  Jews,  under  slightly  larger  pressure,  revealed 
everything. Dr. Schonbaum, himself now in Theresienstadt, said that – 
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although people had human pity for the Jews and if possible, were willing 
to help – there was neither enthusiasm nor endeavour in the Bohemian 
lands to give back to the Jews the positions that they were forced to leave 
by the Germans. This mood is particularly confirmed by the courier and 
his surroundings, which has never been biased against the Jews. It is still 
possible that those sentiments might change, or become less pronounced, 
but  this  is  the  situation  right  now.    It  is  reflected  in  a  joke,  now 
widespread that it will be necessary to build a monument to Hitler in 
Prague, because he: 1/ has unified Slovakia, 2/ has rid the Czechs of the 
Jews, 3/ destroyed Germany.
271 
 
The prejudices against the Jews as cowards, betraying people who helped 
them, were particularly prominent. Furthermore, the adjustment of the social and 
economic status of Jews was presented as desirable. However, the Czechs still lived 
with their own democratic self image as decent people. Therefore Masaryk’s pleas 
on behalf of the Jews were perceived as being offensive. The Czechs were allegedly 
aware of their duties themselves and did not want to be edified. The fact that the 
courier coming from the Protectorate included the information about the reaction to 
Masaryk’s broadcast into his report showed that at least some circles at home were 
not content with similar addresses. Likewise, not surprisingly, the collaborationist 
propaganda  immediately  responded  to  similar  broadcasts.  Moravec  or  activist 
journalists attacked the  exiles for their pro Jewish sentiments that allegedly  went 
against the interests of ordinary Czechs.
272 In fact, even SD reports emphasised the 
negative Czechs’ responses to Masaryk’s address. The SD concluded that the Czechs 
resented Masaryk’s stance on the Jews.
273  
Further examination of the policy behind exiles’ broadcasts about the Jews 
confirms their concerns about the possible reaction in the Protectorate. One of the 
directives for the broadcasting was that the Jews should not be addressed by the 
speakers separately.
274 Moreover, speakers among the politicians, when dealing with 
Jewish issues, were carefully selected. Beneš, for example, never mentioned the Jews 
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in  his  talks  over  the  BBC.
275 When  asked  by  Czech  Jewish  assimilationists  in 
London to talk about the Jews on the BBC, the President declined on account of ‘the 
reasons of higher interests’.
276 Almost no reference to the Jewish plight could be 
found in the addresses by Prokop Drtina, another popular speaker.
277 Indeed, at the 
beginning of the war, the home resistance expressed disappointment that the speakers 
on the Czechoslovak BBC were German Jewish, with strong accents.
278 The exiles 
agreed with the undesirability of the state and tried to change the speakers who had 
been previously chosen by the BBC.
279 
In relations with the Protectorate, the only speeches dealing with the Jewish 
question were delivered by Ripka, Masaryk, and Jaroslav Stránský
280 or by ordinary 
members  of  the  Czechoslovak  BBC  staff.
281 Nevertheless,  Masaryk,  despite  his 
repeatedly praised pro Jewish sentiments, rarely dealt expressly with the Jews. In 
fact, it seems that he was not able, as the Foreign Minister, to deliver a speech about 
the branding of the Protectorate Jewry with the Star of David.
282 For reasons, which 
are unclear, it seems that for some time the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister was not 
advised to talk about the Jews on the BBC (the problem was on the  Czech, not 
British side). Whatever the reason, the fact is that Masaryk talked for the first time 
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English version, Schwarzbart further developed the story and added Masaryk’s explanation that he, as 
the  Foreign  Minister,  could  not  read  the  speech.  The  fact  is  that  the  English  version  is  only  a 
translation did by Schwarzbart in the late 1950s.  78 
about the Jews over the BBC only in August 1942.
283 This sharply contrasted with 
his regular pro Jewish addresses made in Britain or the United States.
284  
An interesting insight into the conditions in the Czechoslovak BBC Section is 
offered in an anecdotal story by Pavel Tigrid (Schonfeld). He was one of the main 
Czechoslovak  speakers  –  as  an  ordinary  member  of  the  staff.  Before  the  last 
broadcast  to  Czechoslovakia,  he  and  his  colleagues,  partly  because  of  their  own 
‘egotism’, wanted to reveal to the listeners their real names, not only the pseudonyms 
they used during the war. Their chief, Minister Ripka, listened to their request, but 
responded:  
Young men, I am not against it, if you want to, do it. But consider also 
this […] you know me well, you know that I am no anti Semite, but we 
probably  cannot say this about people at home […]. Well, we cannot 
flatter ourselves, nearly all of you are Jewish young men, with distinct 
Semitic names, it may not make a good impression on the listeners, may 
be they do not know, as we all here know that the European Jews had 
only two possibilities, either to escape, or perish. Consider it.
285  
 
 
Image no. 4:  Hubert Ripka
286 
The  exiles  were  concerned  that  the  possible  linkage  to  the  Jews  could 
discredit the popular BBC broadcasting. It might have implied that the Czechoslovak 
                                                 
283 AČR, BBC 1939 1945, box 15, 1 August 1942. The address was not read by Masaryk, but by 
Mikuláš Berger, an ordinary member of Czechoslovak BBC staff. It was a reading from Masaryk’s 
address sent to the National Jewish Fund. His first direct speech about Jews was broadcast on 9 
December 1942. 
284 See, for example, Masaryk’s public speech 15 January 1939 (probably in London) (CZA, Z5/851), 
Masaryk in the Royal Albert Hall, 29 October 1942 (Czechoslovak Jewish Bulletin, Number 11, 7 
November 1942, p. 2), Yeshiva University, New York, 18 June 1942 (Rothkirchen, Livia, The Jews of 
Bohemia and Moravia, p. 184; AÚTGM, Klecanda Collection, file 267, Czechoslovak Jewish Bulletin, 
no. 5, 1 September 1942). 
285 Tigrid, Pavel, Kapesní průvodce inteligentní ženy po vlastním osudu, (Prague: Odeon, 1990), p. 
219. My translation. 
286 http://bohuslavbrouk.wordpress.com/tag/herben/ 79 
exiles’ war time propaganda was in the hands of Jews. Although during the war the 
government in exile  was  spreading  the  stories  about  the  Czechs’  true  democratic 
spirit, the real situation was not that clear. The presented reports sent to London by 
the Protectorate underground groups and the exiles’ concerns about the efficiency of 
Nazi propaganda impacted on the government’s policy. But what was the situation in 
relation to Slovakia? Could any such influence be documented there? 
 
Slovak underground groups, the Jews and the exiles 
In  comparison  with  the  Protectorate,  the  Slovak  state  developed  its  anti 
Jewish policy without any considerable pressure from the German government. The 
segregation of the Jews started immediately after the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia 
received autonomy in October 1938.
287 The Catholic Church played a decisive role 
and contributed to the development of anti Jewish policy. Moreover, pre war sources 
of  religious,  racial  and  socio economic  anti Semitism  were  merged  with  national 
anti Semitism, with the Jews accused of possessing pro Hungarian sentiments. Anti 
Jewish legislation was implemented in independent Slovakia between 1939 and 1941. 
The  following  negotiations  between  the  radical  Slovak  politicians,  especially  the 
Prime  Minister  Vojtěch  Tuka,  and  the  German  authorities  resulted  in  the  mass 
deportations of almost 60,000 Slovak Jews to the ghettos and extermination camps in 
occupied  Poland  between  March  and  October  1942.
288 The  participation  of  the 
                                                 
287 Nižňanský,  Eduard,  Holokaust  na  Slovensku  6.  Deportácie  v  roku  1942  (Bratislava:  Nadácia 
Milana Šimečku, 2005), pp. 6 13. 
288 57,752 Jews were deported to Poland in 57 transports during 1942. 38 of these transports with 
39,006 Jews arrived to Lublin district and mostly perished in Treblinka and Majdanek. 19 trains with 
18,746 were directed to Auschwitz. See: Nižňanský, Eduard, Holokaust na Slovensku 6. Deportácie v 
roku 1942 (Bratislava: Nadácia Milana Šimečku, 2005), p. 84; Lipscher, Ladislav, Židia v slovenskom 
štáte 1939 1945 (Bratislava: Print servis, 1992), 140 141. The driving forces behind the deportations 
were especially Vojtěch Tuka and  Alexandr Mach. The  German  Ambassador to Bratislava, Hans 
Ludin, sent a telegram to the German Foreign Office: ‘Die Slow. Regierung hat sich mit Abtransport 
aller  Juden  aus  der  Slowakei  ohne  jeden  deutschen  Druck  einverstanden  erklärt.  Auch  der 
Staatspräsident persönlich hat dem Abtransport zugestimmt, trotz Slow. Episkopates.’ This telegram 
was  sent  on  April  6,  1942, nearly  a  fortnight  after  the  deportations  had  started  (See Tönsmeyer, 
Tatjana, Das Dritte Reich und die Slowakei 1939 1945. Politischer Alltag zwischen Kooperation und 
Eigensinn  (Paderborn:  Ferdinand  Schöningh,  2003,  p.  148).  According  to  Yeshayahu  Jelinek,  the 
deportations were a result of the internal political struggle in Slovakia. Tiso agreed to the deportations 
to show to the Nazis that he could act radically. He was afraid that otherwise radicals, for example 
Tuka and Mach, might gain Hitler’s support (See Jelinek: Jelinek, Yeshayahu, ‘The “Final Solution” – 
The  Slovak  Version’,  in  Michael  Marrus  (ed.),  The  Nazi  Holocaust.  Historical  Articles  on  the 
Destruction  of  European  Jews.  Vol.  IV.2.  The  “Final  Solution”  Outside  Germany  (Toronto, 
Mecklermedia,  1989),  p.  471;  ‘The  Holocaust  and  the  Internal  Policies  of  the  Nazi  Satellites  in 
Eastern Europe:  A Comparative Study’, in Michael Marrus (ed.), The Nazi Holocaust. Historical 
Articles on the Destruction of European Jews. Vol. IV.1. The “Final Solution” Outside Germany 
(Toronto, Mecklermedia, 1989), p. 295). 80 
Slovak population in Aryanization, and also in subsequent crimes committed by the 
Tiso regime, was widespread. Although only selected groups of local collaborators 
participated  in  the  main  wave  of  Aryanization,  the  auctions  of  the  property  of 
deported  Jews  were  attended  by  a  large  stratum  of  locals.
289 Ordinary  people 
willingly  accepted  the  spoils  stolen  from  their  unfortunate  neighbours  already 
relocated ‘somewhere’ in Poland. Consequently, the Slovak population became co 
accountable for the anti Jewish development in this German satellite.
 290 As in the 
case  with  the  Protectorate,  the  impact  of  strong  anti Semitic  propaganda  on  the 
general population should not be downplayed.
291 
Starting in 1943, the Slovak oppositional political mainstream was willing to 
seal  a  new pact  with  the  Czechs,  especially  to  avoid  the  unconditional  defeat  of 
Slovakia.
292 However,  this  new pact  was  to be  sealed  under  completely  different 
circumstances and with a different social and political structure in Slovakia. Slovak 
resistance fighters, although more or less respecting Beneš as the President and the 
leader  in  contacts  with  the  foreign  partners,  overtly  declared  their  will  to  solve 
internal affairs in Slovakia on their own.
293 These Slovak tendencies to reach a looser 
constitution with the Czechs were crushed after the war. Yet, between 1944 and 1947, 
the  Slovaks  in  many  instances  ruled  themselves  without  the  central  government 
being able to influence the course of events. In contrast to the historical lands, the 
anti Semitic  sentiments  had  been  better  developed  in  Slovakia  even  before  the 
war.
294 The  Tiso  government  cleansing  of  the  Jews  from  Slovak  society  and  the 
                                                 
289 Kamenec, Ivan, ‘Changes in the Attitude of the Slovak Population to the So Called “Solution to the 
Jewish  Question”  During  the  Period  1938 1945’,  p.  333.  The  examples  of  the  records  from  the 
auctions could be found, for example in YIVO Archives, Benjamin Eichler Collection, record of the 
auction in Snina (Humenné district), 5 November 1943. 
290 Kamenec, Ivan, ‘Changes in the Attitude of the Slovak Population to the So Called “Solution to the 
Jewish Question” During the Period 1938 1945’, p. 333. As Ivan Kamenec, a Slovak historian writes: 
‘The regime held the public jointly responsible for the crime, blackmailing them with the threat that if 
the Jews returned, they would seek revenge on the new owners of their former property.’ 
291 Besides the day to day propaganda depicting the alleged role of the Jews in the Slovak society, 
also articles suggesting the role of the Jews among the Czechoslovak exiles appeared. See CZA, 
A320/25, Slovák 4 November 1944; Gardista 16 November 1944. War time Minister Slávík referred 
to this in his post war address to the United Jewish Appeal in New York, see: HIA, Juraj Slávik 
Papers, Box 26, file 11. Speech by H. E. Dr. Juraj Slávik, Czechoslovak Ambassador to the U.S.A. at 
the UJA Dinner held in New York June 11
th 1947. 
292 Dejmek, Jindřich, Edvard Beneš. Politická biografie českého demokrata. Část druhá. Prezident 
Republiky a vůdce národního odboje (Praha: Karolinum, 2008), pp. 396, 402 407. 
293 Ibid., pp. 407f, 462 470. 
294 For historiography see Fatranová, Gila, ‘Historický pohľad na vzťahy slovenského a židovského 
obyvateľstva’, in Acta Judaica Slovaca, Vol. 4, 1998, pp. 9 37; Nižnanský, Eduard, Holocaust na 
Slovensku 7. Vzťah slovenskej majority a židovskej minority (náčrt problému). Dokumenty (Bratislava: 81 
instalment of the ‘new and just’ order was in many cases approved of even by the 
oppositional forces and by the Slovak people.  
Reports sent to London by the civic resistance movement occasionally dealt 
with the population’s attitude towards the Jews. The authors did not mention the 
complicity  of  the  locals  in  the  anti Jewish  policies  introduced  by  the  Tiso 
Government. Nevertheless, they still stressed that the population in its entirety agreed 
with the limitations placed on the ‘overrepresentation’ of the Slovak Jews in the 
professions, or in business. Viliam Radakovič, an envoi of the Slovak civilian part of 
the  resistance  movement,  arrived  to  London  in  mid April  1943.  He  submitted  a 
report to the exiles about the situation in Slovakia and also revealed his personal 
impressions  to  the  Undersecretary  in  the  Ministry  of  Defence,  General  Rudolf 
Viest.
295 According to Radakovič, the solution of the Jewish question was regarded 
as beneficial for Slovak society, from an economic, moral and national viewpoint. 
Although  the  brutality  of  the  solution  was  criticised,  it  was  considered  as  being 
definitive  and  any  revision  would  be  rejected  by  the  majority  of  the  Slovak 
population.  Only  the  revision  of  Aryanization,  the  robbing  of  the  Jews  of  their 
property, was demanded by his group.
296 Radakovič and his underground leaders did 
not  belong  to  the  part  of  Slovak  society  who  participated  in  Aryanization.  They 
agreed with the return of personal property to the deportees, but still believed that the 
Jews should not regain their pre war position within society, which was perceived as 
unjustified  and  disproportionate.  The  social  and  economic  status  quo  after  the 
deportation was definitive. The meaning of this message, sent by an important part of 
the  underground  in  Slovakia  (Radakovič  became  a  member  of  the  Czechoslovak 
State Council in London) was clear.  
Furthermore, a report, prepared in Jerusalem, based on the experience of two 
Slovak (probably Jewish) escapees, presented an even grimmer picture: 
Concerning the attitude of the people towards the Jews, it is one sided 
and negative, mostly because of their bitterness, partly also because of 
fear. Having contacts with a Jew is not regarded as something that would 
                                                                                                                                          
Nadácia Milana Šimečku, 2005); Kamenec, Ivan, ‘Changes in the Attitude of the Slovak Population to 
the So Called “Solution to the Jewish Question” During the Period 1938 1945’, pp. 327 338. 
295 Tóth, Dezider (ed.), Zápisky generála Rudolfa Viesta. (Exil 1939 1944) (Bratislava: Ministerstvo 
obrany, 2002), p. 200, the Viest diary entry, 22 April 1943. 
296 CNA, MV L, 2 11 17, Report dated 12 March 1943, by Radakovič. Also another resistance group 
in Slovakia – Flora (Kveta Viestová) – demanded investigation of the Aryanization (Prečan, Vilém 
(ed.), Slovenké národné povstanie: Dokumenty (Bratislava: Vydavateľstvo politickej literatúry, 1965), 
p. 173. Doc. 51, 13 March 1944 – a report forwarded to London by Jaromír Kopecký from Geneva, 
originally sent by members of a non Communist clandestine organization in Slovakia.  82 
increase  trust  towards  an  individual  […]  People  look  at  the  Jews  as 
unfortunate herds, which deserve their fate. The Jews are not pitied, they 
are not helped by the Slovaks and the way their fate bears on them is 
followed, if not with maliciousness, then definitely with indifference. A 
Jew  is  for  a  considerable  majority  of  people  a  vermin  that  has  to  be 
hunted, because it is possible to capture its belongings. We are not talking 
about  companies,  or  properties,  but  about  the  furniture  owned  by  the 
deported  Jews,  which  is  being  sold  in  auctions  by  the  Gardists’ 
auctioneers,  accompanied by  the jeering  and  greed  of  the  crowd.  The 
belongings  have  been  sold  for  ridiculous  prices,  because  the  main 
purpose  was  not  about  the  pay off,  but  about  a  suitable  anti Jewish 
enterprise  that  could  not  miss  its  effect.  Anti Semitism  was  spread 
especially with the help of those auctions, because it became obvious that 
more expelled Jews from their houses meant more cheap possession to 
buy.
297  
 
Both  escapees  were,  with  high  probability,  subjects  of  Slovak  racial 
persecution and their anti Slovak bias might have influenced their account. Yet, this 
report confirmed important trends in Slovak society and documented the complicity 
of ordinary Slovaks in the state sponsored persecution.  
Besides the economic and social factors in Slovak anti Semitism, its national 
dimension was also considerably highlighted in the communications with the exiles. 
The  situation  resembled  the  development  in  the  historical  lands,  where  Czechs 
identified the Jews with Germans – the national oppressors of Czechs. As discussed, 
this national conflict in Slovakia triggered anti Jewish violence in towns and villages 
during the period of transition in 1918 1919. It is correct that the majority of the 
Slovak  Jewry  used  Hungarian  as  their  language  of  communication.  Likewise,  as 
proved  by  Rebekah  Klein Pejšová,  inter war  Czechoslovakia  sought  the  proof  of 
Jewish  loyalty  in  Slovakia  in  their  abandonment  of the  Hungarian  milieu.
298 The 
Czechoslovak constitution allowed people to adhere to a nationality regardless of 
their  means  of  communication  and  many  Slovak  Jews  thus  declared  Jewish 
                                                 
297 This message, forwarded to London by the Czechoslovak Consul General in Jerusalem, Jan Novák, 
summarized  the  content  of  his  interrogations  of  two  Slovaks,  who  escaped  to  Palestine.  It  was 
therefore based on a subjective perception by two observers who were most likely among the subjects 
of the Slovak racial persecution.  CNA, MV L, box 119, 2 11 17, Ministry of Defence to Ministry of 
Interior, 7 December 1943. The ministry was forwarding a report about the situation in Slovakia, 
based  on  information  provided  by  two  Slovak  (Jewish)  women,  who  escaped  to  Palestine.  My 
translation.  
298 Zionism and the promotion of the Jewish national sentiments were perceived by a significant part 
of the Jewish society as a way to find the most suitable pattern of national behaviour in inter war 
Slovakia. Klein Pejšová, Rebekah, ‘”Abandon Your Role as Exponents of the Magyars”: Contested 
Jewish Loyalty in Interwar (Czecho) Slovakia’, in AJS Review, 33:2 (November 2009), pp. 341 362. 83 
nationality. Yet, ordinary people perceived the situation differently. Based on the 
language they used, the Jews were still perceived and constructed as Hungarians.  
In 1943, a Slovak underground group sent to London a survey of the national 
feelings among various groups in Slovakia, discussing their preferences for potential 
rulers in the territory. The report suggested that the Jews would probably decide for 
Hungary.
299 Furthermore, during an exile government’s meeting in June 1943, the 
Minister of the Interior, Juraj Slávik, presented one of the messages sent by Slovak 
underground  groups.
300 It  expressed  strong  sentiments  against  the  Jews  and  also 
warned the government to be careful when dealing publicly with Jewish issues in 
Slovakia.  The  authors  of  the  report  especially  emphasised  that  Jews  world wide, 
mostly  in  the  USA,  supported  Hungarian  irredentism.  The  Horthy  government 
allegedly  used  the  Jewish  persecution  in  Slovakia  to  support  their  international 
position in relation with post war negotiations (southern Slovakia was occupied by 
Hungarians in November 1938).
301 Curiously, the only part of the report criticised by 
Slávik were the remarks about the international Jewish support of Hungarians. In fact, 
he agreed with all the accusations against Slovak Jews – about their adherence to 
Hungarians and their economic and social exploitation of Slovak people.
302  
This notwithstanding, Slávik thought that for international purposes it would 
be  necessary  for  the  people  in  Slovakia  to  distance  themselves  from  the  cruel 
persecution of the Jews. It was supposed to show that the Hungarians’ accusations 
were  baseless;  Slovak  people  were  not  guilty  of  the  crimes  committed  by  the 
Quisling  government.
303  Even  Beneš  himself  expressly  mentioned  in  the 
communication with the Slovak resistance the persecution of the Jews as one of the 
causes of the declining popularity of Slovaks in the world.
304 The suppression of the 
information  and  the  white washing  of  Slovaks  were  desirable  for  the  image  of 
Czechoslovakia. The anti Jewish sentiments ruling in Slovakia might damage the 
Czechoslovak  reputation  abroad.
305 Nevertheless,  the  government’s  response  to 
                                                 
299 Prečan, Vilém (ed.),  Slovenké národné povstanie: Dokumenty, p. 89, doc. 19, Jaromír Kopecký 
(Geneva) to the Foreign Ministry, 4 September 1943. The report was prepared by a group around 
Vavro Šrobár, one of the founders of Czechoslovakia in 1918. 
300 AÚTGM, EB II, box 182, Minutes of the government session, 25 June 1943. 
301 Generally, making the connection between the Jews and Hungarians living in Slovakia is one of 
the common features of reports sent from Slovakia to London.  
302 AÚTGM, EB II, box 182, Minutes of the government session, 25 June 1943. 
303 Ibid. 
304 HIA, Edward Táborský Papers, box 3. Beneš’s message to Slovakia, 20 March 1943. 
305 For example, in the opinion of Viktor Fischl, an official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
British did not differentiate between Czechs and Slovaks. Hence any information about the rising of 84 
Slovakia  did  not  deal  with  the  Jews  at  all.  The  exiles  were  apparently  afraid  to 
demand the Slovaks’ dissociation from the persecution of the Jews. It was in the end 
Slávik himself who made the public speech over the BBC on 9 February 1944.
306 In 
his  address,  he  dealt  with  the  Hungarian  diplomatic  exploitation  of  the  Jewish 
situation in Slovakia, but at the same time overtly distanced ordinary Slovaks from 
the crimes of the Tiso regime.  
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The reports documenting Slovaks’ unwillingness to listen to the addresses 
about the Jews were to serve the exiles’ purposes. On 18 December 1942, Slávik 
over the BBC highlighted that the messages coming from Slovakia advised the exiles 
to avoid mentioning ‘unpopular’ Jewish topics when talking to the homeland. Even 
so, the Minister suggested that despite of the reports, ordinary people did not agree 
with the persecution and were actually helping the Jews.
308 This apparent distortion 
of the reports’ content was simply following the interests of Czechoslovakia and was 
used for propaganda purposes abroad.
309  
                                                                                                                                          
anti Semitic  tendencies  in  Slovakia  might  have  had  an  adverse  impact  on  the  image  of  the 
Czechoslovaks as a whole. CNA, AHR, 1 46 6 10. A note by Viktor Fischl, 5 June 1942. 
306 LMA, BoD, Acc3121/E03/510. Slavik’s speech on 9 February 1944. 
307 http://www.ushmm.org/lcmedia/viewer/wlc/map.php?RefId=CZE71030 
308 ‘However, we know that the Slovak people do not agree and that they could never approve this 
fury and murders. Evangelical bishops resolutely protested against the brutal fury against Jews and the 
Slovak people were not only showing respect, but were also helping to the victims of this bloody 
regime.’ HIA, Juraj Slávik Papers, Box 29, file 3. B.B.C. Special late night Czechoslovak News. By 
dr. Juraj Slávik and dr. Ivo Ducháček, 18 December 1942. My translation. 
309 Slávik  after  the  war,  in  1947,  referred  to  this  speech,  at  a  United  Jewish  Appeal  dinner,  and 
stressed that during the war: ‘I did not fear unpopularity at home by warning my fellow countrymen 
not to harm the Jews, by ordering them to help their Jewish fellow citizens survive the [G]erman terror, 
by  threatening  every  Czechoslovak  with  severe  punishment  for  cooperating  with  the  invader, 85 
However,  the  situation  during  the  war  differed  and anti Jewish prejudices 
were  continuously  presented  in  reports  coming  from  Slovakia.  The  exiles  were 
willing to admit anti Semitic trends among the people in Czechoslovakia, but their 
explanation was always on the side of the Jews themselves, or of the Germans and 
anti Semitism enforced by them. Hence Beneš, in one of his conversations with the 
Czechoslovak  Jewish  exiles  in  the  USA,  utilised  another  report  coming  from 
Slovakia.
310 The  Jews,  in  order  to  save  themselves,  but  also  because  of  their 
‘inadequate character and national feelings’, were allegedly revealing oppositional 
underground cells to the Slovak authorities.
311 This entirely baseless accusation was 
built on the stereotype of a Jew willing to do anything to safe his/her life and sharply 
contrasted with brave non Jewish resistance fighters.
 312 Based on the words of the 
Czechoslovak President in exile, Slovak anti Semitism was based on the personal 
failure of some among the Jews.
313 If an underground cell was betrayed by a Slovak, 
then it was a weakness of a certain person; if by a Jew, his Jewish background was 
immediately emphasised.
314 How far Beneš believed in those accusations, or how far 
he used them for white washing the Slovak people, is difficult to determine.  
The exiles’ relations with the Slovak resistance were complex. There was a 
danger  that  the  Slovak  leaders,  among  them  many  Communists,  could  reject  the 
exiles’ authority. It was important for the exile government to receive and maintain 
full  recognition  by  the  Slovaks  and  to  avoid  any  pretext  for  their  possible 
independence  tendencies.  The  exiles’  negotiations  with  the  underground  Slovak 
                                                                                                                                          
especially in anti Jewish activities.’ HIA, Juraj Slávik Papers, Box 26, file 11. Speech by H. E. Dr. 
Juraj Slávik, Czechoslovak Ambassador to the U.S.A. at the UJA Dinner held in New York June 11
th 
1947. 
310 AJA, WJC Papers, H100/5. Minutes of the meeting between the CJRC and Beneš, 27 May 1943 
(written 30 May 1943). 
311 Prečan, Vilém (ed.), Slovenké národné povstanie: Dokumenty, p. 77. A report sent to Beneš (in 
Washington D.C.) by Jan Masaryk, 21 May 1943. For another example see HIA, Edward Táborský 
Papers,  Box  2,  Diary  entry  19  February  1943,  p.  192 3.  For  another  report,  repeating  similar 
accusations, see CNA, AHR, 1 50 44 (box 190), A study of the internal situation in Slovakia. The 
author of this report suggested that rich and cowardly Jews were working for Germans, in order to 
keep their property. 
312 Prečan, Vilém (ed.),  Slovenké národné povstanie: Dokumenty, p. 77, footnote 5a. The cell was 
betrayed by an agent provocateur of the Slovak police. More on this see: Lipscher, Ladislav, Die 
Juden im Slowakischen Staat 1939 1945, pp. 174f. 
313 However, Beneš did not mention that ‘inadequate character and national feelings’ were the reasons 
for  the  Jewish  collaboration.  The  President  only  suggested  that  the  Jews  had  been  subjected  to 
German  torture  and  that  was  why  they  had  revealed  the  Slovak  underground  groups.  AJA,  WJC 
Papers, H100/5. Minutes of the meeting between the CJRC and Beneš, 27 May 1943 (written 30 May). 
314 Another stereotypical accusation against the Jews argued that only the poor ones were deported. 
The rich remained active in the Slovak society and allegedly even in the state apparatus. See Prečan, 
Vilém  (ed.),  Slovenké  národné  povstanie:  Dokumenty,  p.  54,  document  9.  A  report  sent  from 
Bratislava on 12 February 1943. 86 
National Council (SNC) that was established in 1944, touched mostly on the post 
war position of Slovaks in the common state, the centralization of the government, 
the issues of the existence/non existence of the Slovak nation and not those relating 
to the Jews.
315  
This  complex  situation,  in  combination  with  the  extensive  Slovak 
participation in Aryanization, made any direct involvement of the exiles in the Jewish 
question in Slovakia difficult. This can be documented in relation to the issue of the 
restitution of Jewish property. The exiles declared by late autumn of 1941 that all 
transfers  of  property  made  under  duress  were  invalid.
316 Slávik  confirmed  this 
information  to  the  Slovaks  over  the  BBC  in  February  1944.
317 The  speech  was 
indeed heard and some reports from Slovakia suggested that the people welcomed 
the information. Additionally, the report argued that those who had participated in 
Aryanization  were  ready  to  give  the  property  back.
318 However,  other  sources 
revealed that still a significant part of the Slovak resistance did not stop taking part in 
the process and was even buying property from the former Aryanizers.
319 Likewise 
the  delegation  of  the  SNC,  visiting  London  in  November  1944,  ruled  complete 
restitution  out  and  generally  expressed  strong  anti Jewish  sentiments.
320 Similar 
messages  and  indeed  direct  encounters  with  Slovak  politicians  were  to  have  an 
impact on the exile government’s preparation of the restitution laws.  
Any theory suggesting that the authorities in post war Czechoslovakia were 
caught off guard by the anti Jewish development in Slovakia is baseless. The reports 
confirming  the  strong  anti Semitic  tendencies  among  the  Slovak population  were 
continuously pouring into London during the last years of the war. One of them, 
from the early summer of 1944, documented that the situation had not change at all:  
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Anti Semitism, imposed on Slovakia by the Germans with the help of 
the anti Jewish measures, was firstly accepted by the people apathetically 
/except for the [Hlinka Guards], who considered it as a good business/. 
Over the course of time, a bit of propaganda has taken hold and now, 
when many can see that important positions could be occupied also by 
Slovaks, as they used to be by the Jews, and when they see that the Jews 
are working for Germans [!] and the Slovak police against other Slovaks, 
anti Semitism in Slovakia has become again a problem that will need to 
be somehow solved after the war. The utmost anger was caused by the 
fact that a lot of Jews have been willing, for temporary benefits, to sell 
themselves out to the Germans and spy on our people.
321  
 
Anti Semitic  stereotypes  that  were  the  common  feature  of  the  previous 
messages remained alive among the Slovak population until the end of the war. This 
report, in a very stringent tone, summarized all the possible accusations against the 
Jews living in Slovakia. The image of the sentiments prevailing among the Slovak 
population was clear; the Jews were not welcomed back in Slovakia.  
 
Conclusion 
Several main features repeatedly appeared in the reports sent to London by 
Czech and Slovak underground groups: 
First, there was a general condemnation of minorities’ policy in the pre war 
Republic, and of minorities as such. Minorities did not have a place in post war 
Czechoslovakia.  
Second,  a  new,  just  social  order,  including  the  nationalization  of  key 
industries, was demanded. This could have an impact on Jewish restitution. 
Third,  the  Czech  and  Slovak  Jews  were  condemned  on  national  grounds. 
They were perceived as contributors to Germanization and Magyarization of cities in 
each respective part of Czechoslovakia. Only the Jews who used the Czech or Slovak 
language were to be allowed to stay in Czechoslovakia. 
Fourth,  the  reports  documented  that  Czechoslovaks  were,  to  some  extent, 
buying into anti Semitic propaganda. The social and economic role of the Jews in the 
pre war Republic was condemned and its revision was presented as desirable. 
Fifth, the reports constructed a stereotypical image of the Jew as cowardly, 
unwilling to fight for his country and denouncing underground fighters for temporary 
privileges. 
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Sixth,  Jews  and  their  lobby  were  perceived  and  presented  as  powerful  in 
international relations.  
Seventh, the exiles were warned against any effort that would facilitate the 
return of the Jews to post war Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, in the case of Slovakia, 
a significant problem arose in the case of the Aryanization of Jewish property. A 
large proportion of Jewish property and personal belongings were stolen or auctioned 
by  ordinary  Slovaks.  They  did  not  wish  to  return  the property  to  the  Jews.  It  is 
noteworthy  that  the  Protectorate  messages  about  the Jewish  situation  in post war 
Czechoslovakia tended to confirm the views revealed in the SD documents. It seems 
that there was indeed a negative change in the Czechs’ sympathies with the Jews at 
the point when the German defeat and the Jewish return became imminent.  
Reports  sent  by  the  home  resistance  thus  revealed  deep seated  prejudices 
against the Jews. Czech anti Semitism was very often described as national, as based 
on  alleged  Jewish  support  of  Germans  during  the  Austrian  Empire.  Indeed,  the 
resurgent Czech and Slovak nationalisms played a crucial role during the war. Czech 
experience of the occupation and the existence of the first Slovak state in history 
resulted in the growing self interests of both nations. Furthermore, nationalism was 
strengthened by anti Jewish prejudices brought to the attention of ordinary people by 
the virulent Nazi anti Semitic propaganda campaign. 
The  authors  of  the  reports  also  differentiated  between  their  negative 
perception of some Jews and racial Nazi anti Semitism. In their opinion, whilst the 
former was a correct evaluation of the Jewish behaviour, the latter was backwards, 
even mad, and definitely not assimilated by enlightened Czech people. However, in 
their  perception  of  the  Jews,  the  same  authors  used  the  same  ascribed  identity, 
labelling people not on their own feelings, but through an outsider’s point of view. 
They were projecting onto the Jews all the negative characteristics ascribed to the 
enemies of Czech people. The first Czechoslovak Republic accepted the Jews under 
certain conditions, especially if they would cease being German or Hungarian. With 
the changed conditions after Munich, also the Czech acceptance of the Jews changed 
dramatically.  
The response of the exiles was shaped by two main factors: first of all, they 
partly shared those views and the messages reinforced such sentiments. However, 
they  knew  that  these  sentiments  were  not  compatible  with  the  image  of  the 
democratic nation, at least as this was perceived in the west. Moreover, the Beneš 89 
government  needed  to  struggle  for  acceptance  by  the people  at  home,  mainly  in 
Slovakia. Hence they considered it undesirable to fight the anti Jewish sentiments 
publicly.  This  attitude  was  documented  by  the  examination  of  the  Czechoslovak 
BBC Service broadcasts. Thus we can suppose that this influence existed and it will 
be considered in the following analysis of exiles’ Jewish policy. Furthermore, the 
role  of  anti Semitic  propaganda,  depicting  the  exiles  as  overt  supporters  of  the 
Jewish  restitution,  had  to  be  taken  into  account.  The  reports  of  the  underground 
amplified  the  exiles’  concerns  about  the  impact  of  anti Semitic  propaganda. 
Poznanski’s conclusion concerning De Gaullists’ policy supports this thesis.
322 
 In relation to the issues of minorities, the reports provided Beneš with the 
most radical platform. It was a justification of the eradication of all the minorities in 
post war Czechoslovakia. At the same time, Beneš was aware that there was another 
party participating in the negotiations whose consent with any radical solution of 
minorities’  question  had  to  be  obtained.  No  such  a  solution  in  post war 
Czechoslovakia could have been carried out without the approval of the major Allies. 
In one of his letters to ÚVOD, sent on 6 September 1941, Beneš agreed with the 
desirability of the radical programme. Nevertheless, he continued as follows: ‘But 
every responsible politician must ask himself a question in the interest of the nation: 
what shall I do and how shall I act in the case it would be impossible to execute this 
maximum programme’.
323  
The letter dealt with the proposed total expulsion of the Sudeten Germans 
from Czechoslovakia. Yet it could be applied to all the minorities and to all the 
programmes proposed by the home resistance movements. Beneš de facto respected 
their views, but was still aware of the difficulties in the diplomatic negotiations with 
the major Allies, two of them representing the main liberal democratic countries in 
the world. Beneš particularly expressed doubts about the position of the Americans 
‘who [did not] understand the European issues so far and [would] not understand 
them  even  at  the  end  of  the  war’.
324  Furthermore,  in  his  contacts  with  the 
underground  organizations,  Beneš  tried  to  avoid  Jewish  issues  at  all  costs. 
Nevertheless, it was impossible to do so in his negotiations in exile. International 
Jewish  organizations  closely  followed  the  disturbing  development  in  the 
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Czechoslovak perception of the so called ‘Jewish problem’. The radical programme 
concerning  minorities  received  strong  support  and  was  partly  initiated  at  home. 
However, Jewish issues played a more significant role during negotiations in London. 
It  was  also  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Czechoslovak  exiles  wished  to  maintain  a 
democratic image in the west.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE CZECHOSLOVAK EXILES AND THE JEWS BETWEEN 
1939 AND 1941 
 
[A] Minority is [a] minority. 
 
Edvard Beneš (1941)
325 
 
Introduction 
As suggested, the exiles’ decision making process was partly shaped by the reports 
sent  to  London  by  underground  groups,  both  in  the  Protectorate  and  Slovakia. 
Nevertheless,  the  underground  leaders  were  not  the  only  force  that  was  in  the 
position to influence the Czechoslovak exiles. There were other actors, living in the 
‘free world’, who had interests (or were perceived by the exiles as having interests) 
in  Czechoslovak Jewish  relations.  This  chapter,  as  the  first  in  the  thesis  dealing 
exclusively with the situation in exile, is focused on the early years of the war – the 
time period when the structures and diplomatic position of the Czechoslovak official 
representation in exile were being formed.  
 
Image no. 5: Edvard Beneš
326 
 
In the summer of 1941, the exiled President of Czechoslovakia, Edvard Beneš, 
sent  a  letter  to  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt,  the  President  of  the  USA.  Beneš,  already 
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officially recognised by the British government, tried to receive similar recognition 
by the American government. In the letter, he summarized the main arguments he 
was utilising for the justification of the exiles’ political claims. In this respect, the 
letter may help us to identify the main areas of our interest for further analysis: 
 
In agreement with my country we have created a new Czechoslovak 
army on British soil and organized our Air Force, which has now been 
fighting for a full year with the R.A.F. in repelling German attacks on 
England. We have unified our political emigration and we are working in 
close  collaboration  with  our  country,  with  the  political  leaders  of  the 
nation at home, with the intelligentsia and with the other classes of people. 
[...] Our state and people were a true democratic state; we were the only 
democracy who were able for a full twenty years to preserve our happy 
and successful democratic freedom; and had it not been for the events of 
Munich our land would still be the home of one of the finest democracies 
in Europe.
327 
 
Beneš  thus  highlighted  three  main  points:  the  democratic  tradition  of 
Czechoslovakia,  the  unity  within  the  Czechoslovak  resistance  movement  and  the 
Czechoslovak  army.  These  were  the  most  important  issues  for  the  Czechoslovak 
diplomatic struggle during the first part of the war. It could be added that the general 
historiography on the origins of the Czechoslovak exile movement scarcely deals 
with the Jews at all.
328 Does this mean that the Jews did not play an important part 
among the exiles between 1939 and 1941? As will be argued, an assessment of their 
influence, even a potential one, on the Czechoslovak exiles’ fight for the restoration 
of Czechoslovakia is crucial for the understanding of mutual relations, particularly in 
relation to the three points summarized by Beneš to Roosevelt. Indeed a significant 
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part of the following analysis does not deal with what actually happened but with the 
mutual perception of the development by Czechoslovaks and the Jews.  
We can argue that in comparison with other exile governments, the Jewish 
themes on the agenda of the Polish government most resembled those dealt with by 
the Czechoslovak exiles. Generally, the exile governments coming from East Central 
Europe, from the countries that had accepted the minority treaties, were in a different 
position to the others. Their treatment of minorities was subjected to international 
control. The historiography of the Polish exiled government’s attitude towards the 
Jews identifies several conflicting issues during the first war years, prior to the mass 
deportation of Jews to the Nazi extermination camps. It was especially the notion of 
Polish anti Semitism that complicated mutual relations with Jewish organizations. 
The latter consequently demanded from the Poles a declaration that would confirm 
the position of the Jews in liberated Poland as citizens with equal rights.
329 The Poles 
were aware of their peculiar situation and attempted to distance themselves from the 
pre war  Sanacja  regime.  Ignacy  Schwarzbart,  a  Zionist  from  Cracow,  was 
immediately appointed to Rada Narodowa – the exile parliament.
330 However, the 
proposed declaration of Jews’ rights met with severe opposition on the Polish side. 
The Sikorski government was aware that anti Semitism was not compatible with the 
image of a democratic country. Yet anti Jewish sentiments were overtly pronounced 
in  Poland,  as  well  as  among  the  Polish  exiles.
331 Finally  in November  1940,  the 
Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, Jan Stańczyk, published a declaration about 
the rights of Polish Jews. The declaration was, indeed, overtly criticized in reports 
coming from occupied Poland.
332 Furthermore, the declaration did not appease the 
‘eloquent and mighty’ world Jewish organizations who demanded concrete proof of 
positive  Polish  change.
  333    The  reason  behind  the  scepticism  of  the  Jewish 
organizations  was  the  repeated  occurrence  of  anti Semitic  incidents  in the  Polish 
army  in  France  and  Britain.  Moreover,  Polish  right wing,  overtly  anti Semitic 
politicians were appointed to the government, anti Jewish laws from pre war Poland 
continued to be a part of the Polish legal system, and a part of the Polish political 
                                                 
329 Engel, David, In the Shadow of Auschwitz, p. 55. 
330 Gutman, Yisrael – Krakowski, Shmuel, Unequal Victims: Poles and Jews During World War Two 
(New York: Holocaust Library, 1986), p. 58 
331 See Chapter 1. 
332 Ibid., p. 60; Engel, David, In the Shadow of Auschwitz, p. 80. 
333 Engel, David, In the Shadow of Auschwitz, p. 13. 95 
mainstream  still  supported  forced  emigration  of  Jews  from  Poland.
334 The  Polish 
exiles  were  thus  caught  between  two  complex  influences:  strong  nationalism, 
sometimes  containing  anti Semitism,  and  an  effort  to  present  themselves  as  a 
democratic nation in the sense of the western liberal democracies.  
In the Czechoslovak case, the main issues in the exiles’ relations with the 
Jews differed. In contrast to the Poles, the Czechoslovaks could rely on the notion of 
their democratic tradition. Masaryk’s and later Beneš’s Czechoslovakia was regarded 
by Jews as a true symbol of democracy. The dominant factor in Czechoslovak Jewish 
relations after 1919 was the notion of the ‘democratic tradition’ of the Czechoslovak 
treatment of minorities, in particular the Jews. It was built by the mutual efforts of 
the Czechoslovaks themselves and by international Jewish organizations. Moreover, 
Czechoslovakia’s  neighbours  –  the  Poles,  Hungarians  and  Rumanians  – 
unintentionally contributed to its formation. In the context of the wider region, the 
relative  stability  of  democracy  in  inter war  Czechoslovakia  contributed  to  its 
exceptional perception by international Jewish organizations. The ratification of the 
Munich Agreement in September 1938 was mourned by Jews throughout the world. 
Stephen Wise, the President of the American Jewish Congress and the WJC, for 
example, stated in a sermon: ‘Czecho Slovakia was crucified in her absence by the 
Judases who betrayed her to the Pontius Pilates of a new day [...] My heart has 
broken over the end of a great and noble democracy.’
335 Later, during the war, Wise 
admitted  his  deep  emotional  excitement  when  he  had been  listening  to  the  radio 
broadcast about Munich:  
 
I wonder whether I ought to make the shameful confession to you that I 
cried like a child, like a little child when the last word came from the 
radio that night, that night of shameful betrayal. […] I never lost faith, 
not for one moment, in Czechoslovakia’s power to redeem itself, but I 
was overwhelmed with sorrow. I felt that an infinite wrong had been done. 
It was dishonouring to both of the two great countries which should never, 
never  under  any  circumstances  have  permitted  even  the  temporary 
overthrow of Czechoslovakia. […] I consider Czechoslovakia more than 
any country in the world, the younger brother of these United States of 
America.
336  
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For Wise, the betrayal of Czechoslovakia symbolised the end of democracy 
in Europe and also the beginning of the dark era of the Nazis. This notion of Czech 
decency  survived  even  in  the  time  of  the  limited  democracy  of  post Munich 
Czechoslovakia. Some Jewish politicians observed Czechs’ dissatisfaction with the 
western liberal democracies and with the political system as such. As a result, they 
expressed  their  concerns  about  the  Jewish  position  in  Czechoslovakia  soon  after 
Munich.
337 This  rise  of  nationalistic  hatred  was  attributed  by  world  opinion  to 
German/Nazi pressure and possibly also to the rise and influence of certain circles in 
Slovakia that later declared the clero fascist Slovak republic essentially a German 
satellite.
338  What is more significant, Beneš, who was forced to resign his presidency 
and left the country, or other followers of the late President Masaryk, especially his 
son  Jan,  were  successful  in  distancing  themselves  from  this  undemocratic 
development  in  Czechoslovakia.
339 The  Czechoslovak  exiles  built  their  political 
credit on the notion of their continuous adherence to democracy and it was crucial 
for determining their position among the other governments in exile.  
Nevertheless, the beginning of the war witnessed complications in relations 
between the exiled Czechoslovaks and Jews. In contrast with the Poles, no Jew was 
appointed to the Czechoslovak State Council, exile parliament, in December 1940.
340 
The  negotiation  of  an  appointment  of  a  Jew  to  the  parliament  triggered  broader 
discussion about the post war status of the Jews in Czechoslovakia. The following 
analysis will suggest that a radical change regarding  all minorities, including the 
Jews,  occurred  among  the  Czechoslovaks.  The  dramatic  rise  of  Czecho/Slovak 
nationalism/s found its impact also among the Czechoslovak exiles. However, as in 
the  Polish  case,  the  Czechoslovaks  became  aware  that  their  image  of  desirable 
democrats  might  be  questioned.  The  exiled  government  was  caught  in  the  fight 
between the national radicalization within the resistance movement and their efforts 
not to stand out as anti Semites, or as people with anti Jewish inclinations. In relation 
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to the Jews, the first years of exiles’ political activities were filled with the defence 
of the Czechoslovak ‘myth’.   
This chapter follows developments between 1939 and late 1941. The final 
appointment of a Zionist to the parliament is highlighted as a crucial point in these 
years.  Arnošt  Frischer  was  appointed  in  November  1941  by  Beneš  de  jure  ad 
personam, yet de facto based on his Jewish nationality. This concession meant an 
important exception in the Czechoslovak government’s minority policy during the 
war. The key part of this chapter describes the change in the Czechoslovak view of 
minorities’ position in the liberated Republic that was to have a critical impact on 
Czechoslovak Jewry.  Consequently, the chapter will analyse the main influences on 
the exiles’ Jewish policy that existed during the war in the west. These influences 
might  have  contradicted  the  impact  of  the  Czecho/Slovak  nationalism/s  that  was 
analysed  in  the  first  chapter.  However,  before  we  start  enquiring  into  the 
Czechoslovak Jewish relations in exile, introducing the politicians who represented 
Czechoslovak Jewish interests in Allied London is desirable.  
 
Czechoslovak Jewish Political Exile in the United Kingdom 
Jewish  émigrés  formed  a  significant  part  of  the  Czechoslovak  exiles,  far 
exceeding their proportional share among Czechoslovak citizens as a whole. Beneš 
stressed  during  a  conversation  that  took  place  in  war time  London  that  the 
Czechoslovak emigration to Britain was formed mostly by Germans and Jews (more 
than 7,000 of 9,000 Czechoslovak civil émigrés).
341 Indeed, there were only a few 
Czech and even fewer Slovak exiles living in Britain during the war.
342 It was a 
logical result of the Nazi and post Munich Czech policy, when Jews and democratic 
Sudeten  Germans  were  threatened  by  the  Nazi  menace  earlier  than  the  majority 
population.
343 The Jews and anti Nazi Germans were therefore willing, or felt forced, 
to leave the country after Munich. Another reason, in the case of the Jewish refugees, 
was the enforcement of their emigration by the Nazi administration in the first years 
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of the occupation: this was in accordance with the Nazi plans for ‘the solution of the 
Jewish  question’  between  1939  and  1941.
344 Among  the  large  wave  of  Jewish 
refugees  leaving  East Central  Europe  were  also  the  majority  of  the  former 
Czechoslovak  Jewish  politicians  who  were  active  in  inter war  Czechoslovakia, 
representing various ideological, religious and national groups. Nevertheless, most of 
them found their way to British Mandate Palestine and not to Britain,
345 where the 
centre of the Czechoslovak resistance movement abroad was later formed.
346 In any 
case, it should be noted that not all the Jewish émigrés from Czechoslovakia were 
willing  to  join  the  Czechoslovak  resistance  movement.  The  nationally minded 
radical Czech movement did not appeal to Jewish émigrés coming from the German 
national milieu.
347 The situation was different with Czech, Slovak and national Jews 
who still saw their future in liberated Czechoslovakia. 
The first Czechoslovak Jewish groups in the United Kingdom were formed 
immediately after the German occupation of Czechoslovakia. Those were mostly of a 
humanitarian character and their work consisted of securing relief for refugees or 
immigration visas for people in the Protectorate and Slovakia.
348 These groups later 
assumed political tasks as well, especially the Central Council of the National Jews 
from Czechoslovakia (Ústřední rada národních Židů z Československa – hereafter 
referred  to  as  the  National Jewish  Council).
349  This  National Jewish  Council 
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346 For  the  general  historiography  on  the  Czechoslovak  political  exile  see:  Smetana,  Vít,  In  the 
Shadow of Munich. British Policy towards Czechoslovakia from the Endorsement to the Renunciation 
of the Munich Agreement (1938 1942); Martin Brown, David, Dealing with Democrats. The British 
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348 See  London,  Louise,  Whitehall  and  the  Jews  1933 1948.  British  Immigration  Policy  and  the 
Holocaust  (Cambridge:  University  of  Cambridge  Press,  2000),  pp.  142 168;  Shatzkes,  Pamela, 
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consisted  of  former  members  of  the  Jewish  Party  and  of  the  Social Democratic 
Poale  Zion.
350 The  group  was  founded  in  the  late  autumn  of  1939,  when  Beneš 
officially declared the beginning of the fight for the new Republic and his National 
Council  of  Czechoslovakia  was  recognised  by  the  French  and  British 
governments.
351  The  national  Jews  immediately  declared  their  willingness  to 
cooperate with the former President.  It is clear from the name of this organisation, 
headed by Lev Zelmanovits, that its main purpose was to secure the interests of the 
Jews who considered themselves Jewish in national terms. The renewal of Jewish 
minority rights was the essential point of their political programme.
352 The relations 
between the National Jewish Council and the Czechoslovak government were rather 
complicated. For example, Beneš personally disfavoured Zelmanovits. First of all, 
the Zionist leader avoided joining the army.
353 Furthermore, his perceived methods 
of  leading political  struggle,  of blackmailing  and public  campaigning  against  the 
government in order to reach his goals were overtly condemned by Beneš.
 354  
There were two other Jewish groups, besides the Zionists, who declared their 
interests in different ideological, national, or religious terms. The first group was 
formed by the orthodox Jews/Agudists
355 and the other by adherents of assimilation, 
continuators of the so called Association of Czechs Jews (Svaz Čechů židů).
356 At the 
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among the exiles. He, for example, threatened the government with campaign among Jewish soldiers 
to  enter  the  planned  Jewish  army  instead  of  the  Czechoslovak,  in  the  case  the  Jewish  political 
demands would not be accepted. School of Slavonic and East European Studies Archives, London 
(SSEES), Lisický Collection, box 10, 3/2/1. Report of Minister Nečas about his bureau for the year 
1941.    These  methods  were  unacceptable  for  the  Czechoslovak  President.  YVA,  M.2/765, 
Schwarzbart’s Diary, entry 2 October 1941. Schwarzbart’s notes about his conversation with Viktor 
Fischl from the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry: ‘I tried to explore the possibility of Zelmanovits’ 
appointment to the Czechoslovak State Council. There is no hope whatsoever. Zelmanovits earned the 
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355 Agudas Israel 
356  For  a  history  of  the  Czech Jewish  movement  see  Čapková,  Kateřina,  Češi,  Němci,  Židé? 
Národnostní identita Židů v Čechách, pp. 93 174. 100 
beginning,  neither  group  had  political  programme.  These  were  mostly  developed 
later as a reaction to the activities of the national Jews, at the moment when the latter 
declared their right to be represented in the exile parliament.
357 The Agudists, who, 
as a group, had not been politically active before the war, were firstly represented by 
the Federation of Czecho Slovakian Jews
358 – a humanitarian organisation. Later, as 
its  unofficial  political  branch,  the  Union  of  Orthodox  Jews  from  Czechoslovakia 
emerged.
359 Only a few Czechoslovak orthodox Jewish politicians found their refuge 
in  the  United  Kingdom.
360  Orthodox  Jews  lived  mostly  in  Slovakia  and 
Subcarpathian  Ruthenia,
361 whilst  generally  a  higher  number  of  people  from  the 
Bohemian lands came into British exile.
362 Hence the Agudists were dependent on 
the  support  of  the  British  orthodox  Jewish  politicians,  especially  on  Harry  A. 
Goodman,  the  political  secretary  of  the  British  Agudas  Israel.  The  aims  of  the 
orthodox Union were very modest compared to the Zionists and mostly touched upon 
the  securing  of  religious  freedom  in  future  Czechoslovakia,  or  the  issue  of  the 
orthodox Jewish upbringing.
363  
The last mentioned group, the Association of Czechs Jews, was not active in 
the political sense, because they, as adherents of assimilation, did not want to cause 
further fragmentation of the Czechoslovak resistance.
 364 At the same time, they did 
not  have  any  fundamental  demands  aside  from  a  declared  equality  of  people 
regardless of their religion or race.
365 Mutual relations among the three main Jewish 
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361 Hirschler, Gertrude,  ‘The History of  Agudath Israel in  Slovakia (1918 1939)’, in The Jews of 
Czechoslovakia,  Historical  Studies  and  Surveys,  Volume  II,  (Philadelphia  –  New  York:  Jewish 
Publication Society of America, 1971), pp.  155 172. 
362 LMA, BoD, Acc3121/E/03/510. Note about Slovakia. A report about the visit of Gizi Fleischmann 
in Britain, where she unsuccessfully tried to secure immigration visas for Slovak Jews, 14 August 
1939. Heumos, Peter, Die Emigration aus der Tschechoslowakei, p. 106. Heumos states that 1,462 
Jews from Slovakia came to Britain. 
363 USA, Solomon Schonfeld, MS 183, 636, Report of the Federation of the Czechoslovakian Jews for 
1939 1945.  
364 If there are names to be mentioned from this camp, then it was a businessman Milan Kodíček and 
especially the former head of the Prague Jewish religious community, Emil Kafka. 
365 AÚTGM, EB II, box 364. Minutes of the meeting between the Association of Czechs Jews (Kafka, 
Růžička, Bondy, Kodíček) and Smutný, 18 April 1940. They also prepared a material dealing with the 
issues of Czech anti Semitism, whose spreading demanded, in their opinion, more attention than the 101 
groups were complicated. They rarely acted as partners. The inability of the Jewish 
exiles to find a common ground was apparent to the Czechoslovak government and it 
influenced its perception of the Czechoslovak Jewish politicians in an adverse way.  
In any case, the only group that developed comprehensive political activity 
was the National Jewish Council. Furthermore, it established strong links with the 
mainstream British and American Zionist organizations, especially the World Jewish 
Congress (WJC).
366 It was, however, the political activity of the Zionists that was to 
cause  complications  in  relations  with  the  Czechoslovak  government in exile.  The 
reason was that the Czechoslovak resistance reached the conclusion that after the war 
the  minority  system  of  the pre war  Republic  should not be  re established.  These 
plans were publicly presented by Beneš in 1941.  
 
The Czechoslovak Government in Exile and minorities 
In  October  1941,  President  Beneš prepared  an  elaborate  article  describing 
Czechoslovak  plans  for  the  post war  settlement  in  Europe.
367  The  article  was 
published in January 1942 in a prestigious international journal – Foreign Affairs – 
under  the  title  ‘Organization  of  postwar  Europe’.
 368 The  main  focus  of  Beneš’s 
analysis was the pre war system of protection of national minorities. As argued by 
the President, the old system of minority protection had broken down because it had 
not been applied generally in all countries. Furthermore, some – Germany, Hungary 
and Italy – made improper use of the treaties to disintegrate democratic European 
countries  that  had  respected  their  minorities,  especially  Czechoslovakia.
369 The 
minority treaties thus became ‘a burden upon the states which supported them’.
370 
Although the League of Nations had detailed information about the infringement of 
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242. 
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the treaties by Germans and others, it did nothing to help the affected states. In other 
words, Czechoslovakia felt betrayed and did not want to commit itself to the system 
again. The issue that needed to be solved was what to do with national minorities. 
Beneš  realised  that  a  total  homogenization  of  states  was  probably  impossible. 
Nevertheless, a transfer of populations was to be used ‘on a very much larger scale 
than after the last war’.
371 He continued: 
 
The protection of minorities in the future should consist primarily in the 
defense of human democratic rights and not of national rights. Minorities 
in  individual  states  must  never  again  be  given  the  character  of 
internationally recognized political and legal units, with the possibility of 
again becoming sources of disturbance. On the other hand, it is necessary 
to  facilitate  emigration  from  one  state  to  another,  so  that  if  national 
minorities do not want to live in a foreign state they may gradually unite 
with their own people in neighboring states [italics – J. L.]. 
372 
 
Beneš was not the first one to coin ‘population transfer’ as a way of solving 
the problems of minorities in multi national states. In fact, not long before – after the 
First World War – the transfer of population was used in order to solve the dispute 
between  Greece  and  Turkey;  over  a  million  Greeks  were  moved  to  mainland 
Greece.
373 Moreover, when the fateful Munich Diktat was signed in September 1938 
and  Czechoslovakia  was  forced  to  cede  its  borderland  to  Germany,  around  two 
hundred thousand Czechs, Jews and democratic Germans were forced to leave their 
homes.
374 The  Germans,  furthermore,  conducted  extensive  population  transfers  in 
occupied Poland after 1939.
375  
Beneš’s  article  reflected  the  experience  of  the  Czechoslovaks  during  the 
disintegration of the Republic in 1938 9. The pre war Republic had a multinational 
character  and  minorities  enjoyed  protection  according  to  the  peace  treaties. 
Nevertheless, it was the German, Hungarian and Polish minorities that orchestrated 
the collapse of the Masaryk Republic and its occupation by Germany after the Ides of 
March  1939.  As  argued,  the  experience  of  the  years  1938  and  1939  triggered  a 
national radicalization among Czechoslovaks in the homeland, as well as in exile. 
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The  first plans  for  national  homogenization  of  the Republic  had previously been 
discussed at the time of Munich and then since the first days of the Czechoslovak 
exiles’ political activities.
376 The plans gradually became more radical and the final 
goal  was  set  clear:  minorities  in  Czechoslovakia  should  not be  allowed  to  cause 
another  national  catastrophe,  as before  the  war.  Beneš  revealed  his  vision  of  the 
German position in post war Czechoslovakia to the resistance in the Protectorate in 
November 1940:  
It is necessary to have a programme directed not only by a just feeling 
of revenge and hatred against Germans, but also by the enduring interests 
of the nation and state [...] 1/ Also the Czech nation needs its Lebensraum 
– using the Nazi terminology. The borders set in Munich do not ensure 
that.  Hence  the  Munich  border  must  disappear.  [...]  2/  [...]  The  most 
important will be to create for the future n e w  bigger nationally Czech 
territory and secure it. [...] There would be three districts outside of the 
nationally Czech territory. [...] The Germans living inside of the Czech 
territory,  incl.  Prague,  would  have  to  move  out  or  to  accept 
unconditionally  the  purely  Czech  regime,  in  the  language  and 
administrative sense and without minority rights inside of this new Czech 
ethnographic border [spacing in the original – J. L.].
377 
 
Beneš’s  plan  did  not  count  with  any  officially  recognised  minorities  in 
Czechoslovakia at all. As stressed by Beneš, Germans who would be allowed to stay 
in the Czechs’ Lebensraum would be forced to accept the Czech regime completely. 
They would have the same civil rights as any other citizen, but not as a group.
378 
Although not specifically mentioned, these plans were to affect the position of the 
Jews as well. We do not have any written confirmation of Beneš’s views on the Jews 
from  the  period  under  discussion,  because  the  Czechoslovak  President  did  not 
present them in public. We have to rely on information from the Jewish side – from 
pro Jewish activists who were informed during private talks with the President. The 
former asked Beneš to keep his views secret and not to publish them for the time 
being.
379 
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The policy of population transfer and the Jews 
The Provisional Czechoslovak Government in Exile was recognised by the 
British  on  21  July  1940.  The  exile  administration  was  to  formally  copy  the 
democratic  constitution.  Besides  the  President  and  the  government,  Beneš  also 
planned to establish an advisory body, a quasi parliament, the Czechoslovak State 
Council.  Consequently,  the  National Jewish  Council  conducted  a  series  of 
negotiations aiming at securing a place in the exile parliament for their representative. 
The  national  Jews  referred  to  the  notion  of  continuity  of  the  pre Munich 
Czechoslovak regime, as promoted by Beneš. Two national Jews were elected to the 
last pre war parliament in Prague.
380 Yet during the negotiations, the Czechoslovak 
President revealed to the Zionists his new theory of the Jewish status in liberated 
Czechoslovakia. These new plans were to differ significantly from the settlement in 
the pre 1938 Republic. In September 1940, Beneš met the delegation of the National 
Jewish Council and was to argue:  
 
The Jewish question as it has shown itself shortly before the war and 
now  during  the  war  has  to be brought  to  a  definitive  solution.  […]  I 
believe that this time the Zionists should be more consequent and should 
all aim [at the Jewish State in Palestine] which avoids further spreading 
of Antisemitism.
381  
 
Likewise,  Lewis  Namier,  a  prominent  Zionist  and  a  leading  historian  in 
Britain,  presented  Beneš’s  viewpoint  at  a  meeting  with  other  Zionist  leaders  in 
December 1940: ‘Dr. Benes’ [sic!] view was that in future Jews in Czecho Slovakia 
would  have  to  be  either  Czechs  or  Zionists;  he  did  not  want  any  more  national 
minorities.’
382  A more elaborate interpretation of Beneš’s conception was forwarded 
by  Zelmanovits  to  Arnošt  Frischer,  the  former  chairman  of  the  interwar  Zionist 
Jewish Party, who at that time lived in Palestine: 
 
If expressed simply, the conception is as follows: one of the biggest 
tasks for the post war period must be the complete eradication of anti 
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Semitism. In order to achieve this, Zionism is the best instrument, but 
only  consistent  Zionism.  A Jewish  state  must be  founded  in  Palestine 
after the war with the help of other countries and nations. As its result, all 
the people who identify themselves with the Jewish nationality, will have 
to decide, no matter where they live, either for the Palestinian citizenship, 
or integration into those nations with whom they live. In other words, 
they will be either foreigners with the citizenship of the Jewish state or 
they will assimilate completely.  With regard to this matter, Pres. Benes 
remarked that consistency  in this case is crucial;  one   would have to  
plan  a  fast, in   fact immediate emigration of the Jews,  especially those 
from Central Europe, to this Jewish state, or  maybe  also to some other 
territory. 
383 
 
Beneš  was  rather  vague  about  the  meaning  of  assimilation  into  the  main 
nation. He only remarked: ‘Regarding the Jews something similar should be created 
as in England’.
384 The timing of Beneš’s proclamations on behalf of the Zionists 
coincided with his letter concerning the Czechoslovak Germans. In the second half of 
1940,  the  Czechoslovak  President,  supported  by  the  other  exiles  and  by  home 
underground  groups,  reached  a  decision  about  the  future  national  composition  of 
Czechoslovakia.
385  
The  exiled  authorities  did  not  differentiate  among minorities.  All  of  them 
were disrupting the national character of Czechoslovakia and were seen as a potential 
danger  for  its  security.
  386 Although  Beneš’s  article  in  Foreign  Affairs  did  not 
mention the Jews, the theory it presented entirely matched his remarks on Zionism 
privately revealed during 1940 and 1941. The years of the Second World War and 
the  rising  Czecho/Slovak  nationalism/s  changed  the  rules  of  the  game.  Also  the 
Zionists had no place in the Republic. However, the situation with the Jews was 
different to that of the Germans who were seen as a common enemy among the 
Allies. Beneš could not support any forceful expulsion – a population transfer – of 
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the Jews from Czechoslovakia. The President had to find a different way to solve 
‘the Jewish question’. 
Czechoslovakia was well known for its positive attitude towards the Zionist 
movement  and  practical  Zionism  that  aimed  at  creating  the  Jewish  state  in 
Palestine.
387 The late president Masaryk was sympathetic with the Jewish national 
movement  and  also  had  visited  Jewish  Palestine  in  1927.  However,  the  overt 
Czechoslovak support of the Jewish State in Palestine during the Second World War 
has to be seen in the context of the Czechoslovaks’ efforts to solve the minority 
question in the Republic. In comparison with other minorities, the Jews were to have 
the option to decide whether they wanted to stay in Czechoslovakia. Yet if they did 
decide to stay, they had to accept the Czechoslovak conditions and assimilate into the 
main Slavonic nations. All the Jews who wanted to declare their Jewishness as a 
national group were expected to move to Palestine. If they decided to stay in Europe, 
they could as equal citizens but without any rights as a group. 
There  is,  however,  another  issue  that  has  to  be  addressed  here:  what 
influenced the London exiles’ decision to treat Jews as other minorities and not to 
grant  them  any  special  status  in  liberated  Czechoslovakia?  Why  did  the 
Czechoslovaks  decide  that  the  support  of  political  Zionism,  this  support  of  the 
solution of the Jewish question by ‘population transfer’, was in the interest of the 
Czechoslovak Republic?  
The Czechoslovak and  world  Zionists opposed  Beneš’s plans  and tried to 
persuade him of the negative effect his theory would have on ordinary Jews.  They 
first of all doubted that all national Jews would be willing to abandon their countries 
and move to Palestine.
388 Furthermore, the question of a wholesale emigration to 
British Mandate Palestine seemed to be problematic as early as 1940. Beneš thus felt 
obliged  to  ‘explain’  to  the  pro Jewish  activists  the  reasons  that  led  him  to  his 
conclusions.  During  his  talks  with  western  pro Jewish  groups,  Beneš  presented 
himself  as  a  good  protector  of  Jewish  national  aspirations  and  even  of  the  Jews 
themselves.  In  his  conversation  with  Sydney  Silverman,  Labour  MP  and  the 
chairman of the BS WJC, the President argued as follows: 
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If the solution [of the Jewish question] was to be a positive one it would 
make an immense [difference] in the Jewish problem. Jews will become a 
nation (which they are not at the present time). The moral effect would 
be considerable both to Jews and non Jews. The Jews would lose their 
inferiority complex from which they have suffered so long and which has 
made them tools of stronger nations, say Germany or Russia, who have 
used them for Germanization or Russification purposes. […] 
The  Jewish  problem  was  to  a  very  great  extent  a  moral  and 
psychological one as well as a political problem. If the Jewish State was 
created  and  if  that  state  was  able  to  receive  great  numbers  of  Jewish 
immigrants from Europe, probably the most active and national minded 
elements of Jewry would gradually be concentrated there. It was clear 
that not all Jews would emigrate but that in about 50 or 60 years those 
who  remained  in  the  various  countries  would  undergo  a  very  serious 
process of assimilation. In this way every Jew would have the alternative 
either  of  supporting  and  relying  on  the  Jewish  National  State  or 
remaining a citizen of the state in which he resided and gradually facing 
assimilation [italics – J. L.].
389 
 
As  stressed  by  Beneš,  diaspora  Jews  were  not  considered  to  be  a  nation.  
Only by assimilation, or emigration to Palestine, by losing their ‘inferiority complex’, 
could the Jews become better people. Furthermore, Beneš, in a very paternalistic tone, 
informed  Namier  about  the  reasons  why  he  revealed  to  the  Zionists  his  new 
conception of the solution of ‘the Jewish question’: ‘[Beneš] was saying it to the 
Zionists because their Zionism was often luke warm and theoretical [!]. A nation 
cannot conquer, or reconquer, its national independence and state unless it puts its 
entire energy into it.’
390 In another conversation, the Czechoslovak President praised 
Angelo Goldstein
391 over Zelmanovits, because the former, as a ‘real’ Zionist moved 
to Palestine, not to London.
392 Beneš hence acted as a good and caring patron of the 
Zionists. Patronizing Zionists was perceived by the Czechoslovak President as being 
natural. In his own opinion, his new theory – though slightly misunderstood – was 
correct and the Zionists should simply realise that he only wanted the best for them.  
Beneš was more open in a discussion with Chaim Weizmann nearly a year 
later  –  in  the  end  of  1941.  He,  in  fact,  admitted  the  influence  of  people  in  the 
occupied homeland on the exiles’ political planning. The Czechoslovak President 
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allegedly revealed to Weizmann that ‘when the war was over Czechoslovakia would 
probably  find  itself  obliged  to  “dilute”  its  Jewish  population,  perhaps  by  one 
third’.
393 The difficulties laid in economic reasons. Beneš confirmed that the Jewish 
population  was  economically  ruined  by  Aryanization.  The  President,  however, 
continued:  
 
[i]n  many  instances,  such  property  had  come  into  the  possession  of 
other Czechoslovak citizens. Simply to dispossess them in an effort to 
restore the property to its original owners was scarcely a solution. It left 
out of account any number of difficulties, both of a practical and political 
nature.
394  
 
It was impossible to take all the property from the Czechoslovak people and 
return it to the Jews. Hence, emigration of a part of the affected Jewish population 
would  be  a  solution.  The  Czechoslovaks  were  willing  to  co finance  their 
migration.
395 The  statement  by  Beneš  contradicted  all  his  previous  and  future 
proclamations and public support for the Zionist cause. The interests of people in 
Czechoslovakia  were  clearly  confirmed.  When  enquiring  into  the  reasons  for  the 
Czechoslovak government’s overt support of Zionism, these political and utilitarian 
reasons should be taken into consideration. Yet there were more factors that shaped 
the  exiles’  attitude  towards  the  Jews.  Among  them,  the  policy  of  national 
homogenization and the perception of ‘loyalty’ played key roles. 
 
Perception of the Jews by the Czechoslovak Exiles 
The exiles contemplated the post war position of the Jews in Czechoslovakia 
already at the beginning of the war. Their perception of the Jews’ identity played a 
crucial role. A clear distinction was made between the Jews living in the western 
parts of the Republic, in the Bohemian lands, and those living in Eastern Slovakia 
and  Subcarpathian  Ruthenia.  In  internal  correspondence,  but  also  in  negotiations 
with international partners, the exiles expressed their intention to lower the number 
of the Jews living in Czechoslovakia, particularly among those settled in the east. 
Hence Minister Ripka suggested to the Polish Foreign Minister Edward Raczynski 
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that  there  was  no  Jewish  problem  in  Bohemia  and  Moravia  because  of  the  low 
number of Jews living there and their advanced assimilation. This was not the case 
with the Jews in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Both ministers agreed that the 
Polish and Czechoslovak government would prefer it if ‘the Jewish problem’ was 
solved by the international community.
396  
An  identical  perception  of  the  Jews  living  in  Czechoslovakia  was  later 
confirmed by Julius Fürth, a member of the State Council and an assimilated Jew. In 
his report for the Czechoslovak authorities, Fürth concluded: ‘the Jewish problem in 
Czechoslovakia would be considerably reduced if Subcarpathian Ruthenia with its 
102,000 Jews […] did not constitute a part of the Czechoslovak State’.
397 Moreover, 
he  noted  that  ‘the  backwards’  Jews  of  Ruthenia  lived  under  the  mild  Hungarian 
regime and most of them, in contrast to the Jews in the other parts of Czechoslovakia, 
would survive the war. Thereby, they would constitute at least two thirds of all the 
Jews  living  in  the  Republic.
398 A  considerable  part  of  the  Czechoslovak  Jewish 
community was seen by the exiles as alien to the major population. The perceived 
problem of the Ostjuden laid in their alleged backwardness and also strict adherence 
to Judaism and Jewish tradition.
399  
Nevertheless,  the  exiles  expressed  traditional prejudices  against  Jews  as  a 
whole. A report sent to Beneš by his close collaborators in the spring of 1939 argued 
that most of the Jewish émigrés were allegedly ‘the so called economic émigrés, who 
[had] left the Protectorate mostly for economic reasons and [had] no intention to 
work  in  any  [resistance]  movement’.
400 Furthermore,  Taborský  mentioned  in  his 
diary that the Jews serving in the Czechoslovak army were shirking and were not 
                                                 
396 HIA, Poland: Ambadasa (U.S.) Records, File 51/3, Edvard Raczynski about his meeting with the 
Minister Ripka, 29 November 1941. For Ripka’s version of the meeting, see CNA, AHR, 1 5 19 2, 
box 104, Minutes of Ripka’s meeting with Raczynski, 29 November 1941. 
397 Kratochvil,  Michaela,  The  Jewish  Aspects  of  the  Czechoslovak  Government in Exile:  Minority 
Policy  During  1939 1948  (Jerusalem:  Hebrew  University,  2000)  (unpublished  Master’s  thesis), 
document 3 (no page), Fuerth for the Chancellery of the President, for the Minister of the Interior and 
Justice, 6 October 1942. 
398 Ibid.  
399 These concerns played role in the negotiations of the Czechoslovak Polish confederation at the 
beginning  of  the  war.  See  FDRPL,  Alexander  Sachs  Papers,  box  108,  ‘Note  on  the  Outlook  for 
Czechoslovakia’. The Czechoslovaks allegedly opposed the free movement of people between Poland 
and Czechoslovakia. The reason was their concerns about possible mass migration of Polish Jews to 
Czechoslovakia.  
400 HIA, Edward Táborský Papers, Box 3, A Report sent to Beneš by Edward Táborsky and Vaclav 
Benes  in the Spring of 1939. My translation. 110 
willing to drill. He concluded that the Jews were not eager to fight.
401 The reason he 
gave was their ‘inherent aversion to the physical strain’.
402 Others, especially the 
Minister of Defence, Sergěj Ingr, overtly condemned the Jews as cowards who were 
afraid to join the army and fight. He condemned them as an unreliable element and 
opposed the general mobilization of Czechoslovaks living in Britain.
403 As stated, the 
majority of the exiles were Jewish and German and it was not in the interest of the 
army to have a ‘German Jewish character’.
404 An image of a Jew was constructed – 
one who escaped from the Protectorate only for economic reasons; a Jew who was 
not willing to fight and even if he joined the army, his psychological predisposition 
hindered him in defending Czechoslovakia in the proper way.  
In national terms, the fact that was repeatedly highlighted was that most of 
the Czechoslovak Jewish émigrés residing in Britain were German speaking.
405 It 
was again Táborský who stressed the detail in his diary.
406 Also Beneš used this 
argument in his negotiations with the BS WJC:  
 
In dealing with the Jewish side of the problem [of representation in the 
exile  administration]  he  has  to  face  the  chief  difficulty  that  the  great 
majority  of  the  Jewish Czech  emigration  in  [Britain]  are  German 
speaking Jews. There is an old mistrust amongs[t] the Czechs [against] 
these  German  Jews  –  who  have  been  for  a  long  time  the  bearers  of 
Germanization among the [Czech] population in small towns and villages 
– a mistrust [of] the [G]erman in them.
407  
 
Negative sentiments against German speaking Jews were also acknowledged 
in writing by two ministers of the Czechoslovak government, Ladislav K. Feierabend 
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and Ingr.
408 Ingr even proposed that only those mastering Czech or Slovak languages 
were to be allowed to serve in the army.
409  
Additionally, the exiles’ perception of who actually was and was not Jewish 
was often false and crudely imposed. Ivo Ducháček, a close associate to Minister 
Ripka, noted a conversation between Rudolf Bechyně, the designated chairman of 
the State Council, and the Prime Minister Jan Šrámek. The discussion concerned the 
nomination  of  Fürth,  an  assimilated  and  baptized  Jew,  to  the  exiled  parliament. 
Bechyně  opposed  Fürth’s  nomination  on  the  grounds  that  the  exiles  ought  to  be 
careful  about  the  overall  number  of  Jews  in  the  parliament.  The  conversation 
continued:  
 
Šrámek  argued  that  Fürth  was  a  Catholic  and  not  a  Jew.  Bechyně 
reacted: “Oh  yes, but he is still Jewish”. Stránský
410 has already been 
appointed and there might be others – it is though impossible to burden 
the National Council [State Council – J. L.] in a such way”.
411  
 
Bechyně’s ‘worries’ were probably based on the possible harm caused to the 
parliament’s  image  at  home  or  among  other  exiles.  It  still  reveals  the  exiles’ 
viewpoint of the issues connected with Jews. Neither Fürth nor Stránský were Jewish 
in their own perception. It was an imposed identity, when even people who did not 
have anything in common with Jewishness, were still judged racially, based on their 
ancestors. The Czechoslovak political mainstream constructed Jews as an entity alien 
to the Czech nation. This brings us to the next question: what was the Jews’ place in 
the exiles’ overall plans for minorities in Czechoslovakia? 
 
To solve the minority question in Czechoslovakia 
After the First World War, the Jews in Czechoslovakia were granted special 
national privileges in the constitution, mostly on the ground that the Germans and 
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Hungarians received them as well.
412 Also during the Second World War, the fate of 
the national Jews became linked to other minorities. These tendencies developed in 
1940. Whilst in December 1939, Beneš declared to Zelmanovits his willingness to 
reserve  a  seat  on  the  parliament  for  the  Zionists,  he  dropped  this  plan  in  the 
following months.
413 The President in his conversations with representatives of the 
Zionist organizations repeatedly referred to his decision to solve all the minorities’ 
representation in the State Council simultaneously.
414 When the Zionist politicians 
pointed  to  the  loyalty  of  Jews  to  Czechoslovakia  and  thus  to  the  injustice  of 
comparing  them  to  the  Germans,  Beneš  simply  replied:  ‘[a]  Minority  is  [a] 
minority’.
415  Among  the  other  exiles,  for  example,  Feierabend  from  the  very 
beginning  opposed  Beneš’s  plan  to  call  to  the  parliament  representatives  of  the 
former  Czechoslovak  minorities.  Feierabend  wanted  the  parliament  on  a  national 
level to be purely Czechoslovak.
416 Also Slávik expressed amazement that the Jews 
demanded representation on the exile parliament. The Minister of the Interior asked 
whether  this  might  not  cause  harm  to  the  Jews  themselves  because  they  would 
constitute themselves as a minority. In Slávik’s perception, ‘becoming a minority’ 
was  a  negative  development  and  threatened  the  future  of  the  Jews  in 
Czechoslovakia.
417 To be a minority was simply a negative attribute.  
Furthermore, concessions to the Jews, as a minority, threatened to cause a 
precedent for other minorities. During 1941, this became an argument centred on the 
question of why the exiles did not want to publish any declaration of the Jewish 
status  in  the post war  Republic.
418 Ripka  confirmed  the  government’s position to 
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Ignacy  Schwarzbart  of  the  Polish  National  Council  in  October  1941.  The  State 
Minister agreed that the Jews had been the most ‘reliable excellent citizens’ of the 
Czechoslovak Republic  and that ‘there [had not existed] any Jewish question’ in 
Czechoslovakia before the war.
419 However, according to Ripka, no one knew about 
the real outcome of the war and about the situation in Europe:  
 
We don’t know how we shall succeed in solving the problem of the 
Sudeten and the German problem in general but under no [circumstances] 
do we want to have a German problem in our state. It is for all these 
reasons that we are in no position to issue a declaration regarding the 
national minorities at present.
420 
 
After Schwarzbart’s suggestions, Ripka admitted the differences between the 
German  and  Jewish  minorities.  However,  Schwarzbart’s  reference  to  the  Jewish 
demand for their own educational opportunities in post war Czechoslovakia led to a 
negative  response  from  the  Minister.  The  Czechoslovaks  strictly  opposed  the 
German educational system in the Republic. Possible concessions to the Jews were 
hence seen as a precedent for other minorities.
421 The government was cautious in 
relation to any step that might have caused any complications with the territorial 
integrity  of  the  Republic.  Any  declaration  in  connection  with  minority  groups, 
including the Jews, was, therefore, inadmissible. In fact, the Zionists’ demands raised 
the issue of loyalty; loyalty of the people who, as the situation in the army was to 
confirm, were not entirely trusted. 
 
The situation in the Czechoslovak Army 
Two particular affairs need to be addressed in connection with the situation in 
the army: the mobilization of the Czechoslovak Jews living in Palestine and anti 
Semitism in the Czechoslovak army abroad.  
In  April  1940,  Josef  M.  Kadlec,  the  Czechoslovak  Consul  General  in 
Jerusalem,  ordered  a  compulsory  mobilisation  of  all  the  Czechoslovak  citizens 
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situated there.
422 The Czechoslovak Jews in Palestine constituted a very important 
source of potential rank and file for the army.
423 Their enlistment to the army was 
important  from  a  political  point  of  view.  The  exiles  needed  a  significant sized 
fighting corps that would contribute to the Allied struggle. However, the leaders of 
the Czechoslovak Zionists in Palestine opposed this act and preferred to wait for the 
planned establishment of the Jewish army. They intended to stay in Palestine and 
thus to contribute to the defence of the future Jewish state. In their opinion, a Jew, 
once  he  had  migrated  to  Palestine,  abandoned  his  commitments  to  the  previous 
country and was bound only to the land of Israel.
424 Nevertheless, at the same time, 
most of them did not renounce their Czechoslovak citizenship because of the post 
war  claims  vis à vis  Czechoslovakia  where  they  were  forced  to  leave  their 
property.
425  
As argued before, the Jews were not seen by the exiles as zealous fighters for 
the  Czechoslovak  cause,  and  their proportionally  significant  representation  in  the 
army was seen as undesirable.
 426 Curiously, with the progression of mobilization, it 
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became obvious that the army could not reach any significant size without Jews.
427 
The government officials were, in reality, caught between two mutually conflicting 
problems. Yet the Palestinian Zionists’ opposition to the mobilization came at the 
worst possible moment – that is when the German armies attacked Western Europe.  
The  Czechoslovak  diplomatic  and  military  representatives  in  Palestine 
frequently criticised the Zionists, or even simply the Jews. In one of the reports from 
late 1941, an officer of the Czechoslovak army stationed in Haifa wrote about a new 
wave of volunteers for the unit. He characterised the newly presented volunteers as 
those ‘who belong[ed] neither to the group that [had] faithfully enlisted to the army 
before the fall of France, nor to the group as [were] the people in Atlit,
428 but to a 
group that [was] most intelligibly called “J e w s” [spacing in the original – J. L.].’
429 
The  reason  for  their  sudden  volunteering  was,  according  to  the  document,  their 
realization that thanks to their previous ‘overcunning’, they almost lost any chance 
ever to return to Czechoslovakia. The Jews had allegedly realized that because of the 
bad economic situation in Palestine, they would not be able to reach their previous 
social and economic position. Hence they suddenly changed their mind and wanted 
to go back to Czechoslovakia.
430 The author of the letter opposed their calling to the 
army.
431 The Czechoslovak representatives in Palestine regularly supplied the exiles 
in  London  with  reports  loaded  with  information  about  alleged  anti Czechoslovak 
feelings, conduct, or even the pure personal expediency of the Czechoslovak Jews 
living there.
432 
Authors of such messages found a willing audience in London. Beneš noted 
that he had already been prepared to nominate Angelo Goldstein to the State Council. 
Goldstein was a former Zionist MP in the interwar parliament who came to Palestine 
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in  1939.  Nevertheless,  Goldstein’s  opposition  to  the  mobilisation  and  his 
complicated  relations  with  Consul  Kadlec  purportedly  caused  the  Czechoslovak 
President to abandon this plan. Beneš changed his opinion despite the fact that he had 
expressed understanding for Goldstein’s position on mobilization only a couple of 
months before.
433 Indeed, only in September 1940, Beneš stated to Zelmanovits and 
Rosenberg:  
 
the Czechoslovak people would never make reproaches to the Jews if in 
these  times  they  would  not  fight  under  the  Czechoslovak  flags.  And 
should  they  not  reach  their  aim  after  this  war  [the  Jewish  state  in 
Palestine – J. L.] the Czechoslovaks would not fail to recognise their pure 
intentions and approve of them.
434  
 
It  is  obvious  that  a  change  in  Beneš’s  perception  of  the  issue  occurred 
sometime in the autumn of 1940. When the Czechoslovak Zionists in London asked 
Beneš to investigate the whole Palestinian affair, the President 
 
informed  [Zelmanovits]  that  Consul  Kadlec  had  done  and  was 
continuing to do very valuable work [in Palestine]; that he was a well 
known  personality  and  especially  to  the  English  authorities.  For  this 
reason [Beneš] did not wish to make any investigations. It was enough for 
him to know that there were disagreements and he was, therefore, not 
able  to  call  on  anyone  who  might  continue  those  differences  here 
[reference to Goldstein’s appointment to the State Council – J. L.].
435 
 
 The  events  in  Palestine  and  Beneš’s  remarks  confirmed  that  the  Zionists 
were no longer trusted. Their conduct in Palestine threatened to exclude them from 
the mainstream of the Czechoslovak resistance movement and consequently from 
‘Czechoslovakia’. The WJC leadership immediately recognized that this affair might 
have influenced the Czechoslovak Zionist relations in an adverse way. Thus WJC 
politicians in America tried to distance themselves from the whole affair and also 
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desperately called on the Czechoslovak Zionists in Palestine to stop all obstructions 
and cooperate with the Czechoslovak authorities.
436 
Despite  the  opposition  among  the  Czechoslovak  Zionists  in  Palestine, 
thousands  of  Jews  joined  the  Czechoslovak  army.  In  fact,  Jews  constituted  a 
significant part of the Czechoslovak armed forces.
437 However, since the beginning 
of the war, the army was accused of containing anti Semitic elements that led to the 
persecution of Jewish soldiers. Anti Semitic incidents occurred from time to time, 
beyond any doubt, in the exiled army and have been sufficiently described by other 
authors.
438 Hence this part is more concerned with the implications that the existence 
of  the  army’s  negative  reputation  might  have  had  on  the  position  of  the  exile 
government. Furthermore, did the publicity given to the anti Semitic incidents have 
any impact on the Czechoslovaks’ perception of the Jews?  
In 1941, Beneš stressed that the existence of the exile army in Britain had 
helped him to receive official recognition by the British.
439 However, the evacuation 
of the army from France in June 1940 was accompanied by anti Semitic incidents. 
The moral degradation of the army, where most of the nationally radical elements 
were  concentrated,  continued  on  British  soil.
440 In  August  1940,  a  delegation  of 
Jewish soldiers prepared a memorandum for Beneš and Ingr, summarizing all the 
accusations against the army.
441 Furthermore, at approximately the same time, many 
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memorandum on the situation in the army was submitted already in the end of July 1940 to the Board 
of Deputies, to Selig Brodetsky. Authors of both of the documents were identical: Capt. Brichta, Lft. 
Artur Fleischmann, Sec. Lft. Alexander Kraus, Private Dr. Štěpán Barber, Private Dr Rudolf Braun, 118 
Jews joined the Communist initiated desertion of more than 500 soldiers from the 
army.
442  Prevailing  anti Semitism  was  given  as  one  of  the  reasons  for  their 
desertion.
443 Had the rumours about anti Semitism been proven to be true or even 
only commonly acknowledged, the political struggle of the Beneš government might 
have faced considerable obstacles. Racial persecution did not fit into the image of a 
democratic nation fighting against foreign totalitarian oppression.   
As  noted  by  Ripka,  ‘some  international  Jewish  organizations’  were 
susceptible to the complaints made by Czechoslovak Jewish soldiers.
444 In August 
1940,  Silverman  attacked  the  undemocratic  conditions  in  the  Polish  army  in  his 
parliamentary speech. He continued as follows:  
 
Regrettable as it is, there is something on the Czech side too, which 
needs a certain amount of care and attention. I am sure that these things 
will not be lost sight of. I am drawing attention to these questions. I hope 
I have done it in a friendly fashion.
445  
 
Similar discussions were cautiously observed by the Czechoslovak exiles.
446 
The British parliamentary arena was indeed more dangerous than occasional reports 
in the British press in terms of negative propaganda.
447  
Anti Semitic  incidents  in  the  army  were  repeatedly  confirmed  by  several 
Czechoslovak ministers and Beneš.
448 The incidents were, however, criticized as the 
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446 The Czechoslovak exiles were aware of Silverman’s speech see: HIA, Edward Táborský Papers, 
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447 HIA, Edward Táborský Papers, box 1, diary entry 12 August 1940, p. 268. Reynold’s News and 
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deeds of individuals and the Czechoslovaks rejected the idea that the army could be 
anti Semitic as a whole. Moreover, Beneš and Ingr appealed to the Jewish soldiers, 
stating that they should follow first and foremost the higher common goal of the 
Czechoslovak  ‘saintly  and  righteous  cause’.
449 In  addition,  Beneš  in  his  public 
speech to the soldiers suggested that both sides should always be tolerant.
450 The 
Czechoslovak leaders were aware of the problems in the army, but fought against 
any  publicity  given  to  them.  In  this  sense,  Jewish  complaints  about  anti Semitic 
incidents were presented as going against the Czechoslovak cause. The complaints of 
Jewish soldiers questioned their loyalty to the resistance movement.  
Beneš and Ingr blamed the anti Semitic atmosphere on the disintegration of 
the army during the evacuation from France. Furthermore, both statesmen sought the 
roots  of  anti Semitism  among  Jews  themselves.  Ingr,  in  his  response  to  a 
memorandum submitted by a delegation of Jewish soldiers, referred to the Jewish 
adherence to Germans back in Czechoslovakia, even though many Jews grew rich 
when living with the Czech nation. The Minister complained that many Jews used 
the German language even after the occupation.
451 According to the Minister, the 
anti Jewish sentiments in the army were not anti Semitic, but anti German.
452  
In  his  conversation  with  representatives  of  the  Board  of  Deputies  Beneš 
presented three main sources of anti Semitic feelings among the soldiers: 1) It was 
the general rise of anti Semitism in the World that influenced a small number of 
Czechoslovaks. Also some of the officers in the army were affected by this ‘poison’; 
2) Agents provocateurs were spreading those sentiments among the soldiers in the 
army; 3) The Jews themselves were guilty of worsening the situation. For example, 
as stated by Beneš, some Jews joined the army in Palestine only to get to Western 
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Europe. Beneš thought that they simply wanted to escape the bad economic situation 
in Palestine and did not have the intention to fight.
453 Equally doubtful was another 
explanation given by Beneš: anti Semitic feelings in the army were spread thanks to 
the Czech liberal tradition. The democracy in the army allowed for the discussion of 
all topics that soldiers wished.
454 Beneš in any case labelled the allegations as rather 
exaggerated.  
What is important in the case of Ingr and Beneš is the reference to the Jews’ 
own contribution to anti Semitism in the army. Based on this perception of anti 
Semitism, the Jews who complained were perceived as troublemakers. In fact, the 
Jewish soldiers were aware that their contemplated mass desertion might have only 
harmed the Jewish political position during and after the war. The authors of the 
memorandum for Ingr and Beneš decided to stay in the army.
455 The situation finally 
calmed down in the second half of 1940.
456 
Nevertheless, the Czechoslovak government was still on alert. Shortly after 
Christmas 1941, Beneš complained to Ingr that although anti Semitism had actually 
never played any important role in the army, there were still some ‘excesses, whose 
repetition might lead to serious consequences’.
457 The Christmas celebrations in the 
army were accompanied by several, mostly verbal, anti Semitic incidents. Beneš was 
warned by some Jewish soldiers that ‘certain Jews, not so loyal to the Czechoslovak 
cause, might have appealed to the British authorities and public’.
458 Beneš warned 
Ingr  that  similar  complaints  might  have  seriously  harmed  the  reputation  of  the 
Czechoslovaks.
459  Yet  as  noted  by  the  Jewish  soldiers,  the  situation  in  the 
Czechoslovak army raised the issue of Jewish loyalty. How then was Jewish loyalty 
perceived by the exiles?  
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What did it mean to be ‘loyal’? 
The exiles’ perception of Jewish attitudes towards the resistance movement, 
particularly  towards  the  army  and  Jewish  political  demands,  opened  the  issue  of 
‘dual loyalty’. Was it possible to be loyal to both the Czechoslovak government and 
to the land of Israel – to the Zionist ideals – at the same time? Did the Czechoslovaks 
think that this dual loyalty was possible? Or, to be more precise, how did the exiles 
understand the term ‘loyalty’? What was demanded from ‘a loyal citizen’? 
At  the  beginning  of  the  war,  Beneš  told  a  delegation  of  Czechoslovak 
national Jews: ‘You are Jews and Czechoslovaks and I am aware that according to 
the  manner  of  your  work,  one  does  not  have  to  be  detrimental  to  the  other’.
460 
However,  the  situation  changed  soon  afterwards.  Within  a  month,  Smutný,  the 
Chancellor  to  Beneš,  revealed  to  Zelmanovits  that  it  was  not  advisable  for  the 
National Jewish Council to demand recognition as the official representation of the 
Czechoslovak  national  Jews  in  Britain.  Any  fragmentation  of  the  Czechoslovak 
resistance  movement  was  unwelcome.
461 People  associated  with  Beneš  repeatedly 
expressed their doubts about the Zionist or Jewish loyalty to the Czechoslovak cause. 
Smutný  remarked that in his opinion ‘a hundred per cent supporter of  the Czech 
national interests [could] not be anybody Jewish’.
462 Even Beneš privately criticized 
the Czechoslovak Zionists. Once he was supposed to have uttered a remark that ‘the 
Jews [could not] be represented in the [State] Council by Zionists, that there [was] no 
place  for  [Zionists]  in  the  Republic  of  Czechoslovakia  and  that  they  should 
emigrate’.
463 
As argued previously, it was especially strong Czech nationalism that played 
an  enormous  role  in  the  confrontation  with  Jewish  issues.  Only  unconditional 
adherence to the mainstream Czechoslovak resistance movement was seen by the 
exiles as an expression of loyalty. No particularistic issues were thus expected, or 
welcomed. This was, for example, also the case of several Slovak politicians who in 
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exile  tried  to  promote  a  more  autonomist  regime  for  post war  Slovakia.
 464 The 
evaluation of the perception of the Jews by the Czechoslovak authorities in exile 
confirmed the trends already recorded among the resistance groups in the homeland. 
The  Jews  were  not  seen  as  being  a  reliable  and  unconditional  part  of  the 
Czechoslovak resistance.  
The importance of the situation in the army and the threats emerging from its 
occasional utilization by the Zionists should not be marginalized. The government 
apparently  stopped  believing  in  the  possibility  of  dual  loyalty  among  the 
Czechoslovak Zionists. Based on the information about the Zionists’ conflict with 
the Czechoslovak authorities in Palestine, Smutný told Zelmanovits that ‘he [could] 
appreciate the very confl[ict] which faces every Zionist, but still one must decide 
once and for ever between the old and new Fatherland’.
465 At almost the same time, 
the Czechoslovak Zionists in Britain started their campaign for representation in the 
exile political structures. According to the President’s chancellor, the Zionists could 
not exist between two nations, or as a part of two nations. They were supposed to 
decide on only one of them and join it with all their efforts. The undesirability of 
Zionists’ particularistic interests was echoed in the highest strata of the Czechoslovak 
exiles. Its confirmation came during the negotiations of an appointment of a Jew to 
the exile parliament. Beneš rejected Jewish nomination into the first parliament, also 
for the reason that he did not reach any agreement with other minorities, especially 
the  Sudeten  Germans.
466 It  confirmed  that  the  Zionists  were  treated  as  any  other 
minority.  
The main problem was the different perceptions of loyalty. The Zionists still 
adhered to ‘the contract signed’ between them and the Czechoslovak state in 1919. 
They believed in the world of Versailles and rightly pointed to the different records 
of the Jewish and German minorities’ behaviour in pre war Czechoslovakia. The 
Zionists were apparently unable to comprehend that the war and occupation radically 
changed the rules of the game. The Czechoslovak state no longer demanded only 
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‘passive  loyalty’.  The  Czechoslovak  leadership  was  no  longer  content  with  a 
minority that was loyal in the sense of supporting the regime, but living its own 
particular life in a national and political sense. The Republic demanded what can be 
labelled  as  an  ‘active  loyalty’;  it  was  a  loyalty  without  preconditions,  an 
unconditional loyalty. Consequently, the perceptions of loyalty, as formulated by the 
Zionists and Czechoslovaks, could not meet.  
In  the  first  war  years,  also  based  on  the  pressure  from  the  Allies,  the 
Czechoslovak government could not rule out completely the presence of Germans in 
post war Czechoslovakia. Those were supposed to be concentrated in small districts 
to  distract  from  the  national  character  of  the  new  European  states  in  the  most 
minimal manner possible. This solution was impossible in the case of the Jews. The 
special  character  of  their  community  was  to  allow  a  part  of  them  to  assimilate, 
completely, to the major population. Nevertheless, the national Jews, in the sense of 
the theory of transfer of population, were supposed to move to the Jewish state. 
Although there were minor differences between the planned Czechoslovak solution 
of the Jewish and German questions, the basic principles were identical. Hence the 
overt Czechoslovak support of the Zionist movement should be understood in the 
broader  context  of  the  Czechoslovak  solution  of  minority  issues  in  post war 
Czechoslovakia. Indeed, it was presented as a possible plan for Europe as a whole. 
Beneš  was  caught  by  surprise  by  the  Zionist  opposition  to  his  plans.  He 
probably  expected  that  his  overt  support  of  the  Zionist  movement  would  be 
welcomed by the Jewish nationalists who would, in return, refrain from demanding 
special  privileges  based  on  their  nationality.  The  government’s  perception  of  the 
Zionists did not change over the first months of 1941, especially when the Zionists 
rejected  an  invitation  to  the  opening  meeting  of  the  State  Council.
467 Moreover, 
Zelmanovits  even  started  a  public  campaign  to  support  the  Zionists’  claims  for 
representation in the parliament.
468 It again brought up the issue of the fragmentation 
of the exile movement. Nevertheless, the negotiations continued and, in the second 
half of 1941,  Beneš  expressed his willingness to nominate a  Zionist to the State 
Council. However, the Czechoslovak President made a last gesture of protest. Instead 
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of Zelmanovits, who was supported by the British and American Zionists and who 
apparently wanted to secure the place for himself, Beneš appointed Arnošt Frischer, 
a Czechoslovak Zionist living in Palestine.
469 As will be shown later, Frischer was a 
moderate Zionist and, in fact, accepted Beneš’s vision of the Jewish position in post 
war Czechoslovakia. 
 
Image no. 6: Arnošt Frischer
470 
Although Frischer was appointed ad personam, as any other member of the 
parliament, he positioned himself and was perceived as a national Jew. The Jewish 
press wrote about him in this respect and he was also presented as a Jewish member 
during his public appearances in London.
471 What, then, were the reasons that finally 
persuaded Beneš to accept Jewish minority representation in the parliament? There 
was another force in play that countered radical Czech nationalism. It was in the 
interest of the state to protect the image of Czechoslovakia as a democratic country. 
In  these  efforts,  the  Czechoslovaks  faced  what  they  perceived  as  a  mighty 
interlocutor: international Jewish organizations.  
 
The Czechoslovak Exiles and the ‘power’ of the international Jewish organizations 
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Political  negotiations  and  the  concession  given  to  the  Zionists  opened  up 
another topic that was already part of Czechoslovak Jewish relations a long time 
before the war. It was the issue of the role played in world politics by international 
Jewish organizations and Jewish press, or rather its perception by the Czechoslovak 
exiles;  their  alleged  influence  on  American  and  British  public  life  and  on  the 
decision making  of  both  western  governments.  Engel’s  study  of  the  Polish  exile 
administration’s relations with Jews during the war is based on the assumption of the 
deep  Polish  belief  in  the  power  of  the  American  Jewish  lobby.  The  Jews  were 
perceived as an important possible ally.
472 However, the influence of the Jews, as 
perceived by  the  Poles,  might  also  have been  very  negative.
473 How  far  was  the 
Beneš government policy shaped by their perception of the Jewish lobby in world 
politics? And how was ‘the power of the Jews’ perceived by the Czechoslovaks?  
As argued in the introduction, the late President Masaryk acknowledged the 
importance of the support he had received before 1918 from the influential American 
Jewry.
474 Furthermore,  when  the  Czecho Slovak  government  of  the  post Munich 
Republic discussed the introduction of anti Jewish legislation, opposition against the 
laws was justified by their adverse impact on the Czecho Slovak image abroad. The 
specific consequence was to be the threat of the boycott of Czechoslovak goods by 
the Americans and British.
475  
Likewise  the  exiles  from  the  very  beginning  of  the  war  recognized  the 
importance of being on good terms with American and British pro Jewish political 
groups. On 14 December 1939 Beneš was visited by a delegation of the National 
Jewish Council. During the conversation with Zelmanovits, Beneš appreciated their 
willingness to join the Czechoslovak resistance abroad. Moreover, the ex President 
revealed  to  the  delegation  his  idea  of  their  participation  in  the  struggle  for 
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Czechoslovakia.  Besides  their  loyalty  to  the  Czechoslovak  official  representation 
abroad, Beneš only asked the Zionists to spread the Czechoslovak exiles’ propaganda 
among  American  and  British  Jews.
476 Beneš  was  thus  seeking  support  for  the 
Czechoslovak resistance movement among Jewish groups in the west. Zelmanovits 
indeed later informed Selig Brodetsky, the head of the Board of Deputies, that it 
would be important if someone from the Czechoslovak Jewish circles in America 
could give publicity to the Czechoslovak cause.
477  
The exiles’ concerns about the influence of American Jews were revealed 
during the negotiations of the Jewish representation in the State Council. During one 
of the first meetings with Beneš, Zelmanovits remarked that based on the theory of 
continuity with pre Munich Republic, the national Jews had a ‘legal claim’ to be 
represented in the exile parliament. He emphasized that American and British Jews 
would not be able to grasp the non appointment of a national Jew.
478  Namier went as 
far as claiming that this was not ‘an internal Czechoslovak problem but a matter of 
interest to all Zionists throughout the world’.
479 Indeed, Silverman in conversation 
with  Beneš  in  April  1941  ‘pointed  out  to  […]  Bene[š]  with  respect,  that  he 
underestimates the adverse influences in which the postponement of the settlement of 
the Jewish Representation in the State Council has resulted, especially the adverse 
influence in [the] U.S.A.’
480 The Zionists actively sought to cause concerns among 
the Czechoslovak government.
481 
When a Zionist was not appointed to the first parliament in December 1940, 
Zelmanovits  initiated  a  public  campaign  to  support  the  Zionists’  ambitions.  He 
perceived it as very ambitious, but the only correct way to achieve the Zionists’ 
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481 The National Jewish Council sent a delegation to USA that was to inform American Jewish groups 
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goal.
482  Zelmanovits’  group,  although  invited,  intentionally  did  not  attend  the 
opening session of the parliament. In addition, they prepared a protest memorandum 
for  the  Jewish  press,  international  Jewish  organizations  and  the  British 
government.
483 The  desired  effect  occurred  immediately.  After  hearing  about  the 
reports  prepared  for  the  Jewish  press,  the  Secretary  to  Beneš  (most  probably 
Táborský), asked Zelmanovits to inform the news agencies that the negotiations were 
not closed and would continue.
484 A sentence about the ongoing negotiations with the 
Jews was also included at the last moment in the opening speech by Beneš to the 
parliament.
485 Later,  when  the  articles  about  the  non inclusion  of  a  Jew  –  not  a 
Zionist – appeared in the press, the Czechoslovaks were even more concerned about 
the negative impact on their image.
486 Victor M. Bienstock, from the JTA, described 
his conversation with Masaryk:  
 
I had lunch yesterday with Jan Masaryk who asked me to assure his 
Jewish friends in the States that there was no need for alarm with regard 
to the State Council situation. He said he knew there was some alarm 
over  the  fact  that  a  Jewish  member  had  not  been  appointed,  and  he 
wanted his friends to know there was no question of ‘playing dirty’. He 
was keeping an eye on the question.
487  
 
Masaryk felt obliged to refer to his close ties with Jewish organizations in the 
USA and also to the name of Masaryk, ‘the idol of the Jews’.
488 Later, in April 1941, 
Zelmanovits informed Schwarzbart that Beneš was suddenly willing, under further 
conditions,  to  appoint  a  national  Jew  to  parliament.  The  President  was  allegedly 
influenced by the campaign in the American Jewish press.
489 In addition, Stephen 
Wise’s intervention might have contributed to the decision.
490 
                                                 
482 CZA, S26/1546, Zelmanovits to Frischer, 7 December 1940, a supplement from 12 December 1940. 
483 TNA, FO371/24290, C13739, Lockhart to Halifax, 17 December 1940. 
484 CZA, S26/1546, Zelmanovits to Frischer, 7 December 1940, supplement from 12 December 1940. 
485  HIA,  Ivo  Ducháček  Papers,  #1.6,  Diary  entry  11  December  1940.  The  remark  about  the 
negotiations with Jews was included on Ripka’s and Masaryk’s initiative. Both ministers considered it 
significant because of the influence of Jewish groups in international politics. See CNA, AHR, 1 5 
19 1, box 104,   ‘Minutes of an informative meeting organized by Ripka, 18 December 1940’. For the 
text of Beneš’s speech see: Vondrová, Jitka, Češi a sudetoněmecká otázka, p. 81, doc. 44, the opening 
speech of the Czechoslovak State Council, 11 December 1940. T 
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487 LMA, BOD, ACC3121/E03/510, Victor M. Bienstock (J.T.A.) to Adolph Brotman, 13 December 
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488 See the report by Bruce Lockhart for the Viscount Halifax, 17 December 1940. Lockhart wrote: ‘M. 
Jan Masaryk has assumed his father’s role as the chief opponent of anti Semitism, and he is the idol of 
the American Jews.’ 
489 YVA, Ignacy Schwarzbart Papers, M.2/761. Schwarzbart’s Diary, 28 April 1941. For the original 
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A nationally Jewish MP was finally appointed in November 1941. Hence in 
the end the Czechoslovak Zionists succeeded. The role of the Jewish press has to be 
acknowledged  especially  when  other  Czechoslovak  minorities,  particularly  the 
Germans, never received such recognition.
491 Likewise, Beneš later admitted that the 
Zionists had a far reaching (dalekosáhlý) influence in Britain, but especially in the 
United States. Therefore he decided to support their claim to have an MP.
492 During 
the same talks with Czech Jewish assimilationists, Masaryk added that the whole 
American  war  effort  was  dependent  on  American  Jews,  who  cooperated  with 
Zionists.
493 Beneš’s concerns about the public reaction in Britain and even more so in 
the United States are fundamental in explaining his concession to the Zionists in the 
second half of 1941. These worries were interconnected with Beneš’s perception of 
the  power  possessed  by  American  Jewish  organizations.  This  seems  more  likely 
when  we  keep  in  mind  that  Frischer  was  appointed  to  the  exile  parliament  in 
November  1941,  at  a  point  when  the  American  government  still  did  not  fully 
recognise  the  Czechoslovak  government in exile.
494 At  that  time,  Beneš’s  future 
diplomatic  position  was  still  not  entirely  secure  –  hence  the  government’s 
overestimation of the Jewish influence helped the Zionists to have a member on the 
exile  parliament.  At  the  beginning  of  1942,  Jaromír  Nečas,  the  State  Minister, 
informed  the  exiles  after  his  return  from  America  about  the  ‘really  extensive 
influence’  of  the  American  Jews.  Interestingly,  the  Minister  acknowledged  their 
                                                                                                                                          
krytyzujace  stanowisko  rzadu  czeskiego  w  tej  sprawie  [appointment  of  a  Jewish  member  to  the 
parliament]  wplynely  Benesza  w  tym  sensie,  ze  kompromisowo  pzdjal  koncepcje  pierwsza 
[appointment of a National Jew in the case the Orthodoxy and assimilants would not oppose it]. 
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sympathies for the Czechoslovak cause that was only partially affected by the reports 
about  anti Semitism  in  the  Czechoslovak  army.
495 There  was  no  word  about  the 
parliament  or  minority  rights.  The  appointment  of  Frischer  was  to  ‘appease’ 
American Jews.
496  
In his letter to Roosevelt, introduced at the beginning of this chapter, Beneš 
based his political struggle on the democratic tradition of the Czechs. When dealing 
with  the  political  ambitions  of  the  Czechoslovak  Zionists,  the  Czechoslovak 
President faced the danger of being presented by the American Jewish press as a man 
who declined the ‘just’ demands of the Czechoslovak Jews. Also the fact that the 
‘anti Semitic’  Poles  appointed  Schwarzbart,  a  Zionist,  to  the  parliament  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war  caused  an  unavoidable  comparison.  The  Czechoslovak 
nationalists  opposed  any  concession  to  minorities.  Yet  the  threat  of  losing  the 
reputation of a democratic statesman, when attacked by ‘mighty’ American Jews, 
caused temporary concessions. 
The belief in the influence of American pro Zionist Jews was wide spread. 
Even  pro Jewish  politicians  willingly  spread  this  notion,  which  helped  them  in 
approaching  the  governments  of  East Central  Europe.
  497    The  anti Semitic 
perception of Jews was very fluid and some of the prejudices became commonly 
accepted.  Even politicians,  who based  their  whole political  struggle  on  repeating 
references to their own democratic tradition, expressed their worries about American 
Jewish  power.  However,  can  we  prove  any  actual  impact  of  this  ‘lobby’  on  the 
negotiations  between  the  Czechoslovak  exiles  and  the  American  and  British 
governments during the first years of the war? 
 
The British and American views of the Czechoslovak Exiles’ treatment of the Jews 
The  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States  were  the  main  liberal 
democracies in the world and were natural partners of all the countries that fought 
against the Axis. The Allies presented themselves as fighters for a just cause and also 
wanted to be perceived as such. That was the case with the minor parts of the alliance, 
of the governments in exile too. A fair treatment of minorities was seen as being a 
part of this liberal democratic image. However, how did the western democracies 
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perceive the exiles’ attitude towards the Jews? As noted in the Polish case study, the 
Poles’  Jewish  policy  contributed  to  the  British  reluctance  to  allow  Jewish  mass 
immigration to Palestine. The British government were afraid that the Poles might 
have utilised it for their own goal to ensure the mass exodus of Jews from Poland; 
these plans were indeed contemplated by the Polish political mainstream.
498 Can any 
such relation be documented in the Czechoslovak case? Were the Czechoslovaks’ 
concerns  about  the  Jewish  influence  based  on  an  accurate  assessment  of  the 
American  and  British  policies?  The  main  areas  where  the  Allied  interests  in  the 
Czechoslovak Jewish policy might have lain were the alleged anti Semitism in the 
army and the representation of the Zionists in the administration. 
The British were the main power that was actually in the position to influence 
the exiles in relation to the situation in their armies. The soldiers were stationed on 
British soil and only the British could allow the exiles to form and sustain their 
armed forces. Consequently, the British followed the development within the armies. 
The Foreign Office had information about anti Semitic incidents in the Czechoslovak 
forces from Bruce Lockhart, the British diplomatic representative to the Provisional 
Czechoslovak  government.  But  Lockhart  at  the  same  time  downplayed  the 
importance of the incidents and stressed the Czechoslovaks’ positive reputation and 
explained  the  anti Semitism  in  economic  terms.  Based  on  information  Lockhart 
gained  from  Beneš,  ‘the  Jews  were  allegedly  the  first  to  escape  [from 
Czechoslovakia] and some of them, at least, succeeded in transferring certain sums 
of money to [Britain]’.
499 We do not have precise information about the perception of 
the situation in the Czechoslovak army by the Foreign Office. Yet we may use the 
British evaluation of the situation among exiled Poles. The Poles were repeatedly 
criticised by pro Jewish activists for their anti Semitic behaviour prior to and during 
the  war.  When  confronted  with  the  information,  the  Foreign  Office  was  not 
persuaded of the advisability of publicizing the information, or even negotiating it 
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with the Poles. Frank Roberts from the Central Department of the Foreign Office 
made the following comment:  
 
We must clearly hope that the Polish Government will benefit from 
their sojourn in this country and adopt more tolerant ideas against the day 
of their return to Poland. But this can only be a natural growth and I am 
sure that the position of Polish Jews at home will not be improved if the 
Polish  Government  now  in  this  country  are  badgered  by  H.  M. 
Government or by the World Jewish Congress in spite of the satisfactory 
attitude they have adopted in public. Nor will it, unfortunately, strengthen 
their position with their own people, which is obviously a British interest 
against the day of the reconstruction of Poland, if their enemies are able 
to  accuse  them,  however,  unjustly,  of  having  fallen  under  Jewish 
influence during their stay in this country.
500  
 
The  Poles  were  firmly  supported  by  officials  in  the  Foreign  Office.  This 
assessment  of  the  Polish  situation  can  hence  also  be  used  in  the  Czechoslovak 
case.
501 Furthermore, the files of the Foreign Office do not contain any significant 
material  accusing  the  Czechoslovak  exiles  of  strong  anti Semitism.  Although 
remarks about growing anti Jewish sentiments were time to time forwarded to the 
British, they never reached the scale of the Polish case. Additionally, the British were 
afraid that had they supported the Jewish claims against the exiles, the exiles might 
have  started  public  campaigns  to  support  Jewish  immigration  to  Palestine;  a 
development that the British government wanted beyond any doubt to avoid.
 502   
The British remained passive also during the Czechoslovak Zionist dispute 
about the State Council. The British administration did not interfere at all. Lockhart 
                                                 
500  TNA,  FO371/26769,  C4879/4655/55.  Minute  by  FK  Roberts,  9  May  1941.  See  more  in 
Wasserstein, Bernard, Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939 1945 (Oxford: Institute for Jewish Affairs, 
1979), pp. 121f. 
501 Brandes, Detlef, Exil v Londýně 1939 1943. Velká Británie a její spojenci Československo, Polsko 
a  Jugoslávie mezi Mnichovem a Teheránem, p. 77f. and 427f. Brandes states that it was in the British 
interest that Poles, as well as Czechoslovaks had strong fighting corps in Britain, but also with good 
public  image.  Large  waves  of  deserters  from  Polish  or  Czechoslovak  army  were  hence  usually 
admitted to the Military Auxiliary Pioneer Corps of the British army and they were not forced to stay 
in the Polish or Czechoslovak armies.  
502 TNA, FO371/26769, C4879/4655/55. Minute by FK Roberts, 9 May 1941. ‘But even if the Polish 
Government’s attitude were less satisfactory I should still doubt the wisdom of our taking up this 
question with the Polish Government. Since there are some 3 million Jews in Poland (10 per cent of 
the  population  of  pre war  Poland)  and  many  of  them  are  not  very  well  assimilated,  any  Polish 
Government  must  inevitably  aim  at  finding  some  solution  of  this  problem  by  emigration.  Since, 
however, no other country is willing to accept Polish Jews and the absorptive capacity of Palestine is 
strictly limited, it is not in the interest of H. M. Government to encourage such a policy on the part of 
the Poles. All we can do is to express the pious hope that the Poles will in fact do their best to 
assimilate  the  Jews.  This  being  so,  it  can  hardly  help  us  or  the  Poles  to  embark  upon  any 
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sent a report to Viscount Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, after discussing the issue 
with  Beneš  and  Masaryk.  In  this  report,  Lockhart  clearly  sided  with  the 
Czechoslovak  leadership  and  even  added  that  ‘it  would be  most  unfortunate  if  a 
Zionist  problem  were  to  be  added  to  the  other  difficulties  of  the  Provisional 
Czechoslovak government’.
503 The opinion was shared by the Foreign Office when 
one official commented on the issue: ‘I see no reason whatever why Dr Benes should 
agree  to  […]  representation  of  ‘Zionism’  in  his  provisional  Parliament’.
504 The 
British government was appealing to Beneš to include some of the exiled democratic 
Sudeten Germans to the parliament.
505 But there was no such British involvement in 
the case of the Zionist representation. Lockhart in his memorandum sharply rejected 
the interventions by Namier.
506 On the contrary, the British government suspiciously 
followed Beneš’s pro Zionist policy. The Foreign Office felt threatened by Beneš’s 
support of the Zionists.
507 The Polish and Czechoslovak preference for Zionism was 
perceived  as  an  attempt  to  solve  East Central  Europeans’  problems  on  Britain’s 
account. The British would apparently prefer assimilation and integration of the Jews 
into the major East Central European nations. As a consequence, there was no call 
for Jewish minority representation in the Czechoslovak administration.  
The Americans did not interfere extensively in the exiles’ political affairs 
during the first period of the war. This notwithstanding, the Roosevelt administration 
advised  that  minorities  should  be  represented  on  the  Czechoslovak  government. 
Roosevelt  allegedly  recommended  that  four  of  the  former  minorities  living  in 
Czechoslovakia  should  be  included  in  the  exile  administration;
508  by  this  the 
Americans  probably  did  not  mean  the  Jews.
509  However,  it  seems  that  the 
Czechoslovaks’ perception of the Americans’ viewpoint and not the real situation 
was  to  influence  the  exiles’  behaviour.  Being  recognised  by  this  superpower 
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remained one of the main aims of the Czechoslovak exiles.
510 In his letter to the 
Czechoslovak  underground  groups,  Beneš  stressed  that  the  Americans  did  not 
understand developments in Europe.
511 A fair treatment of minorities was part of the 
image of liberal democracies and the Czechoslovak exiles wanted to be considered as 
one of them. The perception of American ideals was behind the exiles’ efforts to 
reconcile with the Zionists. Moreover, as documented in the previous section, the 
exiles believed in the influence of the American pro Zionist lobby. This was not the 
case with the Beneš government understanding of the influence possessed by the 
British Zionists.
512 The truth is that the non appointment of a Zionist, or at least a 
Jew  to  the  State  Council,  caused  a  deep  disappointment  among  pro Jewish 
activists.
513 However, the influence of the Jewish organizations on the American and 
British governments was simply non existent.
514 Yet, apparently, this reality was not 
recognised by the Czechoslovak government.  
However, one issue in relation to international Jewish organizations and their 
attitude towards Czechoslovakia has to be addressed now. How was the development 
of  the  Czechoslovak  exiles’  attitude  towards  the  Jews  perceived?  Did  the 
government’s  plans  change  the  American  Zionists’  positive  appraisal  of 
Czechoslovakia? Or were there also other factors in play besides the concerns about 
growing Czechoslovak nationalism? 
 
The Perception of the Czechoslovaks by International Jewish Organizations 
The  development  in  the  first  war  years  attested  to  a  change  in  the 
Czechoslovak perception of the Jewish presence in the Republic. The clash of Czech 
and Jewish nationalisms, combined with the exiles’ worries about their image in the 
west and at home, caused the deterioration of the Czechoslovaks’ perception of the 
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national Jews. But how did the perception of Czechoslovakia by international Jewish 
organizations change?  
First  of  all,  we  have  to  differentiate  between  various  international  Jewish 
organizations  and  their  ideological  positions.  Concerning  the  mainstream  Jewish 
organizations in the United States and Britain, the focus will be especially on the 
Orthodox  and  supporters  of  Zionism.  The  latter,  especially  the  WJC  and  the 
American Jewish Congress, represented the broader masses of Jewish people in the 
west. Nonetheless, the eloquence of British Agudists, especially their leaders Harry 
A. Goodman and Solomon Schonfeld, cannot be marginalized. In political terms, 
pro Zionist activists had more specific demands than the Orthodox. The first war 
years hence did not change Agudists’ relations with the Czechoslovak exiles. On the 
contrary,  Di  Vochnzaitung,  British  Orthodoxy’s  weekly,  repeatedly  criticized 
Zionists for their political attacks on the Czechoslovak government in exile, and on 
the true friends of Jews, Beneš and Masaryk.
515 Indeed, pro Zionist organizations, 
linked to the Czechoslovak exiled Zionists, expressed concerns about developments 
in Czechoslovakia. They, for example, raised the issues of anti Semitic incidents in 
the Czechoslovak army and among the Czechoslovak leadership.
516  
Yet the main issue that shaped mutual relations was the appointment of a 
national Jew to the State Council and the rejection of the Jewish minority status in 
the post war Republic. The western Zionists were informed about the development at 
the end of 1940 and immediately started inquiries to assess the real state of affairs.
 517 
According to some of the statements made by American Zionists, their perception of 
the Czechoslovaks was about to change. For example Arieh Tartakower from the 
WJC concluded that ‘[t]he attitude of [the Czechoslovak] government to the question 
of a Jewish representative in the Czech[oslovak] National Council [wa]s very strange 
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and  should  not  be  tolerated  [italics  –  J.  L.]’.
518 Wise  in  this  respect  contacted 
Masaryk, but the Czechoslovak government ignored the intervention.
 519  This further 
stirred  the  situation.  Maurice  Perlzweig,  a  leader  of  the  WJC  in  America,  thus 
concluded:  
 
The failure of Masaryk to reply to Wise’s cable is a grave matter. […] 
Moreover, there were serious signs of anti Semitism in the Czech Army 
and in some circles represented in the present coalition government about 
which we were constrained to take action in London months ago.
520  
 
These comments notwithstanding, the situation did not erupt into any conflict 
as had happened in the case of the Polish exiles.
521  
Silverman’s parliamentary speech in August 1940 about anti Semitism in the 
exiled  armies  frightened  Beneš  and  his  colleagues.  Drtina  hence  asked  Minister 
Nečas to approach the Labour MP and dispel his worries about the development 
among the Czechoslovak exiles. The meeting took place in the Houses of Parliament 
in January 1941. During the talk, two main points came to the fore. Firstly, Nečas 
defended the Czechoslovak democratic tradition and referred to the members of the 
government,  where  Masaryk,  following  his  father,  and  Ripka  were  ‘downright 
Philosemite[s]’.
522 Furthermore, Nečas  himself  led  the  Jewish  Department  for  the 
late President Masaryk.
523 It was a clear reference to the positive past that was to 
help in contemporary diplomatic negotiations.  
The discussion later moved to another issue that was to play an enormous role 
in the assessment of Czechoslovak anti Semitism during the whole period between 
1919 and 1947. One of the MPs accompanying Silverman made ‘a joke’ about the 
mutual rapprochement between the Czechoslovaks and Poles during confederation 
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talks.
524 One  of  the  features  was,  in  his  words,  the  introduction  of  Czech  anti 
Semitism.  Silverman,  however,  immediately  disagreed  and  concluded  ‘that  the 
Czech nation [was] democratic and that one could not compare the conditions among 
the Czechs and Poles. He [had] expressed himself roundly about anti Semitism in the 
Polish  army  and  among  the  Polish  leadership’.
525 Nečas  later  concluded  that  his 
arguments were accepted by Silverman, but the Minister recommended maintaining 
good relations with this ‘upstanding’ but ‘stubborn’ man.
526  
Reference to the Czechoslovak tradition and a comparison with the situation 
among the Poles made the state of affairs among the Czechoslovaks less momentous. 
All concerned knew that even the situation in the Czechoslovak case was not ideal, 
but the pro Jewish activists believed in the good intentions of the Czechoslovaks. In 
addition, more revealing is a letter sent to Masaryk by Neville Laski, the former 
President of the Board of Deputies: 
 
My dear Jan, 
[...] I have, as you know, so high a regard for Czechoslovakia that I 
should dislike intensely any publicity being given to either of these cases, 
or to an allegation which is sometimes made that there is a body of anti 
[S]emitic feeling in the Czechoslovak Armed Forces. I feel sure that this 
is not the case, and that if there is any anti [S]emitism it is of a trifling 
character. Nevertheless, an assurance from you which I could use would 
be of the highest value, and the facts with regard to the two men whose 
names I append hereunder would be of value in preventing my informant 
[...] bursting into public song, or perhaps attempting to refer to a question 
in the House of Commons. As you know, there is always some kindly 
disposed Labour member who will take up a grievance without realizing 
that perhaps there may be reactions which do a great deal of harm. It is 
exactly this which I wish to avoid.
527  
 
Some  Jewish  politicians  hence  even  warned  the  Czechoslovak  exiles 
beforehand of the potential danger. Laski’s letter documents the special place that 
Masaryk  enjoyed  among  Jews.  His  close  personal  friendship  with,  for  example, 
Weizmann is well known. Moreover, Schwarzbart, otherwise a very critical observer, 
admitted that he was prompted to visit the Foreign Minister primarily ‘by a desire of 
[his] heart to make the acquaintance of Jan Masaryk’.
528 
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Yet the ‘myth’ of Czechoslovak democracy also caused concerns among pro 
Jewish activists. In their view, the change in the democratic Czechoslovaks’ attitude 
towards  the  Jews  might  have  far reaching  consequences.  Following  the  non 
appointment of a national Jew to the first State Council, Noah Barou of BS WJC, 
approached Beneš in the following manner: 
  
Jewish democrats have often looked up to Dr Benes and to the Czech 
Democracy, as to the leaders of the democratic forces among the smaller 
nations, and have been always ready to rally around his banner. In the 
tragic conditions of the last two years, it would be a very great moral 
blow,  if  they  should  have  to  nurse  any  doubts,  about  the  change  of 
attitude of [sic] behalf of Dr Benes or the Czechs in general. Our mutual 
enemies are starting a double w[h]ispering campaign. The[y] tell the non 
Jewish world: you see even the Czechs are changing their attitude to the 
Jews. They are saying to Jews: you see, even your friends the Czechs are 
abandoning you. The moral value of the attitude of Dr Benes and the 
Czech[s], because of their standing and influence in the democratic world 
– is too important – and must be preserved from any misunderstanding 
and misinterpretation.
529  
 
This open statement shows that the Czechoslovak tradition was utilised to 
influence Beneš’s plans. This notion of Czechoslovak decency, very often sustained 
by the Czechoslovaks themselves, was suddenly used against them. The intention 
was to show Beneš that his treatment of Jewish issues had broader implications, 
exactly based on the moral reasons on which he built the exiles’ prestige abroad. It 
was hinted that because of his true democratic spirit and for the sake of it, he was 
supposed to handle minority issues more carefully.
530 For example, Schwarzbart was 
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afraid that Beneš’s position might have influenced and been utilised by the Polish 
government in exile.
531 Likewise,  as  expressed  by  Tartakower:  ‘There  might  be 
some countries, not so eager to assimilate their Jewish citizens, which might accept 
the slogan of enforcing their emigration from the respective countries on the basis of 
principle formulated by [Beneš]’.
532 The WJC saw a deeper dimension in Beneš’s 
attitude. The whole point was precisely summarized by Lillie Schulz in New York:  
 
the  Bene[š]  idea  [is]  the  most  dangerous  idea  which  had  yet  been 
projected, and could have a far reaching effect upon the future position of 
the  Jews  in  Europe,  particularly  because  it  came  from  one  whose 
reputation has always been of a liberal and friend of Jews.
533  
 
According to the Zionists, Beneš’s vision of only two possibilities for the 
Jews in Czechoslovakia – assimilation or emigration – might have set a welcomed 
pretext for other countries in the region. It is notable that the WJC did not observe 
purely  negative  intentions behind  the  theories presented by  Beneš.  The  President 
allegedly  did  not  want  to  rid  the  country  of  its  Jews, but  to  assimilate  them.  In 
contrast, there were other countries in the region, with a clear reference to Poland, 
Hungary and Romania, that might have misused Beneš’s views. 
Indeed, some of WJC members attributed the change in the Czechoslovak 
government’s plans to the influence of the exiled Poles during negotiations of the 
Central European Confederation.
534 It was inconceivable to those activists that the 
Czechoslovaks could act accordingly without being influenced by an external power. 
Hence, as after Munich, the change in the Czechoslovak treatment of the Jews was 
attributed to external actors and factors. 
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When Beneš appointed Frischer to the State Council, the situation changed 
completely. Beneš allegedly admitted to Zelmanovits that his theory of not granting 
minority status to the Jews in Czechoslovakia was not ‘the only possible solution’.
535 
Furthermore, Zelmanovits was confident that Beneš’s attitude could be changed by 
‘certain  influence’.
536  In  fact,  according  to  a  hand written  note,  probably  by 
Tartakower, the Czechoslovak State Minister Ján Lichner and the Consul General in 
New York, Karel Hudec confirmed that minority rights would be again granted to 
Czechoslovak Jews.
537 Was the information only part of a diplomatic game on the 
side  of  the  Czechoslovak  authorities?  There  is  no  proof  that  the  Czechoslovak 
government ever expressed their willingness to restore the protection of minorities in 
the post war Republic. Indeed, Bohuš Beneš, the President’s nephew, confirmed by 
mid 1942  that  there  would  not  be  any  minority  rights  in  Czechoslovakia.  The 
Czechoslovaks would consider them only if they would be applied generally in the 
whole world, including the United States and Britain.
538  
In  any  case,  late  1941  brought  reconciliation  in  Czechoslovak Jewish 
relations in the west. The Czechoslovak democratic tradition influenced the Zionists’ 
response  to  the  changing  policy  of  the  exiles  in  two  ways.  Nobody  among  the 
Zionists understood the new Beneš position in the sense of a broader change in the 
Czechoslovak  plans  for  minorities.  Simultaneously,  no  one  among  the  Zionists 
understood that the minority rights granted to the Czechoslovak Jews after the First 
World  War  were  linked  to  the  rights  granted  to  the  Czechoslovak  Germans  and 
Hungarians. The Zionist perception of the Czechoslovak democratic ‘myth’ caused 
concerns about the development in Europe in case the Czechoslovaks would stick to 
the plans they had presented. Yet a reference to the Czechoslovak past was utilised 
by pro Jewish activists during their negotiations with the Czechoslovak authorities in 
order  to  change  the  exiles’  policy.  The  Zionists’  concerns  were  corroborated  by 
worries of the possible effects on the other governments in the region. Curiously, the 
existence of those governments – especially the Polish – made the Czechoslovak 
case  less  acute.  Hence  diplomatic  negotiations  and  not  a  public  campaign  were 
chosen to change the Czechoslovak position. As stated by Schwarzbart to Masaryk: 
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‘Jews have to treat differently a friend who makes a mistake from an adversary who 
continues to make mistakes.’
539  
Consequently, the Czechoslovak government was able to keep its prestigious 
reputation for the second half of the war. The unwavering trust of the Zionists in 
Czechoslovakia was confirmed by Gerhart Riegner of the WJC office in Geneva. In 
late  1941,  Riegner  argued  that  all  the  exiled  governments  should  publish  a 
declaration  confirming  the  rights  of  Jews  (not  minority  rights)  for  the  post war 
period.
540 He expressed the opinion that the easiest way would be to firstly ask the 
governments of the Netherlands, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Greece and Czechoslovakia. 
He did not anticipate any problems in connection with those governments. The others 
– Riegner obviously referred especially to the Poles – would then feel obliged to join 
the declaration too. Hence the message was clear: the Czechoslovaks were among the 
democrats and the Poles were not. 
 
Conclusion 
Zelmanovits in his letter to the WJC headquarters in the USA related that 
Beneš’s opinion on the minority status of the Jews in Czechoslovakia might possibly 
change. The Jewish politicians saw that the main problem of the whole conflict was 
on  the  side  of  the  Czechoslovak  President.
541  However,  as  confirmed,  Beneš 
represented a moderate part of the Czechoslovak resistance. The opposition to any 
concessions and to any minorities, including the Jews, was broad, even consensual. 
For example, Masaryk frequently promised his support for several, often competing 
Jewish groups. Nevertheless, there is in fact no proof that in the end he did anything 
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against the will of the government.
542 The national radicalization of the underground 
groups  also  became  clearly  articulated  among  the  exiles.  Both  branches  of  the 
Czechoslovak resistance agreed on the national homogenization of the Republic. The 
Czechoslovak political leadership did not differentiate between the minorities. Even 
the national Jews were no longer trusted. The problem of different perceptions of 
loyalty to the Czechoslovak Republic was behind the mutual conflict. First of all, the 
national  Jews  failed  to  recognize  that  the  Czechoslovak  authorities  demanded 
unconditional  loyalty  of  all  its  subjects.  The  conflicts  in  the  army,  the  Zionist 
political demands during the war and their repeated calls for minority status in post 
war Czechoslovakia were perceived as proofs of disloyalty. Furthermore, the danger 
of potential precedence for the German minority caused by concessions to the Jews 
was, according to the Beneš government, imminent.  
Therefore,  contrary  to  the  conclusions  presented  by  contemporary 
historiography,  the  Jews  played  an  important  role  during  the  formation  of  the 
Czechoslovak exile political movement. This was at the time when Beneš fought for 
political recognition and had to present a united resistance movement, promoting 
democratic values and principles. Taking into account the three points summarized 
by Beneš in his letter to Roosevelt: 1) according to the Beneš government, national 
Jews caused fragmentation of the Czechoslovak resistance movement; 2) their partial 
opposition to the mobilization and campaign against anti Semitic incidents in the 
army threatened to destabilize one of the main political tools Beneš possessed during 
the  war;  3)  the  situation  in  the  army  and  the  Zionists’  campaign  for  political 
recognition  threatened  the  image  of  Czechoslovakia  as  a  democratic  country. 
Consequently, the Czechoslovak government considered the national Jews as any 
other  minority.  As  noted,  being  a  minority  had  a  negative  connotation.  The 
government decided to promote the policy of ‘population transfer’ in order to solve 
the  minority  problem  in  Czechoslovakia.  As  a  consequence,  political  support  of 
Zionism was used as a way to solve ‘the Jewish question’ in Czechoslovakia.  
Yet,  the  national  radicalization  of  the  Czechoslovak  resistance  was  partly 
contradicted by the government’s concerns to preserve the image of Czechoslovakia 
as  a  democratic  country.  These  considerations  were  further  strengthened  by  the 
                                                 
542 He, for example, promised to Schwarzbart that his broadcast to Czechoslovakia would contain a 
couple of sentences of encouragement for the Jews. (YVA, M.2/765, Diary entry 6 October 1941). 
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Czechoslovak exiles’ vision of the influence of the pro Zionist lobby in the western 
countries.  The  Czechoslovak  exiles’  perception  of  the  Zionists’  power  helped  to 
secure the appointment of Frischer, a national Jew, to the parliament. 
Beneš’s  theory  met  with  opposition  among  the  Zionists.  However,  the 
attitude of the international Jewish organizations towards Czechoslovakia did not 
change as much as might have been anticipated. The majority of Zionists still trusted 
in  the  Czechoslovak  democratic  tradition,  but  they  especially  perceived  the 
development  in  comparison  with  the  Poles.  The  end  of  1941  brought  further 
improvements in the mutual relations. First of all, Beneš appointed Frischer to the 
exile  parliament.  Moreover,  in  mid September  1941,  Minister  Ripka  in  a  BBC 
broadcast  addressed the Jews living in the Protectorate and offered solace to the 
people newly branded by the Star of David. The speech was immediately spread in 
London, became widely acclaimed by the Jewish public and was even published 
under  the  title  ‘We  Think  of  You’.
543 Pro Jewish  activists  thanked  Ripka  in  a 
personal letter and spread the information that the Czechoslovak Minister was the 
first of the Allied statesmen to address Jews via the BBC directly.
544 The fact that the 
information was not correct – René Cassin of the Free French talked about Jews 
before Ripka – further confirmed the unique position of Czechoslovaks’ among the 
Jews.
545 Furthermore, the Czechoslovak government had as early as December 1941 
published a declaration that annulled all the transfers of property made under duress 
after 27 September 1938.
546 This declaration was celebrated by the Jewish groups as 
a clear sign that after the war all the property confiscated from the Jews would be 
returned to its rightful owners.  
Likewise, the appointment of Frischer raised the expectations that the Beneš 
theory about the necessity of the Jewish nationals’ emigration to Palestine had been 
forgotten. Nevertheless, the development in the following years was to show that the 
conduct  of  the  Czechoslovak  government in exile  in  1941  was  only  a  series  of 
immediate  concessions.  The  Czechoslovaks’  perception  of  Jewish  issues  did  not 
change: it was just temporarily suppressed. In any case, the development in occupied 
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545 Poznanski, Renée, ‘French Public Opinion and the Jews during World War II: Assumptions of the 
Clandestine Press’, pp. 122 123. 
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Europe  was  to  change  the  themes  of  negotiations  between  international  Jewish 
organizations and the exile governments. On 16 October 1941, the first deportation 
train  with  1,000 Jews  left  Prague.  Its  direction  was  the  Lodz  ghetto  in  occupied 
Poland. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 144 
CHAPTER 3: THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT IN EXILE AND THE 
NAZI PERSECUTION OF THE JEWS 
 
It is possible to succumb to the appearance 
that Nazism led the first attack in our country 
against ‘the Jews’ and the second against the 
Czechs and Slovaks. In reality, however, the 
first and, from a political viewpoint, the only 
decisive strikes were led against the existence 
of  the  Czechoslovak  Republic,  against  its 
democracy, its army, against its intelligentsia, 
schools etc. Had there been no Jews in the 
Czechoslovak Republic, the Nazi terror would 
have gone against the existence of the country 
[…] in any case. 
 
The Chancellery of the President of 
the Republic (1946)
547 
 
Introduction  
Nazi persecution of the Jews in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia constituted 
a specific example of anti Jewish policy conducted during the years of the Second 
World  War.  The  Protectorate  was  formally  ruled  by  the  local  collaborationist 
government under the State President Emil Hácha.
548 The government was, however, 
controlled by the German civil administration, headed by the Reichsprotektor and by 
competing German agencies.
549 Several centres, from within as well as from outside, 
shaped anti Jewish policy in the Protectorate and their interests were frequently in 
conflict.
550  The  implementation  of  anti Jewish  policy  in  the  Protectorate  was 
complex. For example, low ranking officials, town councils and Landräte (district 
chiefs)  set  in  motion  local  initiatives  that  led  to  the  radicalization  of  the  Jewish 
                                                 
547 Archiv Kanceláře Prezidenta Republiky, Prague (AKPR), D17375/46, a note of the Chancellery of 
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My translation. 
548 There were four Prime Ministers during the existence of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia: 
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Heydrichs Tod bis zum Prager Aufstand (1942 1945) (München: Oldenburg, 1975). 
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policy in the Protectorate and even in the Reich as a whole.
551 Furthermore, although 
the Czech collaborationist circles never received any significant approval from the 
Czech population, they repeatedly attempted to stir anti Jewish violence in the streets 
of Czech towns during the first months after the occupation. The quisling press, in 
addition, as suggested by Benjamin Frommer, contributed to the progress of Jewish 
persecution on a local level by allowing in its pages anonymous denunciation of Jews 
and  ‘Jewish friendly’  Czechs.  The  Czechs  thus  had  an  option  to  denounce  their 
neighbours without the need to face the feared Nazi authorities.
552 
Between  1939  and  1941,  the  situation  of  the  Jews  in  the  Protectorate 
deteriorated.  Their  position  was  gradually  limited  by  the  introduction  of  new 
restrictions.  When  in  October  1939  the  Nazis  made  the  first  attempt  to  deport 
European  Jews  to Nisko  in  the  Lublin  district,  more  than  a  thousand  Jews  from 
Moravská Ostrava were also forcibly included in the transports. Furthermore, when 
the main wave of deportations from the Reich to the east began in October 1941, 
trains from the Protectorate started rolling eastwards too. Six thousand Jews from 
Prague  and  Brno  were  sent  to  the  ghettos  in  Lodz  and  Minsk.  Further,  the 
Reichsprotektor  Heydrich  decided  that  all  the  Protectorate  Jewry  was  to  be 
concentrated, before their deportation to the east, in the Northern Bohemian fortress 
of Terezín.
553 
The  situation  in  semi independent  Slovakia  developed  differently.  The 
Slovak government willingly collaborated in the ‘Final Solution’ and in 1942 handed 
over almost 60,000 Jews to the Germans.
 554  The catastrophe was completed in the 
spring of 1944 with the Nazi occupation of Hungary. In the following months, the 
last fortress of pre war Czechoslovak Jewry was destroyed by the deportations of the 
                                                 
551 Gruner, Wolf, Jewish Forced Labor Under the Nazis. Economic Needs and Racial Aims, 1938 
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552 Frommer,  Benjamin,  National  Cleansing.  Retribution  against  Nazi  Collaborators  in  postwar 
Czechoslovakia, pp. 164 174. 
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Jews  from  Subcarpathian  Ruthenia  to  their  death  in  Auschwitz.
 555 Over  270,000 
Jewish residents of pre war Czechoslovakia perished during the war.
556  
The  following  text  will  analyse  the  response  of  the  Czechoslovak 
government in exile to the Jewish persecution in the Protectorate and Slovakia. We 
need  to  enquire  firstly  into  the  information  about  the  ‘Final  Solution’  that  was 
available to the  exiles. It is important, in this respect, to evaluate the sources of 
incoming  intelligence  and  to  determine  how  the  information  was  perceived.  The 
analysis  will  consequently  lead  to  an  examination  of  how  the  exiles  responded 
diplomatically to opportunities to alleviate the plight of Jews in Europe. It is thus 
necessary  to  propose  a  theoretical  framework  relating  to  the  exile  government’s 
position vis à vis the possible rescue of European Jewry. Yet as in the case with the 
previously  depicted  visions  of  the  radical  Czech  and  Slovak  nationalists,  their 
perception of Jewish suffering in relation to the global war led by Czechoslovakia 
also  needs  to  be  examined.  As  noted,  radical  Czech  nationalism  rejected  any 
fragmentation  of  the  conflict, perceiving  the  war  as  waged  in  the  interest  of  the 
Czechoslovak  state  itself.  Hence  we  shall  analyse  how  Czechoslovak  diplomacy 
responded in cases where interventions on behalf of the Jews did not comply with the 
Czechoslovak fight for national freedom. Furthermore, we need to ask, how Jewish 
suffering was presented by official Czechoslovak exiles’ propaganda.  
 
What was known and how was it understood? 
The  Czechoslovak  exiles  were  aware  of  the  deportations  from  the 
Protectorate and Slovakia from the very beginning.
557 The exiles in Paris and London 
both  received  and  published  reports  describing  the  first  wave  of  deportation  to 
Poland in October 1939.
558 The Lublin district, the so called Jewish reservation, was 
correctly identified as the destination of the transports.
559 Likewise the radicalization 
                                                 
555 Jelinek, Yeshayahu A., ‘Carpatho Rus’ Jewry: The Last Czechoslovakian Chapter, 1944 1949’, in 
Shvut, no. 1 2 (17 18), 1995, pp. 271f. 
556 Hilberg, Raul, The Destruction of the European Jews (New York: Harpertorch Books, 1979), p. 
670. 
557 Archiv Ministerstva Zahraničních věcí, Prague (AMZV), Londýnský Archiv (LA) – 1939 1945, 
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558 CNA,  AHR,  box  190,  1 50 44,    Report  from  Prague,  2  October  1939;  Report  from  Brno,  28 
October 1939; Report from Prague, 27 December 1939; Ibid., 1 50 45, Jaroslav Lípa, Report from 
Belgrade, 12 February 1940; Vojenský historický archiv, Praha (VHA), 37 91 1, Report from the 
Protectorate (2485/39), 27 October 1939. 
559 Česko Slovenský boj,  no. 31, 25 November 1939, p. 5. 147 
of German anti Jewish policy in the Protectorate was reported almost in ‘real time’ 
in the pages of the press in London. In October 1941, the JTA, based on various 
sources,  including  the  Czechoslovak  exiles,  related  information  about  wholesale 
deportations  to  an  ‘unknown  destination’.  This  destination  was  later  wrongly 
identified  as  the  Bialystok  region  and  Pinsk  marshes  in  newly  occupied  Eastern 
Poland and western Belarus.
560 The Czechoslovaks also brought to the public sphere 
the place of Terezín as ‘a labour camp’ for Jews ‘who committed offences against 
anti Jewish regulations’.
561  
Table no. 2: Direct deportations from the Protectorate to the east
562 
 
Date  Place of departure  Destination  Number of 
deportees 
16 October 1941  Prague  Lodz  1000 
21 October 1941  Prague  Lodz  1000 
26 October 1941  Prague  Lodz  1000 
31 October 1941  Prague  Lodz  1000 
3 November 1941  Prague  Lodz  1000 
26 November 1941  Brno  Minsk  1000 
10 June 1942  Prague  Ujazdów  1000 
27 October 1944  Prague  Auschwitz  18 
 
Desperate  Protectorate  Jews  contacted  relatives  in  the  United  States  to 
enquire  into  the  possibility  of  obtaining  Cuban  visas.
563  Based  on  their 
correspondence,  Emil  Kafka,  the  London  based  pre war  chairman  of  the  Prague 
Jewish  Religious  Congregation  and  an  assimilated  Jew,  approached  the  exile 
government  in  late  October  1941.  He  concluded  that  the  only  alternative  to  the 
deportation  to  the  Pripet  marshes,  which  meant  misery,  suffering  and  death,  was 
escape to Cuba.
564 Kafka advised that the Foreign Ministry might contact Minister 
Masaryk,  who  lately  arrived  in  the  United  States,  and  ask  him  to  use  his 
‘considerable influence’ to secure American help with collective visas to Cuba.
565  
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Furthermore, the detailed information about deportations to Poland led to two 
meetings of Czechoslovak ministerial officials. The first meeting took place on 7 
November 1941. The peculiar situation of the Czech Jews was acknowledged and the 
officials discussed options for the evacuation of the Jews from Europe. The only 
proposition  deemed  possible  was  to  obtain  immigration  visas  to  Latin  American 
countries.
566 The officials then contacted Masaryk in the United States and conducted 
further  negotiations  with  Latin  American  embassies  in  London.
567 The  meeting 
confirmed  the  peculiar  situation  of  the  exiles  who,  on  their  own,  possessed  no 
substantial means to help the threatened Jews. Firstly, the government was dependent 
on positive negotiations with Latin American countries. Secondly, the exiles did not 
constitute a political power that might have influenced the decision of the possible 
destination countries. Last, but not least, the whole scheme was dependent on the 
approval  of  Nazi  Germany.  Only  a  week  after  the  November  meeting,  the 
Czechoslovak  government  was  informed  that  the  Germans prohibited  any  further 
Jewish emigration from the territories under their control.
568 This brought any further 
efforts  to  get  the  Jews  out  of  the  Protectorate  to  a  sudden  end.  However,  the 
government explored other ways of helping and the officials proposed sending relief 
parcels  to  the  Czechoslovak  inmates  of  concentration  camps  and  to  the  Jews 
deported to Poland.
569 Yet the problem here was the British economic blockade of 
continental Europe.
570 It took more than a year, until spring 1943, before the British 
allowed the relief parcel scheme to be launched.
571  
Nevertheless, more detailed information about the situation in the east was 
necessary  to  set  any  of  the  proposed  relief  schemes  in  motion.  One  of  the  best 
sources  of  information  about  Jews  in  Polish  ghettos  was  the  Swiss  centre  of 
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international  Jewish  organizations,  particularly  the  Hechalutz  movement.  Its 
representative, Nathan Schwalb, was in charge of a network that brought intelligence 
from all of occupied Europe, including the Protectorate, Theresienstadt, Poland and 
Slovakia to Switzerland. There were also representatives from other agencies, like 
Abraham Silberschein (Relico) and Saly Mayer who had connections to the Jewish 
underground centre in Slovakia, which was one of the best informed circles in the 
Nazi  sphere  of  influence.
572 Schwalb  and  Riegner  (of  the  WJC)  were  in  regular 
contact  with  Fritz  Ullmann  (of  the  Jewish  Agency)  and  Jaromír  Kopecký,  the 
Czechoslovak representative to the League of Nations. Kopecký forwarded all the 
reports he received from the Jewish emissaries to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry 
in  London. This was by far the most significant source of information about the 
Jewish plight that was available to the Czechoslovak government.
573  
The Czechoslovak government was, thanks to Ullmann, informed about the 
situation in Theresienstadt, mainly because of the position of this ‘model ghetto’ in 
Nazi anti Jewish policy and its misuse in their propaganda.
574 The reports, forwarded 
to  London  by  Ullmann,  contradicted  Nazi  propaganda  and  confirmed  that 
Theresienstadt  was,  in  fact,  a  transit  camp  on  the  road  to  the  east;  despite  the 
wholesale  deportations  from  the  Protectorate,  only  30,000  Czech  Jews  were 
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allegedly imprisoned there in July 1943.
575 Later, in 1944, Minister Slávik reported 
that whilst 75,000 Jews lived in Theresienstadt in 1943, only  50,000  were to be 
found there in 1944.
576 Despite the delays and interference of the Nazi censorship, 
Ullmann was able to comprehend the content of the received reports and did not 
spread false information. For example, he immediately denied the veracity of the 
International  Committee  of  the  Red  Cross’  (ICRC)  report  on  Theresienstadt, 
prepared by Maurice Rossel after his visit to the ghetto on 23 June 1944.
577 Rossel 
presented Theresienstadt as a camp of final destination, with no Jews being sent 
further to the East and as one that was subject to Jewish self government. 
Rossel’s report from mid 1944 was contradicted by information which had 
been  available  to  the  Czechoslovaks  since  early  1942.  A  message,  forwarded  to 
London by Ullmann in August 1942, described the pace of deportations from the 
Protectorate.
  578  Although  50,000  Jews  were  confined  in  Theresienstadt,  some 
deportation trains went directly to Poland.
579 According to the report of the London 
based Czechoslovak Red Cross (CRC), Theresienstadt ‘appear[ed] to be a camp in 
which  Czechoslovak  Jews  were  detained before  they  [were]  deported  into  Polish 
territory’.
580
 On 22 December 1942, Jožka David of the Czechoslovak State Council 
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conditions of Czechoslovak civilians in prisons or concentration camps (by Milada Paulíny, CRC). 
According to information available to the CRC, already 60,000 ‘civilians’ were deported to the Lublin 
district, where they lived in several labour camps. For Daily News Bulletin (JTA) coverage at that time 
see:  3 September 1942, p. 4, ‘New deportations of Jews from Czech Protectorate to Poland’; 21 
September 1942, p. 3, ‘Nazis set date on which Czechoslovakia will be completely “Judenrein”’. 151 
stated  that  72,000  Czech  and  76,000  Slovak  Jews  had  already  been  deported  to 
ghettos and camps.
 581  
 
Table no. 3: Deportations from Theresienstadt (1942 1944)
582 
 
Destination 
and years  Auschwitz 
Bergen 
Belsen 
Directly to the 
east (small ghettos 
and extermination 
camps) 
Warsaw 
ghetto 
Riga 
ghetto 
1942  1866    38005  1000  3000 
1943  18264         
1944  25960  40       
 
More problematic  was  to  obtain  information  about  the  destinations  of  the 
deportation trains. Contacts with the ghettos and camps in the east were nearly non 
existent and available only with the help of underground groups. Sporadic reports 
about destinations of the trains and about massacres behind the Eastern front were 
available in the allied and neutral press.
583 On 3 May 1942, the JTA relayed the 
information that the Nazis had established a ‘Jewish reservation’ in Galicia, near 
Lvov.  Also  Jews  from  Slovakia  were  mentioned  among  those  forcibly  settled 
there.
584 A Swiss newspaper in late May 1942 reported that 30,000 Slovak Jews were 
already deported to the Lublin district.
585 Later, in August 1942, the JTA noted that 
tens  of  thousands  of  deportees  from  the  Netherlands,  Germany,  Austria  and 
Czechoslovakia were concentrated in the area of BełŜec, near Rawa Ruska in the 
Lvov  district.  Other,  private  sources  informed  London  that  many  deportees, 
                                                 
581 Daily News Bulletin (JTA), 27 December 1942, p. 1, ‘British Jews present proposals on rescuing 
European Jewry to Eden’.  Concerning  the first information about deportations  from  Slovakia see 
Daily News Bulletin (JTA), 14 May 1942, p. 2, ‘Slovakia determined to become „Judenrein“ this 
summer, minister announces’. Already 32,000 of 87,000 Slovak Jews were deported in mid May and 
another 30,000 was confined and waited for deportation (Daily News Bulletin (JTA), 19 May 1942, p. 
1, ‘Slovak Parliament approves bill to expel all Jews from the country’).
581 
582 www.terezinstudies.cz 
583 The reports were published by The Daily News Bulletin (JTA), or by The Jewish Chronicle. The 
most famous is the so called ‘Bund Report’ from May 1942 that stated that around 700,000 Jews had 
been killed in Poland alone. Daily Telegraph made its content public on 25 June 1942. See Gilbert, 
Martin, Auschwitz and the Allies (London: Michael Joseph/Rainbird, 1981), pp. 39 44; Bauer, Yehuda, 
‘When did they know?’, in Michael R. Marrus (ed.), The Nazi Holocaust. Historical Articles on the 
Destruction of European Jews. Vol. 8. Bystanders of the Holocaust (Toronto: Mecklermedia, 1989), 
pp. 52 59. 
584 Daily News Bulletin (JTA), 3 May 1942, p. 2, ‘Nazis establish “Jewish reservation” in Galicia for 
Hungarian, Slovakian Jews’.  
585 USHMMA, VHA – Prague, 140/24, ‘a message about the situation in Slovakia’ – probably from 
late  May,  early  June  1942.  The  following  locations  were  mentioned:  Lubartów,  Firlej,  Ostrow 
Lubelski,  Kamionka  pri  Lubartowe,  Rejowiec  (Chelm  district),  Sawin,  Kryszow  (both  in  Chelm 
district), Opole (Pulawy district). 152 
especially from Brno (Moravia) were settled close to Izbica by Krasnyscav in the 
Lublin  district.
 586 In  mid 1943,  Ullmann  informed  Frischer  about  messages  that 
arrived from Jews deported to labour camps in Poland, mostly from Ossava (Chelm 
district),  Trawniki  (Lublin  district),  Birkenau,  Monowitz,  Jawischowitz  (all  in 
Silesia), Tomaszow (Lublin district) and Vlodava (Lublin district).
587  
More specific details about the deportations to Poland were obtained thanks 
to Jewish underground groups in Slovakia. The ‘Working Group’ (Nebenregierung) 
was a centre established in 1940 under the leadership of Gizela Fleischmann and an 
ultraorthodox Rabbi, Michael Dov Weissmandel.
588 Their comprehensive network of 
couriers had access to the Jewish ghettos in the General Government. Furthermore, 
they  received  first  hand  reports  about  the  life  and  death  of  Jews  there.
589 The 
Czechoslovak  exiles  thus,  for  example,  received  the  well known  letter  by 
Fleischmann  to  Silberschein  in  Geneva,  sent  on  27  June  1942.
590 Fleischmann 
stressed  that  60,000  Slovak  Jews  had  already  been  deported  to  the  General 
Government and to the Reich.
591 She also described horrific conditions in the Lublin 
district, where deportees, unable to undertake forced labour, had been settled.
592  
Yet the realization of the situation in the east came slowly. Comprehensive 
information arrived only gradually. For example, an account of the life in the Riga 
ghetto in occupied Latvia was provided by a Czechoslovak escapee who reached 
neutral  Spain.  He  testified,  in  October  1942,  to  the  mass  shootings  of  tens  of 
                                                 
586 AÚTGM, Klecanda Collection, file 267, Židovský bulletin, no. 3, 3 August 1942, p. 4. 
587 CNA, MSP L, box 58, Ullmann for Frischer, 1 July 1943, forwarded by the Foreign Ministry. 
588 Bauer, Yehuda, Hews for Sale. Nazi Jewish negotiations, 1933 1945 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1994), pp. 91 101; Jewish Reactions to the Holocaust (Tel Aviv: MOD Books, 1989), pp. 164 
172; Fatranová, Gila, Boj o prežitie (Bratislava: SNM – Múzeum židovskej kultúry, 2007), pp. 200 
265. 
589 Frieder, Emanuel, Z deníka mladého rabína (Bratislava: Slovenské Národné muzeum, 1993), pp. 
74 77; for correspondence between Gizela Fleischmann and representatives of Jewish organizations in 
Switzerland see Hradská, Katarína (ed.), Holokaust na Slovensku 3. Listy Gisely Fleischmannovej 
(1942 1944).  Snahy  Pracovnej  skupiny  o  záchranu  slovenských  a  európských  židov  (Bratislava: 
Nadácia Milana Šimečku, 2003); Lenard, Dionys, ‘Flucht aus Majdanek’, in Dachauer Hefte, 7, 1991, 
pp. 144 173. 
590 AMZV, LA – Confidential, box 189, Kopecký to Masaryk, 18 August 1942. Kopecký attached a 
copy of Fleischmann’s letter to Silberschein, 27 June 1942. 
591 Hradská, Katarína (ed.), Holokaust na Slovensku 3. Listy Gisely Fleischmannovej (1942 1944). 
Snahy Pracovnej skupiny o záchranu slovenských a európských židov, doc. 1, p. 20, Fleischmann to 
Silberschein, 27 June 1942. 
592 Silberschein  provided  a  copy  of  the  letter  to  Kopecký  who  forwarded  it  to  Masaryk.  The 
Czechoslovak government was asked to cooperate with Jewish organization on the help provided to 
the deportees. AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 189, Kopecký to Masaryk, 18 August 1942. 
Kopecký attached a copy of Fleischmann’s letter to Silberschein, 27 June 1942. 153 
thousands of Jews, including deportees from Theresienstadt.
593 Moreover, in mid 
October 1942, Frischer passed onto the government a report, stating as follows: ‘The 
Warsaw Ghetto is being liquidated. All Jews, without distinction of age or sex, are 
being  taken  away  in  batches  from  the  Ghetto  to  be  shot  [sic].’
594 The  report 
mentioned  that  the  mass  shootings  took place  in  special  camps,  one  of  them  ‘in 
Belzek’ [BełŜec].
595 It continued:  
[t]he wholesale slaughter of the Jewish population in Poland is being 
carried out step by step in order not to provoke irritation abroad. Aryans 
from Holland and France have been drafted to the East for labour, whilst 
the  Jewish  deportees  from  Germany,  Belgium,  Holland,  France  and 
Slovakia,  were,  it  is  assumed,  condemned  to  death  […]  Many  of  the 
German  deportees  are  supposed  to  be  in  Theresienstadt.  This  camp, 
however,  is  only  an  intermediary  station,  and  the  same  fate  awaits  the 
inmates of this camp, as the rest [underlined in the original].
596 
 
The report emphasised the uniqueness of the persecution of Jews as a group 
destined for death. According to another account, coming again from Geneva, most 
of the deportees from Western Europe were dying during the journey to Poland and 
only corpses arrived at their destinations.
597 It concluded: ‘The killing in special gas 
rooms has been replaced by another method which consists in injecting of [...] air by 
physicians  into  the  veins  of  the  human  body.’
598 Moreover,  a  coded  eye witness 
account  clearly  stated  that  ‘measures  of  extermination  [were] being  applied  on  a 
large scale to 600,000 Jews residing in Warsaw’.
 599 The Jews were being annihilated.  
                                                 
593 AMZV, LA – Confidential, box 189, minutes of the interrogation of Jakubovič, 6 October 1942. 
Captain Šeda, the Czechoslovak Military representative in camp Miranda, in Spain, concluded that 
although the information could not be verified, the events might happen and their description was 
plausible. 
594 AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 189, Frischer to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 15 October 1942.  A copy of the report was attached to the letter. 
595 This was the first time, when one of the extermination camps was mentioned in despatches to the 
Czechoslovak government.  In fact, the deportations from the Warsaw Ghetto led to Treblinka and 
people were killed mostly by gas. Shootings took place only in special cases. Friedländer, Saul, Nazi 
Germany and the Jews 1939 1945. The Years of Extermination, pp. 426 433.  
596 AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 189, Frischer to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 15 October 1942.  A copy of the report was attached to the letter. There are two handwritten 
minutes on Frischer’s letter. Thanks to them we know that Ripka and Masaryk read this report. 
597 AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 189. An attachment (a note from a reliable German 
source) to the letter sent by Kopecký to Masaryk, 9 October 1942, received in London 12 November 
1942. 
598 Ibid. 
599 Ibid., letter sent from Warsaw on 4 September 1942. My translation. The letter was included in the 
despatch sent by Kopecký on 9 October 1942 (Ibid.). It originated from Warsaw and its author was ‘a 
Swiss Jew’ residing in the  former Polish capital. ‘[T]he Germans [were] driving the Jews out of 
Warsaw  in  order  to  annihilate  them  outside  of  the  town  on  countryside’.  ‘Ich  habe  Herrn  Jäger 
[Germans] gesprochen. Er sagte mir, dass er alle Angehörige der Familie Achenu [Jews] ausser Frl. 154 
Even before, at the beginning of September 1942, Masaryk received a copy 
of ‘the Riegner Telegram’ from Easterman, informing him about the German plan to 
exterminate  all  Jews  in  Europe.
600  On  26  September,  Riegner  sent  a  note  to 
Easterman stating that he had ‘got new strong evidence confirming [his] message to 
Silverman  plans  already  in  execution’.
601 Noah  Barou,  Easterman  and  Frischer 
visited Beneš and asked him about the authenticity of Riegner’s report. It is likely 
that  they  informed  him  about  the  latest  news  as  well.
602 In  mid March  1943, 
Easterman  contacted  Ripka  with  another  account  provided  by  Riegner  and 
highlighted that ‘the extermination of the Jews at the hands of Nazis [was] now 
rapidly reaching a climax. One report, for example, reaching [the WJC] through the 
Polish  Government [stated]  that  not  more  than 250,000 Jews  [remained]  alive in 
Poland.’
603 Riegner thus asked Easterman to ‘urge relief action of the Allies’.
604 A 
message from Jewish groups in Switzerland in May 1943 stressed that transports of 
Jews to the east were being annihilated during the journey. Likewise, the Jews from 
Theresienstadt  were  being  sent  to  their  deaths.
605  The  information  about  the 
annihilation campaign against the Jews was reaching the Czechoslovak government.  
What, however, was the Czechoslovak government’s awareness of the death 
camps in the east? As early as July 1942, Frischer named ‘Oswiecim’ among the 
places where Slovak Jews had been deported.
606 More concretely, Raczynski, the 
Polish Foreign Minister, informed Masaryk in January 1943 that 5,000 Czechoslovak 
                                                                                                                                          
Eisenzweig von Warschau zu sich nach seinem Wohnsitz Kewer [tomb] einladen wird’. It was sent 
from Warsaw on 4 September 1942. 
600 USA, WJC Archives, MS 238/2/14. Easterman to Masaryk, 2 and 4 September 1942. For a copy of 
the  Riegner  telegram  see:  Peck,  Abraham  J.  (ed.),  Archives  of  the  Holocaust.  An  international 
collection of selected documents. Volume 8. American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, the Papers of the 
World Jewish Congress 1939 1945, (New York: Garland, 1990), p. 208, doc. 56. In his autobiography, 
Riegner  did  not  describe  the  reaction  of  the  Czechoslovak  government  to  the  telegram 
comprehensively. He only states that Beneš, a great friend of the Jewish people, surprisingly did not 
believe the report. See Riegner, Gerhart, Niemals verzweifeln. Sechzig Jahre für das jüdische Volk und 
die Menschenrechte (Gerlingen: Bleicher, 2001), p. 80. 
601 USA, WJC Archives, MS 238 2/11. Telegram from Riegner to Easterman, 26 September 1942. The 
message to Easterman was the so called ‘Riegner telegram’.  
602 USA, WJC Archives, MS 238 2/11. Telegram from Easterman and Barou to Wise and Perlzweig, 
30 September 1942. They visited Beneš on 29 September 1942. 
603 CNA,  PMR L,  box  84,  the  Czechoslovak  Foreign  Ministry  to  Frischer,  18  March  1943.  The 
telegram was sent by Kopecký and was intended for Easterman. AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 
1945, box 212, Easterman to Ripka, 21 March 1943. 
604 Ibid.  
605 CNA, MSP L, box 58, MZV to KPR, MSP, MV, FCJ, Frischer, 22 May 1943. 
606 TNA,  FO  371/32680.  Frischer  to  British  Foreign  Office,  2 July  1942.  Frischer  wrote  that  the 
Slovak Jews had been concentrated near Lublin, Miedzierzecz Podlaski, Chlom (all in Lublin district) 
and Oswiecim. 155 
Jews had been incarcerated in the ‘most notorious of those camps at Oświecim’.
607 
Nevertheless, the report presented Oswiecim mainly as a concentration camp for 
Poles.
608  
The  Czechoslovaks  received  more  precise  intelligence  about  Auschwitz 
relatively early.
609 Kopecký reported on 15 July 1943:  
 
Malota from Baťa informed via Bratislava that the reports that the 
internees at Oswieczimi [sic] are being destroyed by asphyxiation and 
burning are accurate. Malota spoke in Olomouc with somebody who 
escaped from the camp and witnessed everything there.
610  
 
Although  the  message  mentioned  the  killing  of  the  inmates,  it  did  not 
explicitly name Jews. Another report by Kopecký was based on the information from 
‘a French deportee worker’. He described a large concentration of French workers, 
English POWs, ordinary convicts and several thousand Jews near Birkenau in Upper 
Silesia.  The  treatment  of  the  Jews  was  the  worst.
611 The problem  with  regard  to 
understanding the intelligence was that Oswiecim and Brzezinka (Birkenau) were not 
regarded as two parts of one camp complex. According to the reports, the inmates 
were being killed in ‘Oswiecim’, but Jews were being deported to ‘Birkenau’.
612  
From the late spring of 1943, Ullmann received reports about deportations 
from Theresienstadt to ‘Birkenau bei Neu Berun’ and later, in September 1943 that 
‘a new camp [was] being built there’.
613 5,007 Jews deported to Auschwitz from 
                                                 
607 AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 212, Raczynski to Masaryk, 20 January 1943. 
608 Ibid., ‘According to the camp register, the number of women interned amounted on June 1
st, 1942, 
to 8,620. The number of men at the same date was 38,720 of which 8,170 were Jews, including about 
1,100 French Jews and about 5,000 Czechoslovak Jews’.  
609 Riegner, Gerhart, ‘Vztah Červeného kříže k Terezínu v závěrečné fázi války’, p. 178.  
610 AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 189, Message by official Bydžovský about Kopecký’s 
telegram. 20 July 1943. My translation. 
611 AMZV,  LA  –  Confidential,  1939 1945,  box  189,  Message  from  the  Czechoslovak  Foreign 
Ministry for Frischer. It  was a message from Riegner and Frischer  was asked to hand it over to 
Easterman. 20 July 1943. 
612 See VHA, 37 91 7, Kopecký from Geneva, 22 January 1944. In January 1944, Kopecký warned 
the exiles in London that the information that the Jews from Theresienstadt were being deported to 
Oswiecim contradicted other reports received in Geneva. He noted that, according to his information, 
the Jews were being sent to Birkenau. He advised the exiles in London not to spread information 
about deportations to Oswiecim because it might have caused panic.  
613 AMZV, LA – 1939 1945, box 515, the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry to Frischer, 17 May 1943; 
Kárný, Miroslav, ‘Terezínský rodinný tábor v „konečném řešení“’, in Toman Brod – Miroslav Kárný 
– Margita Kárná (eds.), Terezínský rodinný tábor v Osvětimi Birkenau (Praha: Terezínská Iniciativa – 
Mellantrich, 1994), p. 48, footnote 25. The information came from Leo Janowitz, a member of the 
Theresienstadt Jewish Council,  who  was deported to Birkenau in September 1943. Ullmann  later 
wrote  that  Birkenau,  in  Upper  Silesia,  was  intended  to  be  a  camp  for  around  35,000  Jews.  See 
Ullmann’s  undated  text  about  Theresienstadt  (probably  from  the  first  months  of  1944)  in  CZA, 
A320/25. 156 
Theresienstadt in September 1943 were in fact the first part of the ‘Theresienstadt 
Family Camp in Auschwitz Birkenau’.
614 The sole purpose of this Nazi project was 
to disguise the last stages of the ‘Final Solution’. It was to show that although Jews 
had  to  work  in  labour  camps  in  the  east,  they  were  alive  and  safe.
615 The  Nazi 
deception worked – until mid 1944, nobody connected Oswiecim (or Auschwitz) and 
Birkenau.
616  
Even more scarce was information about the Operation Reinhard camps.
617 In 
November 1943, a report summarizing the situation in occupied Poland noted:  
 
Trepelini [sic! – Treblinka] is a mass cemetery of the Jews. Thousands 
of  Jews  have been  murdered  there  […],  in  Rava  Ruska  [BełŜec]  […] 
people were killed by gas […]. The camp in Oswiečim is considered to 
be the worst, it outdoes even Dachau. People have been burned there. 
There are thousands of Jews from the Protectorate and Slovakia in the 
camp.
618 
 
The report, received after the actual destruction of Treblinka, considerably 
underestimated the number of victims of this infamous camp. Further, it distorted the 
names  of  the  camps  and  was  generally  misleading.  Only  several  months  later,  a 
Rabbi, originally from Mukachevo in Subcarpathian Ruthenia who got to Palestine, 
                                                 
614 The Nazis created the Theresienstadt Family Camp in Auschwitz Birkenau in September 1943. The 
first transports arrived in September, the second in December 1943 and the last in May 1944. Contrary 
to the custom  in Birkenau, these transports of Theresienstadt Jews  were  not immediately  gassed. 
Furthermore, men, women and children were allowed to live together.  However, all the survivors 
from the September transport (3,792 people) were gassed exactly six months later on 8 March 1944. 
The second liquidation action took place on 11 July 1944, but several thousands of the Jews had been 
sent to labour camps before. The main purpose of the Family Camp was the Nazi deception of the free 
world and of the Jews still living in Theresienstadt. See Kárný, Miroslav – Blodig, Vojtěch – Kárná, 
Margita  (eds.),  Terezínský  rodinný  tábor  v Osvětimi Birkenau  (Praha:  Terezínská  Iniciativa  – 
Melantrich,  1994);  Kárný,  Miroslav,  ‘Obóz  familijny  w  Brzezinke  (BIIb)  dla  Zidów  z  getta 
Theresienstadt’, in Zeszyty Oświecimskie 20, 1993, pp. 123 215.; Kulka, Otto Dov, ‘Ghetto in an 
Annihilation Camp. Jewish Social History in the Holocaust Period and its Ultimate Limits’, in The 
Nazi Concentration Camps – Structure and Aims – The Image of the Prisoners – The Jew in the 
Camps, Yad Vashem, Jerusalem 1984, pp. 315 330. 
615 Ibid.  
616 In fact, Birkenau, as a sub camp of the main Auschwitz camp was no more than three kilometres 
from it and this was the place where the main gas chambers and crematoria were built and more than 
one million Jews were murdered. 
617 Treblinka, Sobibor, BełŜec. 
618 CNA, ČsČk – L, box 53. A letter from the Czechoslovak MFA for MSW, MF, CRC, FCJ and 
Frischer. 18 November 1943. My translation. The message was sent by Kopecký. There were more 
details in the report: It mentioned that in ‘Trepelini’ Jews from the Warsaw ghetto had been liquidated. 
In comparison to this camp, Katyń was only ‘a toy’. ‘The camp in Rava Ruska’ was for the Jews in 
Galicia, Lublin district and deportees from various regions. Before the people were killed, they had to 
take  off  their  cloths  and  were  searched  for  money  and  valuables.  The  camp  in  ‘Oswiečim’  was 
illuminated  during  the  night  by  searchlights,  to  prevent  escapes.  There  were  names  of  the  new 
ghettoes written on the trains with deportees, but those ghettoes did not exist. This was for the general 
population, to think that the Jews were being transported to new ghettos. 157 
made it clear that with minor exceptions, there were no more Jews in Poland. He 
confirmed that camps in the Lublin district were destroyed; Treblinka, Malkinia [sic] 
and BełŜec were completely exterminated and eradicated by the Germans.
619 
This notwithstanding, it was all only a preface to the most detailed report ever 
received by the Czechoslovak government – the so called ‘Auschwitz Protocols’.
620 
This report – prepared by two Slovak Jews who escaped from Auschwitz – reached 
Kopecký via Slovak underground channels on 10 June 1944. He, in cooperation with 
Ullmann,  Riegner  and  Lichtheim,  forwarded  the  report  to  the  Czechoslovak 
government in exile  and  shared  it  with  other  Allies.
621  The  Protocols  were  a 
comprehensive description of all aspects of life and death in the Auschwitz complex. 
The  authors  estimated  that  around  1,765,000  Jews  had  been  killed  in  the  camps 
between April 1942 and April 1944. The report finally revealed to the Czechoslovak 
government the true extent of the murder programme in Auschwitz.
622 In addition, 
the Protocols for the first time confirmed the murder of the Czech Jews deported 
from Theresienstadt to Birkenau.
623  
The  list  of  the  reports  presents  an  impressive  documentation  of  the 
Czechoslovak government’s knowledge about the Holocaust. That the government 
possessed intelligence about the situation in the east from the second half of 1942 is 
indisputable. But these were scarce reports. They may seem comprehensive when 
                                                 
619 CNA, MV L, box 84, ‘A report for the State Council’ by the Minister of the Interior, Juraj Slávik. 
The report probably originated in early 1944. Malkinia was actually a railway junction on the way to 
Treblinka, only several kilometres outside of the camp. 
620 Vrba also wrote about Majdanek, where he had spent several months before he was transferred to 
Auschwitz. For the full text of the Protocols see: Wyman, David S. (ed.), America and the Holocaust. 
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(New York – London: Garland Publishing, 1990), pp. 1 64. Document no. 1. ‘German Extermination 
Camps – Auschwitz and Birkenau’, November 1944.  
621 Kárný, Miroslav, ‘The Vrba and Wetzler Report’, in Yisrael Gutman – Michael Berenbaum (eds.), 
Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 557. Gilbert, 
Martin,  Auschwitz  and  the  Allies,  pp.  232 234.  For  Riegner’s  personal  description  see:  Riegner, 
Gerhart, Niemals vezweifeln. Sechzig Jahre für das jüdische Volk und die Menschenrechte, pp. 124 
125. 
622 For a critical discussion of  the uniqueness of the information see Breitman, Richard, Officials 
Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew (London: Penguin Books, 
1998), pp. 120f. 
623 It was the gassing of the September Theresienstadt Family Camp transport on 8 March 1944. The 
escapees wrote: ‘The next day, 7 March 1944, he [Fredy Hirsch, one of the leaders of the camp, who 
committed suicide before the September transport was liquidated] was taken, unconscious, along with 
his 3,791 comrades who had arrived at BIRKENAU on 7 September 1943 on trucks, to the crematoria 
and gassed’. Świebocki, Henryk (ed.), London has been informed... Reports by Auschwitz Escapees, p. 
240. Vrba and Wetzler also warned of the prepared murder of the second Family Camp transport that 
was planned on 20 June 1944. Ibid., pp. 244 245. 158 
juxtaposed on paper, but the power of their few lines is diminished when mixed with 
thousands of other documents handled by the government during those years.  
Information  about  the  first  phases  of  the  Jewish  persecution,  including 
deportations, was widely available in London.
624 The solution to the Jewish question 
and the deportation of these ‘undesirable’ elements were openly announced by the 
respective Nazi, or authoritarian governments. From the territorial point of view, the 
underground connection to the outside world from Slovakia was better than in the 
case of the Protectorate. A problem arose, however, when reliable information about 
the Jewish plight in the east, where the Jews lived and died in remote areas of Galicia 
and Eastern Poland, needed to be obtained.  
Furthermore, the Czechoslovak intelligence service and official sources did 
not provide any information about the fate of the Jews in the east. The theme was not 
among the priorities of the service, focused, as it was, predominantly on military 
intelligence.
625 Additionally, the whole Czech underground, after being crushed by 
the Germans in late 1941 and 1942, was not able to maintain communication lines 
with London.
626
   Ministers Ripka and Feierabend, for example, complained that the 
                                                 
624 The Persecution of the Jews in Slovakia (London: Federation of Czechoslovakian Jews, 1942), pp. 
8 15.  This  pamphlet  was  published  by  the  Federation  of  Czechoslovakian  Jews  in  June  1942.  It 
contains  newspaper  clippings,  from  the  Slovak  and  Yugoslavian  Press,  describing  the  gradual 
segregation and persecution of Slovak Jews. For example: ‘All Jews will be expelled’ in Slovenská 
Pravda,  29  March  1942.The  Slovak  newspapers  were  for  example:  Slovak,  Grenzbote,  Gardista. 
From the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia: České Slovo, Polední List, Národní Politika, A Zet. 
625 Kokoška, Stanislav, ‘Dvě neznámé zprávy z okupované Prahy o postavení židovského obyvatelstva 
v Protektorátě’, p. 30. Rothkirchen, Livia, The Jews of Bohemia and Moravia, p. 175; Šolc, Jiří, Smrt 
přála statečným (Praha: Vyšehrad, 1995). A special place in the history of the Czechoslovak secret 
service has been assigned to the mythical German agent A 54 – Paul Thümmel. An Abwehr officer, 
who had already cooperated  with the Czechoslovak  service during the late 1930s,  most certainly 
would  have  been  informed  about  the  Nazi  treatment  of  Jews  (For  more  about  Thümmel  see 
Kokoškovi, Jaroslav and Stanislav, Spor o Agenta A54, (Praha: Naše vojsko, 1994). Šolc, Jiří, Ve 
službách prezidenta (Praha: Vyšehrad, 1994), pp. 35 37. Moravec, František, Špión jemuž nevěřili 
(Praha: Rozmluvy, 1990). However, we know only one message, from the summer of 1941, where 
Thümmel informed Czechoslovaks about the ongoing massacres of Jews in the east. See Breitman, 
Richard, Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew, p. 95. 
Breitman wrote: ‘Paul Thümmel […] told […] that German forces in the Ukraine were resolving the 
Jewish question in a radical way. They arrived at a locality, separated the male Jews, had them dig 
trenches supposedly to be used as fortifications, and then shot them into the trenches.’ Breitman took 
this  information  from  Brandes,  Detlef,  Exil  v Londýně  1939 1943.  Velká  Británie  a  její  spojenci 
Československo,  Polsko  a  Jugoslávie  mezi  Mnichovem  a  Teheránem,  p.  489,  footnote  890.  The 
message was sent on 26 July 1941. This information is rather controversial. Dr Milotová, who has 
conducted serious research into this topic, informed me that at the time when he was supposed to 
obtain this information from a chauffeur of the Gestapo chief in Prague, Thümmel was not in the 
Protectorate  (Conversation  of  the  author  with  Dr  Milotová,  Prague,  12 July  2007).  However,  the 
report can be found among the captured German documents in NARA RG 242, T 77/R 1050/6526109.  
626 Bryant,  Chad,  Prague  in  Black.  Nazi  Rule  and  Czech  Nationalism,  p.  143. The  Czechoslovak 
military intelligence network and its head – Colonel František Moravec – have been the subject of a 
long lasting  idealization and  myth making (Moravec,  František, Špión jemuž nevěřili.  For a  more 159 
exiles were insufficiently informed about the situation in the occupied homeland. In 
fact, Feierabend added that Jewish groups had incomparably more information about 
the situation in Europe than the Czechoslovak exiles.
627 The intelligence from the 
mainstream underground groups did not deal with Jewish persecution and the exiles 
were thus dependent on pro Jewish activists and their sources.
628  
There  were  certainly  many  smaller  sources  of  intelligence.  Yet,  their 
importance for the whole picture of the Jewish suffering in Europe was marginal.
629 
This was also the case with the Allied governments. For example the British and 
Americans rarely informed the exiles about the plight of the Jews. The flow of the 
intelligence in this case was simply one sided.
630 Even the Polish government, which 
was, thanks to its wide home resistance movement, the best informed administration 
in  London,  only  rarely  gave  confidential  details  to  the  Czechoslovaks.
631 In  all 
accounts,  the  Czechoslovak  authorities  repeatedly  expressed  doubts  about  the 
                                                                                                                                          
balanced approach see: Šolc, Jiří, Ve službách prezidenta). Beneš and his service were considered to 
be the best informed circle among the exiled leaders in London. Dagan, who as an employee of the 
Czechoslovak  MFA  was  an  actor  in  the  whole  story,  has  argued  that  positive  assessment  of  the 
Czechoslovak intelligence network had not been entirely without justification. See Dagan, Avigdor, 
‘The Czechoslovak Government in exile and the Jews’, p. 467. 
627 For  example,  for  the  Agudists’  sources  of  information  see:  USA,  Joseph  Hertz  Papers,  MS 
175/79/3. Letter from ‘Chajim’, Spring 1942. The recipient of the letter is unknown. It was somebody 
in Britain. The letter described the situation in Slovakia during the first half of 1942. Its abbreviated 
version was later published in The Persecution of the Jews in Slovakia, p. 16. 
628 CZA, A280/33, Kunošy to Frischer, 4 April 1944. 
629 For  example,  various  Jewish  émigrés  sent  notes  to  the  government.  Before  December  1941, 
Czechoslovaks  in  the  United  States  received  letters  from  their  relatives  in  the  Protectorate.  The 
Czechoslovak consuls in Lisbon (František Čejka), Stockholm (Vladimír Kučera), and Istanbul (Miloš 
Hanák) have to be mentioned as well. They were in the same position as Kopecký in Geneva; it means 
that they were not officially recognised, but tolerated.  
630 In November 1942, Nichols asked the Foreign Office, whether he could send one report received 
by the British to Beneš. Frank R. Roberts answered: ‘There is nothing in this report which it would be 
undesirable for us to pass on to the Czechoslovaks. On the other hand I am not sure that it is wise to 
begin handing reports of this kind to the Allied governments. They have a definitive object in showing 
us their reports since they wish us to receive a certain impression of conditions at home.  We have no 
such object and if we only communicate an occasional anodyne report we run the risk of appearing to 
the  Allied  governments  concerned  either  extremely  secretive  or  extremely  ill informed.  In  the 
circumstances I think it would perhaps be better that you should not pass the report on’. Incidentally, 
this report, received by the British legation in Zurich, contained intelligence about the massacres of 
the Jews in the east, as they  were reported by two Slovak army officers,  who suffered a mental 
breakdown  (TNA,  FO371/30838,  C10044/539/12,  Situation  in  Slovakia,  a  minute  by  Roberts,  3 
November 1942; Ibid. Zurich Consulate General to the Foreign Office, 21 September 1942). The US 
intelligence services were even intercepting internal Czechoslovak correspondence. See intercepted 
letter from Kopecký to Ripka, sent on 26 June 1944, dealing with the ‘Auschwitz Protocols’. See 
pictorial  documentation  in  Bankier,  David  (ed.),  Secret Intelligence  and  the  Holocaust.  Collected 
Essays from the Colloquium at the City University of New York (New York: Enigma Books, 2006), 
between pp. 272 and 273. 
631 The Poles sent the intelligence mostly in the late autumn of 1942, in connection with the prepared 
UN Declaration that was published on 17 December 1942 (See AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, 
box  212).  The  Jewish  members  of  the  Polish  National  Council  (Rada  Narodowa)  shared  the 
intelligence with Frischer more often. It was mostly the case of Ignacy Schwarzbart.  160 
veracity of Polish information about the Jewish plight. Viktor Fischl, for example, 
stated  that  the  Bund  report  from  May  1942,  stating  that  700,000  Jews  had  been 
murdered since the beginning of the German Soviet war, was probably authentic but 
that one had to be reserved about Polish sources.
632 Similarly Beneš remarked in 
May 1943 that ‘the Polish propaganda (and [he did] not blame it) [overplayed] to 
some extent the massacres which [were] taking place’.
633 Most of the information 
about the Holocaust available to the Czechoslovaks arrived from Jewish and Polish 
sources. Considering Beneš’s remarks about Polish sources (made in front of Jewish 
representatives), one can argue that this fact might have contributed to the scepticism 
of the Czechoslovak authorities.
634 
But,  putting  aside  prejudices  against  Polish  and  Jewish  sources,  was  it 
possible to comprehend the real nature of Nazi policy? In December 1942, the Allied 
governments  publicly  declared  their  knowledge  of  the  Nazi  extermination  of  the 
Jews.
635  Could  the  Declaration  be  regarded  as  the  real  turning point  in  the 
Czechoslovak  government’s  perception  and  understanding  of  the  Holocaust?  As 
suggested by Barnett, ‘[t]hroughout the World, the predominant reaction to reports 
from Europe was disbelief, indifference, passivity, and a sense of powerlessness’.
636 
It  is  difficult  to  identify  when  ‘information’  became  ‘knowledge’.
  637  The 
Czechoslovak exiles for a long time believed that the policy of forced concentration 
in Polish ghettos and maltreatment with insufficient supplies were the main features 
of Hitler’s policy against the Jews. Frischer underlined the whole situation in August 
1942 as follows: ‘There is no precedent for such organised wholesale dying in all 
Jewish  history,  nor  indeed  in  the  whole  history  of  mankind  [emphasis 
added].’
638According to him, the Germans planned to establish a reservation area in 
                                                 
632 APNP, Viktor Fischl Papers, the Fischl Diary, entry 25 June 1942. 
633 USHMMA, WJC L, C2/1974, ‘Report by Dr. Goldmann at the meeting of the Office Committee, 
21 May 1943’. 
634 One can mention the remark made by the Chairman of the British Joint Intelligence Committee 
William Cavendish Bentinck in July 1943: ‘The Poles, and to a far greater extent the Jews, tend to 
exaggerate German atrocities in order to stroke us up’. See Wasserstein, Bernard, Britain and the Jews 
of Europe 1939 1945, p. 296 (quoted from TNA, FO 371/34551, C9705/34/G). 
635 Hansard, 17 December 1942, volume 385, column 2083. 
636 Barnett, Victoria, Bystanders: Conscience and Complicity During the Holocaust (Westport CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1999), p. 51.  
637 Marrus, Michael R., The Holocaust in History (London: Penguin Books, 1989), p. 158. 
638 It is important to stress that at the same time, Frischer was one of three speakers at the press 
conference organised by the  BS WJC on 29 June 1942, where the Jewish  member of the Polish 
National Council, Ignacy Schwarzbart, said that more than one million Jews had been already killed, 
partly by gas (NARA, 740.00116 EW 1939/536. Biddle to the US State Department, 26 August 1942; 
attached  memorandum  ‘Help  for  the  “Ghettoes”.’)  and  Wyman,  David  S.  (ed.),  America  and  the 161 
Galicia, consisting of internment camps called ‘ghettoes’, for all European Jews.
 639 
It took  a long time before the state sponsored  extermination campaign was fully 
acknowledged. 
This  notion  can  be  documented  through  the  Czechoslovak  government’s 
relief parcel scheme to ghettos and camps. The scheme was carried out until late 
1944 despite of all the information about the Jewish plight in occupied Europe.
640 
Was it possible to comprehend the Jewish policy of the Third Reich and, at the same 
time,  keep  sending  relief  parcels  to  Jews  in  Majdanek,  Auschwitz  or  Birkenau? 
Furthermore, in May 1943, Beneš during his conversation with WJC leaders in the 
USA ‘expressed his conviction that we would find more Jews alive after this war 
than we think.’
641 He repeated similar remarks in late March 1944, a statement that 
caused uneasiness among Jewish soldiers in the Czechoslovak army who allegedly 
consequently complained to the Chancellery of the President.
642  
Two factors caused the Czechoslovaks’ complicated realization of the Jewish 
situation in Europe: firstly, the exiles’ perplexity about the sources of information 
and  secondly,  the  impossibility  of  comprehending  the  uniqueness  of  a  state 
sponsored extermination drive against one race. Regardless of the slow realization of 
the  Jewish  plight  in  Europe,  the  Czechoslovak  government  was  frequently 
approached to conduct rescue or relief interventions. Was the Beneš government in a 
position to offer any help? 
 
An exiled government and the Holocaust 
When  the  Germans  closed  the  doors  to  any  Jewish  emigration  from  their 
realm, all significant rescue alternatives seemed to be abandoned. The Allied policy 
during  the  war  remained  that  only  victory  could  bring  rescue  to  the  Jews.
  643 
                                                                                                                                          
Holocaust. A Thirteen Volume Set Documenting the Editor’s Book The Abandonment of the Jews, 
Volume 1, p. 37, doc. 20. Ambassador Biddle to the State Department, 13 August 1942. 
639 Daily News Bulletin (JTA), 29 April 1942. Used from: CNA, Zahraniční tiskový archiv, box 206, 
folder Frischer. 
640 See  more  about  this  scheme  in:  Láníček,  Jan,  ‘Arnošt  Frischer  und  seine  Hilfe  für  Juden  im 
besetzen Europa (1941 1945)’, in Theresienstädter Studien und Dokumente 2007, pp. 31 47. 
641 CZA, A280/28. Kubowitzki to Frischer, 24 May 1943.  
642 HIA, Poland: Ministerstwo Informacji, box 80, folder 6, Polish Defence Ministry to the Polish 
Ministry of Information, 26 April 1944. 
643 For example, the Czechoslovak Minister of the Interior, Slávik, in his speech in January 1943 
explained his position to the State Council. We do not know if he had been influenced by the approach 
of the major Allies, but his stand exactly copied their attitude. He said: ‘It is impossible to alleviate or 
end their [the deported Jews] sufferings as long as the ghastly Nazi murder lust rules Europe. Only the 
quickest  defeat  of  the  Germans  and  the  annihilation  of  Nazism  will  bring  about  the  end  of  the 162 
Nevertheless, after 17 December 1942 and the UN declaration against the German 
atrocities,  the  pressure  on  governments  to  investigate  possible  rescue  attempts 
became more tangible.   
When  examining  the  responses  of  the  Czechoslovak  government  to  the 
Jewish plight during the war, we have to introduce a theoretical framework for the 
exile  governments’  position  vis à vis  possible  help  to  the  Jews.  Was  the 
Czechoslovaks’ position unique or was it just another ally ( in exile)? Two rescue 
attempts serve as examples to provide this framework: a scheme to evacuate children 
from Slovakia in the spring of 1943 and plans to exchange Czech Jews interned in 
Theresienstadt for German civilians in Allied hands in late 1944. 
In  April  1942,  Minister  Ripka  handed  to  the  Bishop  of  London,  Edward 
Myers, an aide mémoire for the Vatican. During the meeting, Ripka described the 
situation  of  the  Czechoslovak  Jews  who  were  being  deported  to  Poland.  Ripka 
suggested that an intervention by the Holy See could persuade the Germans to let the 
children and elderly leave for neutral countries.
644 Also Frischer frequently appealed 
to  the  Allies  to  save  the  children.  He,  for  example,  stressed  this  point  in  a 
memorandum to the US Department of State, as well as during a Czechoslovak State 
Council meeting shortly after the UN Declaration in December 1942.
645 Likewise, in 
October  1942  Viktor  Fischl,  a  Zionist  in  the  Foreign  Ministry,  discussed  the 
                                                                                                                                          
sufferings of the peoples in occupied Europe’. Czechoslovak Jewish Bulletin, no. 17, 9 February 1943, 
pp. 2f: ‘Ministr Dr. Juraj Slávik on the Situation in Czechoslovakia’). The same approach was shared 
by the British and Americans. No measures could interfere with the successful progress of the war 
(For example: Braham, Randolph L., The Politics of Genocide. The Holocaust in Hungary (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1981), p. 1103). 
644 AMZV, LA 1939 1945, box 514, minutes of the Ripka’s visit to Bishop Myers, 14 April 1942 
(notes taken by Vladimír Slavík).  
645 Frischer in his memorandum for the American government in August 1942 appealed: ‘[n]o enemy, 
however  cruel,  would  refuse  to  grant  and  make  possible  the  free  withdrawal  of  children  from  a 
besieged  fortress.  […]  It  would  be  expedient  to  proceed  by  evacuating  first  from  Vienna, 
Czechoslovakia  and  Germany  and  taking  to  Switzerland  those  children  who  have  not  yet  been 
deported from these countries to Poland. Germany might subsequently be prevailed upon to transfer 
from the Polish internment camps to transit camps those children who have already been deported 
from  these  camps  to  Poland’.  NARA  740.00116  EW  1939/536.  The  US  Ambassador  to  the 
Czechoslovak government, Anthony J. Drexel Biddle to the Department of State, 26 August 1942. 
Attached  memorandum  „Help for the  “Ghettoes“, prepared by  Frischer.  Likewise, Bulletin of the 
Czechoslovak Jewish Representative Committee, No. 4, February 1943, p. 4. For minutes of the State 
Council meeting see CNA, SR – L, box 40, minutes of the State Council meeting 21 and 22 December 
1942. 163 
possibility that several hundreds of Jewish children could possibly be saved from 
occupied Czechoslovakia, with Swedish journalists in London.
646 
Those were, however, non specific calls to initiate rescue actions. Yet on 3 
February  1943,  Oliver  Stanley,  the  British  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Colonies, 
announced in the House of Commons British willingness to admit 5,000 Jews from 
the Balkans to Palestine.
647 Frischer immediately contacted the British Ambassador 
Philip Nichols and enquired whether 1,000 children from Slovakia might be included 
in the scheme.
648   
Frischer’s  efforts  were  further  amplified  by  a  letter  sent  by  Schwalb  to 
Kopecký on 19 March  1943.
649 Schwalb suggested that most of the Slovak Jews 
deported to Poland had lived until August 1942 in the Lublin district. They were then 
chased, ‘under massacres and gas poisoning’, across the Bug.
650 Schwalb appealed 
that further deportations from Slovakia had to be avoided at any cost. The Slovak 
government was allegedly willing to allow 3,000 Jews to leave the country. The 
Czechoslovaks were asked by Schwalb to secure Palestinian certificates.
651  
At the same time, in March 1943, Fischl and Frischer received, thanks to 
London Hechalutz, copies of correspondence between Fleischmann in Slovakia and 
Saly  Mayer  in  Switzerland.
652 Fleischmann  especially  debated  the  possibility  of 
saving  the  remaining  Slovakian  Jews  by  bribing  Nazi  officials  in  Slovakia, 
                                                 
646 AMZV,  LA  –  Confidential,  1939 1945,  box  212,  a  note  by  Fischl,  7  October  1942.    Fischl 
proposed to the journalists that the Czechoslovak representative in Stockholm could cooperate with 
them. 
647 Wasserstein, Bernard, Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939 1945, p. 180. A scheme proposed by 
Stanley included 4,500 persons from Bulgaria and further 500 children from Hungary and Romania.  
648 AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 189, Frischer to Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, 8 
March 1943; Ripka to Nichols, 19 March 1943. 
649 PLILMRA, III 37 1A 15, Schwalb to Kopecký, 19 March 1943. 
650 Ibid.,‘unter Massaker und Gasvergiftungen, über den Bug forschickt’. Another group of 300 young 
Slovak deportees lived under unbearable conditions in Birkenau. 
651 Ibid. The Slovaks were to announce this permit on 5 March 1943. I have not found any reference to 
the issue of this permit in the archives and among other primary sources.  
652 Those were probably copies of communications sent by Fleischmann on 27 August and 17 (or 19) 
September 1942. Hradská, Katarína (ed.), Holokaust na Slovensku 3. Listy Gisely Fleischmannovej 
(1942 1944). Snahy Pracovnej skupiny o záchranu slovenských a európských židov, doc. 2 and 3, pp. 
31 50. They were transmitted to London via the Hechalutz connection between Geneva, Schwalb, and 
London  (Fritz  Lichtenstein)  and  also  thanks  to  Imrich  Rosenberg  of  the  Czechoslovak  National 
Jewish Council (CZA, A87/399, Frischer to Rosenberg, 17 March 1943 and Frischer to Rosenberg, 25 
March 1943. Copies of the letters: ABS, 425 230 1, letters dated: 17, 21, 28 and 29 September 1942. 
See also the correspondence between Frischer and Fritz Lichtenstein of Hechalutz in London, 4 and 
10 March 1943 (ABS, 425 230 1)). We are not informed why those letters were not transmitted to the 
Czechoslovaks via Kopecký, as was the case with the previous letter quoted above (27 June 1942 
from Gizy Fleichmann to Abraham Silberschein). Very tense relations between Schwalb and Fritz 
Ullmann, who was the main source of Kopecký’s information, could be a plausible explanation (CNA, 
MSP L, box 58, a note on Frischer’s visit to the Ministry of Social Welfare, 1 April 1943). 164 
particularly  Dieter  Wisliceny,  wrongly  identified  in  the  copy  of  the  letter  as 
‘Wilhelm  Eichmann’.
653  This  collaboration  with  ‘Wilhelm’  and  the  Slovak 
authorities had already allegedly caused a four week break in deportations.
654 Even 
Schwalb,  in  another  communication,  emphasised  that  money  transferred  to 
Switzerland might be used to save the remaining 15 20,000 Jews in Slovakia by 
bribing the Nazis and Slovaks. The Slovak Jews would then be deported to labour 
camps  in  Slovakia  instead  of  Poland.
655 Fischl  and  Masaryk  informed  Eleanor 
Rathbone, an independent MP for Combined Universities and a British pro refugee 
activist, about this proposal.
656  
Outraged by the reports, Czechoslovak Zionists in the state apparatus initiated 
an inter ministerial meeting on 29 March 1943.
657 Fischl during the meeting noted 
the willingness of the Jewish Agency to reserve 3,000 child certificates for Slovak 
Jews. The British government, however, would have to allow adults, travelling on 
child certificates, to enter Palestine. There were several other obstacles: Slovak Jews 
needed transit visas for Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, but these countries were not 
willing to issue substantial numbers of transit permits.
658 The British, moreover, had 
to  allow  the  transfer  of  currency  to  Switzerland  to  fund  the  whole  scheme.  The 
Czechoslovak authorities already had experience with British unwillingness to break 
the blockade rules when negotiating the funding of the relief parcel scheme from 
Switzerland  and  Portugal.
659 This  notwithstanding,  Czesaný  of  the  Czechoslovak 
Ministry  of  Finance  considered  it  plausible  to  receive  British  consent  with  the 
transfer of funds. The officials therefore decided to contact the Foreign Office to 
receive  permission  to  use  3,000  Palestinian  certificates  for  Slovak  Jews.  The 
                                                 
653 AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 212. A summary of Fleischmann’s letters by Fischl, 20 
March 1943. The coded language used by Fleischmann caused considerable misinformation of the 
exiles. 
654 Ibid. The crucial point of the letter, as perceived by Fischl, was the cooperation of the Slovak 
authorities on the whole bribery affair. 
655 AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 212, a note by Fischl, 5 March 1943. Fischl mentions 
the  letter  sent  by  Schwalb  in  the  second  half  of  January  1943.  See  CZA,  A87/399,  Schwalb  to 
Lichtenstein, 17 January 1943. However, Schwalb did not mention in this letter the bribes being paid 
to the Slovak authorities.  
656 AMZV, LA 1939 1945, box 512, Fischl to Rathbone 9 March 1943, including ‘Notes for Miss 
Rathbone’. Fischl mentioned that Rathbone had met Masaryk a week before. The Minister informed 
her about the proposals submitted by Schwalb. We are not informed whether Rathbone developed any 
activity in respect with the proposals.  
657 APNP, Viktor Fischl Papers, Viktor Fischl Diary entry 27 March 1943. The meeting was initiated 
by Imrich Rosenberg and Viktor Fischl. 
658 CNA, MSP L, box 58, minutes of the inter ministerial meeting of officials, 29 March 1943. 
659 Láníček, Jan, ‘Arnošt Frischer und seine Hilfe für Juden im besetzen Europa (1941 1945)’, pp. 31 
37. 165 
government on the contrary rejected the proposal to send money to Switzerland for 
bribing purposes, as proposed by pro Jewish activists. The officials considered it 
pure blackmail without any guarantee that the Germans would not deport the Jews.
660   
No reply  from the  British was  received by mid May, when  another inter 
ministerial meeting of officials was convened. The meeting was initiated by reports 
that Chaim Barlas (of the Jewish Agency in Turkey) possessed 12,500 Palestinian 
certificates  for  European  Jews,  including  Czech  and  Slovak,  and  funds  for  their 
transit  to  Palestine.
661  In  the  meantime,  the  Czechoslovak  Consul General  in 
Jerusalem reported that a transport of 122 Jews from Hungary, among them 47 Jews 
from Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia, had arrived in Palestine. Similar schemes 
were  indeed  feasible.
662  Moreover,  the  government  received  another  shocking 
account describing deportations of Slovak Jews to Poland in April 1942 and life and 
death in the ghettos (most probably in the Lublin district).
663 On 19 May 1943, the 
ministerial  officials  welcomed  the proposal by  Barlas  and  the  Ministry  of  Social 
Welfare was positively disposed to secure funding for the scheme.
664 Yet the officials 
decided to remind the British government about their previous communication in the 
first instance.
665 
The British administration dealt with the subject when Masaryk’s letter was 
received on 12 April 1943. Additionally, Nichols on his own initiative proposed that 
the suggested Jewish evacuation from Slovakia might be a topic for the Bermuda 
conference.
666 Ian Henderson of the Foreign Office, however, dismissed the proposal 
by Nichols and forwarded the Czechoslovak request to the Colonial Office instead.
667 
The  Colonial  Office  later  confirmed  the  allocation  of  500  certificates  for  Jewish 
children and accompanying adults from Slovakia and likewise from Bohemia and 
                                                 
660 CNA, MSP L, box 58, minutes of the inter ministerial meeting of officials, 29 March 1943. 
661 AMZV,  LA,  1939 1945,  box  513,  Minutes  of  the  inter ministerial  committee  meeting  of  the 
officials, 19 May 1943. It was to be a first part of a wholesale transfer of 25,000 endangered Jews, 
among them 1,000 from Bohemia and Moravia and 1,000 from Slovakia. 
662 CNA, AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 189, Nečas (administrator of the Czechoslovak 
Consulate  in  Jerusalem)  to  the  Foreign  Ministry,  16  March  1943;  Ibid.,  Consul  Novák  to  the 
Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, 1 April 1943. 
663 CNA, MV L, box 119, 2 11 17, an anonymous account ‘Sered Opole  zpäť na Slovensko’ [Sered 
Opole and back to Slovakia’, received in London on 11 May 1943]. 
664 CNA, MV L, box 120, 2 11 21, Minutes of the inter ministerial meeting, 19 May 1943. 
665 AMZV,  LA,  1939 1945,  box  513,  Minutes  of  the  inter ministerial  committee  meeting  of  the 
officials, 19 May 1943. 
666 TNA, FO371/36701, W5860/391/48, Nichols to Eden 12 April 1943. Nichols: ‘I do not of course 
know whether this suggestion is a practicable one, but if it is, it might perhaps conveniently form the 
subject of discussions at the forthcoming conference at Bermuda’. 
667 TNA,  FO371/36701,  W5860/391/48  Palestinian  visas  for  Czechoslovak  Jews.  Minute  by 
Henderson, 19 April 1943. 166 
Moravia. The Colonial Office also asked the ‘Protecting Power […] to consider an 
approach to the Germans for consent to their departure if and when transport can be 
arranged’.
668 Awaiting  the  British  reply,  Frischer  pressed  the  whole  matter  with 
Nichols. He also enquired whether the certificates could have been granted ‘outside 
the quota provided by the White Paper, suggesting the certificates to be granted [for] 
temporary refuge’.
669 Frischer’s suggestion was turned down but Nichols confirmed 
the allocation of 1,000 certificates, as agreed by the Colonial Office.
670 The British 
were  willing  to  help,  though  only  within  the  boundaries  of  their  official  policy 
towards the Jewish immigration to Palestine.
671  
The scheme to evacuate the Jews in 1943 was entirely dependent on external 
circumstances that were outside the influence of the Czechoslovak authorities and in 
the end it was not successful. The German Foreign Ministry contacted the chief of 
the  Gestapo,  Heinrich  Müller,  concerning  the  scheme  in  July  1943.  The  Foreign 
Ministry confirmed that it had conducted appropriate negotiations with the British 
government  through  the  medium  of  the  Swiss.  The  Germans,  however,  rejected 
Palestine as the land of arrival and suggested mainland Britain instead. The Germans 
needed to maintain good relations with the Jerusalem Mufti who objected to any 
Jewish  immigration  to  Palestine.
672  Furthermore,  German  pressure  caused  the 
                                                 
668 TNA, FO371/36701, W6612/391/48, Colonial Office to H.A. Walker, 28 April 1943; It took three 
weeks before the Foreign Office informed Nichols, see TNA, FO371/36701, W6612/391/48, FO (A. 
W. Randall) to Nichols, 21 May 1943. 
669 CZA, Z4/30385, Frischer to the Jewish Agency (Linton), 17 May 1943. 
670 Ibid. ‘A few days ago I have been asked to call on Mr. Nichols who told me on behalf of his 
Government that as a reply to my application I should regard the answer given by Colonel Stanley to 
Mr. Sorenson in the House of Commons on February 3rd, which, as you no doubt are aware, was 
negative’.  See Hansard, 3 February 1943, Volume 386, column 866: Mr. Sorensen: ‘Is there any 
necessity still to preserve the numerical limit laid down in the White Paper, and could arrangements 
be made for any number of Jews temporarily to reside in Palestine?’ Colonel Stanley: No, Sir. I think, 
although this goes far beyond the limits of this Question, that it is essential, from the point of view of 
stability in the Middle East at the present time, that that arrangement should be strictly adhered to. Sir 
Richard Acland: Do not the claims of humanity come before your quota restrictions? Why not take all 
you can get under all conditions? Colonel Stanley:Winning the war is the most important thing of all.’ 
671 On  the  British  official  wartime  policy  towards  the  Jews,  including  Palestine  see:  Wasserstein, 
Bernard, Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939 1945. The Foreign Office was especially concerned 
about the reaction of the Arab population. 
672 This German attitude was confirmed by Oskar Neumann, a member of the Working Group, in his 
post war  memoirs.  Neumann  referred  to  negotiations  with  Dieter  Wisliceny,  the  German  adviser 
(Berater) for the Jewish question at the Slovak government who rejected Palestine as a possible land 
of  departure.  Neumann,  Oskar,  Im  Schatten  des  Todes.  Vom  Schicksalkampf  des  slovakischen 
Judentums  (Tel  Aviv:  Olamehu,  1956),  p.  188f.  Neumann  unfortunately  did  not  use  a  strictly 
chronological  approach  in  his  narrative  and  it  is,  therefore,  complicated  to  date  the  negotiations 
between the Working Group and Wisliceny concerning the evacuation of Jews from Slovakia. See 
also  Friling,  Tuvia,  Arrows  in  the  Dark.  David  Ben Gurion,  the  Yishuv  Leadership,  and  Rescue 
Attempts during the Holocaust. Volume 1 (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 
pp. 168f. 167 
Bulgarians, whose agreement initiated the negotiations in the first place, to change 
their previous consent to the scheme.
673 At the same time, the Germans wanted the 
House of Commons to decide publicly about the scheme.
674 The German agencies 
apparently  intended  to  utilise  the  scheme  for  a  propaganda  attack  on  the  British 
government.
675 There are also doubts about the Slovak willingness to let the Jews 
leave the country in the spring of 1943. We do not have evidence that Schwalb’s 
information  from  March  1943  was  genuine.
676 Proposals  for  the  solution  of  ‘the 
Jewish question’ in Slovakia showed that the Ministry of the Interior was, in fact, 
supporting radicalization of anti Jewish policy.
677  
Further questions are raised by the British conduct during the negotiations. 
Immediately after the war, the British government was blamed by the Slovak Jewish 
activists for the failure of the scheme.
678 For example, the British agreed to give 
assurances to the Turkish government that the evacuated Jews would be allowed to 
enter Palestine. Yet the Turks were not informed accordingly until March 1944.
679 
Consequently,  the  Turkish  government  did  not  issue  transit  visas  for  escaping 
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675 Wasserstein, Bernard, Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939 1945 (Leicester: Leicester University 
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a bit hazy and she specifically mentioned only an option to send abroad 25 children. See ‘The Minutes 
of the meeting of the presidium of the Jewish Council 31 March 1943’, in Hradská, Katarína (ed.), 
Holokaust na Slovensku 8. Ústredňa Židov (1940 1944) (Bratislava: Nadácia Milana Šimečku, 2008), 
p. 301f, doc. 144. 
677 Nižňanský, Eduard – Kamenec, Ivan (eds.), Holokaust na Slovensku 2. Prezident, vláda, Snem SR 
a Štátna rada o židovskej otázke (1939 1945) (Bratislava: Nadácia Milana Šimečku, 2003), document 
105, p. 256ff. ‘Undated proposal by the Slovak  ministry  of the interior how to solve the Jewish 
situation in Slovakia’. The ministry proposed radicalization of the anti Jewish policy.  
678 CZA, S6/970, Oskar Krasňanský to the Organizational Department of the Jewish Agency, 5 May 
1947. 
679 Friling,  Tuvia,  Arrows  in  the  Dark.  David  Ben Gurion,  the  Yishuv  Leadership,  and  Rescue 
Attempts during the Holocaust. Volume 1, p. 174 and 193. Friling suggests that the British were often 
a major source of the hindrance. 168 
Jews.
680 In contrast, Anthony Bevins suggests that the British tried to help in this 
particular  scheme.  He  argues  that  they  investigated  various  alternatives  to  secure 
transport facilities, the main obstacle to the scheme for getting Jewish children from 
the Balkans to Palestine.
681  
The exiles could render only limited help to the rescue interventions. Jews in 
occupied Europe were mostly citizens of the countries officially represented by the 
exile governments. When specific rescue alternatives emerged, the British demanded 
to  be  approached  by  the  exile  administrations  and  not  directly  by  pro Jewish 
activists.
682 It served the positive reputation of the Czechoslovak administration that 
they  willingly  forwarded  those  proposals  to  the  British  authorities.  Nevertheless, 
although the rescue of Jews in occupied Europe might have been conducted only by 
the major powers, it was at the same time impossible without the consent of the Axis. 
There  was  indeed  little  space  for  the  Czechoslovak  authorities  and  other  exile 
governments in the diplomatic struggle to secure any specific help. However, the 
impossibility of contributing to the rescue of endangered Jews made the situation of 
the  exiles  easier.  They  could  shift  all  responsibility  to  the  major  Allies,  without 
having to decide on schemes themselves. The exiles thus focused only  on minor 
operations,  usually  with  the  help  of  their  diplomatic  representatives  in  neutral 
countries.
 683 This  notwithstanding,  we  can  document  differences even  among  the 
minor Allies – the governments in exile.  
 
                                                 
680 Ibid.  See  also  TNA,  FO371/36701,  W6782/391/48,  A.  Walker,  minute  commenting  that  the 
transport  via  Turkey  was  the  obstacle,  7  May  1943.  Ibid.,  MacMichael  from  Palestine  to  SS  for 
Colonies, 3 May 1943, about negotiations with Kaplan (JA Palestine). The Slovaks were allegedly 
willing to let the Jews go, but the main problem was to secure Turkish transit visa. The Turks wanted 
to be assured about transit facilities from Turkey to Palestine. The Jewish Agency would, according to 
Kaplan, cover the costs; Dagan, Avigdor, ‘The Czechoslovak Government in exile and the Jews’, p. 
470. 
681 Bevins, Anthony, British Wartime Policy towards European Jewry: British Diplomatic Efforts to 
Secure  the  Release  of  4,500  Jewish  Children  from  the  Balkans  1943 44  (Reading:  University  of 
Reading Department of Politics Occasional Paper, 1991). 
682 AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 189, the Colonial Office to Rabbi Solomon Schonfeld, 
23 February 1943. ‘Allied nationals are primarily the responsibility of their own Governments, and 
that if those Governments  were to request the assistance of the  Foreign Office the  matter  would 
receive full consideration’; Ibid.,  Oliver Stanley to Joseph Hertz, 18 June 1943. 
683 The  Czechoslovak  representatives  as,  for  example,  Kopecký  in  Switzerland,  Čejka  in  Lisbon, 
Vochoč in Marseille, Hanák in Ankara or Kučera in Stockholm in fact provided significant relief to 
Jewish internees, but also escapees from Nazi controlled Europe. Moreover, as we are informed by 
Dagan, ‘the representatives of the Czech government in exile in Geneva, Stockholm and Lisbon were 
instructed to assist in the rescue of individuals and small groups wherever feasible’. In this case, we 
simply have to believe Dagan and his private archives, because we do not have any proof from the 
archival documents (Dagan, Avigdor, ‘The Czechoslovak Government in exile and the Jews’, p. 469). 169 
Negotiating exchange schemes  
Further  conclusions  about  the  theoretical  position  of  the  Czechoslovak 
government  can  be  documented  with  regard  to  the  proposed  exchange  schemes 
between the Allies and Germans. Fischl informed the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry 
in September 1944 that the Dutch government in exile had approached the Germans 
via the ICRC. The Dutch had suggested that 6,000 Jews in German hands might be 
exchanged for German civilians seized in the Dutch overseas colonial territories.
684 
The Germans allegedly agreed, in the first instance, to exchange 100 persons who 
were to be allowed to enter Palestine. Hence Fischl concluded that the Palestinian 
authorities  might  be  approached  to  issue  further  certificates  for  internees  in 
Theresienstadt.  In  contrast  to  the  Dutch,  the  Czechoslovaks  had  not  seized  any 
German  civilians  who  might  possibly  have  been  exchanged.  Fischl  therefore 
recommended  that  German  nationals  settled  in  allied  countries,  who  had  been 
Czechoslovak  citizens,  might  have  been  used,  with  the  Allies’  consent,  for  this 
scheme. As Fischl concluded, at least a handful of ‘the most worthy people’ might be 
saved.
685 
Yet the idea that pre war German Czechoslovaks might have been admitted 
to Czechoslovakia raised objections in the government. Procházka, of the Foreign 
Ministry,  emphasized  that  the  government’s  intention  was  to  deny  return  to  the 
Republic to any ‘of our unreliable subjects’ who spoke German. This scheme would 
have  contradicted  the  Czechoslovak  plans  and  might  have  affected  post war 
negotiations  with  the  Allies.
686 The  situation  would  have  been  different  had  the 
British  approached  Czechoslovaks  themselves  and  suggested  such  a  scheme.  The 
government might have admitted an exception from its programme and supported the 
scheme on humanitarian grounds. Procházka additionally enquired whether it was 
politically expedient to suggest the exchange only of Jews and not other citizens of 
Czechoslovakia  who  ‘were  suffering  equally  or  even  more  than  Jews’.
687 But  he 
concluded  that  it  seemed  that  Germans  would  only  let  Jews  go  because  they 
perceived them as a security threat. Procházka in the end agreed with Ripka that the 
Foreign  Ministry  would  contact  the  British  and  Americans  as  suggested  by  the 
                                                 
684 AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 189, Fischl for the MFA, 26 August 1944; Wasserstein, 
Bernard, Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939 1945, pp. 234 235 
685 AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 189, Fischl for the MFA, 26 August 1944. 
686 AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 189, Procházka for Ripka, 30 August 1944. 
687 Ibid. 170 
proposal.
688 In  any  case  the  letters  to  the  American  and  British  Ambassadors 
mentioned only that 250 persons might be exchanged. The communications did not 
propose that German nationals of Czechoslovak origin might be considered for the 
scheme.
689 The Czechoslovaks’ concerns that ‘unreliable’ persons might have been 
sent to Czechoslovakia weakened the final appeal to the Allies. 
Czech  historiography  presents  the  scheme  as  another  proof  of  the 
humanitarian spirit represented in the exile government by Masaryk.
690 The letters 
sent  to  the  Americans  and  British  were  indeed  signed  by  the  Minister.
 691 The 
Czechoslovak  internal  correspondence,  however,  documents  that  the  scheme  was 
initiated by Fischl and Frischer and its execution was agreed between Procházka and 
Ripka.
692  The letters were signed by Masaryk only accidentally because the typist 
prepared  them  by  mistake  on  papers  with  Masaryk’s  letterhead.
693 The  exchange 
scheme confirmed that similar interventions came mostly from Jewish officials in the 
administration.  The  scheme  also  highlighted  differences  among  the  minor  Allies. 
Countries with colonial territories, such as the Netherlands and Belgium, had better 
means to negotiate with the Nazis.
694 The Czechoslovaks did not have anything to 
offer and were thus entirely dependent on the major Allies.  
  The major Allies were not eager to conduct similar political negotiations with 
the Nazis. The Americans did not even answer the Czechoslovak enquiry.
695 The 
British were aware of the Dutch and Belgian exchange schemes, but concerning the 
Czechoslovak proposal, the Foreign Office commented: 
 
[a]lthough many British internees in German hands in France have now 
been released, I do not think we can definitely say that we now have more 
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692 AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 189, Procházka to Ripka, 22 September 1944. Frischer 
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for internees in Theresienstadt (AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 189, Fischl to Procházka, 
8 September 1944 
693 AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 189, Procházka to Ripka, 22 September 1944. 
694 TNA, FO 916/929, minutes by a Foreign Office official, 29 September 1944 (signature not legible). 
695 AMZV,  LA   Confidential,  1939 1945,  box  189,  Schonfeld  to  Masaryk,  26  September  1944; 
FDRPL, WRB Papers, box 36, Schonfeld to the Secretary of State, 27 September 1944. Rudolf E. 
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AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 190, Procházka (MFA) to Ripka, 17 November 1944. 171 
Germans in our hands available for exchange than the Germans have BSS 
[?], and failing a clear balance in our favour I doubt whether we should 
wish to make such Germans available for exchange against foreign Jews. 
If not, and since the [Czechoslovak Government] hold no Germans for 
the purpose, we cannot comply with the request.
696 
 
  The  British  government  was,  however,  considering  another  exchange  of 
Palestinian  citizens  interned  in  Germany  for  Germans  in  Palestine.  The  Foreign 
Office suggested that some internees in Theresienstadt might also be proposed as a 
part of the deal.
697 Clearly the British considered it problematic to exchange Germans 
for non British Jews at the point when British subjects were interned in Germany as 
well.
698 This rescue scheme documents another weakness in the relations between the 
British and the minor Allies. There were too many exile governments whose rescue 
actions depended on the major Allies. However, the latter first of all felt obliged to 
act in their own interests. 
Finally, there was the last of the major Allies whose help might be considered 
–  the  Soviet  Union.  With  the  advance  of  the  Red  Army  in  1943  and  1944,  the 
question of the liberation of the camps in Eastern Poland arose. In mid June 1944, 
Frischer asked the Soviets via Ripka if they might consider liberation of the camps 
by a swift action and thus prevent the murder of the remaining prisoners.
699 Ripka, 
although  he  was  aware  of  the  difficulties,  approached  the  Soviet  Embassy  and 
concluded that the Czechoslovaks ‘would like to do everything that could contribute 
to the liberation of [the Czechoslovak citizens with Jewish roots].’
700 Humanitarian 
principles did not figure high in the Soviet military strategy and the reply of the 
Embassy only confirmed this fact.
701 The only possible help for the inmates was ‘the 
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swift cleansing of Poland from the German usurpers now being carried out by the 
Red Army’.
 702 Concerning the situation in occupied Polish territories, ‘the Polish 
Committee for the National Liberation’ (PCNL), recently established in Lublin, was 
to be contacted.
 703  The Soviets clearly wanted the Allied governments to recognize 
their  satellite  governmental  body  in  liberated  Poland.  Once  contacted  by  the 
Czechoslovak government, the PCNL would have been officially recognised.
704 The 
Czechoslovaks did not respond and the scheme was shelved.
705  
The  WJC  approached  the  Czechoslovak  Foreign  Ministry  in  late  October 
1944 and drew its attention to the precarious situation in Slovakia. The Czechoslovak 
Jews were interned by the Germans during the suppression of the Slovak National 
Uprising in the camp in Sered.
706 The previous negative experience notwithstanding, 
Procházka  suggested  that  the  Czechoslovak  Ambassador  to  Moscow,  Zdeněk 
Fierlinger, might be contacted concerning the possible exchange of the internees for 
Germans  under  Soviet  control.
707 Procházka  stressed  that  if  the  Czechoslovaks 
succeeded it would constitute a significant achievement for the government.
708 He 
proposed  asking  Fierlinger  informally  what  the  Soviet  reaction  might  be  if  the 
Czechoslovaks decided to approach them. Although Ripka questioned the feasibility 
of the scheme and had personal doubts about contacting the Soviets in the affair, 
Fierlinger  was  in  the  end  informed.
709 The  Ambassador,  however,  responded  by 
saying that this initiative would have been unlikely to have been approved by the 
Soviets. Such schemes were conducted only in cases of persons of high diplomatic 
position.  Fierlinger  advised  that  only  a  general  request  by  Beneš  to  the  Soviet 
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Embassy  could  possibly  have  any  chance  of  being  considered.
710  Procházka 
consequently  prepared  an  elaborate  analysis  of  the  scheme.  He  highlighted  the 
practical  complications  with  regard  to  the  transport  of  exchanged  persons.  This 
would  involve  the  help  of  neutrals,  Sweden  and  Switzerland,  and  the  political 
support of the British. Nevertheless, he concluded that the scheme was possible and 
stressed  the  moral  benefit  for  the  government.
711 The  final  decision,  suggested 
Procházka, depended personally on Beneš. Yet, Ripka had already before refused the 
exchange on the grounds that the Soviets would have severely rejected any such 
initiative.
712 The ministry subsequently asked Fierlinger to keep the whole plan on 
file for later when larger parts of Germany would be occupied and the Soviets might 
be more amenable to similar schemes.
713 
The Czechoslovaks generally agreed to initiate diplomatic consultations with 
the major Allies, despite their own doubts about their ability to influence the latter’s 
conduct. The Foreign  Ministry, for example, knew that the Soviets would ‘never 
change their military plans, except for purely military reasons’.
714 In spite of that, 
Ripka  asked  them  to  do  so  in  connection  with  the  renewed  Soviet  offensive  in 
January 1945 which brought the Red Army close to Auschwitz.
715 Those initiatives 
did not mean that the Czechoslovaks wanted to interfere with the agenda of the major 
Allies.
716 As  documented  during  preparations  for  the  Bermuda  conference,  the 
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foreign ministers may well have been the factor that led to the convening of the Anglo American 
Conference  in  Refugees,  which  met  in  Bermuda  in  April  1943’.  See  Dagan,  Avigdor,  ‘The 
Czechoslovak Government in exile and the Jews’, p. 470; ‘Excerpts from a London War Diary’, in 
Review for the History of Czechoslovak Jews, Vol. 1, 1986, p. 46. Dagan did not study archival 174 
Czechoslovaks  did  not want  to  approach  the  British because  they  considered  the 
conference an internal affair of the major Allies.
717 Likewise Czechoslovak efforts to 
instigate  the  Allied  bombing  of  extermination  centres,  repeatedly  stressed  in 
historiography, were never proposed by the administration as such.
718 It was Frischer, 
in  his  own  personal  capacity,  who  sent  such  requests  to  the  Czechoslovak 
government and to the major Allies.  
The  Czechoslovaks  did  not  study  the  persecution  of  the  Jews  in  Europe 
systematically.  The  government,  for  example,  never  considered  the  creation  of  a 
body similar to the American War Refugee Board (WRB) or the Polish Council for 
Matters Relating to the Rescue of the Jewish Population.
719 Indeed, when contacted 
by the WRB representative in London in September 1944, the Czechoslovak officials 
allegedly  denied  any  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  this  American  governmental 
body.
720 This discussion opens up an important issue that needs to be addressed here: 
what  was  the  role  of  the  Jewish  plight  in  the  considerations  of  Czechoslovak 
diplomacy?  
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
documents and used his private collection and own memory. He was certainly not informed about all 
Ripka’s or Masaryk’s actions. 
717 AMZV,  LA  –  Confidential,  1939 1945,  box  212,  National Jewish  Council  (Zelmanovits)  to 
Šrámek, 5 April 1943; Ripka to the Presidum of the Council of Ministers, 17 April 1943. 
718 Gilbert,  Martin,  Auschwitz  and  the  Allies,  p.  303;  Neufeld,  Michael  J.  (ed.),  The  Bombing  of 
Auschwitz: Should Allies have attempted it? (Lawrence, Ka: The University of Kansas Press, 2003), 
pp. 67, 103, 112f.; Wyman, David S., The Abandonment of the Jews. American and the Holocaust, 
1941 1945 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), pp. 295f.; YVA, M2/429, Frischer to John M. Allison 
(2
nd  secretary  of  the  US  embassy),  15  July  1944;  Archives  of  the  State  Museum  in  Auschwitz 
Birkenau, Materialy Ruchu Oporu, t. XLI, p. 47; Kubowitzki to J. McCloy, 9 August 1944. Proposals 
to bomb Auschwitz, sent to the Americans, were Frischer’s private interventions. The only appeal 
made by the Czechoslovaks was Ripka’s letter on 4 July 1944, where the Minister simply forwarded 
proposals prepared by the Slovak Jewish underground. The call to bomb the camps and railways 
leading to them were not commented on, or endorsed by the Czechoslovak Minister (Wyman, David S. 
(ed.),  America  and  the  Holocaust.  A  Thirteen Volume  Set  Documenting  the  Editor’s  Book  The 
Abandonment of the Jews, Volume 12, pp. 98 102. Document no. 15. Summary of the Auschwitz 
escapees’ report by Gerhart Riegner, World Jewish Congress, Geneva, sent by R. E. Schoenfeld, U.S. 
chargé to the Czechoslovak government in exile to Cordell Hull, 5 July 1944). The Czechoslovak 
authorities were repeatedly approached by pro Jewish activists (Frischer, Goldmann) to request the 
major Allies to bomb the camps. There is no evidence that Beneš or Masaryk ever did anything in this 
direction. See AMZV, LA – Confidential, box 190, Goldmann to Masaryk, 3 July 1944; Ibid. Viktor 
Fischl’s comments, rejecting the proposal, but leaving the final decision on Beneš, 12 July 1944.  
719 Engel, David, Facing a Holocaust. The Polish Government in Exile and the Jews, 1943 1945, p. 
138. 
720 FDRPL, WRB Papers, box 77, James H. Mann to John Pehle, 19 September 1944. Surprisingly, 
the Czechoslovaks allegedly reacted favourably when informed about the creation of the WRB by the 
US Ambassador to London Winant in February 1944, see: FDRPL, WRB Papers, box 37, Winant to 
the Secretary of State, 1 March 1944. 175 
Czechoslovak diplomacy and the Holocaust  
As I have argued, the Czechoslovak government in exile could offer hardly 
any direct help to the Jews in Europe on their own. Furthermore, the Czechoslovak 
exiles regarded rescue attempts in relation to their overall political programme where 
the interests of the future Republic had precedence. This approach is usually put 
under the category Realpolitik and stands in opposition to idealism. The issue needs 
to be put into a wide context: the restoration and form of the post war state were 
entirely dependent on the major Allies. 
In late September 1942, President Beneš was visited by a delegation from the 
BS WJC. They asked him to confirm or disclaim the intelligence contained in ‘the 
Riegner  telegram’.  Beneš,  who  was  considered  to  be  well  informed  about  the 
situation  in  occupied  Europe,  promised  to  ‘USE  HIS  MACHINERY’  to  prove 
whether  the  message  was  correct.
721 He  advised  the  pro Jewish  activists  not  to 
publicize the information until he investigated it.
722 Beneš concluded that it might 
only be Nazi propaganda,  a  statement  that  seemed plausible  to  Stephen  Wise.
723 
However, more than a month passed and another intervention was needed before 
Beneš finally answered the enquiry. At the time, when the majority of Polish Jews 
had already been gassed in the death camps and more than a year after the expulsion 
of Jews from the Protectorate had begun, Beneš wrote: 
 
Dear Mr. Easterman, 
 
[…] I obtained two replies to my enquiries and both were rather in a 
negative  sense.  According  to  my  reports  there  seem  to  be  no  positive 
indications that the Germans should be preparing a plan for a wholesale 
extermination of all the Jews. From the reports which I have at present at 
hand, it would appear that such a plan does not exist and I therefore cannot 
give you any confirmation of the information which you receive in this 
matter. 
This of course, does not mean to say that the Germans are not going 
perhaps to proceed against the Jews with ever growing brutality. Indeed, 
the more they see that they themselves are lost, the more will their fury and 
                                                 
721 USA, WJC Archives, MS 238 2/11, telegram from Easterman and Barou to Wise and Perlzweig, 
30 September 1942. 
722 USA, WJC Archives, MS 238 2/11, telegram from Easterman and Barou to Wise and Perlzweig, 
30 September  1942. In  a  cable  sent  by  Easterman  and  Barou  after  this  meeting  took  place,  both 
informed the WJC headquarters in the United States that Beneš was surprised by the message and 
‘STRONGLY ADVISES NO PUBLICITY UNTIL REPORT FULLY INVESTIGATED’. 
723 Ibid.  See  also  AJA,  Stephen  S.  Wise  Papers,  2/11,  Wise  to  Goldmann,  Perlzweig,  Schulz,  6 
October 1942. ‘Benes raises a very important point. I have communicated the substance of this letter 
to Welles’. See FDRPL, Sumner Welles Papers, box 86, Wise to Welles, 6 October 1942. 176 
their terror increase – against the Jews as well as against other subjugated 
peoples. But this has, in my opinion, nothing to do with any special plan 
such as you mentioned when you and your delegation came to see me. And 
my  doubts  regarding  the  existence  of  any  such  plan  are  further 
strengthened by the fact that although innumerable Jews are being terribly 
persecuted and practically starved, there are others, however small their 
number  may  be,  who  still  remain  in  their  original  places  and  even  are 
almost unhindered.  
I shall continue, however, to follow the matter and I shall let you know 
any further information which I might obtain in the matter. 
 
          Yours sincerely, 
            E. Beneš
724 
 
Meir Sompolinsky claims that the President was undoubtedly engaged in ‘a 
maneuver to pacify the Jewish leaders’. The unwillingness to promote the suffering 
of one group above the persecution of other groups was allegedly behind this denial 
of Jewish extermination in Europe.
725 Walter Laqueur has queried whether Beneš’s 
intelligence service misled the President, or if it was a failure of the service.
726 Yet he 
does not solve the issue of whether Beneš had previously had any source that might 
have  confirmed  such  information.  The  Czechoslovak  intelligence  service  did  not 
have  a  connection  with  occupied  Europe  between  1942  and  1944,  a  point 
acknowledged by Laqueur as well.
727 The intelligence offered by the Czechoslovaks 
was one of the very few services the government was able to offer to the Allies. 
Beneš  thus  could  not  have  revealed  that  his  service  was  not  as  important  as  the 
Jewish  activists  believed.
728 It  is  doubtful  that  Beneš  received  any  intelligence 
                                                 
724 Rothkirchen,  Livia,  The  Jews  of  Bohemia  and  Moravia,  p.  179.  At  the  conference  Fenomén 
Holocaustu [the Phenomenon of the Holocaust] in 1999, Yehuda Bauer mentioned a letter sent by the 
BS WJC to its headquarters after the Jewish activists had received this Beneš’s reply. In the letter they 
allegedly expressed doubts about everything that Beneš had written to them. However, later, Bauer 
was not able to remember the source of this information. He only wrote that it had to be somewhere in 
the Israeli Archives (Fenomén Holocaustu. Sborník Mezinárodní vědecké konference, Praha 1999  
http://old.hrad.cz/president/Havel/holocaust/speeches/sbornik_ctvrtek.htm (20/08/07); 
Correspondence between the author and Yehuda Bauer, June/July 2007).  
725 Sompolinsky, Meier, The British Government and the Holocaust. The Failure of Anglo Jewish 
Leadership? (Brighton – Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 1999), pp. 7f. Sompolinsky labels it even 
‘the sacred principle’ of the Allied governments. 
726 Laqueur, Walter, The Terrible Secret: An Investigation into the Suppression of Information about 
Hitler’s „Final Solution“ (New York: Penguin, 1982), pp. 162 164. 
727 Ibid. 
728 For example the British government was generally sceptical about the abilities of the Czechoslovak 
intelligence service: Sompolinsky, Meier, The British Government and the Holocaust. The Failure of 
Anglo Jewish Leadership?, pp. 7 and 216 217, footnote 12. Sompolinsky, quoting from TNA, FO 
371/26515, writes: ‘in the discussions held at the Foreign Office on December 23, 1941, doubts were 
raised  about  the  reputation  of  the  Czechoslovakian  secret  service  and  the  reliability  of  Benes’s 
sources’. 177 
concerning his enquiry or even that he asked his service to investigate the matter.
729 
It was highly important for Beneš to present himself as a significant contributor to 
the Allied war efforts and his ‘excellent’ Czechoslovak intelligence service was one 
of the best ways to achieve that. He could not have rejected the WJC request and thus 
promised to investigate the information. Simultaneously, as noted, the President was 
sceptical or disbelieved stories describing the wholesale destruction of the Jewish 
people.  Diplomatic  considerations,  insufficient  information  provided  by  the 
Czechoslovak  intelligence  service  and  the  scepticism  of  Beneš  himself  therefore 
resulted in the letter sent to Easterman.   
Additionally,  as  suggested  by  Sompolinsky,  Beneš  in  the  letter  made  a 
parallel between the persecution of the Jews and ‘other subjugated peoples’. This 
policy of juxtaposing the Nazi anti Jewish measures with the other crimes committed 
against  Czechs  or  Slovaks  was  typical  of  Beneš’s  discourse.
730  Indeed,  the 
information  campaign  conducted  by  Czechoslovak  authorities  all  over  the  world 
during the Nazi reprisals after the assassination of Heydrich and the destruction of 
Lidice was never repeated on behalf of the Jews.
 731 An attempt to secure diplomatic 
recognition  of  the  pre Munich  Czechoslovak  borders  played  the  key  role  in  this 
campaign.
732 At exactly the same time, Frischer faced significant obstacles to secure 
                                                 
729 Miroslav Kárný tried to locate these ‘two replies’ among the intelligence sent to Beneš, but was not 
able to find it. See: Fenomén Holocaustu. Sborník Mezinárodní vědecké konference, Praha 1999. 
There is a report that was forwarded to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry by Frischer in mid October 
1942. It described the liquidation of the Warsaw ghetto and differentiated between the fate of Jews 
and Aryans (See the first chapter AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 189, Frischer to the 
Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 October 1942). We know that Ripka and Masaryk read 
it, the latter even a week before Beneš answered the WJC enquiry. There is no proof that the ministry 
informed Beneš. We certainly cannot rule that out, but there is no remark on the document in that 
respect. On the other hand, Frischer and Easterman could report it to Beneš during their visits in 
September and November 1942.  
730 In 1940, Beneš wrote: ‘What can be read in the British White Paper about the persecution of Jews 
in the concentration camps is a very mild version of what the Gestapo has perpetrated against Czech 
patriots since the occupation of Prague’. Beneš, Edvard, Nazi Barbarism in Czechoslovakia (London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1940), pp. 24f. About the ‘The White Paper on German Atrocities’ see Kushner, 
Tony, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination. A Social and Cultural History, p. 123. It was 
published by the British government in late October 1939. Curiously, the Jewish persecution did not 
play any important part in the document. 
731 German  Massacres  in  Occupied  Czechoslovakia  Following  the  Attack  on  Reinhard  Heydrich 
(London: Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1942). Detlef Brandes writes in connection with 
the  informing  about  Lidice  all  around  the  world  about  ‘the  effective  Czechoslovak  propaganda’. 
Brandes, Detlef, Exil v Londýně 1939 1943. Velká Británie a její spojenci Československo, Polsko a 
Jugoslávie mezi Mnichovem a Teheránem, pp. 182f; For the history of the operation ‘Anthropoid’, 
whose  aim  was  the  assassination  of  Heydrich  see:  MacDonald,  Callum,  The  Killing  of  SS 
Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich (London: Papermac, 1990). 
732 It was successful, the British signature on the Munich agreement was officially repudiated on 5 
August  1942.  Brandes,  Detlef,  Exil  v Londýně  1939 1943.  Velká  Británie  a  její  spojenci 
Československo, Polsko a Jugoslávie mezi Mnichovem a Teheránem, pp. 182f. 178 
the  Foreign  Ministry’s  support  for  his  visits  to  the  British  and  American 
Ambassadors. He wanted to discuss with them the position of the Jews in Europe. 
Apparently,  the  Czechoslovaks  did  not  want  the  persecution  of  the  Jews  to 
overshadow Nazi reprisals in the Protectorate.
733  
This approach was also adopted by other members of the UN. In fact, the 
Czechoslovak  government,  especially  Masaryk,  was  more  inclined  to  stress  the 
uniqueness of the Nazi persecution of the Jews than the other Allies. In the St James 
Declaration,  published  on  13  January  1942,  nine  exile  governments  condemned 
crimes  committed  by  the  Germans  against  civilian  populations  in  the  occupied 
countries. No distinctions according to race, nation or religion were made.
734 Jewish 
organizations, particularly the WJC, negotiated with exile governments in order to 
receive special recognition of the crimes committed against the Jews as a group. 
Ripka was asked to support their demands for a special declaration that would also 
condemn anti Semitism as such.
735 The Minister agreed, but advised the WJC not to 
expect  any  declaration  that  would  confirm  the  complete  restitution  of  Jewish 
property. He expected considerable opposition among the other governments.
736 
Easterman later proposed to Ripka that the persecution of the Jews should be 
recognised  as  possessing  a  unique  character.  Additionally,  he  asked  whether  a 
Jewish representative could be allowed to take part in the following meetings of the 
St James conference.
737 The WJC received support from the Polish Prime Minister 
                                                 
733 The Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry firstly did not support the audience and Minister Ripka agreed. 
(AMZV, LA – 1939 1945, box 511. Record of Frischer’s visit at the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, 
13 June 1942). There is a hand written remark that the Foreign Ministry did not recommend the visit 
to the embassies. Ripka added: „Souhlasím“ [‘I agree’]. Frischer urged the Czechoslovak Foreign 
Ministry at the end of June 1942. AMZV, LA – 1939 1945, box 500, Record of Frischer’s visit at the 
Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, 26 June 1942. It took three weeks before Frischer paid a visit to the 
ambassadors. He was received by the US Ambassador Biddle on 30 June 1942 and later by the British 
Ambassador Nichols. His visit to Nichols was certainly prepared by the Czechoslovak Government. 
However, we cannot be certain in the case of Biddle. Dariusz Stola wrote that this intervention, by 
Schwarzbart and Frischer, was arranged by the Polish Foreign Minister Raczyński (Stola, Dariusz, 
Nadzieja i zagłada. Ignacy Schwarzbart – Ŝydowski prezedstawiciel w Radzie Narodowej RP (1940 
1945) (Warszawa: Oficyna Naukowa, 1995), p. 161). 
734 St.  James’s  Conference  of  the  Allied  Governments  in  London  and  Nazi  Anti Jewish  Crimes. 
Documents exchanged with the World Jewish Congress (London: BS WJC, 1942); Fox, John P. ‘The 
Jewish Factor in British War Crimes Policy in 1942’, in The English Historical Review, Vol. 92, No. 
362 (Jan. 1977), pp. 82 and 86f. 
735 CNA, AHR, box 104, 1 5 19 3, minutes of meeting between Ripka and Zelmanovits and Barou 
(both WJC), 20 January 1942. 
736 Ibid. 
737 AJA, WJC – Papers, C11/7, Note on Mr. Easterman’s and Dr. Barou’s conversation  with Dr. 
Hubert  Ripka,  Foreign  Minister  [sic!]  of  the  Czechoslovak  government  in  London  [s.  d.  – 
February/March 1942?].  179 
Władysław Sikorski in this respect.
738 Yet the other exile foreign ministers rejected it. 
They claimed that the St James declaration already covered the WJC demands and 
no special document was thus necessary.
739 The opposition notwithstanding, Ripka 
assured the WJC of the Czechoslovak willingness to issue a separate declaration that 
would condemn Nazi crimes committed against the Jews.
740 No such declaration was 
ever issued.  
There  was  also  Allied  opposition  to  Jewish  delegates  taking  part  in  the 
meetings  of  the  St  James  conference.  It  was  confirmed  in  a  comment  made  by 
Roberts of the Foreign Office on Masaryk’s behalf. The Czechoslovak Minister was 
labelled, because of his support for the Jewish claim, as a man ‘whose humanity is 
better than his judgement’.
741 However, there is no evidence suggesting Masaryk’s 
continuous diplomatic support for the Jewish demand. The Allies adopted the policy 
of treating the Jews as nationals of respective counties and not as a special category. 
This  policy  was  partly  changed  only  in  December  1942  by  the  UN  Declaration 
condemning the Nazi extermination of the Jews. 
The Allies were not  willing to declare their support for the Jewish cause 
repeatedly.  Easterman  approached  Masaryk  in  September  1943  and  enquired 
whether the UN could publish two new declarations.
742 The first would confirm their 
determination to punish the atrocities committed against the Jews. The second would 
address people in occupied Europe and call on them to exercise ‘all the means in 
their power to aid and protect Jewish and other potential victims of the Nazis’.
743 
Masaryk supported both proposals. He only objected to the implication that people in 
                                                 
738 AJA, WJC – Papers, C11/7, St. James’s Conference on Nazi crimes, interview with Sikorski and 
BS WJC, 4 March 1942. 
739 AJA, WJC – Papers, C11/7, Note on conversation with Dr. Hubert Ripka, by Barou and Easterman, 
14 April 1942. There was also judicial problem that haunted Allied statesmen until the end of the war: 
how to prosecute Germans guilty of crimes committed against the German people, for example, the 
German Jews. 
740 Ibid. 
741 Eppler, Elizabeth E., ‘The Rescue Work of the World Jewish Congress During the Nazi Period’, in 
Yisrael Gutman – Efraim Zuroff (eds.) Rescue Attempts during the Holocaust Proceedings of the 
Second Yad Vashem International Historical Conference (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1977), p. 60. TNA 
FO371/7839/61/18, 30917 F. K. Roberts, 16 August 1942. Roberts, on the contrary, appreciated the 
attitude of Sikorski. 
742 AMZV,  LA  –  Confidential,  1939 1945,  box  202,  Easterman  to  Masaryk  9  September  1943. 
Easterman also approached the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see: HIA, Poland: MSZ, box 612, 
folder  20,  Easterman  to  Adam  Romer,  9  September  1943;  For  the  Polish  reply  see:  Ibid.,  K. 
Kraczkiewicz (on Romer’s behalf) to Easterman, 23 (29.?) September 1943. The Poles rejected to 
initiate  the  declaration,  because  they  had  organized  the  UN  Declaration  in  December  1942. 
Kraczkiewicz  advised  that  another  of  the  UN  governments  might  initiate  it  and  promised  Polish 
support.  
743 AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 202, Easterman to Masaryk 9 September 1943. 180 
Europe had not done enough for the Jews so far.
744 However, Masaryk’s support (we 
are not informed how strongly he advocated the proposals during the actual meeting) 
did not meet with the approval of the Allied foreign ministers. Masaryk confirmed to 
Easterman that no distinction between the persecuted Jews and other nations could 
be drawn.
745 Furthermore, a new declaration would only weaken those already issued. 
Masaryk concluded that the previous declarations might have been reassessed, but 
‘some quite exceptional incentive would have to arise’.
746 One can only  wonder, 
what more than the complete annihilation of the Jewish people by the Nazis might 
have been meant. Similarly, a call to the people of Europe to support the Jews was 
turned down. It might have ‘produce[d] the misleading impression that in this respect 
the nations of Europe [were] indifferent’.
747 The atmosphere in London ruled out any 
overall  stress  on  the  uniqueness  of  the  Jewish  persecution.  Firstly,  the  ‘liberal’ 
approach  opposed  any  differentiation  among  persecuted  people  based  on  their 
nationality, race or religion.
748 However, ‘the competition in suffering’ among the 
Allies and the unwillingness to allow the Jewish persecution to be stressed at the 
expense of other people was also a crucial factor. In addition, the Allies did not want 
to do anything that might confirm Nazi propaganda that suggested that the war was 
controlled by the Jews.
749  
The  Czechoslovak  authorities  were  inclined  to  support  Jewish  demands. 
Thanks to this support, the Czechoslovak government retained its positive image 
among  Jewish  groups.  When,  for  example,  the  Czechoslovak  representative, 
Bohumil  Ečer,  threatened  to  resign  from  the  UN  War  Crimes  Commission,  the 
Americans immediately commented that this would cause a negative response from 
Jewish circles.
750 Yet we must conclude that the Czechoslovaks, although promising 
                                                 
744 AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 202, Procházka, information for Masaryk before the 
meeting of the Foreign Ministers on 4 October 1943. 
745 AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 202, Masaryk to Easterman, 6 October 1943. 
746 Ibid. 
747 Ibid. 
748  USHMMA,  WJC L,  C2/1973,  Executive  Committee  WJC,  Report  by  Max  Freedman,  17 
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749  Tomlin,  Chanan,  Protest  and  Prayer.  Rabbi  Dr  Solomon  Schonfeld  and  Orthodox  Jewish 
Responses in Britain to the Nazi Persecution of Europe’s Jews 1942 1945 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2006), 
pp. 88f 
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740.00116EW/9 2744, Herbert Pell (UNWCC) to the Secretary of State, 27 September 1944. 181 
otherwise,  never  challenged  the  position  adopted  by  the  other  Allies.  They,  for 
example,  did  not  issue  a  separate  declaration  condemning  the  Nazi  crimes.  The 
solidarity  among the Allies did not allow them to act on their own initiative.  In 
contrast, the main driving force behind the UN declaration of December 1942 was 
the  Polish  government.
  751    When  the  Allies  discussed  the  publication  of  the 
declaration, Ripka and Masaryk remained passive, an attitude that sharply contrasted 
with their vocal calls for wholesale reprisals after the Nazi burning of  Lidice.
752 
Similarly, the Czechoslovak attempt to initiate another pro Jewish declaration in July 
1944, when the Auschwitz Protocols were received in London, was abandoned soon 
afterwards.
753 The  British  government  opposed  it  and  the  Czechoslovaks  did  not 
push the matter forward.
754 Does this mean that the Czechoslovaks were not willing 
to challenge the policies of the major Allies? 
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Prelude to Nuremberg. Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of Punishment (Chapel Hill, NC: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), pp. 23 25; Fox, John P. ‘The Jewish Factor in British 
War Crimes Policy in 1942’, p. 89; See also Lukas, Richard C., Forgotten Holocaust. The Poles under 
German Occupation 1939 1944. Revised Edition, pp. 152 167. 
753 TNA, FO371/42809, WR218/3/48, Ripka to Nichols, 4 July 1944. Similar letters were sent to all 
the governments of the United Nations. For the original letters and responses of the governments see 
AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, boxes 189 and 190.  
754 TNA, PREM 4/51/10. Eden to Churchill, 3 July 1944. Eden opposed any new declaration. AMZV, 
LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 190, F. K. Roberts to Masaryk, 29 July 1944. Ripka was informed 
that  the  British  were  negotiating  the  new  declaration  with  the  Americans  and  the  Czechoslovak 
government would be notified in a due course. The Czechoslovak government did not respond to this 
communication and the whole matter was filed.  182 
Czechoslovak diplomacy, the major Allies and the Jews 
Beneš was regularly approached by international Jewish organizations who 
perceived him as an important actor in international politics, especially because of 
his good diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
755 The existing notion about 
Czechoslovak sympathies for minorities and in particular the Jews played its role too. 
The  Czechoslovak  government  was,  furthermore,  the  last  of  the  recognised  exile 
administrations that stayed in London until the winter of 1944/5, when the Red Army 
neared the concentration camps in the east.  
During  meetings  with  Beneš,  pro Jewish  activists  faced  an  experienced 
diplomat who was not prepared to risk his own position and reputation. A BS WJC 
delegation, consisting of Barou and Easterman, visited the Czechoslovak President 
on 23 July 1943. The representatives of the WJC expressed their disappointment with 
the  progress  of  possible  rescue  activities  on  behalf  of  the  Jews  despite  the  UN 
Declaration of December 1942 and the Bermuda Conference of April 1943. The real 
disincentive  was,  allegedly,  the  American  government,  not  the  British.  The  WJC 
asked  Beneš,  if  –  together  with  the  other  Allied  leaders  –  he  could  prepare  an 
especially strong intervention to Roosevelt. According to the WJC:  
 
President Beneš said that he did not regard the suggestion as out of order 
and he considered the proposal of much interest. It was of such a character, 
of course, that he could not give a definitive answer on the proposal at the 
moment but that he would require to think it over. The first thing he would 
have  to  do  would  be  to  suggest  to  the  American  government,  through 
Ambassador Biddle in London, that a proposal of this kind might be made 
and  to  ascertain  how  such  an  approach  would be  received.  Two  things 
were essential. First, that Heads of States could not act publicly and there 
was always the danger, particularly in America, of publicity being given to 
it. That would be extremely undesirable but difficult to avoid. Second, to 
make reasonably certain that the response would be favourable. To get a 
refusal would result in an unfortunate loss of prestige and this the Heads of 
States could not risk.
756   
 
Rescue interventions could not be undertaken if the prestige of the heads of 
states was at stake. This position of Beneš was confirmed later when the President 
rejected Barou’s proposal to ask Stalin about the fate of Polish Jewish refugees in the 
                                                 
755 In comparison, the Poles’ contacts with Stalin were tense from the beginning of the war and were 
further severed when the crimes of Katyn became known in the west. 
756 LAC, MG 31 H 158, Vol.5. Dr Rosenberg’s work during the Second World War: Photocopies of 
research material and correspondence 1938 1943, Note of Conversation between President Edvard 
Benes and Dr. N. Barou and Mr. A. L. Easterman, on Friday, 23 July 1943. 183 
Soviet Union. The Czechoslovak President ‘was more concerned with the Russian 
attitude about the general Jewish situation’.
757  Beneš later promised to investigate 
the proposals presented by the WJC, but it seems doubtful that he did anything in this 
respect.  
Beneš  was  again  visited  by  BS  WJC  representatives  on  16  March  1944. 
Silverman, Easterman, and Zelmanovits (a member of the BS Executive since 1943) 
asked Beneš to contact Stalin with proposals concerning the situation of Rumanian 
Jews and the role of the Red Army in the liberation of the concentration camps.
758 
The WJC desired that one of the conditions presented by the Soviets to the Rumanian 
government during prepared armistice talks should be a demand for the transfer of 
Transnistrian Jewry to ‘old Rumania’ and their protection there.
759 Beneš did not 
consider it possible or easy to include the proposals in the first round of negotiations 
between the Soviets and Rumanians as suggested by the WJC. As had been the case 
during  the  meeting  in  July  1943,  while  the  WJC  delegation  was  considering 
immediate measures on behalf of Rumanian Jewry, Beneš was thinking about the 
general  Jewish  position  in  post war  Europe.  He  repeatedly  promised  to  send  a 
telegram to Stalin. This probably did not happen, even though the President later 
confirmed to Zelmanovits its despatch.
760 Beneš needed to maintain the notion about 
his close relations with Stalin. The reality was not so simple and he was not willing 
to contact the Soviet leader with such proposals. 
                                                 
757 Ibid. 
758 USA, WJC Archives, MS 241/3/46: ‘Notes on the visit to President Benes on March 16
th, 1944. 
Written on 21
st March 1944.’ Furthermore, the Rumanian government would be expected to allow 
Jewish emigration to Palestine and the Red  Army  might be sent special orders and  adopt timely 
measures to rescue the Jewish population in Eastern Europe.  
759 During the advance of the Axis armies in 1941, between 145,000 and 150,000 Rumanian Jews had 
been deported from Rumania to Transnistria. They had to live there under unbearable conditions and 
around 90,000 of them died. See Enzyklopädie des Holocaust. Die Verfolgung und Ermordung der 
europäischen Juden. Band I III (München: Piper Verlag, 2nd Edition, 1998), pp. 1421 1425. 
760 USA, WJC Archives, MS 241/3/46: ‘Notes on the visit to President Benes on March 16
th, 1944. 
Written on 21
st March 1944.’ LMA, BoD, Acc 3121/C/11/010/006, Meeting for Consultation between 
representatives of the Board of Deputies and the WJC, 22 March 1944. The author has examined 
documents at the AÚTGM and has not been able to find any reference to the telegram. It is not among 
telegrams  sent  to  the  Czechoslovak  Embassy  in  Moscow  (AÚTGM,  EB II Dep  14/209,  box  14. 
Telegrams from 1944) or in the correspondence between Beneš and Stalin (AÚTGM, EB II V62A 
C/3, box 196). There is a handwritten note on a letter sent by Easterman to Beneš on 20 March 1944. 
Easterman wanted to be informed about any response from Stalin received by the President. The note 
said: ‘According to the decision by Mr. President a[d]. a[cta]., 9.4.44.’ It might mean either that Beneš 
had sent the telegram, but had not received any answer, or that he simply did not want to be bothered 
with the whole matter. However, in the case of the former, we would expect some remark in the sense 
that the telegram had been sent, or that the President was still waiting for Stalin’s response. 184 
The  Czechoslovak  government  was  in  fact  concerned  about  the  possible 
deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union as can be shown by an episode that 
developed in late 1944. In September 1944, the Polish government in exile asked the 
western Allies and the Czechoslovaks to release a declaration or warning to the Nazis. 
It was prompted by received reports that the Nazis planned to destroy the camps in 
Auschwitz,  Birkenau  and  Buchenwald,  and  murder  all  the  inmates.
761  The 
Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry apparently did not know how to react because the 
Poles  failed  to  contact  the  Soviet  government,  who  established  their  own  Polish 
proxy  in  Lublin.
762 The  Czechoslovak  government,  concerned  about  the  Soviet 
reaction, did not want to adhere to a separate declaration of the western Allies. The 
Foreign  Ministry  was  willing  to  associate  itself  only  with  a  UN  declaration.
763 
However,  the  American  and  British  governments  published  their  own  separate 
warnings on 10 October 1944 and the western Polish government appealed to the 
Czechoslovaks to adhere to it as well.
764 In this connection, in contrast to the Poles, 
the Czechoslovak government informed the Soviets about the Nazi threats, but not 
about the proposed declaration.
765 It took twelve days and two visits to the Soviet 
Embassy  before  the  Czechoslovak  government  finally  associated  itself  with  the 
warning.
766 Although the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry in general supported the 
warning, concerns about possible complications in relations with the Soviet Union 
prevented it from acting earlier. 
                                                 
761 AMZV,  LA  –  Confidential,  1939 1945,  box  189.  Letter  from  the  Polish  government  to  the 
Ambassador  O’Malley,  18 September  1944.  A  copy  was  sent  to  the  Czechoslovak  government. 
Another appeal was later sent by Leon Kubowitzki from the WJC (AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 
1945,  box  189.  Telegram,  Kubowitzki  to  Masaryk,  received  on  2  October  1944).  See  also  HIA, 
Poland: Poselstwo (Czechoslovakia), Romer to Tarnowski (Polish Ambassador to the Czechoslovak 
government), 19 September 1944 (and the following note about Tarnowski’s visit to Masaryk, 22 
September 1944). 
762 As mentioned, relations between the Soviets and western Poles were almost non existent.  
763 AMZV,  LA  –  Confidential,  1939 1945,  box  189.  Masaryk  to  Schonfeld  (US  Embassy),  28 
September 1944: ‘if [the Allies] deem[ed] it advisable that a declaration on the lines suggested by the 
Polish  government  be  issued  by  the  United  Nations,  the  Czech  Government  w[ould]  willingly 
associate itself with such a document’ [emphasis added].  
764 TNA, FO 371/39454. A copy of the British declaration; AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, 
box 189. Procházka (Foreign Ministry official) to Kraus (Foreign Ministry official), 18 October 1944. 
765 Ibid. Masaryk to Lebeděv (Soviet Ambassador), 6 October 1944. A similar letter was sent to the 
British and American governments. The information about the declaration was not mentioned in these 
letters. 
766 Ibid. Procházka to Ripka, 12 October 1944. Remark about Kraus’s  conversation with the Soviet 
officials and another planned visit at the Embassy. Ibid.  Procházka (Foreign Ministry official) to 
Kraus  (Foreign  Ministry  official),  18  October  1944.  Attached  is  the  text  of  the  Czechoslovak 
declaration. As in the case of the western Allies, the word ‘Jews’ was not used in the entire text, there 
were  only  ‘Czechoslovak  citizens’  in  Auschwitz  and  Birkenau.  The  Czechoslovak  warning  was 
published on 22 October 1944, see AČR, BBC 1939–1945, box 29, and Pavel Tigrid, 22 October 1944. 185 
Likewise  in  mid January  1945,  Ripka  was  asked  by  Kubowitzki  if  the 
Czechoslovaks could convene a meeting of Allied governments in London to discuss 
actions that might have saved the remaining Jews in Nazi concentration camps. A 
similar  meeting  had  been  organized  by  Kopecký  in  Geneva  in  November  1944. 
Ripka, however, rejected the proposal ‘in view of the delicate Polish situation’.
767 
The Minister was referring to the precarious situation that emerged when the Soviets 
insisted on the recognition of the Lublin based PCNL. The Soviets wanted the Allies 
to abandon the western Polish administration.
768 Ripka advised that, for example, the 
French  might  be  approached  to  initiate  the  meeting.  He  promised  that  the 
Czechoslovak  government  would  take  part  in  such  a  meeting,  if  convened.
769 
Diplomatic  considerations  played  a  crucial  role  in  the  Czechoslovak  exiles’ 
responses to the Nazi persecution of the Jews. But was this the case only with regard 
to proposed interventions that might question the relations with the major Allies? 
 
Neutral governments and their diplomacy: an obstacle on the road of rescue? 
During the war, neutral governments constituted an amorphous group that 
existed between the Allies and Axis. Officially they did not support either part of the 
conflict and maintained relations with both sides. The neutrals thus accepted the pre 
war disintegration of Czechoslovakia and did not recognise the Beneš government. 
They, on the contrary, recognised the Slovak State.
770 Although the recognition by 
the  neutrals  was  not  as  significant  as  the  diplomatic  ties  with  the  major  Allies, 
official contacts with the former would represent an important moral support for the 
Czechoslovak  exiles.
771 However,  the  Swiss  and  Swedish  governments  and  Pope 
Pius  XII  maintained  diplomatic  contacts  with  the  Tiso  government  until  1945.
772  
                                                 
767 AJA, WJC Papers, D112/8, Note of Conversation between Mr. Frischer, Dr. Kubowitzki, and Dr. 
Ripka, 19 January 1945. 
768 Němeček,  Jan,  Od  spojenectví  k  roztržce,  pp.  284 7.  The  Czechoslovak  government  finally 
recognized the PCNL on 30 January 1945. Němeček documents that in January 1945, the Soviet 
pressure  on  Beneš  became  unbearable  and  the  constant  reluctance  to  recognize  the  Soviet  proxy 
threatened relations between the Soviets and the Czechoslovak exiles. 
769 AJA, WJC Papers, D112/8, Note of Conversation between Mr. Frischer, Dr. Kubowitzki, and Dr. 
Ripka, 19 January 1945. 
770 Němeček,  Jan,  Soumrak  a  úsvit  československé  diplomacie.  15.  březen  1939  a  československé 
zastupitelské úřady, p. 213 and 345. 
771 For example, with relation to Slovakia, the major Allies supported Beneš’s position as early as 
1941. The Slovak government joined the war against the Soviet Union on German side and declared 
war to the United States and the British Empire in December 1941. Rychlík, Jan, Češi a Slováci ve 20. 
století. Česko slovenské vztahy 1914 1945, pp. 215 and 219. 
772 Němeček,  Jan,  Soumrak  a  úsvit  československé  diplomacie.  15.  březen  1939  a  československé 
zastupitelské  úřady,  pp.  230  and  352.  The  Holy  See  recognised  the  Slovak  government  de  jure 186 
These  diplomatic  ties  with  the  Slovak  state  were  considered  an  obstacle  to  the 
reestablishment of diplomatic contacts with the neutrals by the Beneš government.
773 
The  only  exceptions  were  the  exiles’  repeated  attempts  to  re establish 
diplomatic relations with the Vatican.
 774 The Slovak government’s complicity in the 
‘Final Solution’ was to support the exiles’ campaign. For example, on 6 July 1942, 
the Czechoslovak delegation handed an aide mémoire about the situation of the Jews 
in  Slovakia  to  Bishop  Myers  to  share  with  Cardinal  Arthur  Hinsley  and  the 
Vatican.
775 Arguably,  the  aide  mémoire  had  a  deeper  political  significance  than 
purely to alleviate the plight of the Slovak Jews. In particular, there were repeated 
references to the Czechoslovak government’s political and territorial continuity with 
pre war  Czechoslovakia  and  to  the  transience  of  the  rulers  in  Slovakia.
776 The 
purpose  of  this  memorandum  was  to  show  the Holy  See  who  would be  the  real 
master  of  the  territory  and  in  this  way  to  convince  it  to  repudiate  the  Slovak 
government whose persecution of the Jews was inconsistent with Christian ethics.  
                                                                                                                                          
immediately  on  25  March  1939  and  the  Czechoslovak  ambassador  was  informed  that  relations 
between the Vatican and Czechoslovakia had been broken. (Rothkirchen, Livia, The Destruction of 
Slovak Jewry. A Documentary History, pp. xxixf. ). This state of affairs lasted till 30 May 1945, more 
than a month after the Slovak Republic ceased to exist on 18 April 1945. 
773 Němeček,  Jan,  Soumrak  a  úsvit  československé  diplomacie.  15.  březen  1939  a  československé 
zastupitelské úřady, p. 230. 
774 Němeček,  Jan,  Soumrak  a  úsvit  československé  diplomacie.  15.  březen  1939  a  československé 
zastupitelské  úřady,  pp.  241 255.  Actes  et  Documents  du  Saint  Siège  relatifs  à  Seconde  Guerre 
Mondiale, Vol. IV, pp. 360 363. Document no. 244. Le délégué apostolique à Londres Godfrey au 
cardinal Maglione. Londres, 21 janvier 1941; Actes et Documents du Saint Siège relatifs à Seconde 
Guerre Mondiale, Vol. V, pp. 115 117. Document no. 27. Le délégué apostolique à Londres Godfrey 
au cardinal Maglione. Londres, 27 julliet 1941. There was probably no answer to this letter. Actes et 
Documents du Saint Siège relatifs à Seconde Guerre Mondiale, Vol. IV, p. 425f. Document no. 297. 
Le cardinal Maglione au délégué apostolique à  Londres  Godfrey, Vatican, 25  mars 1941. Beneš, 
Edvard, The Memoirs of Dr. Edvard Beneš: From Munich to New War and New Victory, pp. 335 341. 
‘Memorandum  from  President  Dr.  Eduard  Beneš  to  the  Holy  See,  delivered  to  President  F.  D. 
Roosevelt on May 12
th, 1943’; The Vatican did not answer Beneš’s letter of May 1943. However, in 
March 1944, during a conversation with the Slovak ambassador Karol Sidor, Maglione said that the 
Holy See could not recognize and establish diplomatic relations with the Czechoslovak government 
in exile.  (Kamenec,  Ivan  –  Prečan,  Vilém  –  Škovránek,  Stanislav  (eds.),  Vatikán  a  Slovenská 
republika (1939 1945). Dokumenty (Bratislava: Slovak Academia Press, 1992), p. 153, footnote 5). 
775 It seems that the government was not allowed to approach the Apostolic Delegate Godfrey directly 
and therefore the way via Bishop Myers and Cardinal Arthur Hinsley, Archbishop of Westminster, 
had to be chosen. The delegation consisted of Vladimír Slavík (Foreign Ministry), Viktor Fischl and 
Arnošt  Frischer  AMZV,  LA  –  Confidential,  1939 1945,  box  190,  Foreign  Ministry  to  the 
Czechoslovak Consulate General in Jerusalem, 8 July 1942. Note about the visit to Bishop Myers. For 
a personal account of the visit, see APNP, Viktor Fischl Papers, Viktor Fischl Diary, 25 June 1942. 
The preparation of the aide memoire was initiated by Frischer. AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, 
box 190, Aide Mémoire (6 July 1942). Curiously, the document has not been included into the edition 
of documents published by the Vatican (Actes).  
776 AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 190. Aide Mémoire (6 July 1942). 187 
An almost identical text was sent to the Vatican, via Myers, in February 1944.
777 Yet 
although Pius XII intervened with the Slovak authorities on several occasions, he 
never put enough pressure on them to force them to stop further deportations and 
never thought of terminating relations with Tiso.
778   
One issue needs to be addressed here: why did the exiles not try to secure 
help for Slovak Jews from other neutrals, for example Sweden, Switzerland, or other 
Allies? The situation can be explained using the example of one particular episode. 
The Slovak National Uprising in late August 1944 and the ensuing occupation of 
Slovakia  by  the  Wehrmacht  meant  a  deadly  threat  for  the  remaining  Jews.
779 In 
October  1944,  Frischer  presented  several  suggestions  as  to  how  the  government 
might help the Jews in Slovakia. He asked the Foreign Ministry to request the King 
of Sweden, the Swiss government, the Vatican and the Slovak Red Cross (SRC) to 
intervene  with  Tiso  to  stop  the  deportations.
780 However,  nearly  all  of  Frischer’s 
proposals were turned down. Procházka noted that the government could not ask the 
Swedish and Swiss governments because their subsequent contacts with Tiso would 
have  meant  the  exiled  Czechoslovaks  giving  certain  recognition  to  the  renegade 
Slovak government. Further, the SRC could have been approached only directly by 
the Czechoslovak Red Cross (CRC), which could not have negotiated without the 
approval of the Czechoslovak government.
781 The fact that even the Czechs living in 
Slovakia were threatened by the German occupation did not help. On the other hand, 
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779 AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 190, Linton (Jewish Agency) to Frischer, 4 October 
1944;  See also Fatran, Gila, ‘Die Deportation der Juden aus der Slowakei 1944 1945’, in Bohemia 
37 , Vol. 1, 1996, pp. 98 119. 
780  AMZV,  LA  –  Confidential,  1939 1945,  box  190,  Procházka  for  Ripka  about  Frischer’s 
interventions, 9 October 1944. Frischer was influenced by the June 1944 interventions of the Swedish 
King Gustav V with the Hungarian Horthy government, a diplomatic effort that partly caused the 
halting of deportations of Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz. Bauer, Yehuda, A History of the Holocaust. 
Revised Edition, p. 348. Frischer even submitted to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry translations of 
telegrams sent by the Swedish King to Horthy and his reply. See: AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 
1945, box 189, Frischer to Procházka (Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry), 13 October 1944.  
781 This intervention would have had to be conducted with the help of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross. AMZV, LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 190, Procházka for Ripka about Frischer’s 
interventions, 9 October 1944, Procházka summarized the notes made by Ducháček.  188 
the  intervention  via  the  Vatican  was  finally  approved  by  Ripka.
782 The  Foreign 
Ministry was afraid of the tricky situation that emerged when the ministry refused 
some of the interventions. Consequently, it prepared a summary of its activities on 
behalf of the Slovak Jews in October and November 1944. It was to serve as a proof 
that the ministry had tried to alleviate the plight of the threatened Czechs and Jews in 
Slovakia.
783  
Similarly, in mid January 1945, during a meeting with Kubowitzki, Ripka 
rejected  further  interventions  with  neutral  governments.  The  issue  was  the  non 
existence of their diplomatic relations with the Czechoslovak government in exile.
784 
The Minister, on the contrary, confirmed that he had contacted the Vatican prior to 
the  meeting.
785  The  Czechoslovak  government  wanted  to  re establish  mutual 
diplomatic relations with the Vatican and kept contacting it. The diplomatic ties with 
the other neutrals were not perceived to be as fundamental. The government wanted 
firstly  to  be  approached  by  the  neutrals  and  only  then  to  re establish  diplomatic 
relations. It was to document the re emergence of the Czechoslovak power in the 
European diplomatic world. 
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784 FDRPL, WRB Papers, box 36, John Gilbert Winant (US Ambassador to Britain) to the Secretary of 
State, 30 January 1945. Winant forwarded to the Secretary of State communication between Ripka 
and the US Ambassador to the Czechoslovak government in exile, Rudolf Schonfeld. Ripka informed 
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785 AJA, WJC Papers, D112/8, Note of Conversation between Frischer, Kubowitzki, and Ripka, 19 
January 1945. 189 
If  proposed  rescue  actions  were  inconsistent  with  the  administration’s 
political goals, they were simply dismissed. This was the case with negotiations that 
might have meant even indirect recognition of the Slovak government or might have 
risked complications in diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. On the contrary, 
in the case of the Vatican, the Slovak persecution of the Jews was utilised as another 
proof of the decadence of the Tiso regime. High politics and the Realpolitik posture 
of the major officials in the Czechoslovak ranks thus played a crucial role in the 
government’s  response  to  the  Holocaust.  But  we  need  now  to  enquire  into  the 
discourse  used  by  the  Czechoslovak  exiles  when  dealing  publicly  with  the 
persecution of the Jews. It will illustrate that, in fact, the exiles instrumentalised the 
persecution of the Jews in order to serve their political objectives. 
 
The Czechoslovak BBC Section and the Holocaust 
The exiles’ war time BBC broadcasts from Britain to occupied Europe should 
be seen as one of the non military weapons of the war, a propaganda tactical weapon 
to support the ideology and politics of this particular side of the conflict. One of the 
topics that inevitably came up was the persecution of civilians by the Germans and 
also the persecution of the Jews. Therefore the BBC broadcasting of the information 
needs  to be perceived  in  relation  to  the propaganda  war  effort  conducted by  the 
Allies as a whole.  
From a theoretical viewpoint, the broadcasts to occupied Europe were shaped 
by a mixture of competing influences: 
1)  The exile governments’ intention was to influence the population 
in the occupied homeland. Simultaneously, the broadcasts themselves were inspired 
by reports sent to London by underground groups. In the governments’ efforts to 
shape the public opinion at home, the governments reflected the content of messages 
forwarded to them by underground movements. 
2)  The content of the broadcasts regularly became public in London.
786 
The broadcasts dealing with Jewish issues were published by pro Jewish activists 
and journalists. The Czechoslovak exiles occasionally published the speeches in their 
                                                 
786 For example a broadcast by Juraj Slávik, 9 February 1944, published by Frischer (LMA, BoD, 
Acc3121/E/03/510). Or reaction of the British Jewish organizations to the broadcast by Ripka on 18 
September 1941, see We think of you. 190 
official publications as well.
787 We can suggest that some of these speeches were 
indeed intended to enhance the exiles’ image in the west. The minor Allies wanted to 
be seen as adherents of democratic ideals. They were a part of the war between the 
forces of light, as the Allies wanted to be seen and the dark, evil forces of the Nazis.  
3)  The Czechoslovak BBC Service, as was the case with other European 
services, was a part of the broader conglomeration of the BBC and thus under the 
surveillance of the British governmental agencies, particularly the Political Warfare 
Executive.  British  censorship  or  unwritten  laws  in  the  BBC  played  their  role  in 
decisions  about broadcasts.  The  British,  for  example,  did  not  allow  foreigners  to 
prepare the news services of the BBC.
788  The topics of the Czechoslovak political 
commentaries  during  the  war  were  decided  among  the  Czechoslovak  Foreign 
Ministry, the British Foreign Office and the individual speakers.
789 The following 
analysis is thus mostly focused on political commentaries that reveal attitudes unique 
to Czechoslovak broadcasting. Starting from 1943, the Czechoslovaks received 25 
minutes of ‘free time’ which was entirely at their disposal and which had to comply 
only with British political and military censorship.
790 The Czechoslovak broadcasting 
was  still  under  British  control,  but  only  in  the  cases  that  went  against  British 
interests.
791  
Information about the massacres and planned extermination of the Jews was 
presented  in  Czechoslovak  broadcasts,  frequently  based  on  directives  from  the 
chairmen  of  the  European  BBC  Services, Noel Newsome  and  Joel  E.  Ritchie.
792 
                                                 
787 Central European Observer, July 21, 1944, p. 226. ‘The Fate of European Jews: Oswieczim and 
Birkenau. A Document’. 
788 CNA,  MV L,  box  271,  2 82 4,  Proposal  for  Modification  of  the  Czechoslovak  Service,  25 
February 1943. 
789 CNA, MV L, box 271, 2 82 4. Minutes of the Advisory Council to the Czechoslovak broadcasting, 
17  December  1941. The  Czechoslovak  authorities  during  the  first  war  years  confirmed  that  their 
broadcasting was in fact ‘British’ and the Czechoslovaks had only limited powers to pursue their own 
policy. 
790 CNA,  MV L,  box  271,  2 82 4.  Minutes  of  the  new  Arrangements  of  the  Czechoslovak  BBC 
Service, 1943. This time was allocated for Czechoslovak political commentaries and also meant that 
the  government  had  to  abandon  completely  the  preparation  of  news  bulletins.  Also  available 
secondary  sources  suggest  that  there  was  ‘very  little  [British]  control’  over  the  Czechoslovak 
programme. Briggs, Asa, The War of Words. The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom. 
Volume III (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 470. 
791 HIA, Edward Táborský Collection, box 2, Táborský diary entry 12 September 1941, p. 574. The 
censorship did not allow the State Council Member, Vido, to mention that the parts of Slovakia that 
were ceded to Hungary  would be returned back to  Czechoslovakia.  Also all the broadcasts  were 
always translated into English, most probably for the British censorship see AČR, BBC 1939 1945. 
792 The chairmen dealt in accordance with instructions of the Political Warfare Executive, an agency 
linked with the British government. We can identify three main time periods when the European 
Services were asked to broadcast about the Jewish persecution: in late June 1942, when the British 191 
Indeed,  the  European  Services,  in  contrast  to  the  British  Home  Service,  aired 
information about the Holocaust more frequently.
793 Their broadcasts were also more 
detailed and the manner and tone were more open.
794  
Probably the most controversial question regarding the Allies’ responses to 
the Holocaust is: ‘When did they know?’ In the case of the BBC, it should rather be: 
‘When did they broadcast?’ But we must be careful; because of the propagandist 
nature of the broadcasts, the question should rather be: When did the broadcasts 
contain information that might be considered as publicizing the Nazis’ determination 
to  exterminate  the  Jews?  The  BBC  Czechoslovak  Service  first  mentioned 
Theresienstadt, as a ghetto for 90,000 Czech Jews, in early March 1942.
795 Poland, as 
a place where the Jews were being exterminated can be traced in all BBC services to 
the early summer of 1942, after the so called Bund Report arrived in London.
 796 The 
information about the massacres of Jews in the east occasionally appeared on the 
Czechoslovak BBC, but there was no systematic approach to the topic. Broadcasts 
were, for example, based on stories provided by the Czechoslovak soldiers fighting 
in  the  USSR.  One  speech,  aired  on  27  April  1944,  was  exceptional  due  to  its 
elaborate  style  and  very  moving  tone.  Pavel  Tigrid  dramatically  described  the 
execution of Jews behind the eastern front:  
 
Can any of the murderers of the Reich’s paradise escape? The 
17 year  old  girl  that  has  been  taken  to  the  execution  ground  only 
                                                                                                                                          
press published the so call Bund Report; in mid December 1942, at the time of the UN Declaration 
condemning the Nazi persecution of the Jews; and in the summer of 1944, when information about the 
fate  of  Hungarian  Jews  in  Auschwitz  reached  the  west.  Milland,  Gabriel,  ‘The  BBC  Hungarian 
Service and the Final Solution in Hungary’, in Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, Vol. 
18,  No.  3,  1998,  pp.  353 373.  See,  for  example:  Churchill  Archives  Centre,  Churchill  College, 
Cambridge (CAC), NERI, 1/1/2, Directives for 25 and 26 June 1942. 
793 About the British attitude, see BBC Written Archives, Caversham, Reading, R34/277, Minutes of 
the BBC Board Meeting, 19 November 1943; Anti Semitism: BBC Policy, 17 November 1943.  For 
the European Service policy, see CAC, NERI/3/4, The European Service, Principles and Purposes. 
Problems and Policy Points by N. F. Newsome (Director of European Broadcasts), 1 January 1943, As 
suggested by the head of the European Services, Noel F. Newsome: ‘We do seize the anti Semitic bull 
by the horns and do not hesitate to express indignation at the persecution of the Jews and our own 
recognition of the Jews as equals and brothers in every respect. Apart from this, we do not go into the 
question of the future of the Jews, Zionism, etc: etc:, treating them simply as citizens of Europe and of 
that country which they made their home’.   
794 Harris,  Jeremy  D.,  ‘Broadcasting  the  Massacres.  An  Analysis  of  the  BBC’s  Contemporary 
Coverage of the Holocaust’, Yad Vashem Studies XXV, 1996, pp. 74 and 78. 
795 Kárný, Miroslav, ‘Theresienstädter Dokumente’, p. 24, document 12, a note by the Prague Nazi 
intelligence service (Abhördienst), 3 March 1942. The BBC broadcast in July that already 50,000 
Czech Jews had been deported from ‘Czechoslovakia’, see ibid., p. 30, document 28, a note by the 
Prague Nazi intelligence service (Abhördienst), 15 July 1942. 
796 AČR, BBC 1939 1945, box 14, broadcast 26 June 1942, read by Josef Kodíček. The Czechoslovak 
BBC aired the details on 26 June 1942.  192 
because she was Jewish didn’t understand it; she wanted to live so 
badly! 
Rows and rows of Jews gathered from the whole district were 
pushed  into  a  deep  ditch.  The  S.S.  men  didn’t  give  their  rifles  a 
chance to get cool. They started shooting their victims already at 6 
o’clock. 
A row of people which contained Rája Reichová was led to the 
ditch. “I don’t want to die… I don’t want to, I’m not Jewish…” 
Rája was clinging on to life with a desperate cry. The head 
hangman gave his signal. The barrels of the automatics clicked. S.S. 
men  approached  Rája.  “And  what  are  you?”  —  the  corners  of  his 
mouth  contracted  into  a  contemptuous  smile.  Rája  possessed  too 
much  of  the  eastern  beauty  to  be  able  to  convince  the  cynical 
murderer. 
“And what are you?” — he repeated with a smile. 
“Russian,” sighed Rája. 
“Oh,  then,  you  can’t  die  with  the  Jews,”  grinned  the 
commander, turning to the S.S. men. He took Rája’s hand and led her 
away. 
“You will die nicely on your own!” 
He stepped back a few steps and with satisfaction he aimed at 
her. She looked into the black opening with eyes wide open, eyes that 
would not understand. 
Ta ta ta went the automatic and Rája collapsed. The S.S. men kicked 
the expiring body and shouted, “Take the carrion away!”
797  
 
Speeches with informative and humanitarian character which aired via the 
Czechoslovak BBC had two main features. Firstly there were regular warnings to the 
Germans in the Protectorate and to the Slovak government. Secondly, the speakers 
repeatedly asked Czech and Slovak people to help the Jews. After 17 December 1942 
several  Czechoslovak  warnings  were  issued.  They  were  usually  a  reaction  to 
information about new waves of persecution, including deportations, or to reports 
that the Nazis intended to destroy the concentration camps before the arrival of the 
Allies.
798  Furthermore,  the  broadcasts  aired  in  mid June  1944  were  a 
contemporaneous  attempt  to  save  lives.  On  14  June  1944,  Kopecký  sent  from 
Geneva  the  first  sections  of  ‘the  Auschwitz  Protocols’.
799 The  escapees,  among 
                                                 
797 AČR, BBC 1939 1945, Box 31, Pavel Tigrid 27 April 1944.  
798 Thus Minister Ripka appealed to the Czech doctors not to participate in the planned sterilization of 
the Jews in the Protectorate (5 January 1944) and Minister Slávik threatened the Slovak government 
on the eve of new registration of Jews in Slovakia (9 February 1944). On 22 October 1944, the 
Czechoslovak government in exile joined the British and  American governments in their  warning 
against the liquidation of remaining prisoners, though not specifically Jews, in Auschwitz. AČR, BBC 
1939 1945 box 29, Hubert Ripka 5 January 1944; Ibid., box 36 and 38, Pavel Tigrid 22 October 1944; 
LMA, BoD, Acc3121/E/03/510, Speech by Slávik, 9 February 1944,. 
799 For details see Kárný, Miroslav, ‘The Vrba and Wetzler Report’, pp. 553 568. 193 
others, warned of the imminent liquidation of the Theresienstadt Family Camp in 
Auschwitz Birkenau,  after  its  six month  quarantine  on  20  June  1944.  The 
government’s immediate reaction was a broadcast to the Protectorate. The Germans 
were  threatened  with  retribution  in  the  event  that the  liquidation  of  these people 
would  be  carried  out  and  the  Czechoslovak  people  were  asked  to  help  the  Jews 
wherever possible.
800 The Nazis gassed most of the people remaining in the Family 
Camp in July 1944, but several thousand of them had by then been sent to labour 
camps in Germany. The BBC broadcasting did not play any decisive role in the Nazi 
decision  not  to  murder  all  the  prisoners.  This  notwithstanding,  it  was  still  an 
important case of the Czechoslovak BBC broadcasting being used with the intention 
of saving the lives of Jews.
 801  
The speeches presented in this section clearly had a humanitarian impulse. 
However, when we enquire more into the purposes of the political commentaries 
dealing with Jewish issues, we can find a broader dimension. The Czechoslovaks 
needed to maintain the image of decent people, not affected by Nazi anti Semitism 
and here, the BBC broadcasts serve the purpose well.  
When  dealing  with  the  Czechoslovak  government’s  responses  to  the 
Holocaust, we have to first of all differentiate between events that took place in the 
occupied  Protectorate  of  Bohemia  and  Moravia  and  those  that  took  place  in 
independent  Slovakia.  The  exiles’  propaganda  faced  considerable  obstacles  when 
dealing with the Czech authorities in the occupied western parts of the Republic. 
State  President  Hácha  had  already  been  lawfully  elected  to  his  office  before  the 
occupation. He and the Prime Minister Alois Eliáš were, during the first war years, in 
contact with the underground movement and with Beneš. Even later, when Hácha 
and  the  government  were  repeatedly  attacking  the  exiles,  Ripka,  the  head  of  the 
exiles’ propaganda, advised restraint when condemning Hácha. It was not advisable, 
according to the Minister, to attack the Protectorate authorities on a general level.
802 
                                                 
800 Pavel Schönfeld (Tigrid) read out the warning for several days, starting 15 June. See Miroslav 
Kárný, ‘Obóz familijny w Brzezinke (BIIb) dla Zidów z getta Theresienstadt’, pp. 209f.; Toman Brod, 
‘Zamyšlení nad účelem rodinného tábora a nad osudy uvězněných chlapců’, in Miroslav Kárný – 
Vojtěch  Blodig  –  Margita  Kárná  (eds.),  Terezínský  rodinný  tábor  v Osvětimi Birkenau  (Praha: 
Terezínská  Iniciativa  –  Melantrich,  1994),  pp.  66 67;  AÚTGM,  Klecanda  Collection,  folder  177. 
Schönfeld was later well known under the name Pavel Tigrid.  
801 Kárný, Miroslav, ‘The Vrba and Wetzler Report’, p. 559; Brod, Toman, ‘Zamyšlení nad účelem 
rodinného  tábora  a  nad  osudy  uvězněných  chlapců’,  pp.  66 67;  Kulka,  Otto  Dov,  ‘Ghetto  in  an 
Annihilation Camp. Jewish Social History in the Holocaust Period and its Ultimate Limits’, pp. 315 
330. 
802 CNA, MV L, box 271, 2 82 4, minutes of the Advisory Council to the Czechoslovak broadcasting, 194 
For international reasons, Hácha and the government were to be condemned only 
based on specific actions they took. The situation concerning the Slovak government 
was different. Tiso and Tuka were to be attacked on all fronts. It was also only in 
connection  with  Slovakia  that  the  Advisory  committee  of  the  Czechoslovak 
broadcasting  recommended  raising  issues  of  Jewish  persecution  via  the  BBC.
803 
Broadcasts to Slovakia hence followed different objectives and will be dealt with 
separately. 
 
Broadcasts to the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia 
When broadcasting to the Protectorate, the Czechoslovak exiles repeatedly 
asked  Czech  people  to  offer  help  to  the  Jews  whenever  possible.  However,  the 
influence of home underground reports which dealt negatively with political issues 
connected  with  the  Jews  made  their  mark.  Help  to  the Jews  was  not necessarily 
presented as a fundamental, altruistic deed. The exile Minister of Justice, Stránský, 
addressed people at home on the eve of the birthday of the late President Tomáš 
Garrigue Masaryk in the following manner: 
 
all the help and relief that you grant them will be for your honour and 
glory in the world. And it will be put to the credit also of our own 
national  cause.  [Tomáš  Garrigue]  Masaryk’s  world  popularity  from 
which our cause profited so abundantly during the First World War 
was  originally  founded  by  the  valiant  campaign  against  [...]  ritual 
superstition  and  against  the  injustice  committed  against  a  single 
insignificant and poor Jewish fellow citizen. In this way too, therefore 
help in whatever way you can, help and you will be helped.
804  
 
As presented, help to the Jews was in the interest of the Czechs. The belief in 
Jewish influence in world diplomacy was behind Stránský’s broadcast.
805 The exiles 
believed that the world was following the treatment of the Jews by the Czechoslovak 
people. The exiles considered it important to explain to the Czechs why they were 
supposed to help the Jews. The Czechoslovak resistance based their political struggle 
                                                                                                                                          
9 July 1942.  
803 Ibid. 
804 AČR, BBC 1939 1945, box 19, Jaroslav Stránský 6 March 1943. The speech started: ‘Among you 
alone  the  Germans  have  tortured  and  tortured  to  death  tens  of  thousands  of  these  human  beings 
without the merest semblance of any guilt, simply because they were born of Jewish fathers and 
mothers   on the European continent these victims go into millions. […] Not many of the castaways 
from this wretched ship have remained among you.’ 
805 For a description of these concerns, see for example: CNA, MV – L, box 255, file 2 63 2, report by 
the Association of Czech Jews 15 May 1942.  195 
during the war on sustaining the notion of Czech exceptionality. Helping the Jews in 
the Protectorate was consequently to strengthen the notion and thus to support the 
Czechoslovak resistance movement as such.  
We can characterise other features of the broadcasts to the Protectorate using 
an analysis of one particular address. On 17 December 1942, Ripka commented on 
the UN Declaration acknowledging the Allies’ awareness of the Nazi extermination 
campaign  against  the  Jews.  The  broadcast  started  with  a  detailed  description  of 
crimes committed against the Jews. It furthermore provided estimates of the numbers 
of Jews who had already been murdered by the Nazis: 
 
The  joint  declaration  of  the  Governments  of  the  United  Nations 
which you have just heard is only a moderate expression of the horror 
and  disgust  with  which  civilised  mankind  is  moved  to day.  For  the 
horrors committed against the Jewish population of Europe cannot be 
portrayed  in  an  official  declaration.  The  history  of  mankind  is  not 
without  its  shadows.  But  what  is  now  being  carried  out  by  Hitler's 
regime  against  innocent  and  defenceless  people,  this  slaughter  that 
goes into hundreds of thousands and perhaps millions, this torture by 
hunger, extermination by gas and electric current, these massacres of 
old  men,  women,  invalids  and  children,  are  the  most  shameful 
defilement  of  the  name  of  man.  It  has  been  reserved  for  Hitlerite 
Germany to win this darkest record of vileness and barbarism. […] 
[T]he present anti Jewish madness is nothing but the expression of a 
pathological demon who is driven to fury by the very conception of 
humanity.  In  anti Jewish massacres on this scale there is, it is true, 
method  but  there  no  longer  appears  from  them  any  normal  human 
feeling. Only one thing is clearly evident in them: the fear of defeat of 
Hitler and his regime.
806  
 
It thus cannot be claimed that the persecution of the Jews was overlooked by 
the Voice of the Free Republic. Very detailed information was indeed broadcast, 
especially at the time of the UN Declaration.
 807 Nonetheless, the issue was the way 
in  which  the  information  was  commented  on.  Specifically,  it  was  the  German 
persecution of Czechs which played the dominant role. In December 1942, the exiles, 
for example, broadcast: ‘Hecatombs of death are covering the Czech land, currents of 
blood are irrigating it day after day.’
808 Even when broadcasting about the situation 
of Jews in occupied Europe, the situation of other nations was not to be forgotten.
809 
                                                 
806 AČR, BBC 1939 1945, box 17, Hubert Ripka, 17 December 1942. 
807 See AČR, BBC 1939 1945, box 17. 
808 AČR, BBC 1939 1945, box 17, broadcast on 11 December 1942, 6.45pm. 
809 AČR,  BBC  1939 1945,  box  17, broadcast  on  15  December  1942,  6.45pm.  ‘[A]fter  Jews  (and 
together with them), Poles, Russians, Czechs, Yugoslavs will be butchered. The Nordic consciousness 196 
The Nazi campaign against the Jews, though stressed as a unique crime, was still 
presented only as a prelude to the annihilation of other nations. Sometimes the Jews 
were  even  relegated  to  the  background:  ‘The  Germans  have  on  their  road  to 
domination  through  Europe  murdered  millions  of  innocent  people,  Slavs, 
Frenchmen,  Belgians,  Greeks,  Norwegians,  and  Jews.’
810 Ripka  returned  to  the 
theme in his broadcast on 17 December 1942: 
 
The German nation, already burdened by so much guilt, is to share in a 
crime  which  history  will  never  be  able  to  forget.  And  all  that  is  in 
Hitler’s reach is to share his fate of confusion, destruction, death. The 
massacres of the Jews are only a dress rehearsal for massacres of the 
other enslaved nations. Some of them, such as the Czechoslovak nation, 
he still needs. But when his situation is still more hopeless he will spare 
none  who  are  within  the  reach  of  his  power.  This  is  the  political 
importance of the campaign of extermination against the Jews and of this 
you must be aware.
811 
 
Hence we can see that the Czechoslovaks’ perception of the Nazi occupation 
of Czechoslovakia resulted in the stress being put on the ‘political importance’ of the 
Nazi  extermination  of  the  Jews.  It  was  always  the  interest  of  the  nation,  of  the 
Republic, that counted in the first place. An evaluation of the exiles’ perception of 
priorities hence explains why some important features of the Jewish persecution did 
not  receive  considerable  attention  via  the  Czechoslovak  BBC.  The  wave  of 
deportations from the Protectorate in mid October 1941 coincided with the escalation 
of  the  persecution  of  Czechs  after  Heydrich’s  arrival  in  Prague.  The  resistance 
leaders, including Prime Minister Eliáš, were imprisoned, hundreds of people were 
shot  and  martial  law  was  introduced  in  the  Protectorate.  These  events  of  late 
September and October 1941 received substantial coverage by the BBC. This was 
not the case with the first deportations of the Jews.
 812 The situation repeated itself in 
June 1942. The so called Bund report arrived in London exactly at the time when the 
assassination  of  Heydrich  was  followed  by  brutal  persecution  of  Czechs  and  the 
destruction of Lidice. The Polish BBC service, for example, brought the Bund report 
to the public on 2 June 1942, whereas the Czechs, together with the other BBC 
                                                                                                                                          
is supposed to steel itself with the view of the murder of Jews, not to shake when the turn of the others 
will come.’ 
810 AČR,  BBC  1939 1945,  box  33,  broadcast  by  Ivan  Petruščák,  25  June  1944.  Petruščák  was  a 
member of the Czechoslovak State Council in London. 
811 AČR, BBC 1939 1945, box 17, broadcast by Hubert Ripka 17 December 1942.  
812 AČR, BBC 1939 1945, box 9, broadcasts from October 1941. 197 
Services, only in late June.
813 Of significance for the comparison of persecutions of 
Czechs and Jews was a speech planned by Minister Slávik. A talk depicting the 
persecution of Slovak Jews was originally planned to air on 11 June 1942. It was 
nevertheless  postponed  for  four  days,  most  probably  because  of  the  event  of 
Lidice.
814  
There is moreover another feature of Ripka’s  December 1942 speech  that 
needs to be contextualized. Anti Semitism was presented as something German, or 
Nazi, but  definitely  not  Czech;  as  something  that  could  not  appeal  to  the  Czech 
people.  Czechoslovak  BBC  speakers  regularly  distanced  Czechs  from  Nazi  anti 
Semitism. These were not pleas to the Czech people to avoid collaboration in the 
persecution  of  the  Jews.  Rather  they  were  words  of  self assurance,  of  self 
congratulation with regard to decency. And the role of Czech collaborators in the 
‘Final Solution’ was scarcely mentioned and not emphasised at all.
815 Even Czech 
fascists  could  not  cast  doubt  on  the  Czechs  as  a  whole.  These  messages  were 
undoubtedly directed to the audiences in the west as well as to the occupied country: 
 
Vain have been Hitler’s attempts to infect with the spiritual poison 
the nations which he has enslaved. The French, Dutch, Polish peoples, 
and among the first also the Czech people, have shown themselves to 
be immune against the plague which was to seize them and then disrupt 
them. The [e]scutcheon of the Czech people is pure and nothing has 
happened on Czech initiative which might dishonour the good name of 
the Czechs.  
[…] 
Czechoslovak people: the Czechoslovak Government has signed the 
declaration  of  the  United  Nations  in  the  knowledge  that  it  is  thus 
defending  not  only  the  cause  of  humanity  and  justice  but  [in]  the 
sincerest interests of the Czechoslovak nation. It is convinced that it is 
thus expressing your innermost conviction. [...] It has many times been 
stressed in the Nazi programme that the aim of Hitlerism is to eradicate 
the Czechoslovak nation from Central Europe. […] [R]realise that the 
future of the Czechoslovak nation is safeguarded only by loyalty to the 
ideals  of  the  President Liberator  [Masaryk]  and  by  unshakeable 
solidarity with all suffering and fighting nations. 
                                                 
813 Bauer, Yehuda, ‘When Did They Know?’, p. 53. The Czechs broadcast the information only after 
the report was published by British press and was also included among the directives of the European 
Service. See CAC, NERI, 1/1/2, BBC European Division directives for 25, 26, 27 and 30 June 1942. 
814 AČR, BBC 1939 1945, box 14, Juraj Slávik broadcast 15 June 1942 (originally was supposed to be 
aired on 11 June 1942). One source even suggests that the speech was originally planned for 1 June 
1942. The assassination of Heydrich took place on 27 May 1942 and this might be the reason for the 
postponement of the broadcast to 11 June and later to 15 June. See HIA, Juraj Slávik Papers, 18:4. 
815 AÚTGM, Klecanda Collection, file 177, broadcast 5 December 1944 about Alois Kříž, an ardent 
anti Semitic broadcaster in the Protectorate. 198 
And solidarity with the suffering, tortured and slaughtered Jews is 
today a sacred duty of every decent man. We, obedient to the voice of 
our national tradition, have always fulfilled this duty and shall continue 
to fulfil it to the end with fervency of heart and with the profoundest 
inspiration of soul.
816 
 
Broadcasts  to  the  Protectorate  depicting  the  Nazi  persecution  of  the  Jews 
followed the same pattern. The description of concrete events was juxtaposed with a 
link  to  the  fate  of  other  nations  and  finally  concluded  by  stressing  Czech  non 
involvement in the extermination campaign. For example, on 16 July 1944, Ripka 
broadcast a comprehensive report about the Auschwitz Protocols. The Minister in his 
speech  summarized  the  most  important  facts,  describing  in  detail  the  killing 
machinery of the Auschwitz complex.
817 However, he refrained from mentioning the 
overall number of Jews killed in the camp complex of Auschwitz, one of the most 
important features of the report.
818 The second part of the talk made a call to the 
Czech  people,  by  showing  them  a  broader  dimension  of  the  Nazi  policy.
819 The 
persecution of Jews was never presented as possessing its own singularity. But the 
situation in connection with the Jewish persecution in Slovakia was different. The 
anti Semitism of the Slovak government played a prominent part in Czechoslovak 
BBC broadcasts.   
 
Political intentions behind broadcasting to Slovakia 
Slovakia was the first of the German satellites voluntarily to start deporting 
its Jews to Nazi Poland.
820 This was done intentionally and without any significant 
German  pressure.
821 The  Czechoslovak  exiled  politicians  mentioned  the  Jewish 
                                                 
816 AČR, BBC 1939 1945, box 17, broadcast by Hubert Ripka 17 December 1942. 
817 AČR, BBC 1939 1945, box 34, broadcast by Ripka 16 July 1944. 
818 TNA, FO 371/42809, Ripka to the British Ambassador Phillip Nichols, 4 July 1944. Ripka in this 
letter admitted his view that the overall number of Jews killed in Auschwitz, as stated in the report, 
might be exaggerated. It might be that the number of 1,765,000 murdered Jews was seen by the 
Minister as unrealistic and hence he avoided mentioning it in the broadcast.  
819 AČR, BBC 1939 1945, box 34, broadcast by Ripka 16 July 1944. 
820 For the historiography on the deportations from Slovakia see: Tönsmeyer, Tatjana, Das Dritte 
Reich und die Slowakei 1939 1945. Politischer Alltag zwischen Kooperation und Eigensinn; Lipscher, 
Ladislav, Židia v slovenskom štáte 1939 1945; Rothkirchen, Livia, The Destruction of Slovak Jewry. A 
Documentary History. Hilberg, Raul, Die Vernichtung der europäischen Juden (Frankfurt am Main: 
Fischer,  1999),  pp.  766 794.  Tragédia  slovenských  Židov.  Materiály  z  medzinárodného  sympózia, 
Banská Bystrica 25. 27. marca 1992 (Banská Bystrica: Datei, 1992). 
821 See  Tönsmeyer,  Tatjana,  Das  Dritte  Reich  und  die  Slowakei  1939 1945.  Politischer  Alltag 
zwischen Kooperation und Eigensinn, p. 148; Jelinek: Jelinek, Yeshayahu, ‘The “Final Solution” – 
The Slovak Version’, p. 471; ‘The Holocaust and the Internal Policies of the Nazi Satellites in Eastern 
Europe: A Comparative Study’, p. 295. 199 
situation in Slovakia in their official discourse more often than they did in case of the 
Protectorate. There were several reasons behind this decision:  
First, the exile government saw the possibility of attacking the ‘treacherous’ 
Slovak government on humanitarian grounds.  
Second,  as  documented,  in  contrast  to  the  Bohemian  lands,  anti Semitic 
tendencies had been significant in Slovakia even before the war.
822 A considerable 
part  of  the  Slovak  population  collaborated  with  their  government  in  the  ‘Final 
Solution’. The Tiso Tuka government cleansing of Jews from Slovak society was in 
many cases approved of by Slovak people and even by oppositional forces.
823  The 
Slovak  population  changed  their  view  of  the  persecution  of  the  Jews  only  when 
confronted with the reality of the deportations in 1942, but the Czechoslovak exiles 
did not possess any knowledge of this change.
 824 Moreover, as already documented, 
this development in the Slovaks’ attitude did not mean that they wanted the Jews to 
come back.
825 The Slovak government’s persecution of the Jews and the attitude of 
the Slovak population threatened the reputation of Slovaks in the world.
826 The story 
in fact might have harmed the image of Czechoslovaks as a whole.
827 According to 
the exiles, Slovaks, as well as Czechs should be perceived as decent people by the 
public abroad. 
3) There was an international implication in the exile’s considerations when 
deciding about broadcasts to Slovakia. During a government session in June 1943, 
Minister  Slávik presented  a  report  received  from  the  Slovak  underground.
828 The 
account suggested that the Jews in Slovakia supported Hungarian irredentism. They 
                                                 
822 For historiography see Fatranová, Gila, ‘Historický pohľad na vzťahy slovenského a židovského 
obyvateľstva’, in Acta Judaica Slovaca, Vol. 4, 1998, pp. 9 37; Nižnanský, Eduard, Holokaust na 
Slovensku 7. Vzťah slovenskej majority a židovskej minority (náčrt problému). Dokumenty; Kamenec, 
Ivan, ‘Changes in the Attitude of the Slovak Population to the So Called “Solution to the Jewish 
Question” During the Period 1938 1945’, pp. 327 338. 
823 CNA, AHR, 1 50 56c, Report from Slovakia, 26 June 1944 (sent 23 June 1944). Tóth, Dezider 
(ed.), Zápisky generála Rudolfa Viesta. (Exil 1939 1944), p. 200, the Viest diary entry 22 April 1943. 
824 About the change among the Slovaks see Kamenec, Ivan, ‘Changes in the Attitude of the Slovak 
Population to the So Called “Solution to the Jewish Question” During the Period 1938 1945’, pp. 
334 6. 
825 The reports sent to London confirmed that the Slovak population did not want to allow the Jews to 
regain their pre war social status that had been, in their opinion, unjustified and disproportionate, see 
CNA,  AHR,  1 50 56c,  Report  from  Slovakia,  26  June  1944;  similar  remarks  were  made  by  the 
Communist member of the Slovak National Council, Laco Novomeský, during his stay in London in 
October 1944 see Prečan, Vilém, ‘Delegace Slovenské národní rady v Londýně (říjen – listopad 1944). 
Nové dokumenty’, pp. 221 2. 
826 HIA, Edward Táborský Papers, box 3, Beneš’s message to Slovakia, 20 March 1943. 
827 As stated by Viktor Fischl, a Foreign Ministry official, the British did not differentiate between 
Czechs and Slovaks. CNA, AHR, 1 46 6 10, a note by Viktor Fischl, 5 June 1942. 
828 AÚTGM, EB II, box 182, minutes of the Czechoslovak government session, 25 June 1943. 200 
were allegedly, in cooperation with the Jews in the United States, influencing the 
Americans to support the Hungarian international position in post war negotiations 
(southern  Slovakia  was  occupied  by  Hungary  in  November  1938).  The  Slovak 
government’s persecution of the Jews and their relative security in Hungary was to 
play a role in this development.
829 Slávik did not accept the existence of the Jewish 
pro Hungarian lobby, but he thought that it would be important, for international 
purposes, to show that the Hungarians’ accusations were baseless. He highlighted the 
importance of documenting the Slovak people’s decency and non involvement in the 
crimes committed by the quisling government.
830  
In  his  BBC  broadcast  on  18  December  1942,  which  was  well  before  the 
discussed meeting of the government, Slávik noted that the messages coming from 
Slovakia advised the exiles to avoid mentioning Jewish persecution when addressing 
the home audience.
831 He nevertheless continued as follows:  
we know that the Slovak people do not agree  and that they could 
never  approve  this  fury  and  murder.  Evangelical  bishops  resolutely 
protested against the brutal fury against Jews and the Slovak people 
were not only showing respect, but were also helping to the victims of 
this bloody regime.
832  
 
Slávik hence introduced the situation in Slovakia as if the people there, while 
not wanting to hear about the Jews, still did not participate in their persecution. They 
were,  in  fact,  helping  the  Jews.  The  white washing  of  the  Slovak  people,  this 
maintaining  of  the  positive  Czechoslovak  image,  was  the  main  feature  of  the 
broadcasts directed to Slovakia.  In June 1942, at the peak of the deportations of 
Slovak Jews to Poland, Slávik addressed the audience in Slovakia: 
 
Slovak  kinsmen,  the  crimes  of  your  traitors  and  unworthy  leaders 
must appear in a quite new and even more frightful light. [...] [T]he 
                                                 
829 Ibid. 
830 Ibid. Unfortunately, it was not completely correct. The first part of Slovak anti Jewish policy, the 
aryanization and even the beginning of the deportations to Poland, were supported by a large segment 
of Slovak population. It had changed in 1942, when the truth about the situation in Poland reached 
Slovakia and also thanks to the changing war situation (See: Lipscher, Ladislav, Židia v slovenskom 
štáte 1939 1945, p. 151; Jelinek, Yeshayahu, ‘The Vatican, the Catholic Church, the Catholics and the 
Persecution of the Jews During the Second World War: the case of  Slovakia, in Bela Vago and 
George L. Mosse (eds.), Jews and non Jews in Eastern Europe 1918 1945 (New York and Toronto: 
John Wiley and Sons – Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1974), pp. 230 231) 
831 Also the report read by Slávik warned the exiles not to deal with Jewish issues when addressing 
people in Slovakia. AÚTGM, EB II, box 182, minutes of the Czechoslovak government session, 25 
June 1943. 
832 HIA, Juraj Slávik Papers, box 29, file 3, B.B.C. Special late night Czechoslovak News. By dr. Juraj 
Slávik and dr. Ivo Ducháček, 18 December 1942.  My translation. 201 
God fearing Slovak people will avenge its shame and disgrace, […] it 
will  make  order  with  the  traitors  and  diabolic  evil doers  […].  The 
whole world is shocked at the cruelty and the un Christian vengeful 
rage with which the executioners of Mach and Tuka are running amok. 
Revenge  and  hate  are  their  law.  And  at  the  same  time,  disgusting 
Pharisees, they boast of their Christianity. You yourselves see every 
day how they are shaming and distorting the doctrine of Christ. Only 
look at what they are doing to the Jews. Sano Mach publicly boasts that 
by September he will drive 90,000 Jews from Slovakia. He envies the 
dubious  fame  of  Herod.  In  cruelty  and  mercilessness  he  wishes  to 
surpass  his  master,  the  monster  Hitler.  He  is  a  disgusting  vengeful 
lackey who wishes to curry favour with his commander and master. He 
even boasts, moreover, that he is doing it without pressure and at the 
commandment  of  his  own  black  soul.  The  newspapers  of  a  neutral 
country which trembles before the Nazi danger, Sweden, venture to 
give  expression  to  their  horrors  at  the  fact  that  in  no  country,  not 
excluding even Nazi Germany, is the Jewish question settled in such an 
inhuman fashion as in Slovakia.
833 
 
Slávik  intentionally  differentiated  between  the  actions  conducted  by  the 
Slovak government and the sentiments of ordinary Slovaks.
 834  The speakers on the 
BBC  and  in  public  appearances  in  London  dissociated  the  ‘God fearing  Slovak 
people’
835 and the ‘Slovak Patriots’
836 from the ‘so called President Tiso’
837 and ‘the 
Slovak  Quislings’.
838 The  rulers  in  Slovakia  were  foreign  to  their  own  national 
tradition  and  to  Christianity  which  they  claimed  to  represent.  Whilst  the  Slovak 
population’s  cooperation  in  the  ‘Final  Solution’  did  not  find  its  way  into  the 
broadcasts, the Tiso government’s persecution of the Jews was criticised regularly.  
Those attacks furthermore served as another – diplomatic – weapon in the 
exiles’  fight  for  new  Czechoslovakia.    The  propaganda  of  the  exile  government 
declared that after the reestablishment of the Czechoslovak Republic, and after the 
inclusion of Slovakia to the common state, the democratic spirit would rule again in 
the whole country: 
 
                                                 
833 AČR, BBC 1939 1945, box 14, Juraj Slávik broadcast 15 June 1942 (originally was supposed to be 
aired on 11 June 1942),. 
834 For another example consult the BBC broadcast by Msgr. Pavel Macháček, the chairman of the 
Czechoslovak State Council, on 31 August 1942, see: Daily News Bulletin (JTA), 3 September 1942. 
The newspaper cutting is from USA, Joseph Hertz Papers, MS 175, 78/4. 
835 Daily News Bulletin (JTA), 17 June 1942. The newspaper cutting is from: USA, Joseph Hertz 
Papers, MS 175, 78/4, speech by Juraj Slávik.  
836 The Jewish Bulletin, July 1942, p. 4. ‘The Martyrdom of Slovak Jewry. 
837 Slávik, Juraj, ‘The Jews in Nazi Slovakia’, In Di Vochnzaitung (The Jewish Weekly), 27 March 
1942.  
838 ‘Reception to Czech and French Ministers’, In Di Vochnzaitung (The Jewish Weekly), 9 April 1943. 202 
The Slovak people has never been inhuman and cruel and it has 
always had a profound faith in God.  
[…] Again we shall be guided not by the example of Nero and 
Caligula, not by the laws of Hitler and Mach, but by Christ’s love 
and by the humanist principles of Masaryk. Czechoslovak unity will 
be  further  consolidated  and  cemented  by  the  inhuman  bestialities, 
unexampled  in  history,  that  are  being  committed  by  the  monsters 
who  murder  even  women  and  children.  The  brotherhood  of  the 
Czechs and Slovaks will again be the foundation of a happy life for 
future free generations.
839 
 
The main theme of these proclamations was unwavering Czech and Slovak 
adherence to the ‘myth’ of Masaryk democracy.  
 
 
Image no. 7: Juraj Slávik (R) (Copyright LIFE.com)
840 
 
Conclusion 
The Czechoslovak government in exile was sufficiently informed about the 
deportations of Jews from the Protectorate and Slovakia to Poland. Although the 
administration lacked detailed intelligence about the fate of the Jews in the east, there 
was  little  doubt  that  the  Jews  had  to  endure  hardship  incomparable  to  anything 
known before. The government thus approached the Allies with rescue proposals, 
contributed to the relief parcel scheme, published material about the Jewish plight 
and made broadcasts to the occupied homeland.  
                                                 
839 AČR, BBC 1939 1945, box 14, Juraj Slávik broadcast 15 June 1942 (originally was supposed to 
be aired on 11 June 1942).  
840 www.life.com 203 
Nevertheless, whilst it is certainly correct that the Czechoslovak government 
was unable to secure any rescue action on its own, officials rarely urged the Allies to 
do so and were content just with forwarding rescue and relief proposals. Moreover, 
initiations  of  the  interventions  were  dependent  on  pro Jewish  activists  and  their 
implementation  was  first  of  all  considered  in  terms  of  Czechoslovak  diplomatic 
objectives. The reason was not a lack of interest on the part of the involved officials, 
but their perception of the government’s priorities.
841 Shortly after the war, with all 
the extermination centres liberated and the murderous Nazi deeds revealed to the 
world, the Chancellery of Beneš rejected the idea that the Jews were the first and 
main  targets  of  the  Nazis.  It  was  indeed  the  Czechoslovak  Republic  and  its 
democracy that was attacked in the first place.
842  
Michael  Marrus  rightly  suggests  that  we  should  try  to  comprehend  the 
conduct of a bystander ‘by making a painstaking effort to enter into their minds and 
sensibilities’.
843 The analysis of the government’s responses to the Holocaust further 
confirms the conclusions of the previous chapters. Munich and the Ides of March 
meant a severe blow to the Czechoslovak nation. The first and foremost objective of 
the Czechoslovak exiles’ war was the reestablishment of an independent Republic. 
Beneš  was  willing  to  risk  horrific  retribution,  after  the  planned  assassination  of 
Heydrich, to document the suffering and resistance of the Czech population. The 
territorial  integrity  of  the  liberated  Czechoslovak  Republic  and  the  return  of  the 
government back to the country were of the highest importance on Beneš’s political 
agenda.  Beneš’s  position  among  Allied  politicians,  but  also  vis à vis  the  home 
resistance movement, was insecure for a very long time. The exiles thus respected 
the  diplomatic  positions  adopted  by  the  major  Allies  and  were  concerned  about 
conducting  any  intervention  that might  have  severed  mutual  diplomatic  relations, 
especially with the Soviets. The future of Central Europe was decided without the 
exile  governments  and  without  knowledge  of  the  Allied  negotiations  that  were 
conducted between 1943 and 1945. The example of the western Polish government, 
                                                 
841 AMZV, LA   Confidential, 1939 1945, box 190. Procházka to Ripka, 31 October 1944. When 
describing the government’s reaction to Frischer’s proposals concerning intervention on behalf of 
Slovak  Jews  in  the  autumn  of  1944,  Procházka  (Foreign  Ministry  official)  wrote:  ‘I  draw  Your 
[Ripka’s] attention to this fact [that Slovak Jews have been already deported], because it may be 
possible that the government will be questioned, why it did not push [the interventions] through more 
strongly. However, I am not sure if we could have done more’. My translation. 
842 AKPR, D17375/46, a note by the Chancellery of the President of the Republic for the Ministry of 
Interior, 13 September 1946 (and 8 October 1946). 
843 Marrus, Michael R., The Holocaust in History, p. 157. 204 
whose  political  fate  was  decided  unilaterally  in  Moscow,  was  a  cautionary  one. 
Unfortunately for the Jews, this was exactly the time when the main rescue actions 
were being discussed. The Jews were perceived as a particularistic group and their 
demands could not be risked in cases when Czechoslovak national interests might 
have been put in peril.  
The  case  study  of  the  BBC broadcasts  documents  that  the  speeches  were 
influenced  by  complex  factors.  The  reports  sent  by  the  home  underground 
movements and the exiles’ diplomatic consideration changed the rules of the game. 
The Czechoslovak government was not indifferent to the Jewish plight. Yet its public 
treatment of the Holocaust needs to be perceived as an effort to maintain the image 
of Czechoslovak decency. The Czechoslovaks wanted to be seen as a democratic 
nation. The people in the Bohemian lands and in Slovakia were therefore distanced 
from the anti Jewish persecution conducted by the Nazis and the Slovak government. 
In the case of the Slovaks, their record was indeed whitewashed in order not to harm 
the Czechoslovak diplomatic struggle abroad.  
The  exiles’  treatment  of  the  Jewish  persecution  was  not  an  intentional 
downplaying  of  the  Nazi  extermination  campaign.  The  main  factor  was  their 
perception of priorities, where the Nazi attack on the Republic was regarded as the 
main  feature  of  the  war.  Political  considerations  aside,  the  exile  Czechoslovaks’ 
broadcast  the  persecution  of  the  Jews  on  several  occasions.  That  most  of  the 
broadcasts carried broader messages, which regularly overshadowed the presented 
facts  about  the  Jews,  was  the  result  of  the many  anxieties  of  the  exiles  in  these 
difficult and fast changing years.  
With the coming of the end of the war and in the shadow of the emerging 
Holocaust, the exiles and pro Jewish activists returned to the negotiations of the post 
war position of the Jews in Czechoslovakia. It became apparent that Czechoslovak 
radical nationalism did not disappear with the progress of the war. On the contrary, 
the national homogenization of Czechoslovakia became one of the exiles’ objectives 
in  their  struggle  for  a  better  post war  order.  Hence  the  issue  of  how  the  Jewish 
position  in  liberated  Czechoslovakia  was  prepared  during  the  war  needs  to  be 
addressed now. 
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CHAPTER 4: CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENTS AND THE JEWS IN POST 
WAR CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
 
 
There  will  be  no  more 
minorities, Brother Perlzweig 
   
Jan Masaryk (1944)
844 
 
 
Introduction 
At  the  beginning  of  1944,  Arnošt  Frischer  of  the  Czechoslovak  State  Council 
prepared a Memorial Treatise about the issues affecting the life of Czechoslovak 
Jews with the coming liberation of the Republic.
845  Frischer highlighted the most 
pressing themes and presented the Treatise to President Beneš. In turn, the Treatise 
was to initiate a discussion about the position of Jews in post war Czechoslovakia. It 
presented the viewpoint of the official national Jewish representative in the exile 
administration. However, Frischer existed as a kind of a maverick among the exiles; 
his political contacts with his home organization, the National Jewish Council, were 
tense.
846 Especially Frischer and Zelmanovits, the head of the Council, differed in 
their perception of the Jewish position in liberated Czechoslovakia.
847 The Treatise 
was prepared personally by Frischer and ought to be considered as his individual 
initiative. 
Yet  its  importance  was  emphasised  by  Frischer’s  status  as  the  official 
representative of Jews in the Czechoslovak parliament during the war. Additionally, 
in September 1945, he became the chairman of the Council of the Jewish Religious 
Congregations in Bohemia and Moravia, an umbrella Jewish organization in post 
war historical lands.
848 In fact, Frischer was the only one who presented such an 
elaborate analysis of the Jewish position in Czechoslovakia. His views should thus be 
at the centre of our analysis of the Czechoslovak policy towards the Jews. Hence this 
                                                 
844 AJA, WJC Papers, H98/3, Perlzweig to the Office Committee about his meeting with Masaryk, 16 
May 1944. 
845 AÚTGM, Edvard Beneš Papers – II, box 157, file 1557, Memorial Treatise by Arnošt Frischer, 2 
March 1944.  
846 The biggest conflict occurred in April 1944, see: CZA, 280/5, Rosenberg and Platzek to Frischer, 
18 April 1944 and Minutes of the National Jewish Council meeting, 17 April 1944. 
847 Frischer very often acted without any consultation with the National Jewish Council. See: CZA, 
A280/5, Minutes of the National Jewish Council meeting on 9 May 1944.  
848 For  Frischer’s  post war  activities  see:  Láníček,  Jan,  ‘Výhry  a  prohry  Arnošta  Frischera’  in 
Židovská ročenka 5769, 2008 2009 (Prague: Federace židovských obcí v České republice, 2008), pp. 
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chapter will examine how the issues identified by Frischer were dealt with by the 
Czechoslovak authorities during and after the war. 
There were five key issues Frischer discussed in the document. First, he dealt 
with all aspects touching the life of Jews, including their position vis à vis the major 
population. Initially he suggested that Jews had not committed any crime against the 
nations  of  Czechoslovakia.  Therefore,  they  should  enjoy  the  same  rights  as  the 
Czechoslovak constitution had granted them before the war. It was not clear how far 
this statement by Frischer was intended as a claim for the renewal of the minority 
treaties. Only the following part of the Treatise stressed that all the rights given to 
other minorities, as groups, ought also to be given to the Jews.
849 It constituted a 
claim for minority protection only in the case that similar concession was given to 
other groups. Thus Frischer presented his understanding for the new Czechoslovak 
internal policy.
850 He also accepted the Czechoslovak desire to punish all minorities 
that had been deemed to have caused disintegration of Czechoslovakia before the 
war, especially the Germans and Hungarians.
851 However, he argued in this respect, 
with a clear reference to the German speaking Jews, no Jew ought to be punished 
simply based on the nationality s/he had declared before 1939 in connection with 
their mother tongue.
852 
Second, Frischer expressed his concerns about anti Semitism in Europe. He 
did not expect that anti Jewish hatred would disappear with the end of the war and 
hence  demanded  special  protection  for  the  Jews.  The  state  administration  was 
supposed  to  act  against  any  manifestation  of  anti Semitic  feelings,  without  Jews 
having to report particular incidents and demand action against the culprits.
853  
Third,  Frischer  devoted  a  special  section  of  his  Treatise  to  the  issue  of 
repatriation.  The  Jews  deserved  special  consideration,  he  argued,  because  their 
situation was unique. In the spring of 1944, not fully realising the scope of the Nazi 
extermination campaign against the Jews, Frischer stated that a considerable number 
                                                 
849 AÚTGM, Edvard Beneš Papers – II, box 157, file 1557, Memorial Treatise by Arnošt Frischer, 2 
March 1944. 
850 See  also  Frischer’s  address  in  New  York  on  18  November  1944:  Czechoslovakia  and  the 
Czechoslovak  Jews:  address  delivered  at  the  meeting  of  the  Czechoslovak  Jewish  representative 
committee affiliated with the WJC, Nov 18, 1944 (New York: Czechoslovak Jewish Representative 
Committee, 1945), pp. 18 32. 
851 Ibid. pp. 22f. 
852 AÚTGM, Edvard Beneš Papers – II, box 157, file 1557, Memorial Treatise by Arnošt Frischer, 2 
March 1944. 
853 Ibid. 208 
of children and elderly would take part in the repatriation process.
854 Additionally, 
survivors would not be met by their relatives, because all the Czechoslovak Jews had 
been deported by the Nazis. Moreover, Frischer tried to open a topic that became 
very  sensitive  for  the  Czechoslovak  leadership:  the  return  of  Jews  who  did  not 
possess  Czechoslovak  citizenship,  but  had  been  residents  of  the  Czechoslovak 
territory in 1938.
855  
Fourth, Frischer demanded full restitution of Jewish property confiscated by 
the Nazis and other aryanizers, or compensation in cases when such restitution would 
be impossible.
856 Money received after the war from Germany as indemnification or 
international loans might have contributed to the compensation.
857 Heirless Jewish 
property was to be used for the reconstruction of Jewish communal life and for the 
economic revival of pauperized Jews.
858  
Fifth, concerning its foreign policy, the government was asked to continue 
with its support for the Zionist movement. At the same time, this policy was not to be 
used  against  Jews  still  living  in  the  Diaspora.  Emigration  to  Palestine  was  not 
supposed to be compulsory. This vision was in clear opposition to Beneš’s plans 
presented since 1940.
859  
The whole argument presented by Frischer was built on the assumption that a 
significant  part  of  Czechoslovak  Jewry  would  eventually  survive  the  war.  The 
document  was prepared before  the  German  occupation of  Hungary  on  19  March 
1944. More than 150,000 of the pre war Czechoslovak Jewish community lived in 
Southern Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia, annexed to Hungary in November 
1938 and March 1939. They were supposed to form the backbone of Jewish society 
in  post war  Czechoslovakia.  The  national  and  cultural  distinctiveness  of  this 
community – Ruthenian Jews, especially, could be labelled as Ostjuden – was used 
by  Frischer  as  the  main  justification  for  the  official  recognition  of  the  Jewish 
minority  status  in  post war  Czechoslovakia.
860 Yet  only  several  weeks  after  the 
completion  of  this  Treatise,  the  German  occupation  of  Hungary  and  the  almost 
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856 AÚTGM, Edvard Beneš Papers – II, box 157, file 1557, Memorial Treatise by Arnošt Frischer, 2 
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858 Ibid. 
859 Ibid. In the last part of his Treatise, Frischer summarized all measures that were essential for the 
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860 Ibid. 209 
immediate start of deadly deportations to Auschwitz changed the rules of the game. 
Only 50,000 Jewish survivors returned to the Republic after the war.  
Nevertheless, the real extent of the ‘Final Solution’ was not comprehended in 
London until the last months of the war. Beneš even remarked in March 1944 that he 
was  of  the  opinion  that  a  considerable  part  of  the  Jewish  community  would 
eventually survive the war.
861 The reality of the near total annihilation of the Jewish 
population could not therefore be taken into account during the discussions of the 
Czechoslovak plans for the Jewish minority that were going on until mid 1944.
862  
This chapter aims to explain how the policy, prepared during the war in exile, 
was  implemented  in  liberated  Czechoslovakia.  The  post war  position  of  Jewish 
survivors needs to be perceived in a wider time perspective emphasising continuity. 
This notwithstanding, new forces, emerging after 1945, should also be taken into 
account.  Whilst  the  previous  chapters  dealt  only  with  the  democratic,  pro Beneš 
branch of the Czechoslovak resistance, this chapter also enquires into the positions 
adopted by the Communist exiles. The decisive role played by the Soviet Union in 
the final defeat of Nazi Germany raised the significance of the Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia (CPC). The Soviet Union did not take part in the Munich Diktat and 
was perceived positively by a significant part of Czech and Slovak society. Hence 
the CPC became a partner of the London based exiles in the negotiations of the post 
war  settlement  in  Czechoslovakia.  The  Communists’  attitude  towards  the  Jews 
therefore needs to be taken into consideration.  
 
 
Jewish  Voices  against  the  plans  for  the  national  homogenization  of 
Czechoslovakia 
The  experience  of  the  Second  World  War  shaped  Czechoslovak  attitudes 
towards the minorities that had lived in Czechoslovak territories for centuries. Public 
addresses by Beneš and especially his article in the January 1942 issue of Foreign 
Affairs  brought  to  the  public  attention  Czechoslovaks’  plans  for  the  solution  of 
minorities’ problem in Europe.
863 As summarized above, no minorities were to have 
any  new protection  guaranteed by international treaties; countries of East Central 
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Europe were to become national states. The policy of population transfers was to 
help with the solution in countries where minor border corrections could not solve 
the  problem  of  territorial  minorities.
864 The  Czechoslovak  plans  were  first  of  all 
directed against German and Hungarian minorities.
865 Yet Jews, as another minority, 
could  not  count  on  any  revival  of  minority  treaties  and  were  not  supposed  to 
constitute a recognised minority.  
The development of plans concerning the Jewish position in Czechoslovakia 
is  somewhat  difficult  to  follow.  The  Czechoslovak  authorities  did  not  issue  any 
official declaration about the Jews’ status after the war.
866 We must thus rely on the 
gradually  evolving  plans  concerning  the  German  minority  that  were  to  influence 
Jewish survivors in post war Czechoslovakia. Another source of information is the 
interventions of pro Jewish activists. They felt alarmed by the emerging plans of 
what is now labelled as the transfer or ethnic cleansing of post war Czechoslovakia 
of its German minority.
867 
  Shortly  after  Beneš’s  article  appeared  in  Foreign  Affairs,  Jewish 
organizations in Britain and the United States started enquires about the real meaning 
of the President’s writing. The following debates revealed deep ideological division 
in  the  ranks  of  Jewish  organizations.  During  a  meeting  of  the  Joint  Foreign 
Committee of British Jewry (JFC), Harry A. Goodman, an activist of the British 
Agudas Israel, expressed appreciation that the Czechoslovak President was the only 
statesman who clearly expressed his views on the post war position of the Jews. It 
was apparent that Goodman, as an adherent of orthodoxy, did not oppose those of 
Beneš’s plans that reconsidered the system of protection of national minorities.
868 In 
the Orthodox Jewish perception, the Jews did not constitute a minority in the national 
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sense.  As  expressed  by  Goodman,  Agudists  understood  Beneš’s  policy  that  was 
based  on  Czechoslovaks’  experience  with  the  alleged  betrayal  of  the  nation  by 
minorities before the war. Goodman concluded that ‘[i]n this atmosphere it would be 
suicidal for the Jews in Central European countries to insist upon being recognised as 
minorities, and to demand minority rights’.
869  
The Agudist viewpoint reflected in Goodman’s intervention inevitably met 
with opposition among Zionist members of the JFC. Furthermore, the Zionists were 
alarmed by the plans proposed by Beneš. Selig Brodetsky, the President of the Board 
of Deputies, tried to dispel their concerns. He suggested that the article by Beneš had 
been  ‘authoritatively  explained  as  not  referring  to  the  position  of  the  Jews  in 
Czechoslovakia’.
870 Brodetsky  had  already met with Minister Ripka in  December 
1941. They had indeed talked about the population transfers as suggested by Beneš 
during his talk in Aberdeen.
871 Unfortunately, the minutes of the meeting – made by 
Ripka – did not mention the Czechoslovak perspective and summarized only the 
ideas  presented  by  Brodetsky.
872  Both  politicians,  when  discussing  the  issues 
regarding  population  transfers,  dealt  first  of  all  with  Czechoslovak  Germans. 
Brodetsky expressed himself roundly against the Germans, who ought to be punished 
with the utmost severity.
873 Concerning Jews deported to Poland, the best solution 
would be their transfer to Palestine, but only as a part of an internationally agreed 
solution, not as a unilaterally enforced action.
874 These views could easily correspond 
with the Czechoslovaks’ plans for the national homogenization of the Republic. 
  Brodetsky and the majority of the JFC were not the only activists concerned 
with Beneš’s views. Further sporadic voices appeared among the Jewish public in the 
west, both within and outside of the Czechoslovak Jewish exiled community. For 
example, Georg (Jiří) Weiss,
875 an exiled lawyer from Czechoslovakia, contacted the 
Board of Deputies concerning the Czechoslovak plans in May 1942. He first of all 
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opposed  the  whole  theory  of  population  transfers  that,  as  he  argued,  could  not 
increase the external security of a country. Moreover, Weiss continued as follows: 
 
But there is quite a good chance that some 30,000 to 40,000 Jews will 
be counted as ‘Germans’ when the transfer should be carried through. 
As you know such a number of Jews lived in the Sudetenland. Mostly 
more than 30 years old they [speak] German only and even the younger 
generation has been educated in German schools, using German as their 
‘mother  language’  although  speaking  Czech  as  well.  Only  those  of 
them who were Zionist declared themselves as Jews at the last census in 
1930
876, when the Criterium [sic!] was not ‘nationality’ but ‘mother 
language’.
877 
 
  Weiss  also  suggested  that  although  it  was  unlikely  that  Jews  would  be 
regarded and treated as Germans, there might be people who would consider them a 
danger  for  Czechoslovakia  and  would  prefer  their  transfer.
878 He  stressed  that  it 
would be in the interest of Jews that the determining in post war Czechoslovakia of 
who was ‘German’ should not be based on a language test. If a test was required, it 
would result in a ‘considerable number’ of Jews being labelled as Germans and thus 
discriminated against by the Czechoslovak government.
879 In another letter, a month 
later, Weiss stressed that there was no official Czechoslovak declaration suggesting 
that Jews would be treated as Germans or Nazis after the war. Yet, Weiss continued:  
 
a quite important Czech official took it as a matter of course that there 
[has] to be no difference between the treatment of Nazis and German 
speaking Jews so far as the transfer of population is concerned. I was 
told that that particular gentleman has changed his mind. But the fact 
that  he  had  this  point  of  view  clearly  shows  that  the  possibility,  I 
pointed out, really exists.
880 
 
Weiss’  argument  against  these  plans  mainly  emphasised  the  injustice  that 
would occur in the  event that the Czechoslovak government persecuted German 
speaking Jews: ‘[i]t seems to me necessary to point out how wrong it is, to base any 
far reaching consequences in 1942 or 1943 on a statement made in 1930 under quite 
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different  circumstances’.
881  1930  was  the  year  of  the  last  pre war  census  in 
Czechoslovakia.  
Weiss was, moreover, concerned that the Czechoslovak plans might receive 
support even from within the Czechoslovak Jewish community. He expected that 
Czech speaking Jews, especially the assimilationists, might not oppose, though not 
actively initiate, policy against the German speaking Jews.
882 The situation in post 
Munich Czechoslovakia served as an example that this possibility was not totally 
inconceivable.
883   
Frischer,  although  a  Zionist,  implied  in  private  correspondence  that  he  had 
similar sentiments. He was prepared to raise the whole issue of the German speaking 
Jews  with  the  Czechoslovak  authorities,  after  receiving  information  from  Weiss. 
Nevertheless, privately he admitted that, in his opinion, Jews, who in 1930 declared 
German nationality, showed ‘a very unfriendly attitude towards the Czechoslovak 
people’.
884 He  claimed  that  they  had  had  an  option  to  declare  Jewish  nationality 
instead.
885 Frischer thus adopted the argument of the Czechoslovak authorities prior 
to and during the war.
  Jews who in 1930 declared German nationality were not to be 
trusted.  
  Weiss was not the only person expressing concerns about the possible harm 
caused by Czechoslovak plans in relation to the Jews. In 1942, the YIVO Institute for 
Jewish Research published The Transfer of Population as a Means of Solving the 
Problem of Minorities. Its author was Mark V. Vishniak, a Russian Jewish émigré 
residing in New York.
886 The book included, as an appendix, an exchange of letters 
between  Max  Weinreich,  the  director  of  YIVO,  and  Jan  Masaryk.
887 Written  in 
Yiddish and therefore not accessible to the general public, the book analysed the 
history of population transfers. Only the last chapter focused on developments during 
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the proceeding war.
888 A considerable part of the chapter was Vishniak’s response to 
the  articles  published  by  Beneš,  including  the  most  famous  in  Foreign  Affairs. 
Vishniak  concluded  that  it  was  very  dangerous  if  such  theories  were  shared  by 
people like the Czechoslovak President – that is otherwise liberal minded people. 
Also  Weinreich,  in  his  preface  to  Vishniak’s  book,  highlighted  the  rumours 
circulating in New York that Beneš opposed any new minority rights and that an 
individual would have to decide either to move to the land of his nation or to stay in 
his  original  land  without  any  protection.
889  These  rumours  are  what  induced 
Weinreich  to  write  to  Masaryk  in  order  to  dispel  concerns  about  the  future  of 
Czechoslovak Jews.  
  In  the  first  letter,  Weinreich  assured  Masaryk  that  YIVO  understood  that 
Beneš’s  theory  was  first  of  all  directed  against  Sudeten  Germans.  However,  he 
pointed to the fact that some governments in East Central Europe had intended to 
‘evacuate’ Jews even before the outbreak of the war.
890 The Jews and particularly 
YIVO felt threatened by the whole concept of population transfer as presented by the 
Czechoslovak President. The Jews, according to Weinreich, considered themselves 
parts of their own countries. They wanted to stay in those countries and enjoy the 
rights of ethnic minorities.
891 Weinreich asked Masaryk to clarify the attitude of the 
Czechoslovak authorities which was, he opined, open to serious misunderstanding.
892 
Weinreich refrained from attacking the Czechoslovak President but, as pro Jewish 
activists between 1940 and 1941 had, referred to possible misuse of his theories by 
other governments in the region. 
  The  addressee,  Masaryk,  was  considered  the  most  sympathetic  among 
Czechoslovak politicians towards the Jews. He thus acquired the role of appeasing 
Jewish  organizations  in  the  west  and  repairing  possible  damage  caused  by  the 
rumours  about  Czechoslovak  intentions.  The  research  institute  was  not  the  only 
organization  seeking  clarification  by  the  Czechoslovak  authorities.  The  Board  of 
Deputies also contacted the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister in order to receive an 
explanation  about  the  possible  danger  for  the  German speaking  Jews  in 
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Czechoslovakia.
893 However the Jewish agencies seriously overestimated Masaryk’s 
possible influence. The Minister spent considerable time outside London, mostly in 
the United States and was not in daily contact with the Czechoslovak authorities. It 
cannot  be  doubted  that  Masaryk  was  indeed  sympathetic  and  even  paternalistic 
towards the Jews. Even so, he did not possess the political power or even perhaps the 
will to change the progress of events.
894  
  In response to Weinreich, Masaryk tried to dispel his concerns and labelled 
Beneš’s plans as only ‘very hazy’.
895 The Czechoslovaks were considering ridding 
Republic of ‘some of the Germans around the frontiers of Germany who have never 
been  much  good’  to  the  Czechoslovak  Republic.
896  Regarding  Jews,  Masaryk 
concluded: ‘I would like to go on record, and you have my approval to use this letter 
in any way you want to, in stating that Jews are certainly not included in these […] 
plans.  And  I  have  Dr.  Beneš’s  authority  in  emphasizing  this  point.’
897 Masaryk 
expressed similar views during a discussion with Brodetsky and Brotman from the 
Board  of  Deputies  in  London.
898 Yet,  he  did  not  repeat  the  assurances  given  by 
Beneš during this meeting.
899 Indeed we have no proof that Masaryk negotiated his 
response to Weinreich with the Czechoslovak President.
900  
Contemplating the discourse used by Masaryk, it needs to be considered that 
the wholesale transfer of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia was not on the 
official agenda of the Czechoslovak government until the last stage of the war and 
was, in fact, approved only in Potsdam by the Big Three.
901 In 1942, plans for the 
transfer of Germans did not specifically deal with the German speaking Jews.
902 In 
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fact, the German speaking Jews, counting several tens of thousands before the war, 
constituted, in comparison with almost 3 million Sudeten Germans, only a marginal 
problem for the Czechoslovak authorities. It is still noteworthy that individuals such 
as Weiss, Vishniak and Weinreich were, as early as 1942, able to comprehend the 
radicalization of the Czech nationalists. They predicted that plans considered by the 
exiles  could,  in  fact,  cause  a  lot  of  harm  to  the  Jews  who  used  to  live  in 
Czechoslovakia.  
  The concerns of the YIVO chairman were not allayed by Masaryk’s letter. In 
April  1943  Weinreich  contacted  Frischer  and  noted  that  there  was  ‘even  more 
uncertainty  about  the  official  Czechoslovak  point  of  view  on  the  problem  of 
transferring  minorities’  since  Vishniak’s  book  appeared.
903  Frischer  eventually 
contacted Prokop Drtina of the President’s office and asked for some assurance from 
the President. Frischer additionally wanted to gain the President’s approval for the 
draft of his response to Weinreich.
904  
Unfortunately, Drtina’s comments cannot be found. Indeed we cannot even 
be certain whether Frischer in the end sent his letter to Weinreich.
905 In the draft, 
Frischer confirmed that the plans for population transfer were contemplated by the 
Czechoslovak  authorities,  but  were  not  intended  against  the  Jews.
906  He  thus 
approached  the  whole  affair  in  an  identical  manner  to  Masaryk.  Beneš  allegedly 
assured Frischer in November 1942 that there was no intention to punish democratic 
Germans.  They  had  been  threatened  by  the  Nazis  and  were  forced  to  leave 
Czechoslovakia even before the outbreak of the war.
907 Frischer concluded: 
  
[t]his, therefore, applies all the more to the Jews and there is no doubt 
about it that the Czechoslovak Republic will take care of all her citizens 
who [wish] to return, as far as there is no offence against the Republic on 
their part’
908  
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In this way Frischer tried to appease the disquieted activists. As suggested in 
my second chapter, Beneš considered the solution of the so called ‘Jewish question’ 
to be only another step in the national homogenization of Czechoslovakia. Moreover, 
the definition of ‘an offence’ against the Republic was open to various interpretations. 
Despite  that,  it  would  be  wrong  to  claim  that  the  Czechoslovak  authorities 
intentionally planned to expel some of the Jews from Czechoslovakia. Nonetheless as 
the plans for Czechoslovakia as a national state developed, the manoeuvring space 
for the Jews became limited. 
 
A Conditional support of the Zionist movement 
Between  1943  and  1945,  the  Czechoslovak  exiled  political  leadership 
maintained regular contact with Zionist organizations. Both parties carried on with 
discussions that had started before, dealing with the position of the Jewish minority 
in Czechoslovakia.  
Beneš met with Wise and Goldmann of the WJC during his only war time 
trip to the USA on 21 May 1943 in New York. Beneš specifically wanted to be 
informed about the political demands of the WJC. Goldmann did not refrain from 
emphasizing that Beneš’s already known views on minority rights caused disquiet 
among pro Jewish politicians. He  also emphasised that they were ‘difficult to be 
reconciled with the great liberal ideas [Beneš] had always [been] defending’.
909  The 
Czechoslovak  President  responded  that  he  only  ‘[had]  expressed  serious  doubts 
concerning the wisdom of demanding simultaneously a Jewish State in Palestine and 
minority rights in the countries where Jews live[d].’
910 In line with this philosophy, 
the Czechoslovak President advised the Jewish leaders that there should be no half 
measures; they needed to decide what they wanted.  
Likewise, Beneš mentioned several days later on 27 May 1943 to a delegation 
of the Czechoslovak Jewish Representative Committee (which was affiliated with the 
WJC) that he ‘looked reality in the eyes’.
911 He meant that only one of the Zionist 
demands was feasible. The world as perceived by the Czechoslovak President was 
labelled  as  reality  and  the  Jewish  politicians  were  supposed  to  accept  it.  Beneš 
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accordingly emphasised that he did not want to interfere with the Zionists’ policy. He 
only informed them about his own ‘precise and clear’ policy; he was not going to 
divert from his standpoint.
912 This was a clear political statement. 
 
Image no. 8: Nahum Goldmann with Chaim Weizmann in 1935
913 
What was the response of the Zionists? In a letter to Frischer, Kubowitzki 
described the WJC demands presented by Goldmann during the talk with Beneš as 
follows:  
 
‘What we want’, [Goldmann] said, ‘is only recognition of the fact that 
there is a Jewish people in the world, that Jewish citizens of the various 
states have the right to remain members of this Jewish people; that they 
may continue to instruct their children in the Hebrew language and in 
Jewish values, to display a deep interest in Palestine and in the Jewish 
fate  everywhere,  to  cultivate  their  heritage  and  cultural  ties.  This’,  he 
concluded, ‘is what we mean when talking of minority rights. We do not, 
for instance, ask for separate Jewish wards in elections.’
914  
 
Beneš allegedly responded: ‘Whoever told you that I oppose such legitimate 
demands, misunderstood me.’
915 The definition of minority rights, as presented by 
Goldmann,  was  not  identical  with  the  minority  treaties  signed  in  Versailles. 
Goldmann did not demand political rights; he also, for example, did not demand 
official recognition of Jews as a minority that would be allowed to use its language in 
official communication with authorities. If they had been agreed, rights demanded by 
Goldmann would not have constituted Jews as a political or national, but rather as a 
cultural group.  
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Nevertheless, as the following exchange of letters between Kubowitzki and 
Frischer  suggested,  even  the  Zionists  were  internally  divided  in  their  demands. 
Frischer belonged  to  moderate  Zionists  and  it  might be  that  this  was  one  of  the 
reasons for Beneš’s decision to appoint him to the State Council.
916 During the war, 
Frischer, although appointed ad personam, claimed to be the sole representative of 
Jewish  interests  in  contact  with  the  Czechoslovak  government.
917  He  had  not 
belonged to the main supporters of the generally applied minority treaties before the 
war.
918 In 1941, his views were summarized in a letter to Tartakower of the WJC in 
the USA: 
Jews  should  not  demand  any  minority  rights  or  special  legally  and 
internationally guaranteed protection and no special status at all in such 
countries  where  there  is  only  one  nation,  so  that  nationality  and 
citizenship are considered identical and where there is such a degree of 
humane and democratic attitude that no particular discrimination of the 
Jews is to be expected.
919 
 
Moreover,  he  argued  that  the  future  of  the  Jewish  minority  position  in 
Czechoslovakia depended on whether there would be strong German, Hungarian and 
Ruthenian minorities as well.
920 It is noteworthy that Frischer revealed these ideas in 
the autumn of 1941 before the large scale deportations of Jews from the Protectorate 
and from Slovakia and their mass murder in Poland.
921 Yet, even at this early stage 
of the war, Frischer advised that ‘a demand for Jewish minority rights can be made 
only under the supposition that such rights will be given generally, then equality can 
be rightly demanded for the Jewish people’.
922 Frischer expected that without other 
minorities in the country, the Czechoslovak support for the Jewish demands would 
diminish. The future  Zionist member of the exile parliament concluded that ‘the 
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Jews  should  have  the  right  understanding  for  the  whole  building up  of 
[Czechoslovakia] after the war’.
923 Hence the ‘national minority rights’, as a term, 
was, according to Frischer, to remain in the background.
924 
Frischer adhered to this discourse in his response to Kubowitzki’s letter in 
June 1943. He explained that Jews in pre war Czechoslovakia had failed to enjoy the 
full  extent  of  the  minority  rights  which  were  reserved  for  minorities  inhabiting 
certain territories in large numbers.
925 This was not the case with the Jews before and, 
with the Nazi extermination campaign in progress, would hardly be so after the war. 
Frischer repeated the full understanding for the new Czechoslovak policy towards 
minorities  and  warned  the  WJC  against  the  Jews  becoming  trailblazers  for  the 
general renewal of minority rights in post war Europe.
926 As suggested, the problem 
was not with the Jews, but that their rights might be a precedent for other minorities. 
Consequently, Frischer recommended that in order not to refer to the minority rights 
previously misused by other minorities, the Jews should formulate their demands 
under a completely different term, for example, ‘rights of men’.
927  
Kubowitzki argued with Frischer against this position. The Jews should not 
abandon  the  term  ‘minority  rights’  just  because  Germans  misused  them.
928 They 
should not ‘neglect any opportunity to stress the difference that exist[ed] between the 
national minority rights claimed by the territorial minorities and the right [the Jews 
demanded]  to  maintain  and  foster  [their]  religious  and/or  cultural  heritage’.
929 
Kubowitzki continued that Jews should face reality by  adhering to the claim for 
minority rights and not hide behind any new labels as, for example, ‘rights of men’ 
as suggested by Frischer.
930 Jews should stress the fact that they ‘were different and 
wanted to foster this difference [underlined in the original – J. L.]’.
931 They had to 
stress  ‘the  difference  existing  between  the  national  minority  rights  claimed  by 
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territorial minorities and the very modest contents of our group demands’.
932 The 
WJC  leaders  apparently  could  not  find  common  ground  with  the  Czechoslovak 
authorities. The Czechoslovaks did not want to differentiate among minorities. They 
regarded  the  whole  system  of  minority  protection  as  a  failure.  It  is  furthermore 
noteworthy that Frischer, the politician claiming to represent the Jewish minority in 
contacts with the Czechoslovak authorities, in essence agreed with the Czechoslovak 
plans. 
However,  the  WJC  leaders  might  have  found  it  helpful  to  use  the 
government’s  services  in  another  direction.  Minutes  of  a  meeting  between  the 
Czechoslovak  President  on  one  side  and  Goldmann  and  Weizmann  on  the  other 
noted that ‘Mr. Benesh [sic!] [had taken] the attitude of a sincere and devoted friend 
of the Zionist Movement’.
933 The Czechoslovak President presented himself as being 
at the disposal of the Zionist leaders. The minutes record that he said:  
 
I am convinced more than ever that the Jewish problem must now be 
radically  solved,  and  that  the  solution  is  a  Jewish  State  […]  The 
democratic world is under obligation to solve the problem of your people, 
and the solution is a Jewish State in Palestine.
934  
 
During  the  war  the  Czechoslovak  government  and  especially  Beneš  were 
perceived as the main ‘bridge’ between western democracies and the main ally in the 
east.
935 They were the only  government, especially  among the minor Allies, who 
sustained  reasonable  relations  with  Stalin.
936 Goldmann  and  Weizmann  therefore 
considered  it  opportune  to  utilize  Beneš’s  pro Zionist  sentiments  and  his  good 
relations  with  the  Soviet  Union.  In  this  respect  the  Czechoslovak  government 
highlighted its significance for pro Zionist activists. With the progress of the war, it 
seemed impossible to receive any official recognition of Zionist political demands in 
Palestine without the support or at least non involvement of the Soviet Union.
937 
Beneš  therefore  was  to  play  an  essential  role  in  this  diplomatic  struggle.  More 
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significantly for the Zionists, their policy suddenly found a common platform with 
the  Czechoslovak  President.  A Jewish  State  in Palestine  could  solve  the  internal 
problem of Czechoslovakia as well.  
During a conversation with Weizmann and Goldmann in Washington D. C. 
in May 1943, Beneš presented himself in the role of a western emissary going on an 
important mission to Moscow. In addition, he expressed his readiness to raise Zionist 
issues with the Soviet leaders. His goal was to help the Soviets to overcome their 
animosity towards  Zionism, a position which he was not able to comprehend.
938 
Goldmann offered to prepare for Beneš a memorandum about the Zionist problem.
939 
According to the minutes recorded by the Zionists, Beneš concluded: ‘I hope that 
[the Soviets] will understand that there is nothing in their policy which conflicts with 
Zionism, and that they are interested in this solution of the Jewish problem. I will be 
glad to be helpful in this way.’
940  
 
Image no. 9: Aufbau (published in New York) informed about Beneš’s upcoming negotiations with 
Stalin
941 
 
Beneš’s  trip  to  Moscow  was  postponed  for  another  half  a  year  until 
November – December 1943, which gave pro Jewish activists more opportunities to 
ask him to render further services to the Jewish cause there. But it became apparent 
that the Czechoslovak President wanted to follow his own priorities and this was also 
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the case with Jewish issues. In July 1943, Barou and Easterman, secretaries of the BS 
WJC, visited Beneš in London and raised other possibilities regarding his trip to 
Moscow. Barou especially asked him to ask Stalin about the fate of Polish Jewish 
refugees in the Soviet Union.
942 Beneš responded by saying that he planned to talk 
about Jewish issues during his trip to Moscow, ‘however that he [had been] more 
concerned  with the Russian attitude about the  general Jewish situation’.
943  Even 
though  Beneš  promised  to  consider  the  proposal,  it  seems  doubtful  that  he  did 
anything in this direction. In asking him to discuss with Stalin such a sensitive topic, 
the WJC representatives clearly overestimated Beneš’s pro Jewish sentiments.  
Beneš’s  preliminary  list  of  topics  to  be  discussed  with  the  Soviet  leaders 
included only the issue of Zionism. And even this topic was later withdrawn, when 
during the preparatory talks in Habbaniyah, Iraq, the Soviet Deputy Commissar for 
the Foreign Affairs – Alexander Kornejčuk – refused to include it on the agenda.
944 
The  official  minutes  of  Beneš’s  Moscow  talks  with  Molotov  and  Stalin  did  not 
mention  Zionism  at  all.
945  Yet,  later  in  London,  Beneš  informed  the  Zionist 
leadership that he had raised the Zionist problem with Stalin. According to him, the 
Soviet leader allegedly expressed willingness not to hinder the creation of the Jewish 
commonwealth  in  Palestine,
946 providing  the  western  Allies  supported  it.
947 This 
conversation allegedly took place not as part of the official negotiations, but later, 
informally, and only between Beneš and Stalin.
948 This piece of information later 
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found  its  way  to  the  White  House.
949 Subsequently,  during  the  founding  UN 
Conference in San Francisco in the spring of 1945, Masaryk revealed to Weizmann, 
that  ‘the  Soviet  Union  would  favour  a  Jewish  State  in  Palestine’.
950  The 
Czechoslovak politicians thus provided an important service to the Zionist leadership.  
Whatever really happened in Moscow in December 1943, the story confirms 
that Zionism was the main Jewish issue of Beneš’s interest. Hence the theory about 
Beneš’s  purely  humanitarian  motives  towards  the  Jews  seems  doubtful.  Jewish 
emigration to Palestine would solve the so called ‘Jewish problem’ in Europe and 
particularly in Czechoslovakia. Both Masaryk and Beneš repeatedly stressed that the 
‘Jewish question’ needed to be solved in the international arena.
951 This solution lay 
not in the revival of minority treaties and protection of Jews in Europe, but in either 
their emigration or their assimilation. The Soviet support of the Zionist movement 
was to pave the way to the desired solution. Thus, this was the only issue that Beneš, 
most likely, raised in Moscow when negotiating with the Soviet leader. 
However,  the  Czechoslovak  support  of  Zionism  was  not  to  be  offered 
unconditionally. The Minister of State, Ripka, stressed it during a celebration of the 
25
th anniversary of the Czechoslovak Republic, organized by the National Jewish 
Council in October 1943: 
It is natural that the Czechoslovak State will continue in the future to 
consider  it  a  matter  of  each  Jewish  citizen’s  individual  conscience 
whether  he  regards  himself  as  a  Zionist  or  not.  The  Czechoslovak 
Government will continue in the future to show full understanding for the 
efforts of Zionism; naturally it expects that the Zionists too will show 
understanding for the internal needs of a restored Czechoslovakia.
952 
 
Hence  Ripka  summarized  the  government’s  attitude  towards  Zionism:  the 
Czechoslovaks would continue to support Zionism, but the Zionists would not claim 
any special status in post war Czechoslovakia. 
The signals about the government’s new attitude towards the Jewish position 
in post war Czechoslovakia were regularly received by pro Jewish activists. Yet they 
seemed not to be able to grasp the Czechoslovak determination to adhere to this 
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solution. The final negotiations were conducted in 1944, in the atmosphere of high 
expectations  of  the  coming  liberation  of  Europe.  British  and  American  Jewish 
representatives  were  to  face  a  confident  partner  who  had  already  made  his 
irrevocable decision.  
 
The Czechoslovak Government in Exile and the position of the Jews in the post 
war Republic 
Until 1943, most of the specific remarks concerning the Jewish position in 
Czechoslovakia  by  the  Beneš  government  were  made  privately.  Despite  this, 
rumours spread among the Jewish public and some of the public speeches made by 
Czechoslovak politicians contained intimations of their intentions too. For example, 
Ripka’s  statement  from  October  1943  was  hidden  among  other  references  to  the 
unique relations between Jews and Czechoslovaks and was probably not heard or 
fully comprehended by attending Zionists. This notwithstanding, it could be regarded 
as one of the first public statements about the future situation in Czechoslovakia.  
  The Czechoslovak authorities confirmed their determination not to change 
these  plans  during  the  final  negotiations  conducted  in  1944.  Pro Jewish  activists 
were unable to comprehend the new philosophy of the Czechoslovak government 
with  emphasis put  on  the  Slavonic  character  of  the renewed  Republic.  Frederick 
Fried, the chairman of the CJRC in the USA, informed WJC leaders about public 
statements made by Beneš and Ripka in early 1944. He reported that in a broadcast 
made from Moscow the Czechoslovak President had stated that ‘the Czechoslovak 
Republic w[ould] be a national State consisting of Czechs, Slovaks and Carpathian 
Ruthenes [underlined in the original – J. L.]’.
953 Ripka, Fried continued, concluded 
that it was ‘unlikely that we shall simply return to the principle of the protection of 
minorities,  which  produced  disastrous  results  that  cannot  be  forgotten’.
954 
Furthermore,  individual  members  of  a  minority  should  enjoy  equality,  but  there 
should not be any ‘privileged political position’ for them.
955 Kubowitzki in response 
to Fried questioned the meaning of the statement that Czechoslovakia would become 
a ‘national state of Czechs, Slovaks and Carpathian Ruthenes’.
956 He suggested that 
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this  would  still  be  another  ‘nationalities  State’.
957  It  was  an  apparent 
misunderstanding  of  the  position  adopted  by  the  Czechoslovak  authorities,  when 
certain Slavonic nations obviously counted differently than members of other nations. 
  Moreover, Beneš caused serious anxieties among Jews by the statement he 
made during his visit to the Czechoslovak army camp in Britain in March 1944. The 
President, when asked about problems with repatriation of displaced persons after the 
war, allegedly summarized:  
 
As to the repatriation of Jews to their former position, our laws do not 
make a difference between loyal citizens whatever may be their origin or 
religion. I should like to add that the Jewish question is an international 
one, needing to be resolved internationally after the war.
958 
 
  So  the  Czechoslovak  statesmen  repeatedly  emphasised  that  the  ‘Jewish 
question’ needed to be  solved internationally. Nevertheless, rumours immediately 
spread about this statement made by Beneš. Jewish newspapers in Britain, Palestine 
and the United States informed the public that the Czechoslovak President allegedly 
opposed the repatriation of Jews back to Czechoslovakia.
959 For example, Reader’s 
Digest reported that Beneš considered Jewish repatriation to Czechoslovakia to be 
impossible.
960  
Jewish groups’ reactions to the address by Beneš confirmed, however, that 
world  Jewry  could  hardly  speak  with  one  voice.  An  ideological  division  among 
various Jewish political groups shaped their particular responses. The Zionists living 
in Palestine perceived it as another confirmation of their policy. There was no future 
for  Jews  in  Europe  according  to  their  statement  and  all  of  the  Jewish  survivors 
should move to Palestine.
961 The Palestinian Zionists did not condemn Beneš and 
rather praised him for being the only politician who had a straightforward attitude 
                                                 
957 Ibid. 
958 AJA, WJC Papers, H100/17, Kubowitzki to the Office Committee, 6 July 1944. Kubowitzki quoted 
an  article  by  Angelo  Goldstein,  published  in  HaZman,  23  May  1944.  Beneš’s  visit  to  the 
Czechoslovak army camp took place on 24 March 1944 (The translation of Goldman’s article comes 
from News Flashes from Czechoslovakia, 19 June 1944). 
959 For newspaper cuttings see: AMZV, LA – Confidential, box 189. 
960 AMZV,  LA  –  Confidential,  1939 1945,  box  189.  The  Reader's  Digest,  July  1944,  p.  114. 
‘Dissenting reports on Palestine’. ‘It is argued that Polish, German and Rumanian Jews will not be 
welcome in their original homelands after the war, and President Beneš of Czechoslovakia is quoted 
as saying that it is impossible for Jews ever to return there.’ 
961 For the report about the responses of various Jewish ideological streams in Palestine by the chief of 
the  Czechoslovak  Military  Mission  to  the  Middle  East  see  AMZV,  LA  –  Confidential,  box  189, 
Ministry of Defence to  Ripka, Šrámek and the  ministry  of interior, 8 June 1944; Ibid., Dr Felix 
Seidemann,  ‘Dr.  Benesch  und  die  Repatrierungsfrage’,  in  Jedioth  Chadaschoth,  3  May  1944. 
According to Seidemann, Beneš understood the problem of Jewish repatriation as it really was.  227 
towards Jews and who was not afraid of telling them the truth about their future.
962 
On the contrary, Czech Jewish assimilationsts, who had escaped to Palestine before 
the war, were alarmed by the statement and sought explanation.
963 They intended to 
go  back  to  Czechoslovakia  after  the  war  and  similar  proclamations  seemed  to 
threaten their future.  
The Czechoslovak authorities were concerned that false accounts of Beneš’s 
statement  might  harm  Czechoslovak  interests  and  so  they  tried  to  provide  an 
additional explanation.
964 They claimed that Beneš was only trying to point out the 
difficulties  with  the  repatriation  of  Jews  dispersed  all  over  the  world.
965  The 
President allegedly stressed problems concerning Jewish repatriation by comparing 
the situation to the repatriation of Czech slave labourers from Germany. The latter 
were supposedly in a completely different position, with families awaiting them back 
in  liberated  Czechoslovakia.
966 Therefore,  Beneš’s  statement  was  presented  as  an 
attempt to alert the world about the precarious situation of Jews dispersed all over the 
former Nazi empire. It was not the first time the Czechoslovak authorities tried to 
reverse a damaging declaration made by Beneš into a favourable statement claimed 
to be in the interest of Jews.  
  It  was  not  only  the  assimilationists  who  were  alarmed  by  the  President’s 
statement.  Pro Jewish  activists  in  the  west,  among  them  many  pro Zionists,  also 
wanted  further  clarification  about  the  Czechoslovaks’  intentions.  The  main 
negotiations were conducted by the representatives of the Board of Deputies in May 
and June 1944. William Fraenkel and Selig Brodetsky were received by Procházka, 
the head of the Foreign Ministry Legal Department, and the second time by Ripka. 
Procházka explained Beneš’s statement in the following manner: firstly, all the Jews 
holding Czechoslovak citizenship would be allowed to return to the country.
967 There 
was, however, the problem of German and Austrian Jews who had found refuge in 
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pre war Czechoslovakia and might want to return there after the war. This would 
constitute a problem for the Czechoslovak government. Procházka was to say:  
 
Czechoslovakia  had  been  generous  in  admitting  refugees  and  he 
thought that when the state of Europe was to be settled, it would be unfair 
on Czechoslovakia if they were all to return to that country, even though 
they had been admitted as temporary residents.
968  
 
 
Procházka repeated that this problem of Jewish refugees needed to be solved 
internationally.
969 Czechoslovakia  did  not  want  to  be  forced,  just  because  of  its 
former ‘generosity’, to re admit more refugees than other countries.
970  
The Czechoslovaks generally wanted to be in control of people who were to be 
admitted to Czechoslovakia after the war. In early 1943, after the UN Declaration 
condemning  the  Nazi  extermination  of  Jews,  the  Polish  government  wanted  to 
contribute to the rescue activities. They published a declaration that all the Polish 
refugees admitted to neutral countries would be allowed to come back to Poland after 
the  war.
971 The  Czechoslovaks  were  reluctant  to  publish  any  such  declaration 
because  it  might  bind  them  to  allow  many  ‘undesirable  persons’  to  return  to 
Czechoslovakia.
972 Although they did not mean by the statement specifically Jews – 
rather traitors and others who committed ‘crimes’ against the Czechoslovak Republic 
–  this  policy  might  negatively  influence  the  progress  of  rescue  activities.  The 
Czechoslovaks were reluctant to make any such statement regardless of the negative 
impact on the possible rescue of endangered Jews. Similar remarks were repeated by 
Procházka to Brodetsky and Fraenkel in May 1944.  
  Brodetsky and Fraenkel did not react to these plans defended by Procházka. 
The reason was that there were other, more pressing issues to discuss. First, it was 
the Czechoslovaks’ attitude towards the potential renewal of the minority treaties and 
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the  protection  of  Jews  in  European  countries.
973 The  repeated  efforts  of  various 
Zionist  organizations  indicate  that  there  was  rarely  any  cooperation  even  among 
otherwise ideologically related organizations. For example, the WJC and the Board 
never  conducted  any  joint  initiative  in  order  to  influence  the  policy  of  the 
Czechoslovak government. As was the case with the WJC representatives, Brodetsky 
and Fraenkel could not find a common platform with the Czechoslovak government. 
Procházka sharply rejected any policy that would differentiate among Czechoslovak 
citizens and explained that it was in the interest of Jews themselves if they did not 
constitute any separate category.
974 As in the past, the Foreign Ministry official was 
referring to the previous misuse of minority protection by the Germans. Procházka 
explained that the Czechoslovak government now officially preferred the transfer of 
population  as  the  solution  of  the  minority  problem.
975  No  policy  of  minority 
protection  had  place  in  post war  Czechoslovakia,  unless  generally  applied  in  the 
whole world.  
Brodetsky  and  Fraenkel  agreed  with  Procházka  that  special protection  for 
Jews was not needed in Czechoslovakia, whose record was not being questioned.
976 
They,  however,  used  the  already  familiar  argument  about  the  development  in 
neighbouring countries that were not trusted. They suggested that Czechoslovakia 
should accept international minority protection to induce other countries in the region 
to comply with the system.
977 Furthermore, the Board representatives pointed out that 
the long rule of Hitlerism would definitely leave behind a legacy of anti Semitism 
and special protection for the Jews was thus even more desirable.
978 Nevertheless, 
Procházka rejected these proposals and confirmed the Czechoslovaks’ determination 
to have a national state of purely Slavonic character, without recognised minorities. 
In the minutes of the meeting prepared for Ripka, Procházka asked if the Minister 
agreed with the discourse he used during the talks. Ripka not only agreed, he advised 
Procházka to use a ‘more vigorous tone’ next time.
979 
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   The  discussion  continued  several  weeks  later  when  the  Board  delegation 
visited  Ripka.  Ripka  proved  that  any  discussion  with  the  Czechoslovaks  was 
pointless.  He  even  warned  Brodetsky  and  Fraenkel  not  to  help  the  Germans  in 
Czechoslovakia to receive internationally guaranteed protection that would enable 
them  to  cause  political  disruption  in  post war  Europe.
980 Czechoslovakia  did  not 
want to accept a burden of international protection of Jews only to set a positive 
example for the neighbouring countries to follow. The initiative was taken over by 
the  Czechoslovaks  and  the  Jewish  activists  had  to  defend  themselves  against 
accusations that they might be supporting the common enemy. The Czechoslovaks 
were  willing  to  let  the  Jews  live  in  a  community,  but  no  political  parties  and 
activities would be allowed.
981 The Board representatives tried to influence Ripka by 
reference to their negotiations with the British government. The Foreign Office was 
allegedly contemplating renewal of minority protection in post war Europe.
982 This 
piece of information raised Czechoslovaks’ concerns, but was later denied by the 
British Ambassador Nichols.
983 The British planning went in completely the opposite 
direction.
984 Ripka later, after the meeting with Brodetsky and Fraenkel, noted that he 
had not fulfilled the expectations of the activists. Nevertheless, he believed that such 
an  approach  was  necessary  in  order  ‘not  to  let  them  live  in  illusions’  about 
Czechoslovak policy.
985 The decision was irrevocable.  
  Similarly,  Masaryk  during  his  stay  in  the  United  States  emphasised  to 
Maurice Perlzweig of the WJC in his own manner: ‘There will be no more minorities, 
Brother Perlzweig’.
986 On the contrary, on Perlzweig’s insistence, Masaryk repeated 
what the WJC representative labelled ‘his stock sayings’: ‘I will not go back without 
                                                 
980 CNA, AHR, box 105/106, 1 5 19 7, minutes of a meeting between Ripka and the Board delegation 
(Fraenkel, Brodetsky), 6 June 1944. 
981 Ibid.  
982 AMZV,  LA – Confidential, 1939 1945, box 189, Procházka (head of the legal department) to 
Ripka, 15 May 1944; CNA, AHR, box 106, 1 5 19 9a, minutes of a meeting between Ripka and 
Ambassador Nichols, 2 June 1944. 
983 CNA, AHR, box 106, 1 5 19 8, minutes of a meeting between Ripka and Ambassador Nichols, 4 
July 1944. 
984 Ibid. Eden confirmed this position to Beneš and Ripka already in April 1943. Vondrová, Jitka (ed.), 
Češi a sudetoněmecká otázka, 1939 1945: Dokumenty, pp. 240f, doc. 117, Ripka’s minutes of the 
meeting between Beneš and Eden, 22 April 1943; Bruce Lockhart made identical statement to Beneš 
in  December  1941,  see  Smetana,  Vít,  In  the  Shadow  of  Munich.  British  Policy  towards 
Czechoslovakia from the Endorsement to the Renunciation of the Munich Agreement (1938 1942), pp. 
288f. 
985 CNA, AHR, box 105/106, 1 5 19 7, minutes of a meeting between Ripka and the Board delegation 
(Fraenkel, Brodetsky), 6 June 1944. 
986 AJA, WJC Papers, H98/3, Perlzweig to the Office Committee about his meeting with Masaryk, 16 
May 1944. 231 
my Jews’.
987 Indeed, the Minister made a written statement to the WJC that was to 
confirm the Czechoslovaks’ intention not to hinder repatriation of Jews after the end 
of the conflict.
988 Masaryk wrote: 
 
I  wish  to  go  on  record  once  again  stating  that  decent  citizens  of 
Czechoslovakia regardless of race or faith will be treated in the same fair 
manner as was the case before this terrible war started. 
The treatment of Jews in my country is a matter of personal pride to me 
and there will be no change whatsoever in this respect.
989 
 
  Masaryk stated that ‘decent citizens’ of the Republic would be treated in the 
same manner as before. Despite this statement, it became apparent with the progress 
of time that the Czechoslovaks themselves wanted to set the rules about who had 
behaved decently. The Czechoslovaks’ perception of decency towards the Republic 
did  not  match  with  its  perception  by  the  Jewish  groups.  The  situation  became 
precarious  especially  for  Jews,  who  in  1930  declared  German  or  Hungarian 
nationality. During 1943, Beneš received an informal approval with the expulsion of 
Sudeten  Germans  from  the  major  Allies.
990 The  Beneš  government  consequently 
started  preparing  laws  that  would  enable  them  to  deprive  the  Germans  of  their 
Czechoslovak  citizenship  and  prepare  their  expulsion  to  Germany.
991  The 
government was aware of the impossibility of expelling all the Germans because 
there were cases of Germans fighting during the war on the Czechoslovak side.
992 
This  notwithstanding,  the  Czechoslovaks  decided  that  it  would  be  the  Germans 
themselves who would have to claim their citizenship back. It was to be ‘a new 
contract’ – an active proof of loyalty. They would be obliged to present evidence that 
they did not commit crimes against Czechoslovakia and, in fact, fought on her behalf 
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during the war.
993 Thus all the people who, in 1930, had declared German nationality, 
were to be stripped of their Czechoslovak citizenship. This legislative act was to 
impact  upon  several  thousands  of  Jewish  survivors  who  returned  from  the 
concentration camps.  
  This development was not accidental. In January 1944, Frischer asked the 
Minister of Social Welfare, Ján Bečko, if, in preparation for repatriation, Jews could 
register their nationality based on their current feelings and not according to 1930. 
He  thought  that  after  the  experience  of  the  last  years  many  Jews,  who  in  1930 
declared  German  nationality,  would  reconsider  their  previous  ‘superficial’ 
decision.
994 It seems that this proposal was rejected. In August 1944, the National 
Jewish Council discussed the existence of a threat of discrimination against Jews 
during  the  repatriation  and  investigation  of  their  Czechoslovak  citizenship.
995  
Although Frischer denied that any such law was in preparation, the opposite proved 
to be correct.
996  
In late November 1944 Zelmanovits informed the National Jewish Council that 
the Ministry of Social Welfare intended to repatriate only Czechoslovak citizens of 
Czech,  Slovak  (in  fact  Czechoslovak)  and  Ukrainian  nationality.
997 Citizens  of 
German and Hungarian nationality would be repatriated only if they did not pose any 
potential danger for the Republic.
998 The Jewish activists were anxious that, based on 
these plans, Czechoslovak citizens of Jewish nationality might have been deprived of 
their  citizenship.
999  This  issue  brought  together  both  otherwise  alienated 
Czechoslovak  Jewish  ideological  groups:  Agudists  and  Zionists.  Czech Jewish 
assimilationists, however, failed to show enough enthusiasm to fight for non Czech 
Jews.
1000 We  do  not  have  sufficient  information  about  possible  interventions  of 
Czechoslovak Jewish groups, but the government in the end slightly amended its 
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plans. Minister Ripka confirmed it in a discussion with Kubowitzki and Frischer in 
January 1945. The Minister said: 
 
the  Czecho Slovak  approach  in  this  question  was  dominated  by  the 
Czecho Slovak determination to keep as few Germans and Hungarians as 
possible. An exception had been made in favour of Jewish citizens whose 
language is German, unless they opt for German nationality.
1001 
   
  Ripka meant that Jews who declared Jewish nationality and were using the 
German language were to be spared the fate of other ‘Germans’. This ‘favour’ was 
not  granted  to  the  Jews  who  had  declared  German  nationality.  The  ‘treason’ 
committed  in  1930  was,  therefore,  to  be  paid  back  in  1945.  This  proposal  was 
brought  by  the  London  exiles  to  the  negotiations  with  the  Communist  exiles  in 
Moscow. The concerns revealed in 1942 by Weinreich or Weiss and in 1944 by 
Frischer were justified. Also assurances given by Masaryk became worthless when 
facing the radical political programme of the Czechoslovak exiles.  
Historians discussing the Czechoslovak exiles’ treatment of minorities tend to 
overlook  the  Jews.
1002 It  is  justifiable  to  state  that  Jews  did  not  constitute  any 
comprehensive problem for the Czechoslovak government in exile, especially when 
compared  with  three  million  Sudeten  Germans.  It  is  also  correct  that  the 
Czechoslovak authorities did not conduct any diplomatic negotiations with the major 
powers that would deal with the Jewish status in liberated Czechoslovakia. Yet there 
is another part of the whole problem that deserves our attention. In 1942 and 1943, 
the Czechoslovak exiles severed all contacts with the Sudeten German democratic 
exiles around Wenzel Jaksch.
1003 Subsequently, the Jews constituted the major group 
that could raise the issue of minorities’ protection when negotiating with the Beneš 
government. Jewish groups in the west tried to raise these issues when negotiating 
the  post war  status  of  minorities  in  Czechoslovakia.  The  documented  political 
support  of  the  Zionist  movement  showed  that  the  Czechoslovak  authorities  took 
Jewish  demands  seriously.  They  offered  to  the  Zionists  an  option  for  the 
development of their national claims without harming the Czechoslovaks’ intention 
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of clearing the society  of all groups whose loyalty was questioned. The political 
negotiations analysed here were hence important for the discussion of minorities’ 
issues as a whole. 
As during the first war years, several factors influenced the London exiles’ 
decision to reject the special status of the Jews in liberated Czechoslovakia. Firstly, 
the role of the Czechoslovak underground movements in Bohemia and Moravia, and 
in Slovakia has already been highlighted. Secondly, the exiles rejected the system of 
minority protection as a whole. Thirdly, the government did not consider the Jews as 
an entirely reliable minority. Every individual, who did not perceive himself first and 
foremost  as  being  Czechoslovak  (or  Czech  or  Slovak),  was  looked  upon  with 
suspicion. Some officials in the Foreign Ministry, for example, clearly opposed any 
benefits  given  to  Zionists  or  any  negotiations  with  them.  Members  of  the 
Czechoslovak  Zionist  organization  in  Palestine,  Hitachdut  Olei  Czechoslovakia, 
were  even  labelled  as  ‘traitors’  and  negotiations  with  them  were  not 
recommended.
1004 Horský  of  the  foreign  ministry  complained  to  Ripka  that  the 
government was too pro Zionist and the approach should be more ‘balanced’.
1005 
Horský likewise argued that the Zionists had formed a distinct minority in pre war 
Czechoslovakia  and  they  did  not  feel  Czechoslovak.
1006  This  recommendation 
consequently  caused  Ripka’s  refusal  to  address  a  meeting  of  the  United  Jewish 
Appeal in June 1944, although he had promised to attend the gathering before.
1007  
  Fourthly, the situation in the Czechoslovak army in the west alienated the 
government and Jewish groups. In early 1942, some army journalists were successful 
in initiating anti Semitic discussion on the pages of the official Czechoslovak press, 
Čechoslovák. Editors of the newspaper allegedly allowed such discussion to show 
the decadence of anti Semitic thinking; that is to document the moral prevalence of 
democratic ideals.
1008 As it was, the initial article called Dva světy (Two Worlds) was 
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not well received in the west and also the ‘educational purpose’ of the discussion, as 
suggested by the editorial board, was not fully comprehended.
 1009  
Although accusations of anti Semitism against the Czechoslovak army did 
not reach the level they did earlier, in 1940, the army itself was indeed not freed from 
anti Semitism. There was always the possible danger of this being exposed during a 
public campaign in the British press or House of Commons.
1010 This danger was 
among the main concerns of the Czechoslovak leadership. Shortly before D Day, the 
Defence  Minister  Ingr  warned  army  officials  that  in  order  to  cause  harm  to  the 
Czechoslovaks,  ‘some  anti Czechoslovak  circles’  might  utilize  the  pre invasion 
period to raise the issue of the army’s anti Semitism.
1011 These concerns were not 
entirely  baseless.  In  spring  1944  the  leftist  and  allegedly  pro Soviet  National 
Committee for Civil Liberties initiated a large scale campaign against anti Semitism 
in the Polish army.
1012 Tom Driberg MP even brought the affair to the House of 
Commons.
1013 Subsequently, the Czechoslovaks’ concerns about the publicity given 
to certain incidents in their army seemed justifiable. No difference was made by the 
fact that the whole Polish affair was most probably caused by pro Soviet sentiments 
of  the  aforementioned  MPs.
1014 No  similar  campaign  was  launched  against  the 
Czechoslovaks who were generally considered as pro Soviet.
1015 Nevertheless, the 
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whole  campaign  against  anti Semitism  in  the  Allied  armed  forces  was  in  the 
Czechoslovaks’ eyes another proof that the Jews had the ability to complicate the 
Czechoslovak diplomatic position.  
All  the  aforementioned  factors  thus  contributed  to  the  Czechoslovaks’ 
decision that Jews who did not want to assimilate should not stay in the post war 
Republic.  Their  particularistic  interests  and  at  the  same  time  the  existence  of  a 
powerful pro Jewish lobby in western countries was perceived as causing more harm 
than good to the Czechoslovak cause. On 12 March 1945, Ripka announced to the 
press  that  all  Jews  would  enjoy  full  equality  as  individual  citizens  in  liberated 
Czechoslovakia. No group minority rights would be restored. Zionists ‘will be  able 
to  leave  for  Palestine  and  the  Czechoslovak  authorities  will  help,  with  friendly 
understanding, to organize the emigration of Zionists living in Czechoslovakia to 
their own National State’.
1016 
  In any case, post war order in Czechoslovakia was prepared in London and in 
Moscow.  The  Czechoslovak  Communists  had  moved  during  the  war  from  the 
periphery of the Czechoslovak political spectrum to its centre. It became obvious that 
the  Communists  did  not  want  to  be  second  fiddle  in  the  negotiations  conducted 
between 1943 and 1945. It is therefore necessary to introduce their vision of the 
Jewish position in post war Czechoslovakia. Did it correspond with the plans already 
prepared by the Beneš government in London? 
 
The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Jews during the war 
The  underground  movement  and  exiles  linked  with  the  internationally 
recognised  President  Beneš  played  the  main  role  in  the  Czechoslovak  resistance 
during  most  of  the  war.  Nevertheless,  with  the  coming  liberation  and  the 
international importance of the Soviet Union their Czechoslovak protégés, the CPC, 
had  to  be  considered  when  discussing  the  future  Czechoslovakia.
1017 The  CPC 
consisted of several power centres. During the war the illegal Central Committee in 
occupied Bohemia and Moravia and an underground centre in Tiso Slovakia were 
formed. However, the pre war Communist leadership escaped to Moscow after the 
                                                                                                                                          
that he had persuaded the Foreign Office to transfer some of the Polish Jewish soldiers to the British 
army. The reason was to be crude anti Semitism ruling in the Polish army.  
1016 The Jewish Chronicle, 23 March 1945, p. 9, ‘Full Equality for Czech Jews. Minister’s Important 
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1017 Agnew, Hugh LeCaine, The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown (Stanford, CA: Hoover 
Institution Press, 2004), pp. 220f;  237 
Munich Diktat and formed the Central Committee of the CPC abroad. The main 
leaders of the Party in Moscow were: the pre war chairman of the Central Committee, 
Klement  Gottwald,  and  his  close  associates  including  Rudolf  Slánský,  Václav 
Kopecký, Bohumil Šmeral, the Slovak, Viliam Široký and others.
1018 The Moscow 
headquarters  indisputably  played  a  more  prominent  role  in  setting  the  political 
directives  than  Beneš  did  in  his  contacts  with  democratic  underground  in  the 
Protectorate.
1019 Other centres of the exile Communist party were formed in Paris 
and later in London. Prominent Party members, for example Vladimír Clementis,
1020 
Václav Nosek, or Karel Kreibich were involved in the west. 
 
Image no. 10: Klement Gottwald
1021 
During the war, the political programme of the CPC was dictated by the Third 
Communist International, Comintern, in Moscow.
1022 Hence, the Communists did not 
cooperate  with  the  Beneš  exiled  movement  between  August  1939,  when  the 
Ribbentrop Molotov pact was signed, and June 1941, when the Axis attacked the 
Soviet Union.
1023 The official western Czechoslovak administration was labelled as 
waging war in the interest of British and French imperialism and Czech anti German 
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chauvinism.
1024 The CPC, following the policy of the Soviet Union, did not officially 
differentiate  among  people  in  the  national  and  ethnic  sense.  The  German  and 
Austrian working class was thus perceived as one of the allies in the Communist 
struggle  against  Hitler’s  imperialism  and  the  capitalists  who  paved  his  way  to 
power.
1025 For the Communists, a German worker was a closer ally than the Beneš 
government. They likewise rejected the Protectorate leading circles, including the 
Hácha government.
1026  
We  do  not  have  any  comprehensive  sources  documenting  the  Communist 
perception of Jews during the first war years. The Nazi persecution of Protectorate 
Jewry occasionally found its way into the illegal Communist newspaper Rudé Právo 
(The Red Right/Law), but the theme was not systematically followed. The emphasis 
was put on the participation of the ‘ruling classes’, for example the Hácha National 
Solidarity (Národní souručenství), in the Nazi laws directed against the Jews.
1027 The 
Protectorate government’s actions were contrasted with the true will of the Czech 
nation that was allegedly looking up to the Soviet Union.
1028 The socialist country 
was  presented  as  a  land  of  the  new  social  system  that  had  created  respect  and 
friendship among people of all nations and races.
1029 
Comments on the Jewish persecution occasionally appeared, as, for example, 
in September 1941 after the branding of the Jews by the Star of David.
1030 These 
sporadic notes and expressions of sympathies with the persecuted minority were later 
replaced by articles describing the suffering of the Czech nation as a whole.
1031 As in 
the case with the Soviet Union, there was rarely space for the persecuted minorities 
in the official communications of the home and foreign Communist centres.
1032 For 
example, the Communists’ broadcasts over the  BBC and Moscow radio included 
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1025 CNA, Zahraniční vedení KSČ v Moskvě, 1939 1945, box 1, telegrams sent from Moscow by 
Gottwald to the Communist underground in the Protectorate, 16 October 1939, 11 16 March 1940. 
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Communists in London, 21 December 1943. 
1027 Rudé Právo, an issue published in beginning of December 1940, in Rudé Právo 1939 1945 (Praha: 
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369. 
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information about the Jews only sporadically.
1033 In one case, Gottwald attacked the 
Slovak Quislings via Moscow radio in summer 1943. Further, the Communist leader 
accused Hácha of consenting to Protectorate Jewry being sent to Theresienstadt and 
Poland, where they were subsequently killed in Polish death camps by shooting, or in 
special carriages filled with chlorine lime.
1034  Gottwald concluded that the Germans, 
as  well  as  the  Protectorate  and  Slovak  collaborators  had  to  be  met  with  proper 
retribution  after  the  war.
1035 Similar  arguments  could  be  heard  in  broadcasts  by 
Clementis via the London BBC as well as in the London exiles’ general attacks on 
the  Tiso  regime.
1036 London  was,  on  the  contrary,  apparently  reluctant  to  attack 
Hácha  and  his  Protectorate  government.
1037 This  was  a  clear  difference  between 
London’s and Moscow’s responses to the persecution of the Jews in the Protectorate.  
The  future  of  Jews  in  post war  Czechoslovakia  failed  to  attract  much 
attention from the leading Communists. We are thus dependent on articles published 
by lower rank functionaries, or on the Communists’ general attitude towards other 
minorities.  This  issue  opens  the  question  of  how  the  Czechoslovak  Communists 
perceived Jews as such. When discussing the future of minorities, the Communists 
never alluded to Jews. For example, a Czechoslovak German Communist in London, 
Karel Kreibich referred to Jews by using the term ‘Stammesgenossen’.
1038 This can 
be  translated  as  members  of  a  tribe,  but  definitely  not  as  a  nation.  The  Jews, 
according to this label, belonged together, in a community, but did not reach the level 
of a nation. This perception of Jews resembled the views revealed in London by 
Beneš.  
The Communists likewise perceived Czech and Slovak Jews as a community 
in transition between two national communities. Czech Jews were moving from the 
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German national and cultural surrounding to the Czech side. This process, according 
to Kreibich, had been completed before the outbreak of the war.
1039 Also the Slovak 
Jews  had  started  their  transition  from  the  Hungarian  to  the  Slovak  national 
community  before  the  war.
1040  This  assessment  of  the  Jewish  situation  in 
Czechoslovakia  went  hand  in  hand  with  Kreibich’s  call  for  all  Jews  to  join  the 
Czechoslovak  struggle  for  the  freedom  of  the  Republic  unconditionally.
1041 That 
would  definitely  prove  their  allegiance  to  the  Czech  and  Slovak  nations.  These 
Communist  remarks  directed  at  the  Jews  coincided  with  the  slow  change  of  the 
official Communist policy towards the German minority in post war Czechoslovakia. 
Until  late  1943,  Moscow  headquarters  followed  a  programme  that  stressed 
differences between, on the one side, the German proletariat and, on the other, the 
military and political leadership, supported by the bourgeoisie and capitalists.
1042  
 
Image no. 11: Karel Kreibich
1043 
Only when Stalin, during Beneš’s December 1943 visit to Moscow, expressed 
his approval of the Czechoslovak plans for the transfer of Germans did the CPC 
change its political argument.
1044 A letter sent on 21 December 1943 by Gottwald to 
the Communists in London suggested that although the CPC was against the general 
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transfer as such, all guilty Sudeten Germans were supposed to lose Czechoslovak 
citizenship and would be forced to leave the country.
1045 The internationalist element 
of the cooperation of the working classes was soon replaced by the emphasized front 
of  Slavonic  nations  under  the  leadership  of  the  victorious  Soviet  Union.
1046  
According  to  this  programme,  Czechoslovakia  was  to  become  a  purely  Slavonic 
country of Czechs, Slovaks and Ruthenians.
1047 
Communists  in  London  repeatedly  appealed  to  the  Jews  to  decide 
unconditionally for the Czech side. Pavel Reimann published in Einheit, ‘a Sudeten 
German anti Fascist fortnightly’, an article called ‘Juden am Scheidewege’ (‘Jews at 
the Cross road’).
1048 It told the story of ‘a well known’ Jewish writer, called by a 
cover name ‘Dr. Bergner’, who had been recently murdered in Poland. ‘Dr. Bergner’ 
was born in Prague before the First World War and was, like many Jews at that time, 
brought up in German cultural surroundings. He worked in Germany after 1918 and 
left only when Hitler came to power. Reimann used ‘Dr. Bergner’ as an example of a 
Jew who did not recognize that his adherence to the Germans, even after the defeat 
of the German militarism in 1918, was ‘rotten and decayed’ (‘morsch und faul’).
1049 
Reimann suggested to the Jews that they had to fight against the Germans and join 
the Czechoslovak resistance movement.
1050 Furthermore, in January 1943, Kreibich 
roused the Jews saying that they had to revenge their murdered Stammesgenossen. 
They could not just sit at the bank of Babylon, Thames, or Hudson and wail. They 
should fight under the motto ‘Liberation and Revenge’ (‘Befreiung und Rache’).
1051 
These articles documented the stereotypical perception of Jews as cowardly, passive 
and wavering in their national feelings. 
                                                 
1045 CNA, Zahraniční vedení KSČ v Moskvě, 1938 1945, box 2, file 12, Gottwald to the Czechoslovak 
Communists in London, 21 December 1943. Those Sudeten Germans that would not be found guilty 
of crimes against the Republic ought to be allowed to choose between Czechoslovak and German 
citizenship.  All  the  Germans  who  took  part  in  the  resistance  movement  were  to  be  given 
Czechoslovak nationality automatically.  
1046 CNA, Zahraniční vedení KSČ v Moskvě, 1939 1945, box 2, file 12, Gottwald, 21 December 1943, 
Several suggestions for the management of the radio propaganda from London.  
1047 CNA, Jan Šverma Papers, box 2, file 7,  manuscript of an article  ‘Národnostní problém  nové 
republiky’ [Nationality issue in the new Republic], published by Šverma on 15 June 1944, probably in 
Československé listy in Moscow.  
1048 CNA, Karel Kreibich Papers, box 14, Pavel Reimann, ‘Juden am Scheidewege’, in Einheit, 16 
January 1943, pp. 21f. 
1049 Ibid. 
1050 Ibid. 
1051 CNA, Karel Kreibich Papers, box 14, Karel Kreibich, ‘Antisemitismus und Judenschlaechterei’, in 
Einheit, 1 January 1943, p. 5f. 242 
The official Party line towards the Jews was summarized in July 1944 by the 
Communist ideologue Václav Kopecký in Moscow.
1052 It is the only comprehensive 
evaluation of the so called ‘Jewish question’ by a leading Communist during the war. 
The article, published in Československé listy, could be considered as an important 
contribution to the Czechoslovak struggle against anti Semitic prejudices. Yet the 
new  Communist  vision  of post war  Czechoslovakia  found  its  clear  expression  in 
Kopecký’s argument as well. The post war Republic was introduced as a nationally 
Slavonic country, with strong ties to the Soviet Union.
1053 In this article, the mighty 
ally in the east was celebrated, in a clear comparison with the west, as a country 
where  no prejudices  were  rooted.  Anti Semitism  was labelled  as  an  invention  of 
capitalist, bourgeois circles.
 1054  
 
Image no. 12: Václav Kopecký in 1937 (Copyright LIFE.com)
1055 
 
The Communist and pro Soviet political bias was omnipresent in this exposé. 
Kopecký also argued that the Czechoslovak army in Britain, based on the chaotic 
manner  in  which  it  had  been  formed,  included  anti Semitic  elements.  Such  a 
development was out of the question in the case of the Czechoslovak Svoboda army 
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in  the  Soviet  Union.
1056 The  working class,  he  said,  including  that  in  western 
countries,  had  been  liberated  from  these  undemocratic  prejudices.
1057 Moreover, 
Kopecký suggested that the Czech and Slovak nations did not express anti Semitic 
tendencies  thanks  to  the  pedagogical  influences  of  Tomáš  Garrigue  Masaryk.
1058 
Also Hácha and the Slovak Government authorities were not able to impose anti 
Semitic  poison  on  the  Czech  and  Slovak  people.  Anti Semitism  was  perceived 
simply  as  a  platform  where  anti democratic,  anti Soviet  and  anti working  class 
elements could meet.
1059    
Kopecký  devoted  the  main  part  of  his  analysis  to  the  national  and  social 
reasons behind anti Semitic prejudices. He focused on their role in the restitution of 
the Jewish position in post war Czechoslovakia. Kopecký explained the historical 
development in Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia that caused the adherence of a large 
part of Jews to the German and Hungarian nations. There was a definite change in 
their national behaviour during the interwar period, when most of the Jews decided 
for  the  Czech  nation.
1060 As  stated  by  Kopecký,  this  de Germanization  and  de 
Magyarization  was  completed  during  the  Second  World  War.
1061  However, 
concerning  the position  of  Jews  in post war  Czechoslovakia,  Kopecký  adopted  a 
discourse closely resembling that of the Czechoslovak politicians in the west: 
 
It is clear: in connection with Czechoslovak citizens of Jewish origin, 
those Jews who feel themselves to be Germans or Hungarians must face the 
same measures that will be taken against the Germans and Hungarians in 
Czechoslovakia. The liquidation of anti Semitism does not mean that we 
will grant the Jews special privileges if they feel themselves to be Germans 
or Hungarians. Nor will we allow those who feel themselves to be Germans 
and Hungarians to hide their true feelings behind the claim of Jewishness. 
Liquidation  of  anti Semitism  cannot  be  allowed  to  cause  harm  to  the 
national and Slavic character of the future Czechoslovak Republic.
1062 
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The  Communists,  therefore,  explicitly  argued  that  not  all  Jews  should  be 
allowed to stay, or return to Czechoslovakia. Even more significant was Kopecký’s 
suggestion that the determination of who among the Jews was German should not be 
done based on their own feelings, but on the examination of their conduct before and 
during  the  war.
1063 At  the  same  time,  contrary  to  the  Beneš  exiles  in  London, 
Kopecký stated that Jews, who wanted to declare Jewish nationality, might retain this 
privilege.
1064 They  would  have  all  rights,  including  religious,  as  other  citizens of 
Czechoslovakia. It is not entirely clear whether Kopecký by this statement meant 
group minority rights or basically the equal rights of ‘a citizen’.
1065 Nevertheless, this 
opportunity was not to serve as a disguise for German and Hungarian Jews who 
wanted to stay in the Republic.  
In the case of the Communists, social issues in connection with Czech and 
Slovak  Jews  were  also  shaped  by  the  Communist  doctrine.  Jews  were  to  be 
‘cleansed’  of  socially  ‘disloyal’  elements.  Kopecký  argued  that  ‘big  capitalist 
bloodsuckers’  and  ‘panic  mongers’  were  not  to  be  allowed  to  come  back  to 
Czechoslovakia. The criteria again rested in the pre war conduct of an individual.
1066 
The  post war  screening  of  the  Jews,  as  well  as  other  people,  was  to  take  into 
consideration  both  the  political  and  social  behaviour  of  an  individual.
1067  
Nationalization  of  big  properties  owned  by  Jewish  capitalists  was  a  part  of  the 
Communist programme. The alleged intention of the CPC was that the so called 
‘Jewish question’, based on a negative perception of the Jewish minority, was to 
cease to exist.
1068 The German and Hungarian minorities were to be considerably 
reduced  and  the  fate  of  the  Jews  was  to  be  decided  based  on  their  ‘national 
behaviour’ prior to the conflict. For Jews, who did not commit any crime against the 
Czechoslovak  Republic,  only  two  options  remained:  assimilation  or  adherence  to 
Jewish nationalism.  
With the end of the war in sight, the ideological approaches of both the exiled 
branches  of  the  resistance  movement  towards  the  Jews  became  almost  identical. 
Further,  an  important  shift  occurred  in  the  Communist  relationship  to  Jewish 
nationals. This Communist vision of the Jewish position in liberated Czechoslovakia 
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was revealed to the public by Erik Kolár shortly after the liberation of Prague on 
Czech Radio in June 1945.
1069 He called for complete equality for the Jewish citizens 
of  the  Republic,  including  restitution  of  their  property.  The  proper  education  of 
children he said, would eradicate any anti Semitic sentiments that had become more 
pronounced during the war. Kolár also explicitly highlighted what he perceived as 
the most prominent issue in the struggle once and for all to overcome the so called 
‘Jewish problem’: 
 
One more painful problem must be mentioned; national anti Semitism. 
There is no doubt that the older Jewish generation was educated in the 
German  spirit.  The  problem  of  this  generation  was  solved  in  the  gas 
chambers in Oswiecim. The young generation, part of which survived the 
terror of the concentration camp, has had a Czech education. There is no 
language problem among these people. Only a small part remains of the 
middle aged generation, which professed to be German. These Germans 
must  realize  that  the  Czechoslovak  Republic  is  now  a  national  state. 
There is no doubt that these Germans who endured racial persecution will 
be treated like other anti Fascist and anti Nazi German citizens of our 
State,  who  in  accordance  with  the  Government's  programme,  will  be 
considered loyal citizens and will not be deprived of their citizenship. It is 
hoped  that  they  will  have  enough  political  wisdom  not  to  create  any 
obstacles to the complete assimilation of the Jewish Czechs. The same is 
expected of the so called Jewish nationals, the Zionists.  
[…] 
The Jewish public [...] must realize that there are only two alternatives: 
either Jewish nationality in an independent Jewish State, or complete and 
full  assimilation  with  the  nation  in  whose  midst  they  [live].  A  half 
measure  is  illogical  and  would  only  prolong  the  solution  of  the 
problem.
1070 
  
Similarly, at the first founding meeting of the Council of the Jewish Religious 
Congregations in September 1945, Kopecký repeated this perception of the Jewish 
position in Czechoslovakia. He stated that although the assimilation of Jews was 
desirable,  adherence  to  Jewish  nationalism  would  not  be  obstructed.
1071  The 
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Communist  support  of  Jewish  nationalism  was  in  accordance  with  their  general 
attitude towards various nations in post war Czechoslovakia. They supported Slovak 
nationalism, for example. This backing slowly waned when, in the 1946 elections, 
the majority of Slovaks rejected  the Slovak Communists and decided for the Slovak 
Democratic Party, linked with the Catholic Church and the former war time People’s 
Party.  
However, as in the case with the London exiles, the more radical politicians 
came from the ranks of the Communist underground movement. Many of the Slovak 
Communists survived the war in hiding and later contributed to the preparation and 
execution of the Slovak National Uprising that broke out on 29 August 1944.
1072 
Jews proportionally constituted a considerable part of the Slovak underground and 
were prominent among the resistance fighters during the uprising.
1073 But it seems 
they were never entirely trusted. They allegedly behaved badly, worked on behalf of 
the  Slovak  security  service,  and  disclosed  secrets  when  interrogated  by 
authorities.
1074 
Prejudices  against  the  Jews  were  revealed  by  Ladislav  Novomeský,  a 
Communist member of the Slovak National Council (SNC) delegation that visited 
London in October 1944.
1075 One of the first decrees issued by the SNC after the 
outbreak  of  the  uprising  cancelled  all  the  undemocratic  legislation  of  the  Slovak 
State,  including  all  anti Jewish  laws.
1076 Novomeský  suggested  that  the  Jewish 
persecution  provoked  considerable  pro Jewish  sympathies  among  the  Slovak 
population. Yet he noted that one of the main tasks of the SNC was to make sure that 
the Jewish question ceased to exist in Slovakia.
1077 One of the ways to achieve this 
goal was the adjustment of the Jewish position in Slovak society. The main cause of 
Slovak anti Semitism was, according to Novomeský, the disproportional presence of 
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the  Jews  in  big  business  and  among  capitalists.
1078 He  furthermore  repeated  the 
allegations against inadequate Jewish national connection with the Slovak nation, 
expressed by their adherence to Hungarian and German identity.
1079 It was, he said, 
in  the  Jewish  interest  that  they  should  not  play  a  prominent  role  in  the  Slovak 
economy. Novomeský also attacked alleged Jewish behaviour in liberated Slovakia. 
The Slovak population perceived what it saw as the Jewish unwillingness to join the 
reconstruction work.
1080 Jews, he said, claimed that they had already suffered too 
much and, because of this, sometimes ‘brutal methods’ had to be used to force them 
to work.
1081 Anti Semitic prejudices like these can be traced in the discourse of the 
Communist leaders.  
The  attitude  of  the  CPC  towards  the  Jews  developed  from  revolutionary 
internationalism to outspoken Czecho/Slovak, Slavonic nationalism. The Communist 
exiles adopted pro Slavonic discourse and became strict defenders of the national 
cleansing of Czechoslovakia. Also illegal Communist branches in occupied Bohemia 
and Moravia, and in Slovakia, contributed to the radicalization of the Communist 
programme  in  connection  with  Jewish  issues.  With  the  coming  liberation  of 
Czechoslovakia, both exiled branches of the Czechoslovak resistance met in Moscow 
to discuss post war order in the Republic. How the post war position of the Jews was 
shaped by developments during the war is the subject of the next section.    
 
Post war Czechoslovakia and the Jews 
The main part of the Czechoslovak government in exile, including President 
Beneš, left  London for  the liberated Czechoslovak territories on 11 March 1945. 
Their journey firstly led to Moscow, for political negotiations with the Communists. 
They discussed the formation of the new government and its political programme 
until the first post war elections.
1082 The negotiations proved that the Communists 
intended  to  play  the  decisive  role  in  the  new  Republic.
1083 Beneš’s  position  as 
President was not questioned, but Zdeněk Fierlinger, the Czechoslovak Ambassador 
to Moscow, both a Social Democrat and an admirer of the Soviet system, became 
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Prime Minister.
1084 Only four parties in Bohemia and Moravia, and four in Slovakia 
were allowed to function and they formed the National Front, a coalition government 
ruling without opposition. The Communists themselves were allocated the posts of 
two of five deputy Prime Ministers and other important portfolios in the government, 
including the Ministry of the Interior. The new government was sworn into office at 
the beginning of April and moved to Košice, in Eastern Slovakia, as its provisional 
seat.  
The heartland of Bohemia and Moravia was one of the last parts of the Nazi 
occupied  territories  liberated  by  the  Allied  forces.  The  US  army  reached  Pilsen 
(Plzeň) in Western Bohemia on 5 May 1945. It was, however, the Soviet army that, 
according to the Soviet American agreement, finally liberated Prague in the morning 
of 9 May 1945. The government, arriving from Košice, was welcomed at Prague 
airport  by  Soviet  soldiers.  It  served  as  a  symbol  of  the  new  order  in  liberated 
Czechoslovakia. The Communists indeed scored almost 40 percent in the first post 
war  elections  in  May  1946.  However,  they  did  not  reach  a  majority  and  the 
government of the National Front continued to function until February 1948 when 
the Communist coup took place. Four key factors shaped the position of Jews in 
post war Czechoslovakia: 
1)  Anti Semitism in Bohemia and Moravia and especially in Slovakia 
survived the downfall of German rule.
1085 
2)  In  relation  to  other  minorities,  Jewish  themes  developed  in  the 
background of extensive population transfers. Almost three million 
Sudeten Germans were forced to leave the country as a way of 
solving the centuries long struggle between Czechs and Germans.  
3)  The  attitude  towards  the  Jews  developed  in  an  atmosphere  of 
political  struggle  between  the  pro democratic  part  of  the 
Czechoslovak political scene and the Communists. 
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4)  The  different  war time  experience  in  Slovakia,  with  strong 
autonomous tendencies still surviving after the war, shaped Slovak 
political parties’ policies towards the Jews as well.  
As  an  umbrella,  covering  all  these  four  factors,  Czech  and  Slovak 
nationalisms shaped development in post war Czechoslovakia in relation to the Jews.  
There were fewer than 20,000 Jews in the historical lands of Bohemia and 
Moravia  after  liberation  and  approximately  30,000  Jews  in  Slovakia.
1086 They 
constituted approximately one fifth of the pre war Czechoslovak Jewish population. 
In spite of this loss, the now insignificant minority encountered significant obstacles 
when trying to re join Czechoslovak society.
1087 Besides the trauma of survivors, of 
people who often lost their whole families in Nazi extermination camps, the majority 
population frequently looked upon the survivors and their demands with suspicion. 
Although suggestions presented by Frischer in his Memorial Treatise in March 1944 
were  moderate  in  comparison  with  other  Zionists,  they  still  contradicted  the 
philosophy of the new Czechoslovak state.  
First,  not  all  Jews  who  lived  in  pre war  Czechoslovakia  were  allowed  to 
regain Czechoslovak citizenship. Those excluded were especially Jews of German 
and  Hungarian  nationality.  The  first  post war  government’s  programme  included 
rules for the withdrawing of Czechoslovak citizenship. It referred especially to the 
people, who during the last pre war census in 1930 (3 years before Hitler came to 
power  in  Germany)  declared  German  or  Hungarian  nationality.  According  to 
available information, between 2,000 and 3,000 Jewish survivors belonged in this 
category.
1088 The law listed several groups of people who were excluded from this 
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1087 Historiography: Brod, Petr, ‘Židé v poválečném Československu’, pp. 177 189; Hanková, Monika, 
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Czechoslovakia by 30 December 1946. See Staněk, Tomáš, Odsun Němců z Československa 1945 
1947, p. 343. See also Archiv Bezpečnostních složek ministerstva vnitra ČR, Prague (ABS), 425 231 
2,  Frischer’s  meeting  with  Beneš,  8  May  1946.  Frischer  mentioned  that  the  Jewish  community 250 
directive and were allowed, if they wanted, to stay in Czechoslovakia. The first, hazy 
definition of this exemption did not include people who were persecuted by the Nazis, 
only those who fought against them before and during the war.
1089 Later on, a precise 
directive was published as a part of the Constitutional Decree of President Beneš, no. 
33/1945 Sb. on 2 August 1945. It stated: 
 
The persons […] who can prove that they remained faithful to the 
Czechoslovak Republic, who have never committed offence against the 
Czech  and  Slovak  nations  and  either  actively  collaborated  in  the 
liberation of Czechoslovakia or suffered under the Nazi or Fascist terror, 
are allowed to retain their Czechoslovak citizenship.
1090  
 
All  three  conditions  had  to  be  complied  with.  The  final  decision  in  each 
particular case was left to regional National Committees, to people who very often 
had personal interests in depriving Jews of their citizenship.
1091 The pretext was the 
alleged Jewish support of German and Hungarian minorities, very often expressed 
only by their usage of ‘improper’ languages, or attendance of nationally ‘improper’ 
schools.  
Immediately  after  his  return  to  Czechoslovakia,  Frischer  informed 
Czechoslovak Jews in London that Czechs had started to inquire of individual Jews 
whether  they  had  declared  German  nationality  in  1930.
1092 Some  local  National 
Committees  issued  slightly  different  directives  that  first  of  all  investigated  the 
language used by the claimants before and during the war. This directive was, for 
example,  issued  in  Olomouc,  in  Moravia.
1093 Jews,  who  in  1930  declared  Jewish 
nationality but used German as their means of communication, could retain their 
citizenship only if their active support of the Czech national movement during the 
war could be proved. As the Jewish Religious Congregation in Olomouc bitterly 
remarked,  it  was  difficult  to  support  Czech  resistance  from  the  concentration 
                                                                                                                                          
estimated the number of ‘German Jews’ in Czechoslovakia at 2,500, but that the final number was 
probably lower.  
1089  The  Košice  government  programme.  See  http://www.svedomi.cz/dokdoby/1945_kosvlpr.htm 
(accessed 30 March 2010). 
1090 Jech, Karel – Kaplan, Karel (eds.), Dekrety Prezidenta republiky. Dokumenty. Druhé vydání, p. 
345, document 21, Constitutional decree of the President of the Republic no. 33, 1945 Sb. on 2 August 
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1091 Bumová, Ivica, ‘Protižidovské výtržnosti v Bratislave v historickom kontexte (August 1946)’, in 
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1092 CZA, A280/42, Frischer to the Social Council of Jews from Czechoslovakia, 3 June 1945. For 
German translation of this letter see, CZA S26/1245. 
1093 ABS, 425 232 1, Jewish Religious Congregation in Olomouc to Frischer, 6 June 1945. 251 
camps.
1094 Similarly, the National Council in Ústí nad Labem (Aussig) in Northern 
Bohemia decided that all Jews, who had declared German nationality in 1930, were 
considered  German  despite  the  fact  that  they  had  been  persecuted  during  the 
occupation.
1095  
The  reason  behind  these  more  stringent  rules  appeared  to  be  material 
concerns  of  the  local  National  Committees’  members.  To  have  the  ‘proper 
nationality’ was one of the preconditions for restitution of property confiscated by 
the Nazis, in the case of Jews during the so called process of aryanization.
1096 As 
suggested by Yeshayahu Jelínek: ‘It was easy to deny someone his proper national 
identity  on  the  basis  of  language,  and  then  to  hinder  the  restitution  of  his 
property’.
1097 In several cases, Jews were labelled by local authorities as Hungarian 
or German, with the sole purpose of allowing the confiscation of Jewish property.
1098 
Based  on  this  confusing  law,  many  German speaking  Jews  were  refused 
Czechoslovak citizenship.
1099 There are even documented cases of Jews who shared 
the fate of almost three million German expellees and were sent in trains to Germany, 
or who, rather than leave, committed suicide.
1100  
What  was  the  role  played  by  the  exiles  in  this  development?  The  last 
paragraph of the Presidential decree stated that fighters against Nazism and those 
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1100 Staněk, Tomáš, Odsun Němců z Československa 1945 1947, pp. 340f. Staněk notes that many 
Jews left Czechoslovakia to Germany voluntarily, but some of them were also forced to join the early 
transfers of German expellees. Furthermore, Staněk argues that Czechoslovak public opinion  was 
inclined not to differentiate among Germans based on their ‘racial’ origin. See also Meyer, Peter et al, 
The Jews in the Soviet Satellites, p. 81. Dr M. Ungerová spent the war in England, voluntarily serving 
in a hospital for Czechoslovak soldiers. After her return to Czechoslovakia, she also immediately went 
to Terezín, former Theresienstadt ghetto, and treated survivors infected with typhus. When she later 
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Ungerová studied at the German University in Prague, used German, or alternatively English and 
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who  suffered  under  the  German  rule  might  retain  Czechoslovak  citizenship.
1101 
Nevertheless, the article, stating that a claimant had to remain faithful to the Republic 
during all that time, allowed local authorities to utilise the law for their own benefit. 
The issue was that too much power was given to individuals who sometimes wanted 
to cover their own past.
1102 Also Beneš later privately agreed that the German Jews 
were being deprived of their citizenship only because of material reasons.
1103 Yet, in 
a conversation with Bartley Crum, a member of the Anglo American Commission of 
Inquiry  on  Palestine,  the  Czechoslovak  President  was  to  remark  that  German 
speaking Jews were sharing the fate of the rest of the German minority and were to 
be deported to Germany.
1104 This was not an accidental development but a planned 
policy of what Benjamin Frommer calls ‘national cleansing’.
1105 The ‘cleansing’ of 
the Czech and Slovak societies simply offered opportunities to gain material profit. 
Under the pretext of defending the interests of the Czech nation, local authorities 
gained access to the property of Jewish claimants.  
Indeed the Jewish usage of German and Hungarian language became the main 
feature  of  anti Semitic  accusations  against  Jewish  survivors.  Based  on  several 
thousands  of  survivors  who  did  not  master  Slavonic  languages,  the  whole  of 
remaining  Jewry  was  again  labelled  as  agents  of  Germanization  and 
Magyarization.
1106  These  sentiments,  repeatedly  stressed  in  the  war time 
communications  of  Czech  and  Slovak  underground  groups  with  London  exiles, 
survived the downfall of the Nazi empire. In the war itself, Frischer appealed to 
Jewish  exiles,  who  intended  to  return  to  Czechoslovakia,  to  learn  Slavonic 
languages.
1107 He admitted that a mature democracy ought not to differentiate among 
people based on the language they used, but Jewish survivors in Czechoslovakia had 
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to accept ‘the reality’.
1108 Also Slovak authorities in 1946 advised the Slovak Jewish 
leadership to persuade the remaining Jews to use only Slavonic languages in public 
and  in  private.
1109 Indeed,  Jewish  politicians,  although  complaining  about  this 
development, recommended to Jewish survivors not to use German or Hungarian in 
public.
1110 In  this  way,  the  Jewish  leadership  accepted  developments  in  post war 
Czechoslovakia. By this act, Jewish organizations further excluded those Jews who 
did not master Slavonic languages and the backlash hit Jewry as a whole. 
As mentioned previously, the alleged defence of Czech and Slovak nations 
offered  justification  for  actions  conducted  against  the  material  claims  of  Jewish 
survivors. In 1941, the Czechoslovak government published a declaration cancelling 
all the transfers of property made under duress. During the war, Frischer repeatedly 
expressed  concerns  about  the  unwillingness  to  conduct  wholesale  restitution  of 
Jewish property. He was not persuaded about the real intentions of the Czechoslovak 
politicians,  including  Beneš.
1111  However,  Frischer  privately  expressed  his 
understanding concerning the complicated situation in Slovakia.
1112 He realised that 
it would be complicated to ask the pauperised Slovaks to return all the property.
1113 
Likewise Feierabend, the Minister of Finance, in 1943 almost ruled out a complete 
financial  restitution.
1114 He  suggested  that  restitution  would  not  be  feasible  from 
German  sources  obtained  after  the  war  as  indemnification,  or  from  people  who 
enriched  themselves  from  the  aryanized  property.  The  Minister  additionally 
emphasised that no contribution to restitution could come from the Czechoslovak 
state, for example, by higher taxation.
1115 Frischer opposed this argument; the only 
case when Jewish property might not be a part of restitution was if the Czechoslovak 
people after the war decided for nationalization of key industries. But it ought to be 
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applied  generally  and  not  solely  against  aryanized  Jewish  property.
1116 Yet  later, 
during his visit to New York in November 1944, Frischer admitted in front of the 
Jewish gathering that complete restitution would not be possible.
1117  
Underground  sources  informed  the  exiles  about  their  opposition  to  the 
restitution of Jewish property already during the war. In April 1944, General Ingr 
argued during a government meeting that a complete restitution of Jewish property 
would be impossible. The Minister noted that although reports from the occupied 
homeland did not oppose the return of Jews, they opposed the complete restitution of 
their pre war status. The Minister added that the property owned by Jews in pre war 
Czechoslovakia  had  been  disproportionate  to  their  number.  Furthermore,  claimed 
Ingr, not only Jews were persecuted by the Nazis.
1118 In addition, other ministers 
remarked that announcements of general restitution were utilised by the enemies who 
accused  the  government  of  planning  to  give  property  back  to  rich  Jewish 
capitalists.
1119  
Under  the  influence  of  mixed  messages  coming  from  occupied 
Czechoslovakia, the reluctance to return all the aryanised property became apparent 
in London. For example, Ministers Feierabend and Ján Lichner protested against the 
law that was to introduce a restitution decree.
1120 Lichner justified his protest on the 
basis that Slovak peasants received parcelled Jewish estates.
1121 This was therefore 
serving the interest of groups mentioned several times in the Slovak underground 
messages. Consequently, the restitution was accepted by the government only as a 
principle and a specific law was supposed to be discussed later.
1122 Ministers agreed 
that the government would not recognise any transfers of property made under duress. 
But under certain conditions, the property would remain with the recent owners.
1123 
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An identical development can be documented in the case of the Communists. 
Although in December 1943 Gottwald promised restitution of Jewish property (of 
course  still  in  the  line  with  the  Communists  plans  for  nationalization  of  big 
businesses), the Slovak Communists had other intentions.
1124 The Slovak resistance 
was,  according  to  Novomeský,  persuaded  of  the  impossibility  of  the  complete 
restitution of the Jewish pre war position. It was, moreover, argued that to accept 
these plans served the interests of the Jews.  
The delegation of the underground Slovak National Council, visiting London 
in October 1944, ruled out complete restitution.
1125 It was later moderated by one of 
the members of the delegation, Ján Ursíny, an Agrarian politician, during his meeting 
with Frischer.
1126 Ursíny stressed that in cases where small areas of agricultural land 
were transferred to Slovaks, compensation would be offered to the affected Jews. 
Frischer and the National Jewish Council were not, however, entirely persuaded of 
the sincerity of his words.
1127  
Their concerns proved to be correct after the liberation of Czechoslovakia. 
Restitution in Slovakia was one of the ‘Jewish themes’ that became part of the main 
political  struggle.  During  the  war,  Beneš  and  the  exile  government  repeatedly 
stressed that a final settlement in the post war Republic would be decided by people 
at home.
1128 Indeed, the will of the people was to play an important role in hindering 
the full restitution of Jewish property in Slovakia. A discussion about the restitution 
decree took place during a government meeting in liberated Czechoslovakia in May 
1945.
1129 The  Minister  of  Justice,  Jaroslav  Stránský,  defended  the  section  of  the 
proposed  decree  cancelling  all  transfers  of  property  made  under  duress.  He 
highlighted  the  international  significance  of  the  law  and  argued  that  especially 
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‘influential  Jewish  groups’  in  the  United  States  and  Britain  were  following 
developments.
1130  Slovak  ministers  –  on  behalf  of  the  SNC  –  defended  the 
postponement  of  the  implementation  of  the  restitution  decree  in  Slovakia.  The 
Minister  of  Finance,  Vavro  Šrobár,  a  follower  of  the  Slovak  democratic  stream, 
pointed out that the Slovak population opposed the restitution of property to Jews 
who had not declared Slovak nationality before the war.
1131 The defence of Slovak 
national interest was used against the wholesale restitution of aryanized property. Its 
opponents were, in the end, successful in postponing the decree coming into effect in 
Slovakia.  The  decree  was  issued  with  immediate  effect  only  for  Bohemia  and 
Moravia.
1132  
Jewish property played the main role in another clash with Czech and Slovak 
nationalisms encountered by the Jewish leadership. Approximately 140,000 Czech, 
Austrian, Danish, Dutch, German, Polish and Slovak Jews were between 1941 and 
1945  confined  for  some  time  in  the  Theresienstadt  ghetto.  They  left  behind 
considerable  assets.  Very  often  none  of  the  legal  heirs  survived  the  Nazi 
extermination campaign. Heirless aryanized Jewish property and assets left behind in 
Theresienstadt  constituted  an  important potential  source  for  the  rebuilding  of  the 
Jewish community in Czechoslovakia. Frischer claimed during the war: ‘It will be up 
to us then, to insist that such property be handed over to the entire Jewish community 
as such. Out of the funds the Jewish community will rebuild its synagogues, its social 
and  administrative  buildings.’
1133 Pro Jewish  activists  considered  it  natural  that 
heirless Jewish property would be given to the community in order to help it to re 
establish Jewish life in Czechoslovakia.
1134 In fact, they received Masaryk’s support, 
when the Minister, whilst at the founding UN conference in San Francisco, made the 
following personal declaration: 
 
                                                 
1130 Ibid., p.232 3. 
1131 Ibid.  
1132 Jech, Karel – Kaplan, Karel (eds.), Dekrety Prezidenta republiky. Dokumenty. Druhé vydání, pp. 
216 36, doc. 12. Decree of the President of the Republic no. 5/1945Sb. of 19 May 1945 concerning 
the invalidity of some transactions involving property rights from the time of lack of freedom and 
concerning  the  National  Administration  of  property  assets  of  Germans,  Hungarians,  traitors  and 
collaborators and of certain organizations and associations.  See also Bumová, Ivica, ‘Protižidovské 
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‘take into account’ the specific situation in Slovakia.  
1133  Czechoslovakia  and  the  Czechoslovak  Jews,  addresses  delivered  at  the  meeting  of  the 
Czechoslovak Jewish Representative Committee, p. 29. 
1134 AJA, WJC Papers, C119/3, Riegner to Zelmanovits, 28 May 1945. 257 
Many  of  [the  Jews]  have  left  property  and  no  heirs.  This  property 
naturally  would  be  taken  over  by  the  respective  governments  of  the 
countries, the citizens of which these unfortunates were. It has occurred 
to me that a large part of this should be made available for help and 
reconstruction activities in favor of the surviving Jewish sufferers.
1135 
 
Masaryk at the same time emphasised that he made the statement without any 
consultation  with  the  Czechoslovak  government.
1136  The  following  affair  that 
developed  concerning  the  heirless  property  documented  that  Masaryk  had  only 
limited power in shaping the government’s policy. The Minister of Social Welfare, 
Jozef Šoltéz, intended to use the Jewish property left behind in Terezín, amounting to 
one billion Czech crowns, for general rehabilitation purposes.
1137 Nevertheless, the 
WJC  noted  that  such  property  did  not  belong  only  to  the  Czechoslovak  Jews. 
Property  left  behind  by  deportees  from  Germany,  the  Netherlands,  Poland  and 
elsewhere  was  found  in  Terezín  after  the  war.
1138 Yet  a  significant  part  of  the 
Czechoslovak government considered the assets as belonging to the state and wanted 
to use them for the reconstruction of the Republic.
1139 It was in the interest of the 
Czech  and  Slovak  nations  that  the  money  be  used  for  general  purposes.  Jewish 
claims, perceived as particularistic, were met with disapproval.
1140  
During the complicated development of the restitution process, Jewish themes 
entered mainstream politics. This was especially the case with Slovakia. The former 
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Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland etc. in Theresienstadt – J. L.], and that non Jews will be considered 
after they have made their choice.’ 
1140 AJA, WJC Papers, H98/3, Stephen S. Wise to Lawrence Steinhardt, 14 June 1945; Goldmann to 
Steinhardt, 26 August 1945; Library of Congress Manuscript Division (LOC), Lawrence A. Steinhardt 
Papers,  box  83,  Steinhardt  to  Goldmann  17  September  1945;  Ibid.,  Steinhardt  to  Masaryk  17 
September 1945; Wehle, Kurt, ‘The Jews of Bohemia and Moravia: 1945 1948’, in Avigdor Dagan 
(ed.), The Jews of Czechoslovakia. Historical Studies and Surveys. Volume III. (Philadelphia: The 
Jewish Publication Society of America, 1984), p. 520. 258 
supporters of the Slovak Tiso regime and also people who profited from aryanization 
became important players in the political struggle.
1141 They constituted a source of 
political support in the elections. Besides the Democratic Party, which offered shelter 
to the supporters of the war time regime, the Slovak Communist Party reached the 
conclusion  that  overt  support  for  Jewish  claims  did  not  serve  their  own political 
objectives.  Several  CPC  members  advised  that  the  party  should  be  cautious  in 
considering the fight against anti Semitism and for the restitution of Jewish property. 
CPC chairman Gottwald, for example, allegedly warned Gustav Husák, the leading 
Slovak Communist that the number of new Jewish members of the Party should be 
limited.
1142 In  addition,  the  Slovak  Communist  newspaper, Pravda,  announced  in 
February 1945 that there was no intention of returning all the Jewish property to its 
pre war owners.
1143  
A big debate about anti Semitism in Slovakia took place during the first post 
war meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC in July 1945. Karol Šmidke and 
Eduard  Friš,  both  from  Slovakia,  suggested  that  many  low ranking  Communist 
officials in National Committees shared anti Semitic sentiments.
1144 As explained by 
Friš, the sentiments were caused by the specific situation in Slovakia, with a large 
part  of  the  Jewish  population  still  expressing  their  pro Hungarian  sentiments.
1145 
Jews  were,  furthermore,  allegedly  ‘unduly  sensitive’  and  wanted  all  problems, 
including restitution of their property, to be solved immediately.
1146 Other members 
of  the  Party,  especially  Anežka  Hodinová Spurná  and  Široký,  the  Deputy  Prime 
Minister,  criticized  the  Slovak  Communists.  Hodinová Spurná  claimed  that  the 
problem was not the Jews, but the absence of laws.
1147 In fact, it was the anti Jewish 
riots  that  took  place  in  Slovakia  in  the  autumn  of  1945  which  prompted  the 
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(Boulder, CO: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 109. 
1143 Jelinek, Yeshayahu, ‘The Communist Party of Slovakia and the Jews: Ten Years (1938 48)’, p. 
195. 
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1145 Ibid., p. 235. 
1146 Ibid., p. 235. 
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government to demand the implementation of the restitution law in Slovakia. Široký 
overtly supported these efforts.
1148   
Yet the implementation of the law was again postponed.
1149 Several months 
later,  Samuel  L.  Sharp,  the  WJC  representative  in  post war  Czechoslovakia,  met 
Husák, who had become the head of the Committee of Commissioners, the Slovak 
semi government. Sharp described the meeting as follows:  
 
This Communist leader is known to belong to the wing of the party 
which believes that communists cannot risk their popularity by fighting 
the  deeply  seated  feelings  of  the  population.  He  told  me  that  anti 
Semitism in Slovakia is not seven but seven hundred years old, that the 
Jews  are  impatient  and  ‘make  a  noise’  when  their  demands  are  not 
satisfied [a] hundred percent. […] [He] stated that one cannot remove the 
Partisans who were appointed trustees of Jewish enterprises and property 
before new jobs are found for them.
1150  
 
The main topic of Sharp’s discussion with Husák was the anti Jewish riots in 
Bratislava accompanying the meeting of Slovak partisans in August 1946.
1151 The 
source of the disturbances is still unclear. Jelínek asked whether the Communists had 
helped to initiate the pogroms. The Communist intention might have been to revive 
concerns  about  the  surviving  fascist  tendencies  in  Slovakia.  Consequently,  they 
might  attack  their  main  opponent,  the  Democratic  Party,  who  scored  a  crushing 
victory  in  1946  elections  in  Slovakia.
1152 As  argued  by  historians,  the  Slovak 
Communists’  behaviour  towards  Jews  was  influenced  by  opportunism.  They 
supported  Jewish  claims  only  in  the  cases  that  promised  benefit  for  Communist 
                                                 
1148 Bulínová, Marie (ed.), Československo a Izrael v letech 1945 1956. Dokumenty, doc. 2, p. 26. 
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1150 AJA, WJC Papers, H97/12, Samuel L. Sharp to Kubowitzki, 30 August 1946. 
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political  objectives.
1153 At  the  same  time,  when  support  of popular  anti Semitism 
promised public sympathy, local Communist leaders joined the ranks of the former 
supporters of the authoritarian Slovak Republic. Sharp’s notes of the meeting with 
Husák confirm this conclusion.  
Bohemia and Moravia were not spared anti Jewish disturbances caused by 
the  political  struggle  either.  In  February  1946,  the  Communist  Minister  of  the 
Interior,  Václav  Nosek,  accused  in  a  public  speech  the  Jews  of  the  pre war 
Germanization of Brno, the largest city in Moravia. He labelled them as Germans 
who were later ‘partially persecuted’ because of their Jewish origin.
1154  Moreover, in 
March  1947,  newspapers  in  Czechoslovakia published a  speech by  Kopecký,  the 
Communist Minister of Information. It addressed the issue of Jewish refugees from 
Subcarpathian Ruthenia, now living in Czechoslovakia.
1155 In an address to factory 
workers, Kopecký joined the ranks of the most vicious post war anti Semites:  
 
The  bearded  Solomons  who  are  running  away  from  Sub Carpathian 
Russia from the Socialist Regime […] They did not come alone, but with 
all their relatives up to the tenth degree (these words were pronounced 
with a special accent, and were frantically applauded by the audience) 
[…]. This Jewish scum […] The new white guardists […] many of them 
pushed themselves into the Army after the Red Army had decided already 
the war […]  I  recognise only Czech and Slovak nationality but not a 
Jewish one.
1156 
 
This  report  of  the  speech  confirmed  that  Kopecký’s  remark  found  fertile 
ground among the factory workers. This was perhaps the reason why Kopecký chose 
those particular words.  
This  event  coincided  with  another  affair  that  developed  in  relation  to  the 
restitution of the Jewish property. In March 1947, Emil Beer, the lawful owner of a 
textile factory in Varnsdorf, Northern Bohemia, was denied entry to his property by 
factory  workers.  They  did  not  allow  him  to  take  over  the  property  despite  the 
decision  of  the  district  court,  which  confirmed  Beer  as  the  lawful  owner  of  the 
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factory.
1157 The workers’ committee in cooperation with the district committee of the 
CPC  initiated  a public  campaign  against  Beer  and  went  on  strike.
1158 They  were 
supported by the powerful Central Council of Trade Unions, likewise linked with the 
Communists.
1159 Beer was accused of supporting Germanization before the war and 
was  labelled  as  an  ‘asocial’  element.  In  fact,  Beer  had  attended  Czech  schools, 
supported Czech national organizations and declared Jewish nationality. He spent the 
war in England and supported the Czechoslovak exiles.
1160  
The  non Communist  parties  of  the  National  Front  protested  against  the 
Communist initiated affair, which was later discussed in the parliament.
1161 Yet the 
Communists and the trade unions were in the end successful in preventing Beer’s 
claims.
1162 The basis of the Communist fight against Beer was not his Jewish origin; 
it was just another part of their struggle for the new social order in Czechoslovakia. 
But,  what  is  more  significant,  the  Communists,  as  documented  through  Nosek, 
Kopecký and the Varnsdorf Affair, did not refrain from using anti Semitic discourse 
in  order  to  gain political points.
1163 The  existing  historiography  suggests  that  the 
Varnsdorf  affair  demonstrated  the  politicization  of  the  restitution  of  the  Jewish 
property.
1164 Czech and Slovak nationalisms, and their misuse and utilization in the 
political struggle, thus constituted the main factors that influenced the position of the 
Jews after the war.  
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Conclusion  
  Almost  none  of  the  main  points  in  Frischer’s  Memorial  Treatise  were 
successfully  implemented.  The  demands  presented  by  the  Jewish  member  of  the 
Czechoslovak  State  Council  faced  substantial  obstacles  from  the  side  of  the 
Czechoslovak authorities. Minority rights in Czechoslovakia were not renewed and 
the Jews did not receive any special protection.
1165 As argued in the proposed, but 
not published, constitutional decree of the President ‘about the partial solution of the 
Jewish  question’  no  special  status  for  Jews  was  necessary.
1166 First,  its  authors 
suggested that even minority protection of Jews did not hinder their destruction by 
the Nazis. Moreover, they claimed, Czechs and Slovaks always treated Jews decently. 
Second, there were not enough Jews in post war Czechoslovakia, especially when 
Subcarpathian  Ruthenia  ceased  to  be  part  of  the  Republic.  Third,  even  more 
important was that the young Jewish generation allegedly adhered to Czech culture. 
They no longer belonged to the German cultural milieu and a special, ‘artificial’ 
category of Jewish nationality was not necessary to weaken the German nationality. 
Indeed,  as  argued  by  the  authors  of  the  decree,  the  majority  of  Jews  expressed 
willingness  to  assimilate,  for  example,  when  they  joined  the  Czechoslovak  army 
abroad  and  fought  against  Germany.
1167 This  last  argument  was  entirely  flawed, 
because  many  Zionists  fought  in  the  Czechoslovak  army  during  the  war.  Yet  it 
documented the thinking of Czechoslovak nationalists who argued against the special 
minority status of the Jews. As they concluded, the recognition of ‘an abstract Jewish 
minority’ would break the fundamental principle of the nation state.
1168 
Jews coming back to Czechoslovakia faced many obstacles before they could 
re join society. It was their personal decision whether they wanted to stay in the 
place  of  Nazi  terror,  the  place  of  trauma.  However,  it  also  depended  on  their 
willingness to accept purely Czech or Slovak nationality, to assimilate into the Czech 
and Slovak nations. Yet even Jewish willingness to assimilate was not sufficient. A 
person of Jewish origin, who wanted to stay in Czechoslovakia, was supposed to 
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fulfil one main precondition. They had to prove their loyalty to the Czechoslovak 
state prior to the war. If they had declared German, Hungarian, or in some cases 
Jewish nationality, their citizenship might be in peril. Furthermore, if Jews kept using 
German or Hungarian as a means of communication, it could easily serve as a proof 
of  their  disloyalty.
1169 Only  a  correct  ‘nationality’  and  ‘behaviour’  could  lead  to 
citizenship. This radical Czech nationalism, even chauvinism, was partly a genuine 
expression of the experience of the German occupation. All the main branches of the 
Czechoslovak resistance movement agreed on this solution.   
Nevertheless, the defence of the Czech and Slovak nations in many cases 
served  only  as  a  disguise  for  material  claims  against  Jewish  survivors.  Indeed, 
restitution of Jewish property became the cornerstone of Jewish reintegration into 
Czech  and  Slovak  society.  This  continuity  in  the  development  is  crucial  for  an 
assessment  of  the  exiles’  attitude  towards  the  Jewish  position  in  post war 
Czechoslovakia. As proved by negotiations conducted already in London, the exiles 
could  not  be  exculpated  from  developments  in  post war  Czechoslovakia. 
Controversial and often unclear laws were prepared in London and Moscow, and in 
cooperation with underground groups, particularly from Slovakia. The disunity of 
various Jewish groups – and the exiles were well informed about such tensions – 
made the situation for the government easier.
1170  
Slovakia needs to be singled out as a special case. The development after the 
Slovak  National  uprising  and  in  the  first  post war  years  was  separate  from  the 
historical  lands.  The  central  government,  even  if  willing,  was  not  capable  of 
enforcing full restitution of Jewish property. Neither of the main political parties in 
Slovakia  was  willing  to  challenge  the  prevailing  anti Jewish  sentiments.  The 
utilization of Czech and Slovak anti Jewish sentiments in the political struggle was 
evident. 
Radical  Czech  and  Slovak  national  sentiments  fundamentally  shaped 
Czechoslovaks’  attitude  towards  the  Jews.  Homogeneous  Czechoslovakia,  still 
considered as a democratic country, did not want to have minorities any more. The 
Jews’ particularistic demands were perceived as not being in the interest of post war 
Czechoslovakia. There was, however, another factor that might have significantly 
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shaped the development in the country. Czechoslovakia was very eager to maintain 
the  image  of  a  democratic  country.  Nevertheless,  developments  after  the  war 
threatened to damage this notion and the ‘myth’ of the Masaryk Republic. Negative 
publicity abroad and the interventions of international Jewish organizations might 
have influenced the situation in the country. The Czechoslovak authorities had to 
take this danger of losing their reputation into account.  
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CHAPTER 5: DEFENDING THE ‘DEMOCRATIC MYTH’: THE 
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF CZECHOSLOVAK JEWISH 
RELATIONS IN THE 1940S 
 
 
It  is  also  felt  that  we  should 
investigate  the  possibilities  of 
launching a series of articles in the 
press concerning the situation of the 
Jews in Czechoslovakia. 
   
The  WJC  Office  Committee,  3 
May 1946
1171 
 
 
[O]ur  president  Dr.  Edward 
Benes,  [...]  is  perhaps  one  of  the 
greatest friends the Jews have. 
   
Juraj Slávik, 30 March 1947
1172 
 
Introduction 
The  previous  chapters  presented  a  comprehensive  evaluation  of  Czechoslovak 
Jewish relations, focusing on the Czechoslovak exiles and the immediate post war 
years  in  liberated  Czechoslovakia.  They  documented  the  impact  of  Czech  and 
Slovak nationalisms on Czechoslovak Jewish relations and the Czechs’ and Slovaks’ 
perception of the Jews as such. The  examination of the topic illustrated that the 
suppression of Jewish issues during the war was not intended to harm the Jews. The 
Czechoslovaks  regarded  change  in  the  internal  composition  of  the  Republic  and 
securing the existence of the post war state as the highest priorities. The Jews were 
regularly  seen  as  an  obstacle  in  this  struggle.  Only  the  Jews’  unconditional 
cooperation  in  the  resistance  movement  and  in  the  life  of  the  Czecho Slovak 
national  community  was  therefore  accepted  as  an  assurance  for  their  post war 
presence  in  the  nationally  Slavonic  Czecho Slovak  state.  Furthermore,  the 
government in liberated Czechoslovakia was too weak to prevent the misuse of laws 
by individuals for their own material purposes.  Some political parties also utilised 
anti Jewish discourse to score points in political struggles. There was, nonetheless, 
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another part of the story that was to threaten the Czechoslovaks’ intention to solve 
what they perceived as the ‘Jewish problem’ in Czechoslovakia once and for all. The 
Czechoslovaks’ effort to completely change the national structure of Czechoslovakia 
and their attempt to present the whole process as a deed committed by a democratic 
society was not entirely successful.  
This  chapter  seeks  to  explain  another  dimension  of  the  Czechoslovak 
governments’ treatment of the Jewish issues during and after the war. The frequently 
presented,  praised,  utilised  and  defended  ‘myth’  of  the  exceptionality  of 
Czechoslovak  democracy  was  on  trial  during  the  post war  years.  The 
Czechoslovaks’ adherence to democracy was indeed one of the main cornerstones in 
the  Czechoslovak  struggle  for  the  reestablishment  of  the  Republic.  Yet  the 
homogenization  of  the  Czechoslovak  national  community,  problems  with  the 
citizenship  of  Jewish  survivors,  the  maltreatment  of  the  German speaking  Jews, 
problems with the restitution of Jewish property, surviving anti Jewish sentiments in 
the country and even overt hostility from the Slovak population towards returning 
Jews perilously challenged the Czechoslovaks’ image abroad.  
The chapter will not present a comprehensive description of the development 
in  post war  Czechoslovakia  that  was  broadly  outlined  in  the  last  chapter. 
Furthermore,  contemporary  historiography  already  offers  studies  that  explore  the 
situation of Jews in Czechoslovakia between 1945 and 1948 from various points of 
view.
1173 Instead, the intention here is to follow the scheme presented in the previous 
chapters and to document continuity in the historical development of Czechoslovak 
Jewish  relations  in  the  international  arena.  As  in  the  previous  chapters,  the 
perception of the mutual partners rather than the reality will be the main theme of the 
discussion.  
The chapter starts with the examination of the response of American Jewish 
organizations to developments in post war Czechoslovakia. American Jewish groups 
were  the  most  eloquent  and  allegedly  the  most  influential  among  international 
Jewish organizations and deserve special attention. The chapter aims to illustrate that 
there was indeed a change in their perception of the Czechoslovak democracy in 
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relation to its treatment of the remaining Jews. The next section suggests that the 
critics of the Czechoslovaks’ treatment of the Jews received support in the western 
press. Yet Czechoslovakia could also rely on a mighty ally that shaped the attitude of 
the  pro Jewish  activists  in  the  west  towards  Czechoslovakia.  The  pro Jewish 
activists realised that total alienation of the Czechoslovak authorities was not in their 
own  interest.  In  several  instances  the  Czechoslovak  Republic provided  important 
help for Zionist politicians. Additionally, the situation in the broader region played 
into the Czechoslovak hands. The last section of the chapter examines whether the 
Jewish groups were indeed able to secure any help against Czechoslovakia among 
the western democracies. It evaluates the perception of the Czechoslovaks’ treatment 
of the Jews by the American and British governments. Was the pro Jewish lobby 
really as influential as was widely believed? 
 
The WJC and the Czechoslovak treatment of the Jews 
The appointment of the Zionist Frischer to the exile parliament fuelled the 
expectations  of  international  Zionist  organizations  for  a  renewal  of  the  Jewish 
minority  status  in  post war  Czechoslovakia.  Furthermore,  another  Zionist,  Imrich 
Rosenberg, was appointed the Jewish member of the Czechoslovak delegation to the 
liberated  territories  in  late  1944.
1174 However,  as  documented,  the  Czechoslovak 
government had never really left their projected vision of post war Czechoslovakia 
as a nationally purely Slavonic state. The partial concession of Beneš concerning the 
Jewish member of the parliament was influenced by the perceived influence of the 
world  Zionist  (especially  American)  organizations  and  by  the  reports  in  the 
American press. At the time, when his diplomatic position was not completely secure, 
Beneš did not want to risk complications in relations with the ‘influential’ western 
Jewish organizations.  
  The WJC tried to negotiate minority rights for Jews in Czechoslovakia for the 
rest of the war. Yet it became apparent that the Czechoslovak exiles did not want to 
grant them to anybody. This point was repeatedly stressed during Beneš’s, Ripka’s, 
or Masaryk’s negotiations with Jewish groups between 1943 and 1945. Consequently 
in 1945, in a memorandum for the first, founding conference of the United Nations in 
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San Francisco, the WJC did not mention the claim for minority rights for Jews in 
Europe.  They  did  not  want  to  cause  a  conflict  with  some  of  those  countries 
concerned, namely with Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.
1175  
Despite  that,  the  WJC  did  not  want  to  leave  Czechoslovakia’s  changed 
attitude towards the Jews as a minority without protest. First of all, the American and 
British Zionists advised Czechoslovak national Jews not to resign on the minority 
status openly.
1176 They did not want the Jews actively to accept the loss of their 
minority status, rather to allow the rights to be taken from them by the authorities. 
Secondly,  in  July  1945,  Perlzweig  –  the  most  eloquent  among  the  WJC 
representatives  –  summarized  the  attitude  of  his  organization  towards  the  new 
Czechoslovak minority policy in a memorandum for Masaryk. It was more a political 
statement  by  the  WJC  than  an  attempt  to  change  the  progress  of  events.  The 
representatives of the WJC had been informed about the Czechoslovak new minority 
conception long before:  
 
Considerable disquiet has been caused throughout the Jewish world and 
particularly in the United States and Great Britain, by statements reported 
to have been made by Czechoslovak officials on the future status of the 
Jews  in  that  country.  These  reports,  which  come  from  many  sources, 
suggest  that  Czechoslovak  Jews  will  in  future  be  presented  with  the 
alternative  either  of  emigrating  to  Palestine  or  of  becoming  totally 
identified spiritually and culturally, as well as politically, with one or the 
other  of  the  nationalities  which  now  make  up  the  Czechoslovak 
population.  
Since  the  tragic  events  of  the  past  few  years  have  resulted  in  the 
annihilation of by far the greater part of the Jewish community, it is clear 
that the surviving Jews must in any case have a hard struggle to maintain 
their  ethnic,  religious  and  cultural  identity.  The  task  would  become 
impossible in the teeth of a government policy aimed at the destruction of 
their  distinctive  way  of  life.  Accordingly,  the  World  Jewish  Congress 
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begs you to endeavor to secure a reexamination of government policies in 
relations to the Jews.  
[…] 
The  World  Jewish  Congress  ventures  to  urge  that  members  of  the 
Jewish community, whose loyalty has never been in doubt, should retain 
the right in some appropriate form of registering as Jews, irrespective of 
the language of their education and upbringing.
1177 
 
The tone of his address showed unease with developments in the country. It 
additionally provided an insight into a totally different perception of Jewish identity 
in Czechoslovakia. The WJC wanted even those Jews who decided to stay in their 
countries of origin to retain their Jewish identity. Not all Zionists were allowed to go 
to  Palestine  because  of  the  British  restrictions  on  immigration.  In  relation  to 
Czechoslovakia, the WJC argued as follows: 
 
There is scarcely an active Zionist anywhere who is not now convinced 
that  President  Bene[š]  has  made  up  his  mind  that  the  price  of 
Czechoslovak citizenship henceforth must be the loss of any real Jewish 
identity.  If  this  apprehension  is  mistaken,  it  ought  obviously  to  be 
removed  by  an  official  statement.  Unfortunately,  every  scrap  of 
information that comes to us from Czechoslovakia tends to confirm it.
1178 
 
In addition, the WJC had received information about the practical execution 
of efforts to make Czechoslovakia a purely Slavonic country. First reports about the 
persecution of the Jews, who in 1930 declared German and Hungarian nationality, 
reached west. This new national policy in fact contradicted declarations previously 
delivered by  Czechoslovak ministers like,  for  example, Masaryk.
1179 Reports that 
even  survivors  of  the  concentration  camps  and  returning  soldiers  might  face 
persecution,  or  at  least  obstacles  in  their  life,  were,  it  was  suggested,  causing 
considerable disquiet among Jews in America: 
 
While  it  is  recognized  that  injustices  may  occur  during  a  period  of 
revolutionary change, we find it difficult to believe that the Czechoslovak 
Government would wish to tolerate so gross and macabre an injustice as 
to punish Jewish survivors of Nazi concentration camps for Nazi crimes 
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or to brand Jewish soldiers who have honorably worn Czech uniforms as 
traitors.
1180 
   
Reports  about  the  new  Czechoslovak  legislation  concerning  minorities, 
nevertheless, soon gave way to coverage of events in Slovakia. Jewish organizations 
in  the  west  had  easy  access  to  information  from  Czechoslovakia.  Several  Jewish 
activists were in the ranks of the Czechoslovak administration, or were attached to 
Jewish  humanitarian  organizations,  for  example  the  American  Jewish  Joint 
Distribution Committee (Joint). One of the most eloquent activists, Imrich Rosenberg, 
deserves special mention. He was a war time member of the Czechoslovak National 
Jewish  Council  and  an  official  of  several  Czechoslovak  ministries.
1181 Rosenberg 
belonged to the younger generation of Czechoslovak Jewish politicians and also to 
the  more  radical  wing  of  the  Czechoslovak  national  Jews  represented  by 
Zelmanovits.
1182 As a member of the Czechoslovak government’s delegation to the 
liberated territories, Rosenberg arrived in the Soviet Union in November 1944 and 
later reached Eastern Slovakia.
1183 He therefore had first hand access to information 
from the liberated eastern parts of Czechoslovakia.  
In comparison with the cautious Frischer, who reached Slovakia only in April 
1945, Rosenberg was willing to publicize critical reports about the Jewish situation 
in  Czechoslovakia.  Of  particular  importance  was  that  Rosenberg  conducted  this 
criticism from his official post as the Deputy Head of the Repatriation Department of 
the Czechoslovak government. In an interview with the JTA correspondent in Prague, 
he  commented  on  the  Jewish  situation  in  Czechoslovakia:  ‘Jews  returning  to 
Czechoslovakia  are  not  being  welcomed  home  with  open  arms  and,  in  Slovakia 
particularly,  have  encountered  a  great  deal  of  hostility’.
1184 Rosenberg  moreover 
stated that the majority of Jews did not want to stay in Czechoslovakia and that 
because of the increasing  anti Semitism they desired to emigrate to Palestine.
1185 
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Although Rosenberg did not criticize the central government, he did not refrain from 
attacking the Slovak authorities.
1186  
With time, news agencies in the west brought out more reports about the 
generally hostile environment for the remaining Slovak Jews, including the delayed 
restitution  of  Jewish  property.  As  the  Overseas  News  Agency’s  correspondent 
reported: ‘Hitler’s hymn of hate against Jews is being whistled if not loudly sung by 
people  in  Slovakia’.
1187 The  first  information  about  the physical  violence  –  anti 
Jewish riots in Prešov in Eastern Slovakia – also appeared in his report.
1188  
 
Image no. 13: Congressman Adolph J. Sabath
1189 
The leaders of the WJC came to the conclusion that something had to be 
done. The WJC was also pressurised by the American Jews whose relatives lived in 
Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, Perlzweig informed the Office Committee of the WJC 
about his conversation with Congressman Adolph Sabath. During the meeting with 
Perlzweig, Sabath mentioned that the reports about anti Semitism in Slovakia moved 
him to prepare a draft letter for Beneš. Sabath allegedly ‘felt very strongly about the 
whole situation since he considered that he had himself played a decisive part in 
persuading the late President Wilson to support the establishment of a Czechoslovak 
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Republic’.
1190 Sabath was one of the Jewish Congressmen who supported Tomáš G. 
Masaryk during the First World War.
1191 We do not know whether Sabath proceeded 
with his intervention. However, had it been sent, it would have constituted a serious 
attack on the core of Czechoslovak concerns  about the political influence of the 
American Jews.  
As  it  was,  Perlzweig,  in  the  name  of  the  WJC,  visited  the  Czechoslovak 
Consul General in New York, Karol Hudec and sent a letter to Foreign Minister 
Masaryk.
1192 During  these  contacts  with  the  Czechoslovak  authorities,  Perlzweig 
presented  an  ambiguous  picture  of  the  situation  in  Czechoslovakia  and  the  role 
played by the government. During the meeting with Hudec, Perlzweig in fact agreed 
with the latter’s statement about the sources of anti Semitism in Slovakia. Hudec 
suggested that the situation in the eastern part of the country was a logical result of 
war time propaganda, the role still played by the Catholic Church and the remnants 
of  the  previous  regime.  Perlzweig  also  included  the  Soviet  Union  among  the 
elements spreading anti Jewish sentiments.
1193 The Czechoslovak government was 
therefore  accused  of  non action  rather  than  active  participation  in  anti Jewish 
measures.
1194  
The  discourse  used  by  Perlzweig  nevertheless  showed  that  there  was  a 
change in the perception of the Czechoslovak democratic image among American 
Jews. It was indeed a reference to the traditionally friendly Czechoslovaks’ attitude 
towards the Jewish minority that played the main role in the argument presented by 
Perlzweig. According to him, the WJC did not intend to accuse the Czechoslovak 
leadership of anti Semitism. Yet the WJC expected a public declaration that would 
resolutely condemn the situation in Czechoslovakia, particularly in its eastern parts:  
 
This silence, together with the increasingly serious reports which reach 
us, has created an atmosphere of acute discomfort. Jewish public opinion 
is becoming very restive, and we are in no position to answer any of the 
urgent questions which are being raised. 
 […]  
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I doubt very much whether it is appreciated in Prague how strong the 
feeling  is  here.  What  we  are  trying  to  do  is  to  prevent  a  rise  in  the 
temperature of public feeling. We do not want to have public meetings of 
protest, which some people have already begun to demand, and we are 
hoping that you [Masaryk] will be able to help us to avoid this tragedy by 
persuading the government to take a strong and more active line.
1195 
[…]  
We  are  anxious  to  do  whatever  we  can  to  reassure  Jewish  public 
opinion,  but  I  think  it  fair  to  say,  though  I  do  so  with  the  greatest 
reluctance,  that  expressions  of  faith  in  the  Czechoslovak  tradition  are 
ceasing to carry weight. It is respectfully submitted that it has become 
urgent for the Czechoslovak Government to take action without avoidable 
delay if the situation is not to deteriorate still further.
1196  
 
In this letter, Perlzweig was using the line of argument already familiar from 
the  early  war  years  and  was  playing  on  perceived  Czechoslovak  concerns  about 
possible damage to their positive image in the west. In addition, he emphasised the 
alleged power of ‘Jewish public opinion’ in the United States. The WJC considered 
that the Czechoslovaks’ might feel threatened by the danger of public meetings held 
in  America  against  their  country.  Furthermore,  Perlzweig  appealed  to  the 
Czechoslovaks by referring to their unique position in East Central Europe:  
 
It is really a terrible blow to us to have to face the fact that Jews are 
subjected to physical violence in any part of Czechoslovakia. We might 
regard it as normal elsewhere, but not there.
1197 
 
The  WJC  still  regarded  the  Czechoslovak  authorities  and,  in  particular, 
Masaryk, as sympathetic to Jewish aspirations: ‘[Y]our record and your name are all 
the guaranty we need that you will understand our anxieties. But to put it bluntly and 
personally, there are not to[o] many Masaryks in Czechoslovakia, and certainly not 
in Slovakia’.
1198 Masaryk was known for his humanitarian attitude towards the Jews 
and for his public proclamations supporting Jewish demands during the war. We 
have seen, however, that his powers were rather limited and he was not in a position 
to  influence  the  government.  The  WJC  therefore  in  many  aspects  simply 
overestimated Masaryk’s position and his power to change the progress of events. In 
contrast, other pro Jewish activists had no illusions about Masaryk’s influence.
1199 
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The change in the WJC’s attitude towards the Czechoslovak authorities was 
finally  summarized  by  Perlzweig  to  Hudec.  The  WJC  representative  called  the 
Czechoslovak Consul’s attention to the fact that, ‘[the WJC] regarded the situation in 
Czechoslovakia as one of great gravity and that [they] could no longer have faith in 
the appeals to names and tradition with which [their] complaints had been answered 
so far’.
1200 
The American Jewish leaders were suddenly willing to challenge the situation 
in  Czechoslovakia  in  public,  in  the  press,  or  in  contacts  with  western  political 
representatives. The whole campaign also needs to be seen in conjunction with the 
Zionists’ struggle to open the doors of Palestine for further Jewish immigration. One 
of their particular goals was to pressurize the British authorities by presenting the 
situation  in  continental  Europe  as  impossible  for  further  Jewish  residence. 
Czechoslovakia played the role of the country most sympathetic to the Jews that still 
was  not  entirely  free  from  anti Semitism.  Unsurprisingly,  the  Czechoslovak 
authorities restlessly followed this development.  
September 1945 witnessed the escalation of the American Zionists’ campaign 
against  Czechoslovakia.  The  action  of  the  American  Zionist  organizations  also 
revealed  their  actual  weakness  in  confronting  Eastern  European  countries  and 
particularly  Czechoslovakia.  The  American  Jewish  leaders  in  fact  worsened  their 
own  negotiating  position  with  the  Czechoslovaks  by  their  lack  of  caution.  In 
September 1945, Abba Hillel Silver from the American Zionist Emergency Council 
(AZEC) and Stephen Wise, of the WJC, sent an open letter to the British Prime 
Minister  Clement  Attlee.  Based  on  a  JTA  report,  these  two  Zionist  leaders 
complained about the situation in Czechoslovakia. The main point of their letter was 
the statement that around 7,000 concentration camps’ survivors, most of them Jews, 
had been persecuted by the new regime in Czechoslovakia and had consequently 
committed suicide.
1201 The open letter was originally printed in The New York Post 
on 27 September 1945, but was later published by other American press and various 
agencies around the World.
1202 For example a Zionist Revisionist weekly The Jewish 
Standard issued a black framed article reporting ‘7,000 suicides in Prague’. Based on 
‘a reliable source’, the weekly reported that ‘[t]he tragic position in which many of 
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the people returning from concentration camps [found] themselves [had led] to [these 
suicides] in Prague since last May’.
1203 Although the Czechoslovak authorities were 
not directly blamed for these alleged tragedies,  the publication of similar articles 
threatened the good image of Czechoslovakia in the west.  
It  nevertheless  soon  became  obvious  that  the  report  was  based  on  false 
information and it caused outrage among the Czechoslovak authorities. Wise was 
immediately informed by the Czechoslovak Jewish Representative Committee in the 
USA  (CJRC)  that  the  statement  did  not  correspond  with  the  facts.  The  CJRC 
furthermore added that the statement undoubtedly would negatively affect the public 
in Czechoslovakia ‘and certainly [would] not alleviate the Jewish situation there’.
1204 
The CJRC later informed Wise that the Czechoslovak Ambassador Hurban was ‘very 
angry about the matter’ and that the Embassy expected to receive an apology from 
the AZEC.
1205 The whole unfortunate event enabled the Czechoslovak authorities to 
gain the initiative and to position themselves in the role of victim of false propaganda. 
It also made any following official publicity conducted by the American pro Jewish 
activists difficult. The Czechoslovak authorities could always point to the affair and 
reject on this basis any subsequent criticisms.
1206 
Perlzweig, who prepared Wise’s apology to the Czechoslovak Embassy, tried 
to keep it on a dignified level. He agreed that ‘it [was] obvious that a serious error 
[was] made’, and that the WJC had to do what they could ‘to repair it if [they were] 
to maintain decent relations with the Czechoslovak government’.
1207 Wise’s letter to 
the Consul General Hudec tried to explain that the accusation was not made against 
the Czechoslovak people, but against the situation caused by the enemy occupation. 
Yet it presented a compassionate apology to the Czechoslovak people.
1208  
The accusation of 7,000 suicides caused serious damage to the WJC efforts to 
influence events. The leaders of the Jewish organization, despite being disillusioned 
with the Czechoslovaks’ treatment of the remaining Jews, were forced to present an 
apology that contradicted their inner conviction. The beginning of the affair showed 
that a change in the perception of the Czechoslovaks as a tolerant nation had indeed 
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occurred. The original letter sent by Silver and Wise would not have been possible 
before or during the war. Western Jews would not have believed such information 
before. The apologies provided by Wise could hence be seen as a humiliation of the 
long standing Jewish leader. This argument is strengthened further by the fact that 
the WJC publicized the apology in the press and also by the tone of the apology. The 
New York Times brought to public attention the following quotes from Wise’s letter 
to Hudec: 
 
I accept unreservedly your judgement that this story in not true [...] and 
I am glad and grateful for many reasons to be able to do so. 
As you know, I have for many years given whole hearted support to the 
cause of a free and democratic Czechoslovakia and was among the first 
of those who stood behind the late President Masaryk in his heroic and 
historic fight for the independence of your country. I am glad to be able 
to take this opportunity of reaffirming my faith in the great democratic 
tradition  of  your  country,  of  which  President  Bene[š]  has  been  so 
distinguished and consistent an exponent.
1209 
 
The letter by Wise, published in mainstream American press, again revived the 
Czechoslovak  democratic  ‘myth’.  The  fading  leader  of  American  Jewry  had  to 
deliver another apology when an identical letter was demanded by the Czechoslovak 
Ambassador to the D.C., Vladimír Hurban.
1210 Hurban was uncompromising in his 
efforts to whitewash the Czechoslovak record. He demanded that the apology had to 
be published in all the newspapers that previously carried the original report from the 
New York Post. He persisted in his demand even though the WJC did not know 
about all the newspapers and journals that publicized it.
1211  
Within the WJC, Perlzweig accused Hurban of escalating the whole affair by 
informing the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry.
1212 A public apology was hence more 
desirable because of the Foreign Ministry’s recent support for the WJC’s demands 
concerning the heirless assets left by Jews in Theresienstadt.
1213 It is worth noting 
that the apology was made by the WJC, although the author of the original letter 
probably  came  from  among  the  more  radical  and  eloquent  Silver’s  group 
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(AZEC).
1214 Although Frischer sent an assurance from Prague that the situation had 
been settled as well as possible, the whole affair meant that the American Jewish 
leaders had to act with utmost caution during any of the following interventions.
1215 
They realised that the Czechoslovak authorities were easy to alienate, but difficult to 
appease. Subsequent interventions by the Jewish leaders were through diplomatic 
channels in order not to cause another rift with the Czechoslovaks.  
The maintenance of good relations was perceived as crucial for Jewish interests. 
But  western  Jewish  leaders  received  another  strong ally  in  their  struggle  for  the 
alleviation of the Jewish situation in Czechoslovakia – the western press. It was a 
surprising  supporter  when  taking  into  account  the  previously  generally  positive 
coverage the Czechoslovaks received in the west. The negative publicity in the press 
was to remind the Czechoslovak leadership of their previous worries concerning the 
influential  American  Jews.  Also  the  progress  of  the  anti Jewish  disturbances  in 
Slovakia reached its climax and the interventions of the Jewish groups could no 
longer be ignored.  
 
A conspiracy of the press? British and American journalists about the treatment of 
the Jews in liberated Czechoslovakia 
On 24 September 1945, the Western Slovakian town of Velké Topoľčany 
witnessed an event that caused many worries for the Czechoslovak government in 
Prague. A mob, initiated by the people who profited from Jewish property during the 
war,  harassed  the  remaining  Jews  in  the  town,  shouted  anti Semitic  slogans  and 
ransacked  Jewish  houses.  The  violent  mob  was  later  joined  by  a  military  unit, 
consisting of 20 soldiers, who were sent to stop the disturbances.
1216 Rumours, such 
as that a Jewish doctor inoculated Christian children with poison, or that nuns were 
to  be  expelled  by  the  Jews  from  schools,  were  used  as  a  pretext  to  trigger  the 
riots.
1217 The pogrom in Topoľčany was only one in a chain of anti Semitic riots 
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(although  the  most  important)  in  post war  Slovakia.
1218 Regional  authorities  in 
Slovakia warned the central authorities from the day of liberation that strong anti 
Semitic sentiments had survived the fall of the Tiso regime.
1219 
The inevitable negative publicity given to the events in Topoľčany was seen 
by the central government as threatening Czechoslovakia. This attitude was exposed 
during the government’s meeting following the events. It was Masaryk who brought 
the topic to the attention of the ministers. He argued that the pogrom would have 
negative consequences for the Czechoslovak Republic abroad. He was  convinced 
that the notions of the Czechoslovak Republic and of a pogrom were ‘completely 
incompatible’.
1220 Also other ministers, for example Ursíny, Gottwald, and Stránský, 
agreed that it was impossible to conceal such an incident from the public in the 
west.
1221 Minister Ripka consequently suggested that it might be efficient to publish a 
government  press  release  condemning  the  pogrom  and  ensuring  the  world  that 
similar  events  would  not  be  allowed  to  take  place  again.
1222 He  argued  that  the 
silence from the government might be perceived as its acceptance of anti Semitic 
violence  in  Slovakia.  The  ministers  therefore  decided  to  anticipate  the  upcoming 
negative press campaign in the west and to condemn the events of Topoľčany in the 
strongest words. The condemnation was indeed published and was spread among 
journalists.  It  also  found  its  way  to  the  American  and  British  Ambassadors’ 
communications with their headquarters.
1223 Furthermore, Beneš angrily suggested to 
a Swiss journalist that if Slovaks were not able to solve the problem themselves, he 
would send the Czech army there to preclude any repetition of such incidents.
1224  
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  Any  negative  publicity  in  the  western  press  was  followed  with  growing 
suspicion by the Czechoslovak authorities.  The press was one of the closest allies of 
the  Czechoslovak  cause  during  the  whole  war.  Liberated  Czechoslovakia  was  a 
relatively open country where foreign journalists were largely free to move around 
and  to  report  any  event.
1225 The  situation  in  post war  Czechoslovakia  received 
extensive coverage in the west. In fact, it was the only country in the Soviet military 
sphere which offered such privileges to journalists.
1226 For example, this extensive 
coverage was the main reason why the initial negative response of British public 
opinion  to  the  transfer  of  German  minorities  from  Eastern  Europe  was  directed 
against Czechoslovakia.
1227 
  The  Czechoslovak  authorities  resented  the  negative  publicity  which  their 
treatment of the German minority received in the British press. As Ralph Parker of 
The Times wrote to his editor: 
 
a leading article or two in the Manchester Guardian [sic! – a comment 
by  Frank],  written  by  some  well meaning  person  who  has  no  idea 
whatsoever of the feeling of the people here can do immense harm to 
our  cause.  I  don’t  think  that  it  is  always  realized  at  editorial  desks, 
especially those of the Liberal press, how seriously every word they 
write is read in Central Europe today, and how sensitive people are 
after six years of German occupation.
1228 
 
As Matthew Frank commented on the events, ‘the Czechs […] exhibit[ed] an 
almost  pathological  sensitivity  to  any  outside  criticism  of  their  handling  of  the 
German  problem’.
1229 How  can  we  view  the  Czechoslovak  response  to  foreign 
criticism of their treatment of Jews? In comparison, the Germans really were being 
expelled from the Republic. The Czechoslovaks were particularly open about the 
transfer  and  had  foreign  approval  which  they  received  in  Potsdam.  The  whole 
transfer was presented as a definitive solution to the impossibility of the coexistence 
of two nations. The subject of the foreign critique was not the transfer per se but the 
manner in which it was being carried out. Yet the Czechoslovaks were not prepared 
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to  admit  any  officially  directed persecution  of  Jews.  Hence  their  response  to  the 
allegations  in  the  American  and  British  press  was  fierce.  At  the  same  time,  the 
Czechoslovak authorities searched for hidden intentions behind these allegations.  
  The greatest turmoil was caused by the coverage of events in Czechoslovakia 
by the main American newspapers The Washington Post, The New York Post and 
The New York Times. The Washington Post reported the peculiar situation of Jews in 
Czechoslovakia on 12 September 1945 even before the pogrom in Topoľčany. Even 
the  title  of  the  editorial,  ‘Question  For  Bene[š]’,  suggested  that  the  journalists 
intended to present the situation in Czechoslovakia as a deliberate policy targeting 
the  most  vulnerable  sections  of  the  population.  The  Czechoslovak  President  was 
attacked on the basis of two charges: first, the Czechoslovak expulsion of Sudeten 
Germans  and  second,  anti Semitic  developments  in  Slovakia.  The  author  of  the 
article, based on Beneš’s interview given to John MacCormac of the New York Times, 
concluded:  ‘[W]hen  Czechoslovakia’s  President  is  not  vague,  he  is  illiberal.’
1230 
According to Joseph G. Harrison of the Christian Science Manner, the Hlinka Guard 
in Slovakia was behaving as if the war had not ended, persecuting minorities, notably 
Jews and Hungarians. The Jews were, according to Harrison, discriminated against in 
the distribution of UNRRA relief shipments. The journalists therefore appealed to the 
Council  of  Foreign  Ministers,  a  body  formed  of  ministers  of  the  main  Allies 
established in Potsdam that they should ‘call on President Benes at once to arrest the 
vicious practices which are going on under his nose’.
1231  
Czechoslovak  diplomats  were  caught  unprepared  by  the  emerging 
complications  for  Czechoslovakia’s  image  abroad.  Ján  Papánek,  a  Czechoslovak 
diplomat in the USA with close contacts to Beneš, expressed his personal feelings 
about the development in late August 1945. Puzzled, Papánek acknowledged that the 
reports coming from Czechoslovakia were not good. Yet he labelled Zionist circles 
in America, with close  ties to Poland and Hungary, as the main initiators of the 
undesired publicity.
 1232 Those circles, he alleged, wanted to cover up the situation in 
neighbouring countries by focusing the attention of the world on Czechoslovakia.
1233 
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The articles published in the United States tended to accuse the Czechoslovak 
government of not responding adequately to anti Semitic developments in Slovakia. 
These  allegations  were  so  strong  that  the  Czechoslovak  Ambassador  Hurban  felt 
obliged  to  react.  He  confirmed  that  anti Semitism  was  to  a  certain  degree 
acknowledged ‘frankly and honestly’ by Beneš. However, in his explanation of the 
sentiments prevailing among Slovak society, Hurban returned to the explanation used 
by the Czechoslovak authorities since the days of Versailles. In his words, ‘[t]he 
Jews in Slovakia during the Hungarian regime were the privileged class, who served 
the Magyar oppressors – to oppress the people and exploit them mercilessly’.
1234 
According  to  Hurban,  the  fact  that  the  Jews  remained  Hungarian  even  after  the 
establishment of independent Czechoslovakia could not be ‘forgotten so easily by the 
population’.
1235 Nevertheless, he argued, there were factual reports that documented 
the Slovaks’ help to the Jews during the war when many Jews were saved from 
deportation to Poland and the gas chambers. Hurban, moreover, emphasised that in 
Bohemia  and  Moravia  the  Jews  were  nationally  Czech  and  did  not  cause  any 
significant anti Semitism.
1236 This was a false statement: as documented, there were 
several  thousand  German speaking  Jews  in  Bohemia  and  Moravia  who  faced 
considerable hostility from the Czech population. 
The  reaction  of  the  Ambassador proved  that  the  Czechoslovak  authorities 
were  not  prepared  to  accept  any  foreign  criticism  of  their  internal  affairs.  They 
remained unwavering in their defence of Czechoslovakia in their public appearances 
and fought against any accusation that appeared in the press.  As time went on, the 
reaction of Czechoslovak authorities to these accusations became excitable. Papánek, 
otherwise  an  experienced  diplomat,  reacted  to  an  article  called  ‘Liberated 
Czechoslovakia: Words and Deeds’, published by ‘the Jewish News Letter’ Trend of 
Events, in the following way: 
 
[U]nder  the  said  title  you  crowd  a  boat  of  statements  lacking  any 
foundations.  Sprinkling  throughout  numbers  of  […]  decrees  of  the 
Government  connected  with  the  Czechoslovak  policy  towards  the 
German and Hungarian minority to give veracity to your assertion in the 
mind  of  an  uninformed  reader  [concerning  those  Jews  who,  in  1930, 
declared German or Hungarian nationality – J. L.]. But even here you 
quote only those parts of the said decrees, which might plausibly support 
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your false statements, omitting those which would make them baseless. 
[…] [T]he tone of your article and the collection of untrue statements it 
contains would demand but a two word answer […].
1237 
 
Papánek concluded the letter with the advice that such articles, as published 
by the Trend of Events, could not help the Jewish situation in Czechoslovakia. He 
called the attention of the editor to the fact that Czechoslovakia was a democratic 
country, easily controlled by press and ‘agencies concerned with the problem’.
1238  
Likewise, about a year later, Rudolf Kuráž, the Czechoslovak Consul General 
in New York, convened a press conference because of reports about the previously 
discussed  Varnsdorf  affair  in  the  American  Jewish  press.  The  failure  of  Beer’s 
restitution received extensive coverage in the United States. With reference to Beneš, 
Masaryk, Ripka and Slávik, Kuráž stated: ‘We Czechoslovaks do not like the idea of 
having to apologize to any group or nationality. In fact, we have nothing to apologize 
for.’
1239 Furthermore, he attacked the press itself on the basis of its alleged non 
action  when  the  ‘Final  Solution’  was  taking  place.  Any  serious  attack  on 
Czechoslovakia  was  therefore  immediately  countered  by  the  Czechoslovak 
authorities  in  order  to  keep  the  name  of  the  country  clean.  It  was  not  only  that 
Czechoslovakia did not like to apologize; basically, as Kuráž said, it did not like to 
be criticized. 
The Czechoslovak authorities were not willing to admit that the publicity in 
the press might be caused by sincere concerns among western journalists. The latter 
were repeatedly accused of siding with the Hungarians and their political demands 
against Czechoslovakia. The accusation of the Hungarian utilizing of developments 
in  Czechoslovakia  was  another  relic  of  war time  suspicions  regarding  American 
Jewry’s connections with the Hungarians.  
This notion opens the issue of the role of diplomacy in the ‘Final Solution’ 
and of Jewish themes in post war diplomatic negotiations. Holly Case argues that the 
territorial  struggle  between  Hungary  and  Slovakia  contributed  to  the  Slovak’s 
willingness  to  collaborate  with  Germany  in  the  ‘Final  Solution’.  Simultaneously, 
Slovaks,  in  order  to  support  their  territorial  claims,  stressed  to  the  Germans  the 
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Hungarians’ unwillingness to deport Jews.
1240 Curiously, with the coming end of the 
war, the Czech and Slovak resistance feared that the Tiso collaboration in the ‘Final 
Solution’ might harm post war Czechoslovak claims against Hungary. The Slovak 
democratic  underground  groups  were  afraid  that  the  Hungarians  might  use  the 
Slovaks’ persecution of Jews in post war talks.
1241 How deeply those preconceptions 
were  embedded  in  the  minds  of  the  Czechoslovak  politicians  was  revealed  by 
Beneš’s Secretary Táborský. In July 1944 an outrage was caused in the west by the 
deportations of Jews from Hungary and the now confirmed information about the 
massacres in Auschwitz. The declaration made by Cordell Hull, US Secretary of 
State,  about  the  guilt  of  the  ‘puppet  Hungarian  government’  was  welcomed  by 
Táborský with a comment that ‘another of the Hungarian lies lays in the dust’.
1242 
The  Hungarians  had  been  trying,  according  to  Táborský,  to  cash  in  on  the 
comparative security of Jews in Hungary for political gains.
1243 The coming of the 
‘Final  Solution’  to  Hungary  was  perceived  by  the  Czechoslovak  authorities  as 
lowering  Hungarian  credit  in  the  peace  negotiations.  Also  the  Czechoslovak 
democratic exiles believed in the existence of a Jewish pro Hungarian lobby in the 
USA. 
These sentiments survived the war. In September 1945, the Czechoslovak 
Foreign Ministry asked the Slovak National Council for material that would help 
them to counter ‘malign propaganda’ in discussions with foreign journalists. The 
main issue was the delay in restitution of Jewish property in Slovakia and also the 
fact that Aryanized properties were allegedly still in the hands of Hlinka Guardists 
and  other  fascists.
1244 The  Foreign  Ministry  concluded  that  journalists  often  had 
reports from persons directly involved with those cases and Czechoslovak officials 
were facing a very delicate situation.
1245 The democratic image of Czechoslovakia 
was allegedly at stake, because, for example, the news from the Washington Post 
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was broadcast by New York radio and published by the Hungarian press.
1246 The 
Foreign  Ministry  concluded  that  Hungarian  agents  and  ‘other  malicious persons’ 
tried to cause political and economical harm to Czechoslovakia among the Allies. 
This  potential  danger,  argued  the  officials,  was  not  caused  by  the  Czechoslovak 
treatment  of  Jews,  but  by  the  efforts  of  Hungarian  agents  and  their  helpers  to 
destabilise the Czechoslovak diplomatic position.  
However,  this  does  not  mean  that  the  Czechoslovak  authorities  were  not 
partly  correct  about  the  role  of  pro Polish  and  pro Hungarian  lobbies  in 
disseminating false reports about the situation in Czechoslovakia. Pro Polish circles 
in the British parliament did not easily bear the negative perception of the Polish as 
opposed to the positive perception of the Czechoslovak treatment of Jews during the 
war. For example, they tried to bring the Czechoslovak case to the agenda of the 
Houses of Commons in spring 1944, when parliament discussed the affair caused by 
the maltreatment of Jewish soldiers in the Polish army. Alan Crosland Graham, a 
Conservative MP with sympathies for Poland, attempted to shift the attention to the 
alleged  desertion  of  80  Jewish  soldiers  from  the  Czechoslovak  army.
1247  But 
Graham’s efforts were not successful. Furthermore, the accusation was refuted by 
the Czechoslovak army.
1248  
More accusations were spread in London by Polish journalists. In April 1945, 
the  New  York  based  Morning  Journal  published  a  report  based  on  a  piece  of 
information  from  a  ‘Catholic  Polish  journalist’  in  London.  He  accused  the  new 
Czechoslovak Social Democrat Prime Minister, Zdeněk Fierlinger, of anti Semitic 
remarks during his stay in Košice, the provisional seat of the government. Fierlinger 
allegedly blamed the Jews in Czechoslovakia for collaboration with the Nazis. The 
article in the Morning Journal also reported that no Zionist was invited to the first 
reception  held  in  Košice  on  behalf  of  Beneš’s  arrival  to  Czechoslovakia.
1249 
Fierlinger immediately publicized a categorical dementi and there seems to be no 
evidence  that  he  really  made  any  accusations  against  the  Jews.
1250 It  was  just  a 
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provocation  that  aimed  to  stir  up  the  Jewish  public  in  the  United  States  against 
Czechoslovakia.  
The  development  in  post war  Slovakia  was  in  any  case  more  closely 
followed in Hungary. Every anti Semitic incident was immediately commented on in 
the  Hungarian  media  and  was  forwarded  to  the  Jewish  agencies.
1251 Hence  the 
Czechoslovak authorities tried to explain some of the anti Semitic riots in Slovakia 
as being initiated by pro Hungarian forces. For example, the gathering of Slovak 
partisans in Bratislava in July 1946 was accompanied by extensive anti Jewish riots. 
Yet the provincial police commander informed the authorities that the unrest was 
stirred  up  by  pro Hungarian  forces  who  wanted  to  complicate  the  Czechoslovak 
position before the peace talks with Hungary in Paris.
 1252 The immediate publicity 
given to the events in the Hungarian press supported this theory.
 1253 Also the Jewish 
leadership in Czechoslovakia tried to press the government into action against the 
rioters by stressing that those incidents were being utilised by the enemies of the 
Czechoslovak Republic, namely Hungarians.
1254  
An understanding of the capabilities of the pro Jewish lobby in the United 
States seemed to be equally spread among the Czechoslovaks as well as among the 
Hungarians.  Both parties saw the Jews as a good ally, but potentially  a difficult 
enemy. The Czechoslovaks were afraid that the situation in Slovakia might sabotage 
their  demands  against  Hungary  in  Paris.  Curiously,  during  the  Paris  peace 
negotiations,  the  Czechoslovaks  helped  to  reject  the  British  declaration  against 
Hungarian  anti Semitism.
1255 The  Czechoslovak  delegation probably  followed  the 
directive from Moscow, because the Soviet Union was the main opponent of the 
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declaration.
1256 Yet we could also argue that the Czechoslovaks rather did not want 
to open the discussion about anti Semitism in Hungary because of their concerns 
about the situation in their own country.  
The anti Jewish riots in Slovakia reinforced Czechoslovak efforts to maintain 
the  image  of  a  democratic  country.  That  the  negative  publicity  abroad  could 
significantly alter Czechoslovak policy can be documented in one particular case 
study. This was the issue of the Czechoslovak citizenship of Jews who in 1930 had 
declared  German  or  Hungarian  nationality.  Their  precarious  position  after  the 
liberation of Czechoslovakia was simply another link in the chain of mistrust and 
hostility  against  these  Jews.  It  was  not  surprising  that  the  international  Jewish 
organization immediately reacted to the plan to deprive the Jews of citizenship in 
post war Czechoslovakia. The WJC contacted the Czechoslovak government: 
This  is  the  only  case  of  Jewish  citizens  of  an  Allied  country  being 
deprived wholesale of their citizenship (at least temporarily) and placed 
in the same position as Germans or Hungarians. Even if in the end these 
persons  will  probably  retain  their  citizenship,  the  necessary 
administrative delay causes great hardship, leaving them in a state of utter 
insecurity, and, in many cases, barring them from re integration in […] 
economic  and  social  life.  All  this  even  applies  to  people  who  have 
returned from concentration camps.
1257 
 
The WJC claimed that the Jews were the first victims of Nazi oppression and 
were  always  loyal  citizens  of  Czechoslovakia.  The  WJC  then  requested  that  the 
Czechoslovak government issue instructions to lower authorities to the effect that 
none of the Jews should be regarded as losing their citizenship, even temporarily.
1258  
The Czechoslovak government gradually realized that the treatment of these 
Jews  was  a  burning  issue.  Interventions  by  Jewish  organizations  and  especially 
negative publicity worldwide might have escalated into an international affair. For 
example, the aforementioned address given by the Minister of the Interior, Nosek, in 
February 1946 in Brno caused real uproar among the Jews.
1259 As a result, Minister 
Václav Kopecký promised Frischer that he would raise the issue at a government 
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meeting.
  1260 Kopecký  stated  that  a  grave  injustice  could  have  been  committed 
against those Jews and that it might harm the Czechoslovak image.
1261 Kopecký in 
fact presented the whole issue to Frischer as an accidental result of the post war laws 
that solved the German problem in Czechoslovakia. This statement was obviously 
incorrect because it was Kopecký himself who in 1944 argued that German speaking 
Jews should be sharing the fate of other Germans.
1262  
The  interventions  from  abroad  really  influenced  the  Czechoslovak 
government. A telegram sent to Beneš in February 1946 allegedly put a stop to any 
possible  transfer  of  Germans speaking  Jews  from  Czechoslovakia.
1263 Moreover, 
under pressure from the publicity abroad, the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior 
issued  a  directive  that  no  Jews  was  supposed  to be included  on  expulsion  trains 
taking Sudeten Germans out of Czechoslovakia.
1264 The final decision to allow these 
Jews to stay in Czechoslovakia was reached partly under the influence of an article 
published in News Chronicle. The liberal and pro Jewish British newspaper reported 
plans to expel 2,000 Jews from Czechoslovakia to Germany.
 1265 Furthermore, these 
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plans were criticised by Robert Murphy, the political advisor to General Joseph T. 
McNarney, Commander in chief of the US occupation forces in Germany.
1266  
In  response  to  this  negative  publicity,  the  Czechoslovak  Ministry  of  the 
Interior  decided  that  all  the  German  and  Hungarian  Jews  were  eligible  to  retain 
Czechoslovak  citizenship.  The  only  exceptions  were  Jews  who,  until  1938, 
participated in the policies of Germanization and Magyarization. The sole fact that a 
Jew in 1930 declared German or Hungarian citizenship was no more considered as 
evidence of Germanization and Magyarization. Only active support for irredentist 
movements, the founding of German or Hungarian schools in Slavonic districts or 
support for non Slavonic officials and institutions, were still considered hostile acts 
against the Czechoslovak Republic. Those could lead to an individual being deprived 
of Czechoslovak citizenship.
1267 The situation was therefore significantly changed 
based on reports published in the foreign press. It was seen as not in the interests of 
the positive image of the Czechoslovak government when Jews were treated as their 
war time  oppressors  and  expelled  together  with  them  in  cattle  trucks.
1268 The 
directive of the Ministry of the Interior changed the situation and most of the Jews 
were allowed to stay in Czechoslovakia.
1269 
That the west was interested in Jewish issues and especially that the pro 
Jewish lobby was influential in western public life shaped Czechoslovak policy after 
the war. Press coverage of the Jewish situation in Czechoslovakia strengthened this 
notion. It was not only that negative publicity given to the Czechoslovak treatment 
of  Jews  might  reverse  the  so  far  positive  attitude  of  western  Jews  towards 
Czechoslovakia; it was also that pro Jewish actions by the government might help 
the  Czechoslovak  cause.  Czechoslovak  support  of  Zionism  and  events  in 
neighbouring Poland offered to the Czechoslovaks a chance to improve their image 
among Jews in the west. The Czechoslovak government caught the proffered hand 
with remarkable enthusiasm.  
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‘It  is  very  important  for  the  future  to  maintain  the  goodwill  of  the  Czech 
government’
1270 
The critical approach of western Jews towards post war Czechoslovak policy 
had its limits. Groups such as the WJC and the Jewish Agency were aware that total 
alienation of the Czechoslovak government was not in their interest. They realised 
that they had a potential need of Czechoslovak politicians and accepted some of their 
worldview. Although the philosophy of the Czechoslovak politicians had a different 
justification,  it  could  find  a  common  ground  with  the  objectives  of  the  Zionist 
leadership. That was especially the case in the attitude towards ‘practical’ Zionism. 
The previous chapters argued the reasons for the Czechoslovaks’ support of a Jewish 
state in Palestine. The Czechoslovaks wanted to solve their own internal issues with 
minorities; pure humanitarian motives, though present, were in the background.  
Some  pro Zionist  activists  understood  the  viewpoint  of  the  Czechoslovak 
authorities,  specifically  of  Beneš.  In  July  1945,  Imrich  Rosenberg  presented  his 
perception of the Czechoslovak President’s worldview to Easterman:  
It is my firm conviction that if the Russians can be made to feel that 
[the Zionists] accept the Soviet standing in Europe, that we do not want 
to interfere in big politics and in their position in Europe, that we will act 
correctly and accept their views and that we are interested only in the 
solution of the Jewish problem that has still remained in Europe,   then I 
feel that we could get their help; I feel that this help is needed now. This 
help could be given through diplomatic and political pressure, and I think 
Prague is the appropriate place where it could be done. 
Beneš is the man to be approached, because he is quite open in his 
[belief] that there is either Zionism or full assimilationism as a solution of 
the Czechoslovak Jewish problem. 
[...] Beneš would help you, for he wants to solve the Jewish problem 
completely and would give you every assistance.
1271 
 
 
Rosenberg had no illusions about Beneš’s reasons for supporting Zionism, but 
advised the WJC to utilise that support for their own benefit. Rosenberg furthermore 
highlighted the previously depicted notion about Beneš’s role in the Zionists’ efforts 
to  gain  the  support  of  the  Soviet  government,  reinforcing  the  Zionists’  need  for 
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having  decent  relations  with  the  Beneš  administration.
1272 It  seemed  politically 
inopportune to alienate such a political force.  
Beneš and members of the government did not confine their support of the 
Jewish  state  in  Palestine  only  to  diplomatic  negotiations.  What  seemed  equally 
important was their regularly expressed preference for Zionism to the press. Their 
argument, as documented by Beneš’s interview for the JTA, complemented that of 
Zionist groups. Beneš stated:  
 
I have always been a friend of Zionism. The establishment of a Jewish 
Home in Palestine is a necessity for all nations, because anti Semitism is a 
regrettable but practically inevitable social phenomenon. It will not vanish 
till the creation of a Jewish country granting citizenship to all Jewry.
 1273  
 
He  additionally  promised  to  do  everything  possible  to  facilitate  Jewish 
emigration  to  Palestine.
1274  Although  Beneš  understood  the  impossibility  of 
immediate total Jewish emigration to Palestine, he saw it as feasible at least for Jews 
living in Europe.
1275 Similar views were expressed by the Communist Undersecretary 
in  the  Foreign  Ministry,  Clementis.
1276 The  Czechoslovaks  argued  that  the  still 
persistent anti Semitism in Europe, as evident in Slovakia, revealed that there was no 
future for Jews in Europe unless they completely assimilated. Those who wanted to 
retain their Jewish identity had to leave for Palestine. This transfer of population 
should thereupon be supported by the international community. What made those 
public  proclamations  of  particular  importance  was  the  democratic  image  of 
Czechoslovakia. It was the argument of a government that did not persecute Jews but 
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still favoured their emigration to Palestine. The Jewish press agencies consequently 
provided considerable publicity to these Czechoslovak declarations.
1277  
The Czechoslovak government indeed appreciated the publicity that confirmed 
to the world their humanitarian support for underdogs. As Hurban commented to 
Eliahu Epstein of the Jewish Agency, there had been a lot of misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation of the Czechoslovak policy after the war: 
 
On several occasions misleading reports were circulated and he has had 
to defend his Government against stupid accusations of anti Semitism, 
although the Czech people were never anti Semitic. His Government had 
the courage to speak the truth to the Jews and to the world alike. [The 
Zionists]  can  always  count  on  the  support  of  the  Czechoslovak 
Government whenever such support may be required.
1278 
 
The  Czechoslovak  government  repeatedly  declared  their  support  for  the 
partition of Palestine between 1945 and 1947.
 1279 Pro Jewish activists even wanted 
Masaryk to be present personally at the UN meeting discussing the issue of Palestine 
in the spring of 1947. They considered his presence of considerable importance for 
the  final  outcome  of  the  negotiations.  They  thought  that  his  arguments  might 
significantly support the Zionist cause.
1280 The belief of some Zionist politicians in 
the Czechoslovak sympathies with Zionism was deeply embedded in their minds. 
Two  months  before  the  USSR  officially  backed  the  partition  plans,  Zionist 
politicians did not doubt Czechoslovak support for the Jewish state. They expected 
the  Czechoslovaks’ positive  vote  even  despite  the  negative  Soviet  attitude  to  the 
partition plans. Walter Eytan wrote in a memorandum for the Jewish Agency:  
 
I do not believe that Czechoslovakia under Masaryk and Beneš would 
cast an anti Zionist vote. But I suggest that a special effort be made in 
Prague, not to prevent an anti Zionist vote at the dictation of USSR, but 
to persuade the Czech government to give us vocal support.
1281 
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In the end, the Czechoslovak delegation cast a vote in favour of the partition 
and thus supported the Zionist aspiration in a practical way. Furthermore, it seems 
that the Czechoslovak delegation in New York actively supported the pro Zionist 
position  during  the  discussions  in  the  UN.
1282 There  were,  in  any  case,  several 
reasons behind this decision, including humanitarian sympathy with the persecuted 
minority. The role of the Soviet Union should be taken into consideration as well. 
The Communists played the main role in the Czechoslovak government and followed 
Moscow’s  line.
1283 There  is,  however,  undeniable  evidence  that  the  government, 
especially  Beneš,  acted  on  their  inner  conviction  that  the  problem  of  the  Jewish 
minority had to be solved in Europe. Pro Zionist activists either did not recognize the 
real  intentions,  or,  as  in  the  case  with  Rosenberg,  accepted  the  philosophy  and 
decided to utilize it.  
  Furthermore, Czechoslovakia played an important role in supporting Jewish 
emigration  to  Palestine.  After  their  return  home,  Jews  in  liberated  Poland  faced 
constantly growing hostility from the non Jewish population. Sources of widespread 
hostilities were of economic, as well as political origins.
1284 The Jews were accused 
of siding with the new Communist authorities, seen as hostile to the Polish nation. 
This  image  of  Zydokomuna,  of  Jewish  collaboration  with  Communism,  was 
particularly strong. Consequently, a wave of murders, anti Jewish riots and pogroms 
took place all over Poland.
1285 The Jewish quarter in Cracow was plundered on 11 
August  1945.  Many  Jews  were  severely  beaten  and  the  synagogue  was 
desecrated.
1286 However, all this was just a prelude to the sweeping terror unleashed 
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in the Central Polish town of Kielce on 4 July 1946. As in the case of Cracow, the 
medieval superstitions of blood libel (Jews killing Christian children) served as a 
trigger for bloody violence in the streets. Forty two Jews were murdered and many 
more injured.
1287  
Not surprisingly, a decisive number of Polish Jews did not see any future for 
Jewish  life  in  Poland  and  decided  to  leave,  mostly  for  Palestine.
1288 This  illegal 
movement, organized by Zionist groups, became known under the term Brichah. The 
main  road  for  escapees  led  to  the  South  –  to  Mediterranean  and  Adriatic  ports. 
Czechoslovakia came to play a role as the main ‘land of transit’.
1289 The Jews were 
crossing the border in northern Bohemia (Náchod) and proceeding to Bratislava in 
Western Slovakia. They then continued via the Soviet occupied part of Austria and 
reached  the  US  zones.
1290 Hence  maintaining  the  goodwill  of  the  Czechoslovak 
government was critical for the Zionists. 
Yet the position of the Czechoslovak government was not as simple as might 
appear.  The  British  government,  because  of  its  restrictive  policy  towards  Jewish 
immigration to Palestine, criticised this movement of tens of thousands of Jews. The 
Foreign Office appealed to the Czechoslovak government in the summer of 1946 not 
to allow the stream of Polish Jewish refugees to cross its territory. As one British 
official noted, the Jews should not be allowed to continue to their ‘final (and illegal) 
destination’.
1291 The Czechoslovak authorities were asked to tighten border controls 
and forbid passage to escapees who lacked the appropriate documentation.
1292  
Nevertheless, for most of the time, the border was not completely sealed and 
escaping Jews were allowed to carry on to Palestine.
1293 There were several reasons 
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for the Czechoslovak reluctance to stop the flow of refugees. The first can be sought 
in humanitarian motives and compassion with suffering Jews. There were, however, 
other important reasons that deserve further evaluation. The whole movement from 
Poland, across Czechoslovakia and the Soviet occupation zone, could not have been 
done without at least the silent consent of the Soviet government.
1294 As was the case 
with  the  support  of  political  Zionism,  the  Communist  Prime  Minister  of 
Czechoslovakia,  Klement  Gottwald  overtly  supported  the  passage  of  the  Polish 
refugees.
1295  
Furthermore, on 16 August 1946, Minister Ripka informed the Council of 
Ministers about the British note asking Czechoslovakia to close the border to Jewish 
refugees. The Minister agreed that the government did not want to sever relations 
with the British administration. Yet there was another viewpoint that needed further 
consideration.  The  Czechoslovak  government  was  negotiating  a  loan  from  the 
American  government  and,  in  Ripka’s  words,  needed  ‘the  support  of  American 
Jews’.
1296 The Minister hence advised proceeding with extreme precaution.
1297 Ripka 
in fact revealed the same perception of the problem to the British, namely to C. A. 
Schuckburgh from the British legation in Prague.
1298 Consequently, the border was 
never entirely closed and a stream of refugees flowed continuously between Poland 
and US Zones in Germany and Austria via Czechoslovakia.
1299 
The Czechoslovaks’ utilization of the Brichah passage across its territory was 
also  mentioned  by  Masaryk  to  officials  in  the  Czechoslovak  Ministry  of  the 
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Interior.
1300 The Minister in connection with Brichah and the new, lenient attitude 
towards the Jews of non Slavonic nationality, mentioned that both these cases had a 
tremendous  importance  in  the  international  arena.  He  added  that  the  30  million 
Crowns spent by the Czechoslovak state on the maintenance of Jewish refugees from 
Poland  was  a  good  investment.  He  explained  that  due  to  these  pro Jewish 
interventions,  he  would  be  able  ‘to  mobilize’  American  Jews  for  the  support  of 
Czechoslovak  claims  during  peace  negotiations  with  Hungary.
1301  Indeed,  the 
Czechoslovak government asked the Joint to provide it with information about the 
publicity the Czechoslovak support of Brichah received abroad.
1302 The final report 
had to please the Czechoslovak authorities.
1303 The Czechoslovak government was 
keen to receive positive publicity in the USA.  
In public and to pro Jewish activists Czechoslovak support for Brichah was 
presented  as  a  natural  humanitarian  deed.
1304 A  closer  research  of  the  available 
documentation, however, reveals that the authorities were more afraid that some of 
the  refugees  might  settle  permanently  in  Czechoslovakia.  Their  worries  were 
strengthened by reports that some of the Jewish refugees managed to escape illegally 
from the refugee camps and got to Czech towns, including Prague.
1305 Czechoslovak 
ministers  especially  stressed  that  Jewish  escapees  needed  to  be  under  constant 
surveillance  and  had  not  to  be  allowed  to  mingle  with  the  Czechoslovak 
population.
1306 They were even labelled as ‘dangerous elements’. Fierlinger pointed 
out that it would be a real danger for the peaceful development of Czechoslovakia if 
‘some  of  the  people’  would  be  allowed  to  stay  in  the  Republic.
1307  These 
considerations  hence  also  contributed  to  the  final  decision  to  facilitate  a  smooth 
                                                 
1300 Ibid. 
1301 Ibid. 
1302 AJJDCA, 1945 1954, box 213, Israel G. Jacobson to Joint NY, 11 October 1946. ‘Getting from 
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1303 AJJDCA, 1945 1954, box 213, Israel G. Jacobson to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Interior, 16 
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Czechoslovak Government has received as a result of its humane treatment of Polish Jewish refugees. 
I  am  proud  of  the  fact  that  we  have  been  of  some  service  in  helping  to  develop  goodwill  for  a 
government which has done so much for human beings seeking refuge from terror.’ 
1304 ABS, 425 231 3, Minutes of the meeting between Frischer, Gottwald and the Chief Rabbi of 
Palestine, Herzog, 16 August 1946. 
1305 AJJDCA, 1945 1954, box 213, Maurice Eigen to Rabbi Joseph H. Lookstein, 8 October 1946. 
1306 Bulínová, Marie (ed.) – Dufek, Jiří – Kaplan, Karel – Šlosar, Vladimír, Československo a Izrael 
v letech 1945 1956. Dokumenty, doc. 5, minutes of the government meeting, 26 July 1946, p. 33. 
Drtina’s remark. 
1307 Ibid., pp. 33f. This remark was made by Fierlinger. 297 
transfer of Polish Jews to the US Zone. A controlled transfer, which also ensured that 
none  of  the  ‘dangerous  elements’  was  allowed  to  stay,  was  conducted  by  the 
Czechoslovak  authorities.
1308  Furthermore,  the  Czechoslovaks  stressed  that  the 
transit  should  not  have  any  influence  on  the  number  of  German  expellees  being 
received monthly by the Americans.
1309 Czechoslovak society was being nationally 
and culturally homogenized and escaping Jews could not have been allowed to spoil 
these efforts.  
Whatever the reasons for the Czechoslovak support of the Brichah movement 
were,  it  increased  their  importance  for  pro Jewish  groups  in  the  west.  The 
Czechoslovaks’  lenient  attitude  towards  the  Jews  escaping  Poland  without  any 
appropriate  documents  became  crucial  for  the  Brichah  movement.  As  Salomon 
Adler Rudel of the Jewish Agency suggested: ‘[i]t is very important for the future to 
maintain the goodwill of the Czech government, because it may be assumed that the 
flight  from  Poland  will  certainly  continue  for  the  next  few  months’.
  1310 Jacob 
Rosenheim  of  the  Agudas  Israel  World  Organization  asked  whether  the 
Czechoslovak authorities might be approached with a plan to establish a transit camp 
for the escaping Jews in Czechoslovakia: ‘there would be a chance […] to induce the 
Czechoslovakian  government  to  prove  again  its  really  democratic  and  humane 
sentiments in the spirit of the traditions of Masaryk’.
 1311 The political and practical 
support of the Zionist movement contributed to the western Jewish groups’ discretion 
in further attacking the Czechoslovak government.  
It is noteworthy that it was again the situation in neighbouring Poland that 
allowed the Czechoslovaks’ to counteract their fading ‘myth’ in the west and they 
made full use of this opportunity. With successful propaganda tools, they  spread 
information about their support of Brichah movement. For example, almost a year 
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Prime Minister, 2 February 1946; Ibid., Minutes of the meeting at the repatriation department of the 
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1310 CZA, S25/5272, Salomon Adler Rudel: ‘Notes on Visit to Czechoslovakia and Austria’, 24 July 
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1311  LOC,  Laurence  A.  Steinhardt  Papers,  box  83,  Jacob  Rosenheim,  Agudas  Israel  World 
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after the events, Slávik, the Czechoslovak Ambassador to the USA,
1312 addressed a 
meeting of the United Jewish Appeal in the following manner:  
 
Last year when tens of thousands of Jews came to seek sanctuary and 
temporary shelter we neither closed our borders nor our hearts to those 
unfortunates.  Our  government  and  people  wholeheartedly  cooperated 
with the great Jewish relief organizations and helped those unfortunate 
people  in  every  way  possible.  It  is  not  to  boast  [that  I  cite]  here  the 
modest sum of 80,000,000 crowns spent by our government in a brief 
period of less than 15 months for relief to trans migrants and refugees.
1313  
 
The Czechoslovak politicians wanted to strengthen their democratic image 
among  Jewish  organizations  in  the  United  States.  This  self congratulation  and 
discourse used by Slávik had an obvious political purpose.  
 
The Western Allies and the Czechoslovak treatment of the Jews after the war 
Conflicts between the Czechoslovak authorities and western journalists were 
caused by the former’s concerns that their negative image might influence diplomatic 
and economic negotiations conducted after the war. Czechoslovakia’s image of a 
democratic country in the heart of Europe suffered serious blows during the first 
post war  months.  The  situation  of  the  Jews  in  Czechoslovakia  could  not  be 
overlooked, notably because of the press coverage in the west and the interventions 
of pro Jewish activists. Therefore it is crucial to explore the American and British 
perception of Czechoslovakia’s treatment of Jews.  
At the beginning of the war, Czechoslovakia retained a positive image in the 
correspondence  of  American  diplomats.  In  early  1939,  the  post Munich, 
authoritarian  Beran  government  stepped  up  the  limitation  of  Jewish  presence  in 
society.
1314 Yet even then George F. Kennan of the US embassy in Prague informed 
the State Department: ‘The mass of the people appear simply to have very little 
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interest in anti Semitism.’
1315 If there was any possibility of anti Semitic policy, it 
was  assumed  it  would  be  done  under  German  pressure  or  as  a  result  of  the 
development in neighbouring countries.
1316  
The Czechoslovak political struggle during the war found support among the 
Americans.  The  Lidice  massacre  caused  a  profound  reaction  in  America.
1317 For 
example a village in the vicinity of Chicago was renamed ‘Lidice’.
1318 Furthermore, 
an internal document prepared in 1943 by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the 
American  Intelligence  agency,  revealed  that  the  Czechoslovaks  held  a  special 
position among the other exiles in the eyes of Americans. The OSS claimed that 
although Czechoslovakia had not suffered any significant destruction, its successful 
propaganda policy made it into a collective symbol for all the oppressed countries: 
‘It is simply to point out that the Czechoslovaks have known better than any of their 
co sufferers  how  to  state  their  cause  before  the  world.’
1319 Also  British  Foreign 
Secretary Eden confirmed that the Czechoslovak political cause had strong support 
in America.
1320 This Czechoslovak image in the United States was further enhanced 
by  President  Beneš’s  visit  to  America  in  the  spring  of  1943  when  he  was  even 
invited to address Congress.
1321  
Reports  in  American  files  suggested  that  the  Czechs  in  the  Protectorate 
behaved  sympathetically  towards  the  Jews  and  expressed  ‘coldness  to  the  anti 
                                                 
1315 NARA, RG 59, SD Files, 860F.4016/68, George F. Kennan to the State Department, 17 February 
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1316 Ibid. and Kennan, George, From Prague after Munich, pp. 42 57, doc. 7. About the German 
pressure on the implementation of anti Jewish programme in Slovakia see: NARA, RG 59, SD Files, 
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1319 NARA, RG 226, OSS Records, Roll 43, 490 496, Czechoslovakia, Special Records, 22 July 1943. 
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1320 CNA, AHR, 1 161 1, Minutes of the meeting between Eden and Beneš, 22 April 1943. 
1321 Dejmek, Jindřich, Edvard Beneš. Politická biografie českého demokrata. Část druhá. Prezident 
Republiky a vůdce národního odboje, pp. 387 394; Němeček, Jan – Nováčková, Helena – Šťovíček, 
Ivan (eds.), ‘Edvard Beneš v USA v roce 1943. Dokumenty’, in Sborník archivních prací 49, 1999, no. 
2, pp. 469 562; AJA, WJC – Papers, H98/3, Nahum Goldmann to Edward Benes, 10 May 1943. 
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Europe. However, Beneš did not do that.  300 
Semitic  philosophy’.
1322  A  memorandum  about  the  position  of  Jews  in 
Czechoslovakia concluded that the essential solution after the war was to return Jews 
to the position they had held prior to the conflict. The author of the report did not 
expect any considerable obstacles in the case of Bohemia and Moravia, though he 
argued that it ‘would require more serious economic and cultural  adjustments in 
Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia’.
1323 Interestingly, he stated that Czechoslovak 
Jews  did  not  constitute  a  minority,  but  rather  a  religious  group.
1324 In  fact  a 
significant part of the Jewish community in Czechoslovakia considered itself a part 
of  the  Jewish  national  minority.  This  misunderstanding  hence  contributed  to  an 
erroneous assessment of the feasibility of the restoration of Jews to their pre war 
position.  
Nonetheless,  rumours  about  the  changing  Czechoslovak  perception  of  the 
Jewish national minority did circulate in America. Daniel L. Moses from Baltimore 
contacted the State Department in March 1945. He expressed his profound shock on 
the information now coming from official Czechoslovak circles: 
 
Last week the most liberal and humane head of any Government in 
Europe, Edward Benes [sic!] of Czechoslovakia, notified the world that 
Czechoslovakia would have no room for the Jews after the war. If that 
is the attitude of the most humane ruler in Europe, what will become of 
what is left of these poor people?
1325 
 
While  the  wording  of  Moses’  record  of  Beneš’s  statement  might  seem 
distorted, it in fact fully summarized Czechoslovak intentions. They did not want to 
remove Jews from Czechoslovakia as such, but wanted them to assimilate fully into 
the main nations. The Jews who decided to stay in Czechoslovakia were supposed to 
cease being Jewish. However, the reply by James Clement Dunn, Assistant Secretary 
at the State Department, revealed deep trust in the Czechoslovak democracy: 
 
The statement attributed to President Bene[š] in the enclosure to your 
letter is an unfounded rumor which has been in circulation for over two 
years. A search of the press and our own sources of information fail to 
reveal any basis for this rumor. I am sure you will agree with me that 
such an attitude is also contrary to the well known political philosophy 
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1324 Ibid. 
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of President Bene[š] and the excellent record of his country in all racial 
questions.
1326 
 
It  is  revealing  for  the  American  administration’s  assessment  of  the 
Czechoslovak  attitude  towards  Jews  that  Czechoslovak  intentions  were  not  fully 
comprehended.  Furthermore,  the  Jewish  position  in  Czechoslovakia  was  not 
perceived with the highest urgency and hence not studied in its entirety.  
The Czechoslovak ‘myth’ in the United States was still alive. It was only 
partially shaken later when American soldiers occupied western parts of Bohemia 
and witnessed the settling of accounts between Czechs and Sudeten Germans.
1327 
The  Americans  received  comprehensive  coverage  about  the  situation  in  post war 
Czechoslovakia from its army and embassy. Also western journalists and pro Jewish 
activists travelled around Czechoslovakia and provided the Truman administration 
with first hand accounts.  
In its assessment of the situation in a country, a government in the first place 
relies  on  the  information  it  obtains  from  its  official  representation.  Ambassadors 
possess considerable influence on their respective governments. The American and 
British  governments  were  represented  in  Prague  by  Ambassadors  who  were 
sympathetic  to  the  Czechoslovak  cause  and  eagerly  promoted  the  image  of  a 
democratic country.
1328 In this respect, Laurence A. Steinhardt, the first American 
post war Ambassador to Prague, was an important actor in the American perception 
of the events that took place in the Third Czechoslovak Republic, 1945 1948.
1329  
Before  1945,  Steinhardt  had  already  gained  experience  representing  US 
interests in Sweden, the Soviet Union and Turkey. Although he maintained contacts 
with  the  Jewish  and  particularly  Zionist  circles  in  the  United  States,  he  always 
promoted the interests of the United States first.
1330 Steinhardt was well informed 
about the post war development of the ‘Jewish question’ in Czechoslovakia. He had 
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1327 Ullmann, Walter, the United States in Prague 1945 1948 (Boulder, CO: Columbia University 
Press, 1978), p. 60. 
1328 Nichols was once in the Foreign Office labelled as ‘a more than 100 percent Czechophile’. See 
Smetana, Vít, In the Shadow of Munich. British Policy towards Czechoslovakia from the Endorsement 
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1329 About  Steinhardt’s  background  see:  Rubin,  Barry,  ‘Ambassador  Laurence  A.  Steinhardt:  The 
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information about anti Jewish disturbances in Slovakia, about the threats that the 
immigrants from Subcarpathian Ruthenia faced in Czechoslovakia (deportation back 
to the Soviet Union) and about the persecution of the Jews who in 1930 did not 
declare Czechoslovak or Jewish nationality.
1331 Representatives of the WJC regularly 
pleaded  for  his  help  and  informed  him  about  their  intentions  to  attack  the 
Czechoslovak government in the US press. Steinhardt nevertheless played down the 
importance of the incidents and advised the WJC not to publish the information.
1332 
In one of his letters to Francis T. Williamson (State Department), he argued:  
 
I quite agree with you that the bad press the Czechs have been receiving 
in the United States – particularly on the subject of anti Semitism is most 
unfortunate and that something ought to be done about it, particularly as 
it  is  most  undeserved.  Just  because  the  Czech  Government  has  been 
busily  engaged  in  reconstructing  itself  and  rehabilitating  the  country 
without  waiting  for  help  from  the  outside  and  has  not  bothered  to 
advertise its efforts or to engage in propaganda is no good reason why it 
should be presented in a false light to the American public [underlined in 
original – J. L.].
1333 
 
Steinhardt’s  letter  thus  provides  clear  evidence  that  the  notion  of  the 
undesirability of attacking the Czechoslovaks in the press was widespread among 
State Department officials.  
There were two factors that shaped Steinhardt’s reaction to the development 
in  Czechoslovakia.  Inevitably,  he  always  showed  preference  to  the  US  interests. 
Consequently,  he  did  not  want  to  alienate  the  Czechoslovak  government.  The 
negative  response  of  the  US  military  authorities  in  Germany  to  the  implemented 
transfer  of  the  Sudeten  Germans  caused  trouble  in  Czechoslovak American 
relations.
1334  Furthermore,  anti Jewish  incidents  in  Slovakia  received  negative 
publicity in the American press and the reaction of the Czechoslovak authorities was 
                                                 
1331 See NARA, RG 59, SD Files, 860F.4016/10 1945, Steinhardt to the Secretary of State, 19 October 
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fierce. US diplomats in Prague understood the importance of good relations with the 
Czechoslovak  authorities.
1335  Steinhardt  therefore  put  off  American  Jews  from 
publishing information about the situation of Jews in Czechoslovakia, believing it 
might cause more harm than good.  
 
Image no. 14: Laurence Steinhardt (R) in September 1948 with Zdeněk Fierlinger (L) and 
Antonín Zápotocký (C) (Copyright LIFE).
1336 
 
Moreover,  Steinhardt  generally  sided  with  the  Czechoslovak  cause.  His 
sympathies found expression in remarks concerning Hungary and its attacks on the 
Czechoslovak government after 1945. He wrote to the State Department:  
 
It strikes me as rather odd that an enemy country defeated only a few 
weeks ago should be allowed to carry on such a campaign against one of 
the United Nations, and yet the Czech Government busy with its internal 
affairs has done nothing to counteract this campaign. [...] I am strongly 
sympathetic to the desire of the Czechs and Slovaks to rid themselves of 
the Germans and Hungarians. One could not have much respect for a 
sovereign country which was torn to pieces by the Germans, Poles and 
Hungarians, suffered dismemberment and untold sufferings for six years 
if it does not care to see the process repeated 20, 30, or even 50 years 
from now. [...] Anything the Department can do to set the Hungarian 
Government right as to who won the war would undoubtedly be helpful 
and might save us a great many headaches later on.
1337 
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Steinhardt’s pro Czech sympathies and his intention to secure US interests in 
Czechoslovakia were the main reasons for his  whitewashing of Czechoslovakia’s 
treatment of the Jews. Steinhardt was aware of the problems facing the Czechoslovak 
Jews. He nevertheless preferred not to spread the information and rather tried to 
secure some help via secret channels.  He mentioned his diplomatic interventions 
with the Czechoslovak authorities in his letters to Goldmann of the WJC. He tried, 
for example, to prolong the decision on deporting Ruthenian Jews back to the Soviet 
Union and wanted to allow them to cross illegally to the US Zone in Germany.
 1338 
Yet Steinhardt never blamed post war developments on the Czechoslovak authorities. 
The main culprits, he maintained, were the remnants of the Slovak People’s Party, 
the transitional period of unlawfulness, regional Communist functionaries or growing 
pressure of the Soviet Union.
1339  
It  was  not  only  Steinhardt  who  did  not  want  to  interfere  with  internal 
Czechoslovak affairs. Rudolph Rusek, an American subject, appealed to the State 
Department  in  September  1947  on  behalf  of  his  brother  Otto.  The  latter  was 
threatened with deportation from Czechoslovakia because, although of Jewish origin, 
he  had  declared  German  nationality  in  1930.  Rusek  closed  his  plea  to  the  State 
Department by asking whether the Czechoslovak government was entitled to deport 
Jews  ‘because  they  were  born  in  Sudetenland’.
1340 Williamson  responded,  using 
diplomatic language: 
 
I  regret  to  inform  you  that  this  Government  is  not  in  a  position  to 
interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of  a  sovereign  state  such  as 
Czechoslovakia unless the rights of American citizens are involved. […] 
With reference to the last paragraph of your letter, as you are no doubt 
aware,  the  transfer  of  certain  German  and  Hungarian  populations  in 
Czechoslovakia  was  approved  by  the  Allied  nations  at  Potsdam  on 
condition that transfers be conducted in a humane and orderly manner. 
The  Czechoslovak  authorities  were  responsible  for  determining  which 
persons  would  be  expelled.  While  most  of  these  were  located  in  the 
Sudeten  area,  it  is  understood  that  neither  the  address,  birthplace  nor 
religion of an individual was a basic factor in the selection.
1341   
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The central American agencies apparently did not intend to question whether 
there  were  any  Jews  among  the  expelled  Germans.  It  does  not  mean  that  the 
Americans  were  not  aware  of  the  changing  situation  in  Czechoslovakia.  Charles 
Woodruff  Yost  of  the  US  Embassy  in  Prague  summarized  the  situation  in 
Czechoslovakia with the utmost precision:  
 
[T]hus a situation is created in which, while the Czechoslovak people as 
a whole are not anti Semitic and do sympathise with the sufferings of the 
Jewish  people  during  the  war,  conflicts  over  property  in  which  both 
private  interests  and  political  strategy  are  involved  are  nevertheless 
gradually contributing to a reascendance of anti Semitic feelings.
1342  
 
The Czechoslovaks’ concerns about the influence of the pro Jewish lobby in 
the  United  States  were  not  based  on  an  accurate  assessment  of  the  situation  in 
America. Furthermore, the very low number of Jewish survivors in Czechoslovakia 
failed to catch the attention of the American administration which was busy solving 
problems of much broader scope, such as of DPs and of Palestine. Also Steinhardt’s 
role needs to be highlighted. After all, Czechoslovakia managed to retain its positive 
image. What finally shook US relations with Czechoslovakia was not the position of 
Jews, but the growing strength of the Communist party, the influence of the Soviet 
Union  and  the  unsolved  compensation  to  Americans  for  economic  losses  in 
Czechoslovakia. That was also the reason why the financial loan to Czechoslovakia, 
originally supposed to be supported by American Jews, was not granted.
1343 
In  comparison  with  the  Americans,  the  British  government  was  more 
involved in the discussion about the Jewish position in liberated Czechoslovakia. 
After the war, the British were cautiously following the situation in Palestine. The 
rise of anti Semitism in East Central Europe added another dimension to the issue of 
the Jewish DPs waiting in German camps and longing for emigration to Palestine.
1344  
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Furthermore, in comparison with the Americans, the British had reserved opinion 
about the Czechoslovak treatment of minorities overall.
1345  
The British government’s interest in the Jewish position in Czechoslovakia was 
interconnected with their plans concerning Palestine. Already during the war they 
reluctantly  followed  the  pro Zionist  proclamations  of  the  Czechoslovak  exiled 
politicians. In 1942, Frank Roberts of the Foreign Office commented on the contact 
between Beneš and Weizmann: 
 
I am sorry to see that Dr. Beneš and Dr. Weizmann have been getting 
together as I fear that no good to H.M.G. can result from such contacts. It 
must surely be our policy to convince Central European Governments 
that they must cope with their own Jewish problem at home and not look 
to  H.M.G.  to  provide  convenient  national  homes  abroad  either  in 
Palestine or elsewhere.
1346 
 
  As  suggested  by  Roberts,  the  Czechoslovaks,  together  with  other 
governments,  supported  the  Jewish  immigration  to  Palestine  not  for  altruistic 
motives, but to solve their own internal problems. The British had no illusions about 
the motivations behind Beneš’s support of Zionism. 
Jewish issues featured among despatches sent from Prague after the war by 
the  British  Ambassador  Nichols.
1347 He  forwarded  information  about  anti Jewish 
incidents occurring in Slovakia and mentioned anti Semitic proclamations of low 
ranking  regional  officials.
1348 A  month before  the pogrom  in  Topoľčany, Nichols 
summarized the situation: ‘There seems no doubt that anti Semitism is on the rise in 
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Roberts, 4 January 1942. Roberts continued: ‘I think, therefore, that when the time comes to discuss 
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Slovakia and unconfirmed reports refer to excesses already having taken place. At 
the  same  time  Jews  themselves  express  fear  of  pogroms’.
1349  Even  so,  the 
Ambassador  emphasized  his  confidence  in  the  Czechoslovak  government.
1350 
Likewise,  when  describing  the  Topoľčany  events,  Nichols  stuck  to  the  official 
declaration of the Czechoslovak government and did not condemn the inaction of the 
authorities.
1351 
Minutes  made  by  Foreign  Office  officials  on  Nichols’  despatches 
documented that his reports about anti Semitic incidents in Slovakia did not cause 
any  reaction  in  the  Foreign  Office.  The  British  were  more  concerned  with  the 
prepared influx of the Sudeten Germans, who were partly destined for the British 
occupation zone in Germany. The British were aware that their ambiguous attitude 
towards the expulsion complicated relations with the Czechoslovak government.
1352 
The  Czechoslovaks  could  not  comprehend  why  the  western  Allies  did  not 
enthusiastically support their intention to get rid of the German minority once and for 
all. As Ralph Parker wrote to The Times office in London: ‘I am convinced that one 
of the most important tasks of our diplomacy in Central Europe is to prevent such 
impression  of  Britain  being  seemingly  unsympathetic  to  national  aspirations’.
1353 
Consequently, Jewish issues were considered marginal in comparison with millions 
of Sudeten Germans to be expelled in the following months. 
Yet the British authorities did respond to the Czechoslovak policy towards 
the  Jews  when  it  threatened  British  interests.  The  British  attitude  can  best  be 
documented through issues connected with the Czechoslovak citizenship of the Jews 
who in 1930 declared German and Hungarian nationality. The Foreign Office was 
informed  about  the  Constitutional  Decree,  depriving  the  German  and  Hungarian 
citizens  of  their  Czechoslovak  citizenship.  This  law  did  not  cause  any  response 
among  British  diplomats.  The  British  considered  it  solely  as  an  internal 
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Czechoslovak affair.
1354 We are not informed about how far the British realised that 
by this decree also some of the Jews in Czechoslovakia could be deprived of their 
citizenship. They simply did not investigate the matter.  
The rules of the game changed only several months later, when the British 
received  reports  that  German speaking  Jews  might be  expelled  to  Germany.  The 
Foreign Office immediately contacted Nichols:  
 
We  should  like  to  emphasise  that  Jews  who  have  a  good  claim  to 
Czechoslovak  nationality  are,  in  our  view,  simply  Czechoslovaks  of 
Jewish race. We are determined to stop the general exodus of Jews from 
Poland which we regard as an entirely unscrupulous ramp.
1355  
 
The Foreign Office  considered the looming expulsion of these Jews from 
Czechoslovakia as a part of Brichah, the flight of Jews from Poland. As in the case 
with Roberts during the war, the British perceived the situation through the lens of 
Palestine. The countries of East Central Europe were allegedly solving their internal 
issues at the expense of the British Empire.  
The divergence of American and British attitudes towards Jewish survivors 
in Europe can be documented also in the case of Czechoslovakia. At the beginning 
of  1946,  both  western  powers  were  informed  about  the  planned  repatriation  of 
Ruthenian  Jews,  who  stayed  in  Czechoslovakia,  to  the  Soviet  Union.  The  most 
eastern  part  of  the  Republic  became  a  part  of  the  USSR  after  the  war.  All  the 
civilians who in 1930 declared Czechoslovak nationality were allowed to opt for 
Czechoslovak  citizenship.  However,  most  of  the  Jews  had  adhered  to  Jewish 
nationality and were thus threatened with forced repatriation.
1356 The Czechoslovak 
authorities  did  not  want  to  antagonize  the  Soviet  authorities  and  there  was  also 
reluctance to let these ‘foreign elements’ stay in Czechoslovakia.
1357 Therefore the 
Czechoslovaks were liable to agree with Soviet claims.  
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Neither of the western powers officially interfered in negotiations that were 
entirely an internal affair of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Yet Steinhardt 
tried, with the silent consent of the Czechoslovak authorities, to help to get these 
Jews  to  the  US  zone  in  Germany.
1358 The  British  response  was  fundamentally 
different.  Easterman  of  the  WJC  approached  the  Foreign  Office  to  ask  the 
Czechoslovaks to grant citizenship to the threatened Jews.
1359 The Foreign Office 
responded that although they did not agree with any repatriation against the will of 
the  individual  concerned,  they  ‘would  have  no  locus  standi  for  intervening 
[underlined in the original – J. L.]’.
1360  
This was not the end of the whole story. The British were informed in July 
1946 that the Jewish Agency office in Prague planned to issue the Ruthenian Jews 
with  ‘provisional  certificates’  for  Palestine.  Based  on  these  documents,  the  Jews 
could  be  allowed  to  go  to  work  in  France  and  thus  would  avoid  forced 
repatriation.
1361 The Foreign Office was aware that they could not interfere with the 
French decision to allow these Jews to enter its territory. Nevertheless, the British 
started  an  information  campaign  to  explain  that  ‘provisional  certificates’  did  not 
entitle their owners to enter Palestine and did not give any assurance that a proper 
certificate  might be  issued  in  the  future.
1362 The  Mandate  authorities  furthermore 
spread the rumours that the true intention of the Ruthenian Jews was not to work in 
France,  but  to  reach  Palestine  as  illegal  immigrants.
1363  The  Foreign  Office 
instructed the British Ambassador to Paris, A. Duff Cooper, to ask the French to 
prevent the departure of these Jews to Palestine.
1364  
Thus the British became interested in the Czechoslovak attitude towards the 
Jews only when the Czechoslovak policy threatened to contradict British plans for 
Palestine. British interventions with the Czechoslovak government during the flight 
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of  Polish Jews  across  the  Czechoslovak  territory  support  this  hypothesis.
1365 The 
British considered the whole Brichah movement as an illegal enterprise organized by 
Zionist agents to undermine the British position in the Middle East. Although the 
British Ambassador to Poland, Victor Cavendish Bentinck, agreed that the position 
of Jews in Poland had become unbearable, the Foreign Office apparently did not 
share his view.
1366  
 
Conclusion 
Several  key  issues  in  post war  Czechoslovakia  triggered  repeated 
interventions by Jewish groups, especially the WJC.
1367 The first of these issues was 
the citizenship of Jews in post war Czechoslovakia. In the second place the WJC 
raised  the  issue  of  the  minority  status  of  Czechoslovak  Jews.  Thirdly,  the  third 
Czechoslovak republic was occupied throughout its duration with the problem of 
negotiating Jewish restitution, including heirless property.
1368 Fourthly, in 1946, pro 
Jewish activists were  alarmed by the danger that several thousands of  Ruthenian 
Jews might be deported to the Soviet Union. And, fifthly, there was the issue of anti 
Semitic  tendencies  in  Slovakia  which  continuously  called  for  the  attention  of 
activists in the west.  
In  their  interventions,  the  pro Jewish  activists  received  important  support 
from  the  American  press.  In  contrast,  the  Jewish  community  in  Czechoslovakia, 
particularly in Bohemia and Moravia, was reluctant to back public campaigns against 
the  Czechoslovak  government.
1369 Also  Slovak  Jewry,  though  more  willing  to 
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threaten  the  government  with  public  campaigning,  approached  the  theme 
carefully.
1370 
Pro Jewish  activists  never  received  any  significant  support  from  the 
American and British governments. Whereas the British generally opposed any pro 
Zionist campaigns, Steinhardt preferred diplomatic interventions. Curiously, many of 
his actions, for example on behalf of the Ruthenian Jews, went against the interests 
of his British allies. To complete the picture, the Soviets were never really visible 
during the time under consideration. Yet their impact on Czechoslovak policy was 
undeniable. The passage of Brichah and the Czechoslovak support for the partition 
plans could not have been done without the consent of the Soviet Union.  
Although the Americans and British did not support Jewish interventions, the 
Czechoslovak  authorities  apparently  believed  in  the  existence  of  an  influential 
Jewish lobby in the United States. Therefore they felt the need to maintain the image 
of a democratic country with a tolerant attitude towards the Jews. In response to 
negative publicity abroad, the Czechoslovak government was willing to amend post 
war  laws.  Around  2,000  German speaking  Jews  were  allowed  to  stay  in 
Czechoslovakia and Ruthenian Jews were not, in the end, repatriated back to the 
Soviet Union.
1371 The Czechoslovaks, although excessively sensitive to any criticism 
abroad, were aware of the controversies arising from developments in the post war 
Republic. Yet in cases when the interests of people in the homeland outweighed the 
need for a positive image abroad, even foreign interventions could not help. This was 
the case with either the minority status of the Jews or the restitution of (heirless) 
Jewish property. 
However, just as the Czechoslovaks believed in the need for a positive Jewish 
influence in the United States, so the Zionists also needed Czechoslovak support. 
Pro Jewish  activists  repeatedly  expressed  disappointment  and  concerns  about 
developments in post war Czechoslovakia. Yet at the same time they acknowledged 
the need for the goodwill of the Czechoslovak government. Continuous and eloquent 
Czechoslovak  support  for  Zionism  seemed  crucial.  In  the  UN,  Czechoslovakia 
overtly backed the creation of the State of Israel. Moreover, the government agreed 
an arms deal (for cash dollars of course) with the Yishuv that helped to win the 
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Israeli war of independence. Furthermore, the regional factor came into play again. 
The logistic and material help to Jews fleeing Poland promoted the democratic image 
of Czechoslovakia and Czechoslovak politicians were able to utilise the prevalence 
of the climate of ‘fear’ in Poland as a way of stressing their own humanitarian spirit. 
The support of Brichah and Zionism replaced the otherwise negative tendencies of 
post war Czechoslovakia in Jewish public memory.  
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CONCLUSION – BEYOND CONDEMNATION AND IDEALIZATION 
 
Antony Polonsky asks us to go beyond ‘condemnation, apologetics and apologies’ 
when studying Polish Jewish relations in the first half of the twentieth century.
1372 
He  rejects  any  simplifications  in  presenting  historical  research  and  stresses  the 
complexities of Polish Jewish relations on the eve of the Holocaust. There have been 
several  intensive  debates  about  modern  Polish Jewish  history.  One  can  mention 
recent  discussions  on  books  by  Jan  T.  Gross.  Studies  of  the  Polish  exile 
government’s response to the Jewish plight during the war have also triggered  a 
strong  exchange  of  opinions between  David  Engel  and  Dariusz  Stola.
1373 Similar 
debates have further stimulated historical research and modern Polish Jewish history 
belongs to the best documented areas of Jewish studies as such. This is particularly 
clear  in  comparison  with  modern  Czechoslovak Jewish  history,  and  especially 
Czechoslovak historiography. We can indeed argue that besides radical pro Zionist 
historiography that condemns the situation in Europe as such, Czechoslovakia is still 
presented as an ideal country that respected the Jews in the inter war period and 
responded positively to the Holocaust. When the Czechoslovak post war record is 
questioned, the situation is explained in terms of the general moral decadence of the 
Second World War and as a bitter legacy of Nazi rule in Czechoslovakia. My thesis 
could thus be summarized, with a slight amendment of Polonsky’s thesis, as going 
beyond condemnation, but at the same time beyond idealization. 
In summary, there are eleven points to emphasise.  
First, we can document that the behaviour of various governments in exile 
during the Second World War was shaped by almost identical factors. As in the case 
with the Polish government in exile, also the Czechoslovaks’ treatment of Jewish 
issues was shaped by their desire to maintain the image of a democratic country. Yet 
the  Czechoslovak  government  at  the  same  time  tried  to  keep  pace  with  strong 
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national radicalization of the resistance movement abroad, as well as in the occupied 
homeland.  
Second,  we  can  argue  that  the  national  radicalization  was  more  strongly 
articulated in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, the territory subjected to the 
German occupation regime. The Czechs responded to Munich with renewed interests 
in  Czech  history,  Czech  language  and  Czech  culture.  Furthermore,  they  were 
persuaded that the occupation of the country was caused by the betrayal committed 
by  minorities.  In  the  Czechs’  perception,  the  Sudeten  Germans  had  been  treated 
decently, but they, as the fifth column, helped the German Reich with its attack on 
the  integrity  of  Czechoslovakia.  In  the  case  of  Slovaks,  the  end  of  the  first 
Czechoslovak Republic brought them the first modern experience of independence; 
an  independence  that  was  granted  at  the  expense  of  the  previous  Republic.  The 
modern Slovak nation was born under the Hungarian rule in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. As Germans were the main enemies of Czechs, Hungarians were 
for  Slovaks.  Consequently,  the  resistance  movement  demanded  that  post war 
Czechoslovakia would be constituted as a nationally homogeneous Slavonic country. 
Third,  in  order  to  be  recognized  as  the  official  representation  of  the 
Czechoslovak resistance movement abroad, the Beneš government had to respect the 
sentiments  of  people  living  in  occupied  Bohemia  and  Moravia,  as  well  as  in 
independent Slovakia. Reports about these sentiments and this political programme 
were  forwarded  to  London  by  underground  groups,  the  self proclaimed 
representatives of the oppressed people. The people who were able to communicate 
the political stance of the population were only a small minority in comparison with 
the population as such. Resurgent nationalism in the occupied homeland influenced 
the perception  of  the  Jewish  minority by  the  general population.  The  Jews  were 
constructed  as  a  distinct  minority  that  had  never  felt  Czech  and  in  fact  had 
contributed  to  the  Germanization  or  Magyarization  of  the  Czech  and  Slovak 
territories in the past. The Nazi persecution of the Jews was not rejoiced by the non 
Jewish population, but the political, social and economic position of the Jews after 
the war was to be ‘adjusted’. This image was presented to the exiles in reports that 
reached London. 
Fourth, the exiles’ rejection of the German and Hungarian minorities opened 
the issue of the perception of the Jews. All the minorities were perceived negatively, 
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Czechoslovakia.  Also  the  Jews  were  generally  constructed  as  an  entity  that  was 
mostly foreign to the interests of the Czech and Slovak nations. During the war the 
Czechoslovak government in exile repeatedly stressed that ‘the Jewish question’ in 
Europe needed to be solved and therefore would cease to exist. The main problem 
was the existence of anti Semitic ideologies that, according to the exiles, poisoned 
the minds of people in Europe. Yet as argued by the exiles, the problem had to be 
solved by the Jews themselves, not by the majority population. The international 
community would contribute to the solution of ‘the Jewish question’ by the creation 
of a Jewish state. The Jews who still wanted to declare their national status, those 
who claimed to belong to the Jewish nation, would be asked to move to Palestine. 
The  Jews  who  wished  to  stay  in  European  countries  had  to  undergo  a  complete 
integration, even assimilation, into major nations. The Jewish national minority in 
Europe would no longer be present.  
  Fifth, Czechoslovak Jewish relations in exile were shaped by mutual mistrust. 
The  Czechoslovak  exiles,  under  the  influence  of  the  home  underground  groups, 
demanded the unconditional loyalty of all subjects who intended to claim residence 
in  the  post war  Republic.  The  Zionists/national  Jewish  groups  became  the  most 
eloquent defenders of Jewish minority rights among the Czechoslovaks in London. 
Yet their political demands were perceived as a fragmentation of the exile movement 
and  raised  the  possibility  of  ‘dual  loyalty’.  Furthermore,  pro Jewish  groups 
frequently  threatened  to  accuse  exiled  governments  of  anti Semitism;  this  was 
essentially in connection with the situation in exiles’ armies. The cornerstone of the 
Czechoslovak resistance was the notion of their adherence to democratic principles: 
self congratulation with regard to the image of a democratic country in the heart of 
Europe. Particularistic demands presented by national Jews and the constant threat of 
anti Semitic  accusations  served  as  proof  to  the  exiles  that  the  Jews  were  not  a 
reliable minority.  
  Sixth,  the  complexity  of  the  Czechoslovak  perception  of  the  Jews  was 
highlighted by their belief in the existence of the pro Jewish lobby in the United 
States.  The  Czechoslovaks  had  acknowledged  the  role  of  American  Jewish 
politicians in President Wilson’s decision to support the creation of the Czechoslovak 
republic. The Beneš government repeatedly expressed concerns about the power of 
pro Zionist press in the United States. Hence the response of this ‘mighty’ Jewish 
press to the non appointment of a Zionist/Jew to the first exiled parliament in 1940 317 
eventually persuaded Beneš to nominate Frischer as an MP a year later. Nevertheless, 
this temporary concession to the national Jews reinforced Beneš’s decision that Jews, 
as a distinct minority, should not be present in the renewed Republic.  
  Seventh, in comparison with the Czechoslovak resistance overall, Beneš was 
a moderate politician who acknowledged the need for balanced relations with the 
western powers.  He  was  a politician  who  was aware  that  Czechoslovakia  had  to 
maintain the image of a democratic country. Yet even Beneš regarded Jews as a not 
entirely reliable minority that had mighty supporters abroad; a minority that had the 
potential to complicate the situation in the renewed Republic. Thus the overt support 
of the Zionist movement was offering another option to the national Jews. Whilst the 
Sudeten Germans were to be expelled from Czechoslovakia, the national Jews could 
decide where their loyalties were to be placed. In Beneš’s opinion, a nation, in order 
to prove its existence, had to conquer. National Jews, if they wanted to constitute a 
nation, should prove it in Palestine.  
  Eighth, there were not many democratic politicians who in the early 1940s 
overtly declared support for the Zionist movement. Pro Jewish activists in the west 
acknowledged the need for good relations with the Beneš government. During and 
after the war, the Czechoslovak support of political and practical Zionism was an 
important contribution to the struggle for an independent Jewish state in Palestine. 
Especially  Beneš’s  contacts  with  the  Soviet  authorities  documented  the 
Czechoslovak intention to support the Zionist political programme. The information 
brought by Beneš from Moscow in 1943 further assured the Zionist leadership that 
good relations with the Czechoslovak President were in the interest of the Zionist 
project.  
  Ninth,  the  Czechoslovak  exile  government’s  response  to  the  Holocaust 
proved  that  all  interventions  and  diplomatic  activities  were  subordinated  to  the 
interests of the Czechoslovak nation. We can document several humanitarian acts of 
the  Beneš  government  that  were  to  alleviate  the  plight  of  the  victims  of  Nazi 
oppression, including the Jews. The singularity of the fate of the Jews was repeatedly 
recognized by the Czechoslovak government. The humanitarian compassion with the 
suffering minority was frequently articulated and had its imprint in specific rescue or 
relief actions conducted by the government. Yet all these actions had to conform to 
the  Czechoslovak  interests,  first  of  all  in  the  diplomatic  sphere.  In  their  official 
communications about the Jewish situation in occupied Europe, ordinary Czechs and 318 
Slovaks were always dissociated from the Jewish persecution. These government’s 
efforts led to the whitewashing of the Slovak complicity in the Nazi ‘Final Solution’. 
Furthermore,  any  diplomatic  interventions  threatening  to  cause  even  indirect 
recognition of the political status quo in Slovakia, that is the existence of the puppet 
Tiso  government,  were  rejected.  The  main  interest  was  the  reestablishment  of  a 
united country of Czechs and Slovaks. Hence all political interventions on behalf of 
the Jews had to respect this programme. In the government’s perception of the war, 
the  main  attack  was  led  by  the  Nazis  against  the  existence  of  the  Czechoslovak 
republic, not against any of its particular national, religious or cultural groups.  
  Tenth,  the  Jews  in  liberated  Czechoslovakia  were  not  granted  any  group 
minority  rights.  Although  national Jewish  activities  were  not  suppressed, 
assimilation was favoured by the Czechoslovak authorities. All the main branches of 
the  Czechoslovak  resistance  agreed  on  this  programme.  However,  the  laws  that 
enabled the Czechoslovak authorities to expel the German minority impacted on the 
Jews as well. The laws prepared by the exiles could easily be misused by people 
whose sole interest was often to secure Jewish property aryanized during the war. 
Additionally, in the case of Slovakia, Jewish themes entered mainstream politics. 
Both  the  Communists  and  the  Democratic  Party  utilised  anti Jewish  sentiments 
among the Slovak population in their political struggle. The Communist party also 
adhered to anti Semitic discourse in Bohemia and Moravia.   
  Eleventh and lastly, the Czechoslovak attitude towards the Jews was shaped 
by several complex factors. Yet the same can be concluded about the attitude of 
national Jews towards Czechoslovakia. For example, the WJC was informed about 
what  they  perceived  as  a  change  in  the  Czechoslovak  attitude  towards  the  Jews 
relatively  early.  These  concerns  were  further  multiplied  by  the  existence  of  the 
notion or ‘myth’ of a democratic Czechoslovakia. The WJC was anxious that if the 
information about the plans became public, other – ‘undemocratic’ – countries in the 
region,  particularly  Poland  and  Rumania,  could  adhere  to  identical  plans  with 
reference to democratic Czechoslovakia; the model country of East Central Europe 
was setting an example that was easy to abuse.    
However,  the  development  in  the  broader  region,  particularly  in  Poland, 
unintentionally supported the Czechoslovak ‘myth’. During the war, Polish Jewish 
relations in London were gradually deteriorating. Furthermore, the events in liberated 
Poland and the Czechoslovak involvement in the evacuation of the escaping Polish 319 
Jewish refugees further contributed to the Czechoslovaks’ efforts to maintain their 
democratic image. Yet even in Prague, the Communist coup and the deterioration of 
the Soviet Israeli relations were soon to change the situation.  
The  official  Czechoslovak  policy  towards  the  Jews  underwent  significant 
change between 1918 and 1948. In 1918, Masaryk’s Czechoslovakia accepted Jews 
of all ideological and national backgrounds. During the 1920s and 1930s, Jews in 
Czechoslovakia  enjoyed  considerable  freedom  and  an  independent  cultural  and 
national  development.  Many  Jews  abandoned  their  German  or  Hungarian 
background and identified themselves with Czechs or Slovaks. Simultaneously, the 
number of Jews adhering to the Jewish national movement was constantly rising. 
However,  the  Second  World  War  and  resurgent  Czecho/Slovak  nationalism/s 
impacted on the Jewish position in Czechoslovakia. Only full integration into the 
main  nations  was  offered  to  the  Jews  who  wanted  to  stay  in  the  Republic. 
Contemporary  historiography  acknowledges  the  peculiar  situation  of  Jewish 
survivors in post war Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, this thesis argues that the post 
war developments had their origins during the war and cannot be attributed purely to 
a  malignant  influence  of Nazi  anti Semitism.  Yet  Czechoslovakia  still  desired  to 
maintain the image of a democratic country and its overt support of Zionism served 
this purpose. An adherence to liberal democracy was a key political asset used by 
Czechoslovakia since her creation in 1918. Fair treatment of minorities, in particular 
the Jews, became part of this ‘myth’. However, the Second World War brought to the 
fore Czechoslovak efforts to nationally homogenize the post war Republic and rid it 
of its ‘disloyal’ minorities. The change in the Czechoslovak policy towards the Jews 
in  the  1940s  raises  the  question  as  to  what  extent  this  reflected  a  change  in 
mentalities. How did Czechoslovaks perceive the Jews, as a minority, prior to the 
conflict? Did the positive treatment of the Jews mean that they, as a minority, were 
perceived favourably? This issue deserves further evaluation by future researchers.  
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